



Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)

Palestinian Terrorism in 2005

Qassam rocket fire



In 2005, firing Qassam rockets remained a preferred method of operation of the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. However, the number of such incidents decreased in comparison with 2004, and they resulted in relatively few fatalities.

Suicide bombing terrorism



The scene of the suicide bombing attack in Netanya (July). In 2005, the number of suicide bombing attacks, led by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, decreased. However, they remained the main cause for Israeli fatalities.

Abduction and murder



The abduction and murder of Sasson Nuriel, perpetrated by Hamas, was the only abduction incident in 2005. Hamas embraced a restrained policy of terrorist attacks in the wake of the lull agreement, and took advantage of the time period to build up its operative capabilities.

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1. Overview

a. Primary characteristics of Palestinian terrorism in 2005

■ Since late September 2000, the Palestinian terrorist organizations have been waging a **relentless campaign of terrorism against Israel**, one of unprecedented magnitude and intensity. In the course of the campaign, now entering its sixth year, there have been **upsurges and declines in the scope of terrorism, as well as occasional changes in the tactics** used by the terrorist organizations.

■ **The year of 2005 was characterized by a drop in the scope, “quality”, and deadly effect of terrorism, continuing the constant decrease** since 2001-2002, the **peak years** of the current violent confrontation. **The three main parameters that demonstrated the decrease were:**

✦ **The continuing drop in the magnitude of terrorism:** in 2005, there was a **drop of nearly 40 percent in the number of terrorist attacks** in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank compared to 2004 (2,365 terrorist attacks in 2005 compared to 3,871 in 2004), **continuing the constant decrease** in the number of terrorist attacks, begun in 2001.

✦ **The continuing decrease in the number of suicide bombing attacks:** **seven suicide bombing attacks were perpetrated in 2005, of which 5 by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad**, and 15 more suicide bombing attacks were thwarted by the Israeli security forces. This is a **sharp decrease** compared to 2004, in which 15 suicide bombing attacks were perpetrated and 119 thwarted, **continuing the constant decrease** in the number of suicide bombing attacks since the peak in 2002 (60 suicide bombing attacks).



The suicide bombing attack at the Hasharon mall in Netanya, December 5, 2005 (Photo: Al-Jazeera Television)

➤ **The continuing decrease in the deadly effect of terrorism:** In 2005, **54 Israelis were killed**, most of them civilians (44), compared to 118 killed in 2004 (a **drop of about 46 percent**), continuing the constant decrease in the number of killed and injured in the confrontation since the peak reached in 2002 (453 killed). **Suicide bombing terrorism stood out** this year as well, despite the significant decrease in the number of suicide bombing attacks, as the prime cause for Israeli casualties.¹ Another prime cause for casualties was the **shooting attacks on West Bank roads**. The deadly effect of **rocket and mortar fire from the Gaza Strip**, despite its high frequency, was low.

▣ **The counter-activities conducted by the Israeli security forces**, which included thousands of **arrests and targeted killings** of senior terrorist operatives, alongside the existence of the **security fence** (even though incomplete), contributed to the drop in the magnitude, “quality”, and deadly effect of terrorism. In addition, the drop was also influenced by **developments on the internal Palestinian scene and in the Israeli policy**. On the internal Palestinian scene, the **lull agreement was achieved** against the backdrop of the end of Arafat’s era and the rise of his successor, Abu Mazen. Following the lull agreement, **Hamas**, the leading terrorist organization up until 2005, embraced a

¹ Despite the small share of suicide bombings in the total number of terrorist attacks, in the years of the confrontation (and in 2005 as well) they were the cause for about half of the Israeli fatalities.

restrained policy of terrorist attacks. The Israeli policy in 2005 was closely linked to the **disengagement from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria,** and also had a restraining influence on the force of the conflict (see below for details).

▣ The Hamas movement and the other terrorist organizations **took advantage of the lull in the fighting to enhance their operative capabilities as part of their preparations for “the day after”.** This was reflected in **smuggling** large quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosives to the Gaza Strip (**possibly including several anti-aircraft rockets**), using the window of opportunity opened in the wake of the disengagement; continuing attempts to **relocate their rocket manufacturing capabilities to the West Bank, primarily Samaria** (several uncovered cells were well into production of rockets, but most such attempts had yet to come to fruition or were thwarted in advance); **attempts to smuggle terrorists, technological know-how, and arms from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank** along a route passing through Sinai and the Negev; **transfer of funds from abroad** to terrorist organizations and operatives in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank through various channels.



A rocket being prepared for launch on Zikim on December 22 (Photo: Al-Jazeera Television)

b. Primary factors influencing the scope and nature of Palestinian terrorism in 2005

The counter-activities conducted by the Israeli security forces²

▣ In the course of 2005, the Israeli security forces conducted **intensive counter-activities** against the terrorist organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Those activities included **large-scale arrests** (focusing on Palestinian Islamic Jihad infrastructures in Samaria), **targeted killings** (mainly of terrorist operatives responsible for Qassam rocket fire from the Gaza Strip), **air strikes against terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip**, **artillery fire** on the launching sites and access routes of Qassam rockets and, at the end of the year, the **creation of a buffer zone of sorts** in the northern Gaza Strip. **The security fence**, even though it was incomplete, and in spite of the “weak points” discovered in crossings from the West Bank to Israel (see below for details), **continued to contribute towards the decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in Israel.**

▣ In 2005, 4,351 Palestinians were detained for questioning, **of which 1,737 were identified as terrorists.** Throughout the course of the counter-activities, **exchanges of fire occurred more than once between the Israeli security forces and terrorist operatives hiding among Palestinian civilians and operating from inside populated areas.** As a result, **72 armed Palestinians were killed** in the counter-activities, as well as 25 civilians and a Palestinian police officer caught in the line of fire. The arrests led to the uncovering of many terrorist infrastructures and the thwarting of many terrorist attacks, including **15 suicide bombing attacks** thwarted before their perpetration. Among the detainees were **160 terrorists earmarked by the Israel Security**

² According to IDF data submitted by the Operations Division as well as data received from the Israel Security Agency.

Agency as potential suicide bombers, most of them belonging to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (see the chapter on suicide bombings).

The end of Arafat's era, the lull agreement, and the PIJ attempts to undermine it

■ With his rise to power following Arafat's death (November 2004), Palestinian Authority Chairman Abu Mazen brought forth a new agenda, different from that of his predecessor. At the top of his agenda, reflecting to a great extent **the desires of the Palestinian public and its tiredness of the conflict's difficult, cumulative results**, were the following issues: stopping the terrorist activities, returning to a non-violent struggle with an emphasis on political means (based on the American Roadmap), disarming the terrorist organizations, putting an end to anarchy, and turning the Palestinian Authority into the de facto ruler of the territory (based on the slogan “one authority, one law, one weapon”).



Abu Mazen: a new agenda that remained unfulfilled (Photo: Al-Jazeera Television)

■ However, Abu Mazen's and the Palestinian Authority's new agenda **was not accompanied by a profound conceptual change in all that concerned the actual use of terrorist attacks**—so-called “acts of resistance” by the Palestinians—as a **legitimate means** in the confrontation against Israel. The condemnations of terrorism voiced by Abu Mazen and Palestinian Authority spokesmen did not include terrorist attacks in the West Bank; rather, they were

directed at **suicide bombing attacks in Israeli territory**. Such condemnations were not driven by an underlying renunciation of murderous terrorism aimed against citizens but rather by a realization that suicide bombing attacks were detrimental to the Palestinian Authority's policy and were perceived as hindering Palestinian interests (the terrorist organizations, of course, continue to emphasize the legitimacy of terrorist attacks although directed against civilians).

▣ Unlike Arafat, Abu Mazen **avoided embracing a rhetoric that encouraged and spurred terrorism**. At the same time, however, Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority, a key side in the decisions reached in the Sharm el-Sheikh summit (followed by the lull agreement), **neither wanted nor, probably, could take strong, effective measures against the terrorist organizations**, subjecting them to their control and agenda. The terrorist organizations, on their part, followed an **independent terrorist policy** of their own. Spearheaded by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which made it a goal to undermine the lull agreement (see below), they refused to disarm, accumulated might and power on the ground, and **turned into alternative sources of power threatening** the Palestinian Authority's loose control.

▣ A momentous event that **contributed towards the decrease of the level of terrorism**, even though it did not stop it altogether, was the **lull agreement—the *tahdi'a*³**. An agreement achieved between the Palestinian Authority and the terrorist organizations in Cairo on March 17, 2005, it was given various, at times conflicting, interpretations. According to the Palestinian Authority's version, it was an unlimited ceasefire contingent upon Israel's willingness to uphold its obligations towards the Palestinians. According to the

³ The basic meaning of this Arabic term is “to calm, pacify, soothe pain.” It was embraced by the Palestinians since the use of the earlier term for “ceasefire” (*hudna*) was perceived as being inclusive and binding. *Hudna* is an Islamic term with a clear legal definition, **while *tahdi'a* is a secular term that does not have a legally-binding status on the ground**. Indeed, while the Palestinian agreement on the lull in the fighting incorporated “**lowering the profile**” in the number and severity of terrorist attacks, **it did not incorporate their complete stop**.

terrorist organizations' interpretation, this was not a complete stop of violence but a **temporary reduction of the magnitude of the confrontation**, valid through 2005,⁴ giving them the **“right to respond”** to Israel's actions. The manner and timing of exercising said “right” were left to the terrorist organizations' discretion, based upon each organization's policy: while it drove **Hamas** to embrace a restrained policy of terrorist attacks, the **Palestinian Islamic Jihad** and other insubordinate terrorist elements strove to derail the lull in order to provoke an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

▣ In 2005, the **Palestinian Islamic Jihad spearheaded the effort to undermine the lull and render obsolete the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, with the guidance of its Damascus-based leadership and the support of Syria and Iran.** By derailing the lull and escalating the conflict, the organization sought to **position itself as the leader of the struggle against Israel, creating a belligerent alternative for the Hamas movement**, which lowered its profile of terrorist attacks in the wake of the lull. Thus, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad joined forces with insubordinate terrorist organizations that also strove to escalate the conflict (such as the Popular Resistance Committees and insubordinate Fatah factions).

▣ It should be noted that **Syria and Iran**, two state sponsors of terrorism pressured by the international community, urged the organization to continue the strategy of undermining the lull. The two had interest to **divert attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict** and make it clear to the US that they were able to disrupt its Middle East policy (in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as in Iraq).

⁴ Indeed, the various organizations abstained from renewing the lull in the fighting in the end of 2005, when according to their interpretation it expired. However, Hamas, in spite of its statement on the end of the lull, continued to maintain a restrained policy of terrorist attacks against the backdrop of the Legislative Council elections that were to take place on January 25, 2005.

▣ Another instrument policy was the Lebanon, which **controlled tension** border in 2005 as well Shabaa Farms region),



used in Syria's and Iran's **Hezbollah** organization in continued its efforts to maintain along the Israeli-Lebanese (focusing on the Har Dov, and prevented the

implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559. **Hezbollah also provided terrorist infrastructures in the Palestinian Authority administered territories with funds, weapons, and know-how**, encouraging them to **continue terrorist activities** and oppose the Palestinian Authority's policy. Throughout the year, there were also several incidents of Qassam rocket fire from Hezbollah-controlled territory on Israel by Palestinian terrorist elements in Lebanon. The last such attack was perpetrated by **global jihad elements operating in Lebanon**.



Hezbollah's occasional attempts to "heat up" the Israeli-Lebanese border: fire on an Israeli outpost – November 21, during an assault along the border under the cover of which an attempt was made to abduct Israeli soldiers (Photo: Al-Manar Television).

▣ The primary tool used by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in its attempts to derail the lull was suicide terrorism,⁵ the organization's "specialty". After a

⁵ See study published by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, "Suicide bombing terrorism during the current Israeli-Palestinian confrontation (September 2000 – December 2005)", dated January 1, 2006.

drop in the number of suicide bombing attacks in 2004,⁶ the organization's operative infrastructures, demonstrating an impressive ability to survive and restore their capabilities, perpetrated five suicide bombing attacks during 2005. These were perpetrated in Israeli population centers (Tel-Aviv, Netanya [twice], and Hadera), with another suicide bombing attack perpetrated near an IDF roadblock in the Tulkarm region by terrorists on their way to a terrorist attack at a supermarket in Rosh Ha'ayin. Furthermore, additional suicide bombing attacks planned by the organization were thwarted in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, and other locations.⁷



The scene of the suicide bombing attack perpetrated near the Hadera market, October 26 (Photo: Yaron Brener, Ynet)

■ **The deadly suicide bombing attacks perpetrated by the organization resulted in the reemergence of a dynamic that has been visible throughout the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:** multi-casualty terrorist attacks amidst Israeli population intensified the Israeli security forces' counter-activities (targeted killings, arrests, closures, air strikes on terrorist targets, artillery fire on rockets' launching sites). The latter triggered responses by the terrorist organizations (mainly Qassam rocket fire on Israeli population centers); and those, in turn, were followed by Israeli counter-reactions.

⁶ In 2004, the organization perpetrated only one suicide bombing attack (and three suicide bombing attacks in collaboration with other terrorist organizations), a considerable drop compared to 2003 (six suicide bombing attacks) and 2002 (the peak year, with 15 suicide bombing attacks).

⁷ On January 19, 2006, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad perpetrated another suicide bombing attack at a fast food stand at Tel-Aviv's old central bus station. Some 30 people were injured in the attack, one of them severely.

Towards the end of 2005, rocket fire on Israeli towns in the Negev desert has increased, and even began threatening Israeli infrastructure facilities in the Ashkelon region. Therefore, the arsenal of Israeli reactions was supplemented by the **establishment of a buffer zone of sorts in the northern Gaza Strip** (December), its purpose being to keep rocket launchers away from the ruins of the three settlements evacuated during the disengagement (Nissanit, Dugit, Elei Sinai).

▣ **The Hamas movement**, which until 2005 was the leader in both number and “quality” of terrorist attacks, **embraced a restrained policy of terrorist attacks in the wake of the lull**, significantly diminishing its involvement in terrorist attacks, mainly suicide bombing attacks. The primary cause for that was its need, unlike the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to **take into consideration the desires of the Palestinian people** (most of whom support the lull and the disarmament of the terrorist organizations), **and the organization’s interest to attain a position of influence in the Palestinian political system**. This was reflected in its participation in the municipal elections (in which it succeeded), and in the Legislative Council elections (January 25, 2006), in which Hamas defeated Fatah and won the majority of the seats.

▣ **Hamas’ restrained policy of terrorist attacks** was reflected in a significant decrease in its involvement in suicide bombing attacks inside Israeli territory, where it previously was the leader, and in a **significant decrease in shooting attacks on West Bank traffic arteries**. However, **Hamas did not abandon the perpetration of terrorist attacks**: two prominent terrorist attacks perpetrated by the movement were a **suicide bombing attack in Beersheba** (the only one to be perpetrated by Hamas since the lull agreement) and the **abduction and murder of Sasson Nuriel**. Moreover, Hamas played a central part in the escalation of Qassam rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, the most significant of which took part in July, on the eve of the disengagement. However, following an additional round of escalation that took place in

September, proving to be a seminal event, **the Hamas movement showed great caution in all that concerns rocket fire due to a severe blow to its credibility.**⁸ In addition, **Hamas extended behind-the-scenes assistance to terrorist activity conducted by other terrorist organizations, mainly the Popular Resistance Committees,** as a means to perpetrate terrorist attacks without them being directly associated with Hamas.

▣ As for **Israel’s disengagement policy:** the evacuation of the settlements (August 15-23), the agreement on principles for opening the Rafah crossing and operating the other crossings, and the transfer of full control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority (for the first time since 1967)—**all of the above resulted in the creation of a new reality on the ground, opening a window of opportunity for the Palestinian Authority.** So far, however, that **window of opportunity has not been taken advantage of,** and terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip (mainly Qassam rocket fire) have not ceased after the disengagement. This was mainly caused by the fact that the Palestinian Authority did not succeed in imposing order on the terrorist organizations and armed gangs that created a state of **anarchy and chaos** in the post-disengagement Gaza Strip.

⁸ A vehicle containing Qassam rockets exploded during a “victory procession” held in Jebaliya, causing many casualties among the participants. Hamas issued a false announcement laying the blame on Israel, and “retaliated” by massive Qassam rocket fire on Israel. **Its announcement was refuted by the Palestinian Authority and received with total skepticism by the Palestinian population.**



The Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip: a window of opportunity for the Palestinian Authority that was not exploited

■ An examination of the distribution of terrorist attacks during and after the disengagement shows that the **restraining effect of the disengagement was manifest in the months of August – November**; that is, during the disengagement and in the three months that followed. In those months, **there was indeed a drop in the number of terrorist attacks** in comparison with **February – July, characterized by a constant rise in the number of terrorist attacks that peaked in the month of July, on the eve of the disengagement.** However, terrorist attacks, primarily deadly suicide bombing attacks perpetrated by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Hadera, Netanya, an IDF roadblock in Tulkarm) did not give a real chance to **take advantage of the disengagement as a means to establish** a ceasefire and create a calm atmosphere for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Terrorist attacks created a dynamic in which, after three months of (relative) calm, there was once again an **increase in the number of terrorist attacks and Israeli casualties during the month of December.**

▣ **The level of terrorism did drop in 2005; however, the campaign of terrorism waged by the Palestinians since September 2000 did not come to an end, and in the Abu Mazen era there has yet to emerge a new reality in Israeli-Palestinian relations. The entire spectrum of restraining factors, having their source in the counter-activities conducted by the Israeli security forces as well as internal Palestinian developments (the lull in the fighting) and Israeli policy (the disengagement), brought about a sharp decrease in the number of terrorist attacks and casualties in 2005. However, the influence of those restraining factors was limited first and foremost by the weakness of Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority. Late 2005 saw the operative and political strengthening of the terrorist organizations, surging waves of anarchy, escalation of terrorist activity against Israel, and intensification of the Israeli security forces' counter-reactions.**

2. The scope and nature of Palestinian terrorism in 2005 compared to the previous years of the confrontation (September 2000-December 2005)⁹

a. The number of the various terrorist attacks

▣ In 2005, there was a sharp decrease of some 40 percent in the number of the various terrorist attacks compared to 2004, continuing the constant decrease since 2001, when the number of terrorist attacks reached its peak. Quantitatively, most of the terrorist attacks were perpetrated in or from the **Gaza Strip**. However, the deadliest, most “quality” terrorist attacks (suicide


⁹ The figures in this chapter are based on **IDF data received from the Operations Division**. Also incorporated were figures provided by the **Israel Security Agency**, as they appeared on the Prime Minister's website (<http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Communication/Spokesman/sbkspoke/spokeshab020106.htm>), and **Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center** data as published in the Information Bulletins featured on the website (www.intelligence.org.il).

bombing attacks and shooting attacks on roads) were **perpetrated in the West Bank**.

▣ A total of **2,365 terrorist attacks** were perpetrated in the course of 2005, **the majority of which perpetrated in or from the Gaza Strip** (1,565), and relatively few in the **West Bank** (592) and **Israel** (207). **The number of terrorist attacks peaked in the month of July**, before the disengagement, and there was a **constant drop** in the number of terrorist attacks since then until the month of November. However, three months after the disengagement, when the dust settled, there began to emerge (December) a **renewed increase in the number of terrorist attacks**, even though their number in December was still **lower** than it had been in the three months preceding the disengagement. Most of the terrorist attacks perpetrated in 2005 were **small arms shooting attacks** on roads (some 47 percent), as well as **Qassam rocket and mortar fire** (some 42 percent).

▣ Following is the distribution of terrorist attacks in various cross-sections:


Distribution of the number of the various terrorist attacks in 2005




Distribution of the number of terrorist attacks in regional cross-section (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Israel) in the years of the confrontation



Distribution of the number of the various terrorist attacks in the Gaza Strip in the years of the confrontation



Distribution of the number of the various terrorist attacks in the West Bank in the years of the confrontation



b. Suicide bombing attacks

■ **Seven suicide bombing attacks were perpetrated in 2005, killing 23 people and injuring some 160.** In addition, **15 suicide bombing attacks were thwarted in the course of the year**—some as a result of the activities conducted by the Israeli security forces, and some due to various malfunctions of the responsible organizations (“work accidents”, malfunctions during execution, etc.). **It is therefore a sharp decrease compared to 2004** (15 suicide bombing attacks perpetrated, 119 thwarted), **continuing the decrease** that followed **the peak of 2002** (60 suicide bombing attacks perpetrated, 112 thwarted).


■ **The decrease is also evident in the number of fatalities caused by the suicide bombing attacks:** in the seven suicide bombing attacks perpetrated in 2005, **23 people were killed** (mostly civilians), compared to **55** killed in 2004, **142** in 2003, and **220** in 2002. **The decrease in the number of fatalities also continues since 2002**, in which the number of fatalities reached its peak.

■ In 2005, the **Palestinian Islamic Jihad** was the leading organization in perpetrating suicide bombing attacks (5 out of 7, about 71 percent), compared to **Hamas**, which perpetrated two suicide bombing attacks (one of which in January, before the lull agreement). However, throughout the entire confrontation, **Hamas is still the top perpetrator of suicide bombing attacks** (about 40 percent of the total), followed by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (about 27 percent) and Fatah (about 23 percent). **It may therefore be assumed that Hamas’ potential of suicide bombing attacks remained largely unexploited in 2005, owing to a significant extent to the restrained policy of terrorist attacks embraced by the movement after the lull agreement.**

■ It should be noted that **many suicide bombing attacks in various stages of planning were ultimately not perpetrated, this being as much a result of**


the effective counter-activities conducted by the Israeli security forces as it was of the terrorist organizations' self-imposed restraint. During 2005, 15 suicide bombing attacks were thwarted before they came to fruition. Furthermore, in 2005 the Israel Security Agency arrested in the West Bank 160 terrorists earmarked as potential suicide bombers, most of them belonging to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (59) and Fatah factions (47). “Only” 29 potential suicide bombers belonging to the Hamas movement were arrested.¹⁰

▣ What follows is the distribution of suicide bombing attacks in 2005 compared to the previous years of the confrontation.




¹⁰ According to Israel Security Agency data.


Suicide bombing attacks in yearly distribution




Suicide bombing attacks perpetrated by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in yearly distribution



Fatalities in suicide bombing attacks in yearly distribution




Thwarted suicide bombing attacks in yearly distribution¹¹



* Thwarted suicide bombing attacks: counter-activities conducted by Israeli security forces, "work accidents", malfunctions during execution, etc.

¹¹ According to Israel Security Agency data.

Potential suicide bombers arrested in the West Bank in 2005 by organization¹²



c. Qassam rocket and mortar fire

▣ In 2005, the 9-km Qassam rocket and mortar fire **continued to serve as the preferred course of action for the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip**. Despite the frequency of these attacks, in 2005 **there was a drop in their number compared to 2004** (1,059 hits were registered in 2005 compared to 1,475 in 2004, the peak year in the number of Qassam rocket and mortar fire incidents throughout the course of the confrontation). It should be further noted that Qassam rocket and mortar fire was on a **constant rise** since the beginning of the confrontation, 2005 therefore being the first year in which a decrease was observed.

▣ The extent of Qassam rocket and mortar fire was on a **constant rise since the beginning of 2005, peaking in July 2005**, on the eve of the disengagement (221 hits). **The number of hits dropped to a lower level** in the first months following the disengagement (several dozens of hits per month), but **picked up**

¹² ibid

again in the month of December as part of the confrontation's escalation. The rise in numbers was also accompanied by **firing on population centers and facilities south of Ashkelon** from sites located in the northern part of the Gaza Strip (the ruins of the settlements evacuated during the disengagement). Prominent among the perpetrators was the Hamas movement (until September, the incident in Jebaliya), the Fatah factions, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (two organizations that took Hamas' place in the lead after September).


■ The terrorist organizations consider the Qassam rocket and mortar fire a **means to disrupt the life routine of population centers in the Negev** (while gaining extensive coverage on the media). They consider the Qassam rocket and mortar fire a method of operation that makes it possible for them to create a **“balance of terror”** with Israel, forcing it to restrain its counter-activities (in similar vein to the Lebanese-based Hezbollah). At the same time, however, the terrorist organizations have come to realize once again the **shortcomings of such tactics:**

◆ **Qassam rocket and mortar fire is not as deadly as other forms of terrorist attacks: the 1,059 hits registered in 2005 caused five fatalities,** that is, 0.9 percent of the total Israeli fatalities that year.


◆ **The Qassam rocket and mortar fire became the target of widespread public criticism among Gaza Strip residents and the Palestinian Authority.** This was a result of the Israeli responses, triggered by the incidents, which disrupted the life routine of the Gaza Strip residents. Furthermore, this was also a result of the fact that in many cases, due to technical malfunctions, **the rockets and mortar shells hit population centers in the Gaza Strip, causing, on more than one occasion, numerous casualties.**

■ Distribution of Qassam rocket and mortar fire in 2005 (by month) and during the confrontation.

Qassam rocket and mortar fire in 2005¹³




Distribution of Qassam rocket and mortar fire in the five years of the confrontation



¹³ Hits identified by the IDF. The chart does not include unregistered drops (even when the terrorist organizations claimed responsibility for such), some of which hit the Gaza Strip territory. The actual number of hits is higher than it appears on the chart.

Distribution of Qassam rocket and mortar fire during 2005 per terrorist organization



Note: **Ham**as, prominent among the organizations firing Qassam rockets and mortar shells, changed its policy after the incident in Jebaliya (September) that triggered harsh public criticism against the movement.

3. Victims of Palestinian terrorism in 2005 compared to previous years

■ In 2005, the year of the lull in the fighting, **54 Israelis were killed** and **484 injured** as a result of terrorist activity. Most of the fatalities (44) were civilians, and only 10 were members of the security forces. This is a **significant drop** in the number of fatalities compared to the previous years of the confrontation, **continuing the constant decrease in the number of casualties since 2002**, the peak year in terms of the number of casualties (453 **killed** and some 2,350 injured). **Since 2002, there is also a constant decrease in the number of injured** (484 injured in 2005 compared to 925 in 2004, 1,123 in 2003, and 2,349 in 2002).

■ The number of killed in 2005 peaked in the **months of July** (8 killed) and **June** (6 killed), the two months preceding the disengagement. There was a drop in August (the month of the disengagement) and September (one Israeli

killed per month); however, the **number of fatalities rose once again** in the months of October (8 killed) and December (8 killed), primarily due to the suicide bombing attacks perpetrated by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Most fatalities were caused by suicide bombing attacks (23), followed by small arms fire (17), of which 6 were shot dead by a terrorist at the Karni crossing on January 13); Qassam rocket and mortar fire was a distant third (5).


▣ Alongside the 54 victims of Palestinian terrorism, one must note that in August 2005, during the disengagement, **two shooting attacks were perpetrated by Jewish terrorists:**

➤ On August 4, Eden Nathan Zada, an AWOL IDF soldier, perpetrated a shooting attack on a bus in Shfar'am (a town in which Israeli Druze, Christians and Muslims live together), killing four local residents.

➤ On August 17, a resident of Shilo perpetrated a shooting attack in Shilo against Palestinian workers he drove. Four Palestinians were killed in the terrorist attack.


▣ What follows is the distribution of Israeli casualties.

Killed and injured in 2005




Distribution of Israelis killed by type of terrorist attack in 2005

54 killed




Number of killed and injured in 2005


Total 7,454 Injured



Distribution of Israelis killed in the five years of the confrontation



Distribution of Israelis injured in the five years of the confrontation



* The figures also include those **lightly injured** and those with **post-traumatic disorder**

Overview of the leading terrorist organizations' activities

A. Hamas



■ The so-called internal Palestinian “**lull in the fighting**” agreement adopted in **March 2005 led Hamas to restrain its policy vis-à-vis attacks on Israel**. Hamas’s relative restraint was also the outcome of its need to consider the Palestinian people’s mindset, the movement’s participation in municipal elections (where they recorded significant achievements) and **its intention to participate in the January 25, 2005 Palestinian Legislative Council elections**. Nevertheless, Hamas continued to carry out attacks and provide behind-the-scenes support for the other terrorist organizations. Part of policy was to be not directly linked to attacks, while making sure that **a certain level of anti-Israel terrorism was maintained**.

■ **Thus Hamas, which in previous years was the terrorist organization which carried out the largest number of terrorist attacks, was responsible for “only” two suicide bombing attacks in 2005**. The first was in January (before the lull was achieved), when the organization attacked **an IDF post in the Gaza Strip**, and the second was in August at the **central bus station in Beersheba**. The latter, which wounded approximately 40 civilians, was planned and carried out by the Hamas terrorist-operative infrastructure in Dhariya, south of Mt. Hebron, but **Hamas refrained from publicly claiming responsibility**, in order to make a show of preserving its “adherence” to the lull. Another Hamas attack during the lull was the abduction and murder, on September 21, of **Sasson Nuriel**, a resident of the Pisgat Ze’ev neighborhood of Jerusalem, carried out by Hamas terrorist-operatives from

Ramallah. Hamas **did claim responsibility** for the attack, **since even during the lull it considered abducted Israeli civilians as “legitimate” bargaining chips** who could be traded for terrorists imprisoned in Israeli jails.



Sasson Nuriel, abducted and murdered by Hamas (Photo: Izzedine al-Qassam Battalions Internet site)

▣ **During the lull Hamas played a leading role in firing rockets and mortar shells at populated areas in the western Negev, including attacks after the disengagement.** The restraint Hamas imposed upon itself regarding such attacks – which continues – began after **severe public criticism was leveled at the movement when a technical failure led to the explosion of a truck carrying Qassam rockets during a Hamas parade in Jabaliya on September 23.** The explosion killed 19 Palestinians and wounded approximately 80. The Palestinian Authority (PA) publicly accused Hamas of being responsible for the explosion. Hamas issued a **completely fabricated statement** blaming Israel for it and in “retaliation” fired dozens of rockets at Sderot and other western Negev towns. However, the severe criticism led Hamas to change its policy of launching rockets from the Gaza Strip.

▣ **In addition to its terrorist activities, Hamas was active behind the scenes, aiding the other Palestinian terrorist organizations to carry out mass-murder attacks while making every effort to hide its own involvement.** For example, Hamas helped Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades to prepare the explosive stockings worn by Wafaa' Bas, who was arrested at the Erez crossing point in June on her way to carry out a suicide bombing attack in an Israeli hospital. **Hamas also aided the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), a Gaza-based terrorist organization**

which functioned as a Hamas quasi-terrorist-operative wing during the lull. Hamas support was exploited to settle internal Palestinian accounts, for example, the assassination of Musa Arafat on September 7 by PRC terrorist-operatives, which was aided and possibly also planned and directed by Hamas.



Musa Arafat, whose assassination was planned and organized by the PRC with the aid (and possibly direction) of Hamas (Al-'Alam TV, October 13, 2005).

B. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)



■ After a period of relative quiescence in 2004, in 2005 the **PIJ significantly increased** the number of its suicide bombing attacks. The organization received instructions from its headquarters in Damascus and political, operational and financial support from **Iran and Syria**. During **2005** the PIJ carried out a series of lethal suicide bombing attacks with the intention of **escalating violence** and positioning itself at the **forefront of the ongoing violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontation**.

■ In fact, while until 2005 Hamas carried out most of the suicide bombing attacks, during the past year the PIJ was the leading organization carrying out suicide bombing

attacks and was responsible for **five such attacks, four of them in densely populated centers within Israel. The five attacks carried out were in Tel Aviv, Netanya (two), Hadera and at an IDF roadblock near Tulkarm (by terrorists who were on their way to Rosh Ha'ayin) and killed 23 Israelis (37% of Israelis who died in terrorist attacks during 2005) and wounded approximately 160 (33% of the total number wounded).**

▣ The attacks were directed by the **PIJ's terrorist-operative infrastructure in Tulkarm and Jenin**, the last of which managed to **survive and regroup** even after the intensive counter-terrorist activities of the Israeli security forces. The organization's most dangerous West Bank **infrastructure is located in Tulkarm, which acts as operational headquarters for most of the other PIJ terrorist-operative infrastructures in Judea and Samaria.**

▣ Despite the fact that one of the objects of the deadly suicide bombing attacks directed by Damascus was to undermine the policies of the PA and harm the interests of the general Palestinian population, the **PA took no effective steps to put an end to the Iran and Syrian-backed PIJ's anti-Israeli terrorism.** After the attack, the PA detained more than 50 activists, an action best described as **“too little too late.”** Arrested were minor figures unconnected to the suicide bombing attacks in Netanya, and eventually the PA, as usual, released some of them.



PA security forces arrest a PIJ activist after the suicide bombing attack in Netanya. Too little too late (Photo: Al-Jazeera TV, December 8, 2005).

▣ It should be noted that during the lull **Israel gave the Palestinian security forces information** about the activities of most of the wanted PIJ operatives in Tulkarm (a city under PA control), however, **nothing was done at the time to stop their activities**. In certain instances terrorist-operatives were even released after only a short imprisonment. For example, on June 10, after the PIJ exerted pressure on the PA, three PIJ operatives from Tulkarm who had been arrested after the suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv in February were released. On June 14 the IDF detained one of them, **Sadiq Oudeh**, near Nablus. During interrogation he admitted that he had asked PIJ leaders for a weapon to attack an IDF roadblock near Tulkarm.¹⁴

▣ Since the PA seems unwilling to do anything to stop the PIJ's terrorist activities, the Israeli security forces have taken the entire mission on themselves. During 2005 they exposed a large number of infrastructures in Judea and Samaria. Some of them had already conceived **well-developed plans for attacks, including suicide bombing attacks within Israel**. The Israeli security forces foiled plans to carry out suicide bombing attacks in **Jerusalem** (a double suicide bombing attack in June), **Tel Aviv** (a triple suicide bombing attack in June) and at **a bus stop in the Gush Etzion region**.

C. Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades factions



▣ Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades did not carry out suicide bombing attacks during 2005. Nevertheless, **47 terrorist-operatives** belonging to the organization and categorized by the ISA as **potential suicide bombers** were detained by Israeli security forces. In addition, at least one Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades suicide

¹⁴ According to information provided by the Israel Security Agency (ISA).

bombing attack was foiled when **Wafaa' Samir Ibrahim Bas**, who belonged to the organization, was sent to carry out a **suicide bombing attack in a hospital in Israel and was caught at the Erez crossing point** on June 20.



The suicide bombing attack removes her clothing and attempts to detonate her explosive stockings (Photo courtesy of Israeli Channel 10 TV).

▣ The organization's various factions focused on launching rockets and mortar shells from the Gaza Strip, although Fatah's role was minor (until September most of the rocket and mortar attacks were carried out by Hamas, and afterwards by the PIJ). Nevertheless, after September, when Hamas toned down its attacks, Fatah increased its activity, aided by weapons received from Hamas and the PIJ.

▣ Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades carried out many shooting attacks along roads, mainly in Judea and Samaria. **It should be noted that during 2005 such attacks led to the deaths of 17 of the 54 Israelis killed.** It should also be noted that since the disengagement Fatah operatives have **laid many side charges along the security fence between Israel and the Gaza Strip.**

D. The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC)



▣ During 2005 the PRC focused on attacking population centers in the western Negev with **rocket and mortar fire**, although they played only a minor role, and in attempting to carry out attacks (which were foiled) through the Sinai Peninsula.

▣ They also carried out (unsuccessful) attempts to **export Gazan terrorism to the West Bank**. Three PRC terrorist-operatives were detained on October 5 near Mitzpeh Ramon while on their way from the Gaza Strip to Jenin to join the terrorist infrastructure there and to pass along technical information for manufacturing rockets and explosive devices. The organization also aided other terrorist organizations in carrying out attacks, such as the one at the **Karni crossing point** in January, which was joint operation carried out by the PRC with Hamas and PIJ PRC collaboration.

e. Al-Qaeda

▣ An additional characteristic in 2005 was the activity of the **Al-Qaeda** organization, or its supporting factions, in countries bordering Israel, with some of the terrorist attacks perpetrated by the organization targeted against Israel. Noteworthy acts of terrorism in this context are:

- ✦ **On July 23, 2005**, three coordinated terrorist attacks were perpetrated in hotels in Sharm el-Sheikh, in the southern Sinai Peninsula. The terrorist

attack was perpetrated by two car bombs and an explosive suitcase that detonated near major tourist sites, hotels, and cafés. Some 88 people were killed and over 200 were wounded in the attacks. Among the fatalities were 10 tourists from Persian Gulf countries and Europe; the rest of the fatalities were Egyptians.

✦ **On August 19**, three Katyusha rockets were fired from Aqaba on the city of Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba. One of the rockets landed near the Eilat airport. Two other rockets, targeted against an American vessel in the Gulf of Aqaba, missed their mark. One of the rockets hit Jordanian soldiers, one of whom was killed and the other injured. A group calling itself “Al-Qaeda in Syria and Egypt—Martyr Abdallah Azzam Brigades” claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack.

✦ **On November 9**, a series of combined, coordinated terrorist attacks was perpetrated in three hotels in Amman, the Jordanian capital. As a result of the attacks, some 67 people were killed and some 200 were injured. Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s organization (the Al-Qaeda offshoot in Iraq) claimed responsibility for those three terrorist attacks. The attacks were perpetrated by three suicide bombers who had arrived from Iraq, and a female suicide bomber (the wife of one of them) who was unable to blow herself up due to a technical malfunction and was arrested by the Jordanian security forces.

▣ **On the night of December 27-28**, several (close to ten) 107mm rockets were fired from Lebanese territory on northern Israeli population centers. The shootings were carried out simultaneously from two sources in the central and western sectors of southern Lebanon. Several rockets were fired on Kiryat Shmona from the central sector, and several rockets that dropped in the vicinity of the town of Shlomi and other towns along the border were fired from the western sector. One day later, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s organization published

a claim of responsibility for the attack. In the claim of responsibility, which had anti-Semitic overtones, the organization announced that it had launched ten rockets on targets in the north of the “Jewish state”.

Exploiting the lull to improve terrorist-operative capabilities

a. The Palestinian terrorist organizations attempt to export weapons manufacturing capabilities from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank

■ During 2005, especially since the disengagement completed in August, the terrorist organizations made every effort to **export mortar and rocket manufacturing capabilities to the West Bank, especially Samaria**. The efforts are part of the strategy the terrorist organizations (with Hamas at the center) formulated during the disengagement process, designed to enable rocket launchings from the West Bank, which would become the “**strategic weapons**” of the next phase of the confrontation.

■ This concept was formulated by the terrorist organizations as a response to operational difficulties created by the security fence in Samaria and the IDF’s intensive counter-terrorism.¹⁵ There were additional intra-Palestinian considerations, the most important of which was the Gazan Palestinian population’s desire to return to a normal life once the Israeli “occupation” was over, as opposed to the legitimacy of continuing the struggle (i.e., terrorist activities) in and from the “occupied” West Bank. In addition, it would seem that the terrorist organizations were encouraged by their disruptions of the western Negev residents’ daily routine, and hoped to export a **balance of terror** eastward, as Hezbollah had in the north.

¹⁵ For further information see our Special Bulletin ["The Hamas-associated Al-Mustaqbal research center presents another study on the future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the new era following the IDF's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank,"](#)

▣ The practical application of their efforts was found in the exposure of **eight** infrastructures in the **Nablus-Jenin** area belonging to the various terrorist organizations, all of them busily acquiring the capability to manufacture rockets and mortars. **Half belonged to Hamas and the other half were joint PIJ-Fatah/Tanzim infrastructures.** At the time of their exposure they were at various stages of readiness, some of them **advanced**, to the point where they were capable of firing trial rockets at population centers within Israel.¹⁶

▣ The following are examples of the infrastructures that were exposed:¹⁷

➤ **A laboratory for the manufacture of weapons was exposed in Nablus in December 2005:** On the night of December 14 the IDF exposed a weapons laboratory in Nablus in the home of **Sameh Samir Sayid ‘Iyyad**, a **Hamas** operative, who worked closely with **Amjad Muhammad Rashid Hanawi**, a senior Hamas terrorist-operative who was killed during an IDF action. It contained an empty **Qassam** rocket shell (without explosives), an **explosive belt ready for detonation** , 60 kg (132 lbs) of explosives, electronic detonation devices, a small explosive charge and the chemicals and other materials used in making explosives. The laboratory was exploded by IDF sappers.



The contents of the laboratory



The Qassam rocket shell found in the laboratory

(Both photos courtesy of the IDF Spokesman)

¹⁶ According to information provided by the ISA.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

✦ **A PIJ-Fatah/Tanzim infrastructure was exposed in the village of Yamoun, north west of Jenin in July 2005:** The two terrorist-operatives in charge, Warrad and Ibrahim Abaharah, were working on the group's rocket launching capabilities when they were killed by Israeli security forces. Their goal was to hit Israeli population centers in the Jezreel Valley. Their infrastructure received instructions from abroad and had links to the Fatah/Tanzim and PIJ infrastructures in the Jenin region.¹⁸

✦ **A PIJ cell was exposed near Jenin in June 2005:** some of its members were detained in February and March and its commander, **Ra'ed Hijawi**, was detained in June. They concentrated their efforts on acquiring equipment and materials for the manufacture of Qassam rockets, and during interrogation stated that they had succeeded in manufacturing a few of them. During March they tried out their homemade rockets, firing them at Ganim and Qadim, two Israeli communities near Jenin. The rockets fell in open fields and did not damage persons or property.

✦ **A joint Fatah/Tanzim-PIJ cell was exposed near Jenin in March 2005:** During March eight terrorist-operatives were detained around Jenin. They had been collecting the raw materials used to manufacture rockets, and had engaged in trial launchings to develop those with longer ranges.

✦ **A Hamas infrastructure was exposed in Jenin, January-March 2005:** On January 24 members of a Hamas infrastructure in the villages of Silat al-Harithiya and Yamoun were detained. They had set up a laboratory for the manufacture of mortar shells, Qassam rockets and explosive devices, and acquired the necessary raw materials. **The infrastructure was directed and financed by Hamas-affiliated elements abroad.** Information revealed during interrogation led to the seizure of weapons in the house of **Khaled Zayyud**, a long-time Hamas operative residing in Silat al-Harithiya. **Many instruction manuals relating to the production of weapons and Qassam missiles were**

¹⁸ It should be noted that on the afternoon of December 11 a group of terrorists fired trial rockets in northern Samaria from the area around the village of Al-Yamoun. The Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades issued a statement claiming the Jenin 1 rockets had been fired at Ram On, a moshav in the Jezreel Valley, in retaliation for the targeted killing of senior Fatah and PIJ operatives. The remains of the rocket were found near the moshav.

also found. Some time later **‘Issam Shafiq ‘Abd al-Qadr Samar**, a terrorist-operative residing in Yamoun who was also a metalworker, was detained. Materials and equipment for the manufacture of explosives and rockets were found stored in his workshop. **During interrogation he revealed that he had managed to manufacture at least three Qassam rockets, two of which he had test-fired in the area around his home.** A Qassam rocket ready for launching was found in the slick in his house along with a large quantity of other weapons.

b. Large quantities of weapons (possibly including anti-aircraft missiles) smuggled into the Gaza Strip

▣ The terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas, exploited the lull for intensive retrenching and **improving their operational capacities for a possible escalation of the violence against Israel.** To that end they smuggled in massive amounts of weapons both by land and sea, about one quarter of the total finding its way into Hamas hands. The weapons strengthened Hamas and the other twos and increased the intensity of the violent power struggle for control of the Gaza Strip.

▣ The IDF's having left the Philadelphi route as part of the disengagement led to a significant increase in the amount of arms smuggled into the Gaza Strip as the terrorist organizations **exploited the helplessness of the PA's security forces. Since September 12 more than five tons of explosives have been smuggled into the Gaza Strip from Egypt, approximately 200 anti-tank missile launchers and 350 anti-tank missiles, 5,000 assault rifles, scores of hand guns, more than a million rounds of ammunition and possibly a small number of anti-aircraft missiles.**

▣ The greatest amount of smuggling activity occurred between September 12-18, when the Philadelphi route was broken through, and **the opportunity to smuggle vast quantities of weapons into the Gaza Strip was exploited** (between January and September relatively small amounts were smuggled in: approximately 20 anti-tank

missile launchers and 50 missiles, and 1,800 assault rifles and large quantities of ammunition.)¹⁹

It is possible that some **anti-aircraft missiles** were smuggled into the Gaza Strip. The terrorist organizations consider such weapons very important because **many of the Israeli targeted attacks against terrorist leaders are carried out by the Air Force**, and such missiles would give them leverage. **The introduction of weapons of that nature poses a genuine threat to Israeli military and civilian aircraft, and there is a real danger that they might find their way to the West Bank where they would threaten Israel's international airport.**

c. Palestinian security services' involvement in smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip

Despite the PA's avowed commitment and occasional actions to put an end to weapons smuggling, the PA security forces (which replaced the IDF along the Israeli-Egyptian border) **continue their involvement**. They do so primarily to **equip themselves** in order to increase their strength against the Palestinian terrorist organizations and other centers of power in the Gaza Strip.

It should be noted that the **Palestinian security services are either bribed to turn a blind eye** to smuggling activities or have private local arrangements whereby they allow the smuggling to continue in return for a small percentage in kind. In addition, they often provide the smugglers with logistic aid, for example by allowing them to use Palestinian security service vehicles or even by placing orders for weapons themselves.

¹⁹ According to information provided by the ISA.

d. Infiltrating terrorists, transmitting information and smuggling arms into Israel through the Sinai Peninsula²⁰

▣ After the disengagement, there was a **sharp increase** in the scope of smuggling from the Gaza Strip into Israel and the West Bank through the Sinai Peninsula. The route used runs from the southern Gaza Strip to the Sinai and from there to the Negev, and exploits the fact that Israel's border with Egypt is 215 km (almost 134 miles) long and **completely open and unguarded, and there are almost no physical obstacles:** in the Gaza Strip region there is a fence but elsewhere it has either been covered by sand and does not present a real barrier, or is nonexistent. The terrorists infiltrating into Israel have turned it into their **main access route**, especially Fatah and the PRC.

▣ **The route through the Sinai serves four main groups of infiltrators:**

- **Illegal workers bought into Israel by smugglers.**
- **Arms and “ordinary” smugglers, including drug smugglers.**
- **Terrorists on their way to the West Bank to improve the infrastructures there by exporting data and technology from the Gaza Strip.**
- **Terrorists who plan to carry out attacks against Israel.**

▣ **The infiltrators use various methods to enter the Sinai Peninsula**, among them tunnels, breaks in the fence along the Egyptian border and sometimes official authorization (entrance permits for medical reasons, work or family visits). Until the disengagement, most of the smugglers used tunnels, but since August mostly **overland routes** are being used. That is because of the small number of Palestinian security forces deployed in various areas, and sometimes the result of bribes paid to members of the Palestinian and Egyptian security forces.

▣ **The terrorist organizations' smuggling efforts are abetted by criminal elements, especially by Bedouins in the Sinai and Negev (who smuggle in arms,**

²⁰ According to information provided by the ISA.

drugs and foreign workers). They also help infiltrate terrorists into Sinai, see to their needs and escort them to Israel. In addition, terrorist-operatives are often sent from the Gaza Strip to Egypt to provide logistical support for others who are planning to come later on. It should be noted that in some cases the Bedouin collaborators are unaware of the terrorist attack intentions of those they help infiltrate.

▣ **A prominent example of the use of the route to infiltrate terrorists through the Sinai was the incident in October 2005, when three PRC operatives were detained on their way from the Gaza Strip through the Sinai to Mitzpeh Ramon. The three planned to reach Jenin to establish an infrastructure for the manufacture of weapons, especially rockets and mortars, and were even planning to participate in attacks against Israeli targets.** They infiltrated into the Sinai through a short tunnel dug under the concrete fence near Rafah and were discovered by Egyptian police. They bribed the Egyptians into letting them continue. They spent a day the Sinai with the Bedouin collaborators and were then handed over to smugglers, entering Israel escorted by an Egyptian. When captured they had a dock in their possession containing a **Hezbollah** instruction manual for making explosives and explosive devices.

e. The money flow

▣ **During 2005 enormous amounts of money continued to flow from abroad** into the coffers of the Palestinian terrorist organizations. Some of the conduits were exposed by the Israeli security forces.

▣ **Some examples of the methods used to funnel in money:**

✦ On July 14, 2005, the ISA detained Osama Bshayti of Khan Yunis. During interrogation he admitted that since the beginning of the lull he had served as a conduit for the transfer of hundreds of thousands of dollars from Hamas abroad. The money passed into the hands of **Muhammad Sanwar**, head of the Hamas

terrorist-operative wing in Khan Yunis, and its senior operatives throughout the Gaza Strip.

✦ On November 16, Israeli security forces and customs officials confiscated a number of containers at the Ashdod Port. They contained merchandise worth tens of thousands of dollars. **The merchandise was suspect of having been purchased through PIJ financing.** The merchandise was addressed to a Gazan company called **Abu Akar**, which dealt with the import of foodstuffs. The company was headed by **Faiz Abu Akar**, a businessman from Khan Yunis, known to the security forces for his ties to terrorist organizations.

✦ On October 16 the Israeli security forces detained **Majdi Kamal ‘Abd al-Jabar ‘Amer** from the village of Qalil, near Nablus. During interrogation he stated that **he was handled by Hezbollah in Lebanon via a kind of frontline headquarters in the Gaza Strip.** He and his brother had received \$1,500 from Hezbollah to finance terrorist activities and to purchase weapons and explosive devices.

The search for the weak points in the security fence and entrances to Israel

▣ The (partial) construction of the security fence (begun in 2003) contributed significantly to the sharp decrease in terrorist attacks, including suicide bombing attacks, carried out in Israeli territory. Nevertheless, the terrorist organizations continue their efforts to infiltrate squads of terrorist-operatives into Israel while **continually searching for weak points in the security fence and entrances into Israel.**

▣ The PIJ terrorist infrastructure in Samaria and the Hamas infrastructure at Mt. Hebron, which carried out suicide bombing attacks in Israel during 2005, found ways to overcome the security fence and infiltrate suicide bombers. For example:

✦ The PIJ terrorist-operative infrastructure in Tulkarm, which carried out the suicide bombing attack in Hadera in October, **infiltrated the suicide bomber**

through Jerusalem using a spot where the fence was incomplete. The terrorist reached Hadera with the aid of Palestinians who did not hold valid entrance permits into Israel.

✦ The Hamas terrorist infrastructure in the village of Dhariya in the southern Hebron hills, which carried out the suicide bombing attack in Beersheba in August, **exploited the incomplete security fence in that region** to infiltrate the suicide bomber.

✦ The PIJ terrorist infrastructure in Tulkarm, which carried out the suicide bombing attack in Netanya in July, exploited the sometimes-lax examinations at crossing points. It infiltrated the suicide bomber through the Tzufin roadblock with the aid of a Jew and an Israeli Arab who brought illegal Palestinian workers into the country.

Appendix ²¹

Victims of Palestinian terrorism, 2005²² The 23 victims of suicide bombing attacks




Dani Golani, 45, from Netanya. Killed on December 5 in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon shopping mall in Netanya. Survived by his wife, two daughters and parents.



Elia Rosen, 39, from Bat Hefer. Killed on December 5 in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon shopping mall in Netanya. Survived by her husband and three children.



Lieutenant **Uri Binamo**, 21, from Nesher. Killed on December 29 in a suicide bombing attack at a roadblock near Tulkarm. Survived by his parents and three sisters.



Keinan Tsuami, 19, from Netanya. Killed on December 5 in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon Mall in Netanya. Survived by his parents and two brothers.




Haim Amram, 26, from Netanya. Killed on December 5 in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon Mall in Netanya. Survived by his parents, brother and two sisters.



Alexandra Garmitzky, 65 from Netanya. Killed on December 5 in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon shopping mall in Netanya. Survived by her husband and son.

²¹ The pictures and biographical information about the victims comes from Websites of the Israeli National Insurance Institute (www.btl.gov.il, Hebrew), the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/terrorism-%20obstacle%20to%20peace/palestinian%20terror%20since%202000/Victims%20of%20Palestinian%20Violence%20and%20Terrorism%20sinc>) and Office of the Israeli Prime Minister (<http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/IsraelUnderAttack/>).

²² The victims of Al-Qaeda in Jordan and Sharm el-Sheikh are not included.



Genia Poleis, 66, from Hadera. Killed on October 26 in a suicide bombing attack in Hadera. Survived by her family.



Jamil Qa'adan, 48, from Baka al-Gharbiya. Killed on October 26 in a suicide bombing attack in Hadera. Survived by his wife and five children.



Pirhiya Machlouf, 53, from Hadera. Killed on October 26 in a suicide bombing attack in Hadera. Survived by her husband, son and two daughters.



Ya'akov Rahmani, 68, from Hadera. Killed in a suicide bombing attack in Hadera on October 26. Survived by his son, two daughters and eight grandchildren.




Michael Kaufman, 68, from Hadera. Killed in a suicide bombing attack in Hadera on October 26. Survived by his wife, son, daughter and grandchildren.



Sabiha Nissim, 66, from moshav Ahituv. Killed in a suicide bombing attack in Hadera on October 26. Survived by her husband, six children and eight grandchildren.



Nofar Horowitz, 16, from Tel Aviv. Killed in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon shopping mall in Netanya on July 12. Survived by her parents and two sisters.



Julia Voloshin, 31, from Netanya. Killed in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon shopping mall in Netanya on July 12. Survived by her husband and parents.



Rachel Ben-Abu, 16, from Tel Aviv. Killed in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon shopping mall in Netanya on July 12. Survived by her mother and two brothers.



Ronen Reuvenov, 29, from Tel Aviv. Killed in a suicide bombing attack on the Tel Aviv waterfront promenade on February 25. Survived by his parents and sister.



Corporal Moshe Maor January, 21, from Netanya. Killed in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon shopping mall in Netanya on July 12. Survived by his father and pregnant wife.



Anya Lifshitz, 50, from Netanya. Killed in a suicide bombing attack at the Sharon shopping mall in Netanya on July 12. Survived by her husband, daughter and granddaughter.



Odella Hubara, 26, from Jerusalem. Killed in a suicide bombing attack on the Tel Aviv waterfront promenade on February 25. Survived by her parents and two brothers.



Yitzhak Buzaglo, 39, from Mishmar Hayarden. Killed in a suicide bombing attack on the Tel Aviv waterfront promenade on February 25. Survived by his wife, two children, parents, brothers and sisters.



Yael Orbach, 28, from Rehovot. Killed in a suicide bombing attack on the Tel Aviv waterfront promenade on February 25. Survived by parents and brothers.



Oded Sharon, 36, from Gan Yavneh. Killed on January 18 in a suicide bombing attack at the Gush Katif junction in the Gaza Strip. Survived by his wife and three children



Aryeh Nagar, 36, from Kfar Saba. Killed in a suicide bombing attack on the Tel Aviv waterfront promenade on February 25. Survived by his parents and brothers.

The 31²³ victims of other Palestinian terrorist attacks



Staff Sergeant **Yonaton Evron**, 20, from Rishon Lezion. Killed in a shootout with Palestinian gunmen while attempting to detain a wanted Hamas terrorist. Survived by parents and brother.



Sergeant **Nir Kahana**, 20, from Kiriya Tivon. Stabbed to death by a Palestinian terrorist at the Qalandiya checkpoint north of Jerusalem. Survived by his parents and two brothers.



Yosef Shok, 35, from Beit Hagai. Killed in a drive-by shooting in the southern Hebron Hills on December 16. Survived by his wife and five children.



Matat (Rosenfeld) Adler, 21, from Carmel. Killed in a drive-by shooting at the Gush Etzion junction on October 16. Survived by her parents, brother and three sisters.




Oz Ben-Meir, 15, from Maon. Killed in a drive-by shooting at the Gush Etzion junction on October 16. Survived by his parents, three brothers and two sisters.



Kineret Mandel, 23, from Carmel. Killed in a drive-by shooting at the Gush Etzion junction on October 16. Survived by her parents and three brothers.



Dana Galkowicz, 22, from Kibbutz Bror Hayil. Killed by a direct Qassam rocket hit to the house she was visiting in Netiv Ha'asara on July 14. Survived by her parents, brother and sisters.



Sasson Nuriel, 55, from Jerusalem. Abducted and murdered in Ramallah on September 21. Survived by his wife and children.



Second lieutenant **Ariel Buda**, 21, from Tel Aviv. Died on October 15 from wounds sustained in an ambush on the trans-Samaria highway on January 7.

²³ The number of victims of Palestinian terrorism includes a Chinese worker and two Palestinian workers killed on June 7 in a direct Qassam rocket hit on a greenhouse in Ganei Tal in Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip.



Dov Kol, 58, from Jerusalem. Ambushed by Palestinian terrorists on the Kissufim road at Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip. Survived by his son, two daughters and grandchild.



Rachel Kol, 53, from Jerusalem. Ambushed by Palestinian terrorists on the Kissufim road at Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip. Survived by her son, two daughters and grandchild.




Shmuel Mett, 21, from Britain. Stabbed to death at the Jaffa Gate in Jerusalem on August 24. Survived by his parents and six brothers.



Yevgeny Reider, 28, from Hermesh. Shot by Palestinians in Baka al-Sharkia on June 20. Survived by his wife, daughter, parents and sisters.



Avihai Levy, 17, from Beit Hagai. Killed in a drive-by shooting on June 26. Survived by his parents and four brothers.



Aviad Mansour, 16, from Otniel. Wounded in a drive-by shooting near Beit Hagai on June 24 and died on June 26. Survived by his parents and four brothers.



Salah Ayash Imran, 57, from Khan Yunis. Killed by a direct Qassam rocket hit on the greenhouse where he was working in Gush Katif. Survived by his wife and eight children



Bi Shude, 46, from China. Killed by a direct Qassam rocket hit on the greenhouse where he was working in Gush Katif. Survived by his wife and two children.



Sergeant Major **Avi Karouchi**, 25, from Beersheba. Killed on the Israel-Egypt border by an anti-tank missile fired from the Gaza Strip on June 19. Survived by his parents, brother and two sisters.



Ayala-Haya Abukasis, 17, from Sderot. Died on January 21 of wounds caused by the direct hit of a Qassam rocket on January 15. Survived by her parents, two brothers and her sister.



Staff Sergeant **Dan Talasnikov**, 21, from Nir Galim. Killed during a military operation in the village of Saida north of Tulkarm on May 2. Survived by his parents and four brothers.



Muhammad Mahmoud Jaroun, from Khan Yunis. Killed by a direct Qassam rocket hit on the greenhouse where he was working in Gush Katif.



Herzl Shlomo, 51, from Sderot. Killed in a Palestinian terrorist attack at the Karni crossing point on January 13. Survived by his wife and three children.



Ivan Shmilov, 53, from Sderot. Killed in a Palestinian terrorist attack at the Karni crossing point on January 13. Survived by his two children and three grandchildren.



Ofer Tiri, 23, from Ashkeon. Killed in a Palestinian terrorist attack at the Karni crossing point on January 13. Survived by his parents and nine brothers and sisters.



Dror Gizri, 30, from Sderot. Killed in a Palestinian terrorist attack at the Karni crossing point on January 13. Survived by his wife, parents and two sisters.



Ibrahim Kahili, 46, from Umm al-Ghanem. Killed in a Palestinian terrorist attack at the Karni crossing point on January 13. Survived by his wife and five children.



Munam Abu Sabia, 33, from Daburiyeh. Killed in a Palestinian terrorist attack at the Karni crossing point on January 13. Survived by his wife and daughter.



Staff Sergeant **Yosef Atia**, 21, from Petah Tikva. Ambushed by Palestinian terrorists on the trans-Samaria highway on January 7. Survived by his parents and four brothers.



Nissim Arbiv, 26, from Nissanit. Died on January 11 from wounds sustained from an anti-tank missile fired at the Erez crossing point on January 2. Survived by his wife and child.



Gideon Rivlin, 50, from Ganei Tal. Killed when a bomb was detonated as a military vehicle patrolled the route near Morag in the southern Gaza Strip on January 12. Survived by his wife and four children.