

## 9 Corruption Perceptions Index 2004

*Johann Graf Lambsdorff*<sup>1</sup>

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The year 2004 marks the tenth publication of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The index assembles expert perceptions vis-à-vis corruption. In an area where objective data is not available, such an approach helps our understanding of real levels of corruption. That is why many economists, political scientists and sociologists use the CPI as a starting point for investigating the causes and consequences of corruption in a cross-section of countries. Since the first publication of the CPI in 1995, there has been a wave of research publications based on the CPI and our knowledge is still expanding rapidly.

The CPI aggregates the perceptions of well-informed people with regard to the extent of corruption, defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit. The extent of corruption reflects the frequency of corrupt payments and the resulting obstacles imposed on businesses. While methodological innovations are introduced continuously, the results from different years show a high level of consistency. A remarkable improvement this year is the expansion of the index from 133 to 146 countries.

This year's CPI used data collected between 2002 and 2004. The CPI is a composite index. Altogether 18 data sources were used in the 2004 CPI, from 12 different institutions: (1) the World Economic Forum; (2) the Institute of Management Development (in Lausanne); (3) the Economist Intelligence Unit; (4) Information International from Beirut (Lebanon); (5) the World Markets Research Centre (in London); (6) Gallup International, on behalf of Transparency International; (7) Freedom House's *Nations in Transit*; (8) the Merchant International Group Limited (in London); (9) the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (in Hong Kong); (10) Columbia University; (11) a multilateral development bank; and (12) the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey of the EBRD and the World Bank.

One precondition for the inclusion of a source is that it must provide a ranking of nations. Another is that it must measure the overall level of corruption. Ensuring these conditions is essential to guaranteeing that we are not mixing apples with oranges. Inappropriate sources exist that merge the level of corruption with other variables, such as xenophobia, nationalism, political instability or expected risks due to changes in corruption. Including such sources would distort the measurement of perceived levels of corruption, rendering a resulting composite index defective for wide areas of academic research and public awareness. We take a conservative approach, only including sources that strictly compare levels of corruption.

The strength of the CPI lies in the combination of multiple data sources in a single index, which increases the reliability of each individual score. The benefit of combining data in this manner is that erratic findings from one source can be balanced by the inclusion of at least two other sources, lowering the probability of misrepresenting a country's level of corruption.

The high correlation of the different sources used in the CPI indicates its overall reliability. The reliability is also depicted in Figure 9.1, which shows the confidence intervals for each country included in the 2004 CPI. This range indicates how a country's score may vary, depending on measurement precision. Nominally it depicts a range within which the true score lies with 90 per cent probability. However, when few observations are available this level of certainty cannot be met. For example, when only five observations are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is 80 per cent. As the figure indicates, most countries are measured with sufficient precision to allow a ranking of nations.

The index provides an annual snapshot of the views of decision-makers. Comparisons with the results from previous years should be based on a country's score, not its rank. A country's rank can change simply because new countries enter the index. However, year-to-year comparisons of a country's score result not only from a changing perception of




Figure 9.1: 2004 CPI and confidence intervals

a country's performance, but also from a changing sample and methodology – each year different viewpoints are collected and somewhat different questions asked. Research on long-term trends is currently being carried out and findings are expected in 2005–06.

The CPI gathers perceptions that are invariant to cultural preconditions and represent a global perspective. The robustness of the CPI findings is enhanced by the fact that surveys containing residents' viewpoints were found to correlate well with surveys that polled expatriates. In the past, the viewpoint of less-developed countries seemed under-represented. Since 2003, however, Gallup International on behalf of Transparency International has surveyed respondents from less-developed countries, asking them to assess the performance of public servants in industrial countries. A similar approach was applied by Beirut-based Information International and a multilateral development bank. The results correlate well with the other sources used in the 2004 CPI, corroborating the robustness of the CPI.

A more detailed description of the methodology is available at [www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi](http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi) or at [www.icgg.org](http://www.icgg.org)

Table 9.1: Corruption Perceptions Index 2004

Country rank	Country	CPI 2004 score <sup>a</sup>	Surveys used <sup>b</sup>	Standard deviation <sup>c</sup>	High-low range <sup>d</sup>	Confidence range <sup>e</sup>
1	Finland	9.7	9	0.3	9.2 – 10.0	9.5 – 9.8
2	New Zealand	9.6	9	0.2	9.2 – 9.7	9.4 – 9.6
3	Denmark	9.5	10	0.3	8.7 – 9.8	9.3 – 9.7
	Iceland	9.5	8	0.2	9.2 – 9.8	9.4 – 9.7
5	Singapore	9.3	13	0.3	8.5 – 9.5	9.2 – 9.4
6	Sweden	9.2	11	0.2	8.7 – 9.5	9.1 – 9.3
7	Switzerland	9.1	10	0.3	8.6 – 9.4	8.9 – 9.2
8	Norway	8.9	9	0.5	8.0 – 9.5	8.6 – 9.1
9	Australia	8.8	15	0.8	6.7 – 9.5	8.4 – 9.1
10	Netherlands	8.7	10	0.4	8.3 – 9.4	8.5 – 8.9
11	United Kingdom	8.6	12	0.5	7.8 – 9.2	8.4 – 8.8
12	Canada	8.5	12	0.9	6.5 – 9.4	8.1 – 8.9
13	Austria	8.4	10	0.7	7.3 – 9.3	8.1 – 8.8
	Luxembourg	8.4	7	0.8	7.3 – 9.6	8.0 – 8.9
15	Germany	8.2	11	0.6	7.5 – 9.2	8.0 – 8.5
16	Hong Kong	8.0	13	1.5	3.5 – 9.4	7.1 – 8.5
17	Belgium	7.5	10	0.8	6.6 – 9.1	7.1 – 8.0
	Ireland	7.5	10	0.7	6.5 – 8.7	7.2 – 7.9
	USA	7.5	14	1.1	5.0 – 8.7	6.9 – 8.0
20	Chile	7.4	11	0.7	6.3 – 8.7	7.0 – 7.8
21	Barbados	7.3	3	0.7	6.6 – 8.0	6.6 – 7.6
22	France	7.1	12	1.1	5.0 – 9.0	6.6 – 7.6
	Spain	7.1	11	0.6	5.6 – 8.0	6.7 – 7.4
24	Japan	6.9	15	1.4	3.5 – 9.0	6.2 – 7.4
25	Malta	6.8	4	1.9	5.3 – 9.1	5.3 – 8.2
26	Israel	6.4	10	1.4	3.5 – 8.1	5.6 – 7.1
27	Portugal	6.3	9	0.9	5.0 – 7.3	5.8 – 6.8
28	Uruguay	6.2	6	0.6	5.6 – 7.3	5.9 – 6.7

Table 9.1: *continued*

Country rank	Country	CPI 2004 score <sup>a</sup>	Surveys used <sup>b</sup>	Standard deviation <sup>c</sup>	High-low range <sup>d</sup>	Confidence range <sup>e</sup>
29	Oman	6.1	5	1.2	4.2 – 7.3	5.1 – 6.8
	United Arab Emirates	6.1	5	1.5	4.7 – 8.0	5.1 – 7.1
31	Botswana	6.0	7	1.3	4.4 – 8.0	5.3 – 6.8
	Estonia	6.0	12	1.2	5.0 – 9.1	5.6 – 6.7
	Slovenia	6.0	12	1.0	5.3 – 8.7	5.6 – 6.6
34	Bahrain	5.8	5	0.5	5.3 – 6.6	5.5 – 6.2
35	Taiwan	5.6	15	1.0	3.7 – 7.8	5.2 – 6.1
36	Cyprus	5.4	4	0.5	4.7 – 6.0	5.0 – 5.8
37	Jordan	5.3	9	1.2	3.7 – 6.8	4.6 – 5.9
38	Qatar	5.2	4	0.6	4.3 – 5.8	4.6 – 5.6
39	Malaysia	5.0	15	1.3	2.6 – 8.0	4.5 – 5.6
	Tunisia	5.0	7	0.9	3.7 – 6.6	4.5 – 5.6
41	Costa Rica	4.9	8	1.3	3.6 – 7.8	4.2 – 5.8
42	Hungary	4.8	12	0.5	4.1 – 5.6	4.6 – 5.0
	Italy	4.8	10	0.7	3.4 – 5.6	4.4 – 5.1
44	Kuwait	4.6	5	1.0	3.4 – 5.6	3.8 – 5.3
	Lithuania	4.6	9	1.3	3.1 – 7.7	4.0 – 5.4
	South Africa	4.6	11	0.7	3.4 – 5.8	4.2 – 5.0
47	South Korea	4.5	14	1.0	2.2 – 5.8	4.0 – 4.9
48	Seychelles	4.4	3	0.8	3.7 – 5.3	3.7 – 5.0
49	Greece	4.3	9	0.7	3.8 – 5.6	4.0 – 4.8
	Suriname	4.3	3	2.2	2.1 – 6.6	2.1 – 5.8
51	Czech Republic	4.2	11	1.2	3.4 – 7.3	3.7 – 4.9
	El Salvador	4.2	7	1.5	2.1 – 6.3	3.3 – 5.1
	Trinidad and Tobago	4.2	6	1.2	3.3 – 6.6	3.6 – 5.2
54	Bulgaria	4.1	10	0.9	2.9 – 5.7	3.7 – 4.6
	Mauritius	4.1	5	1.1	2.5 – 5.6	3.2 – 4.8
	Namibia	4.1	7	0.9	2.6 – 5.3	3.5 – 4.6
57	Latvia	4.0	8	0.4	3.5 – 4.8	3.8 – 4.3
	Slovakia	4.0	11	0.9	3.0 – 5.6	3.6 – 4.5
59	Brazil	3.9	11	0.4	3.5 – 4.8	3.7 – 4.1
60	Belize	3.8	3	0.5	3.4 – 4.3	3.4 – 4.1
	Colombia	3.8	10	0.7	2.5 – 4.5	3.4 – 4.1
62	Cuba	3.7	4	1.7	1.6 – 5.6	2.2 – 4.7
	Panama	3.7	7	0.7	3.0 – 5.1	3.4 – 4.2
64	Ghana	3.6	7	0.9	2.5 – 5.1	3.1 – 4.1
	Mexico	3.6	11	0.5	2.6 – 4.5	3.3 – 3.8
	Thailand	3.6	14	0.7	2.5 – 4.5	3.3 – 3.9
67	Croatia	3.5	9	0.4	2.7 – 4.2	3.3 – 3.8
	Peru	3.5	8	0.4	2.6 – 4.0	3.3 – 3.7
	Poland	3.5	13	0.9	2.4 – 5.3	3.1 – 3.9
	Sri Lanka	3.5	8	0.8	2.5 – 4.5	3.1 – 3.9
71	China	3.4	16	1.0	2.1 – 5.6	3.0 – 3.8
	Saudi Arabia	3.4	5	1.0	2.0 – 4.5	2.7 – 4.0
	Syria	3.4	5	1.1	2.1 – 5.1	2.8 – 4.1
74	Belarus	3.3	5	1.9	1.6 – 5.8	1.9 – 4.8
	Gabon	3.3	3	1.1	2.1 – 4.3	2.1 – 3.7
	Jamaica	3.3	6	0.7	2.1 – 4.2	2.8 – 3.7

Table 9.1: *continued*

Country rank	Country	CPI 2004 score <sup>a</sup>	Surveys used <sup>b</sup>	Standard deviation <sup>c</sup>	High–low range <sup>d</sup>	Confidence range <sup>e</sup>	
77	Benin	3.2	3	1.6	2.0 – 5.1	2.0 – 4.3	
	Egypt	3.2	8	1.0	2.1 – 5.1	2.7 – 3.8	
	Mali	3.2	5	1.5	1.5 – 5.1	2.2 – 4.2	
	Morocco	3.2	7	0.5	2.5 – 3.9	2.9 – 3.5	
	Turkey	3.2	13	0.9	1.9 – 5.4	2.8 – 3.7	
82	Armenia	3.1	5	0.9	2.3 – 4.3	2.4 – 3.7	
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.1	7	0.6	2.3 – 4.0	2.7 – 3.5	
	Madagascar	3.1	4	1.7	1.7 – 5.3	1.8 – 4.4	
85	Mongolia	3.0	3	0.4	2.6 – 3.4	2.6 – 3.2	
	Senegal	3.0	6	0.8	2.0 – 4.2	2.5 – 3.5	
87	Dominican Republic	2.9	6	0.7	2.0 – 3.6	2.4 – 3.3	
	Iran	2.9	5	0.8	1.6 – 3.7	2.2 – 3.4	
	Romania	2.9	12	0.9	1.7 – 5.1	2.5 – 3.4	
90	Gambia	2.8	5	0.9	1.6 – 3.8	2.2 – 3.4	
	India	2.8	15	0.5	2.2 – 3.7	2.6 – 3.0	
	Malawi	2.8	5	1.0	2.0 – 4.5	2.2 – 3.7	
	Mozambique	2.8	7	0.6	2.1 – 3.7	2.4 – 3.1	
	Nepal	2.8	3	1.0	1.6 – 3.5	1.6 – 3.4	
	Russia	2.8	15	0.8	2.0 – 5.0	2.5 – 3.1	
	Tanzania	2.8	7	0.6	2.0 – 3.7	2.4 – 3.2	
	97	Algeria	2.7	6	0.5	2.0 – 3.4	2.3 – 3.0
		Lebanon	2.7	5	0.9	1.6 – 3.7	2.1 – 3.2
Macedonia		2.7	7	0.8	2.1 – 4.3	2.3 – 3.2	
Nicaragua		2.7	7	0.4	2.1 – 3.5	2.5 – 3.0	
Serbia and Montenegro		2.7	7	0.6	2.1 – 3.5	2.3 – 3.0	
102	Eritrea	2.6	3	1.4	1.6 – 4.2	1.6 – 3.4	
	Papua New Guinea	2.6	4	1.2	1.6 – 4.3	1.9 – 3.4	
	Philippines	2.6	14	0.6	1.4 – 3.7	2.4 – 2.9	
	Uganda	2.6	7	0.8	2.0 – 3.7	2.1 – 3.1	
	Vietnam	2.6	11	0.6	1.6 – 3.7	2.3 – 2.9	
	Zambia	2.6	6	0.5	2.0 – 3.4	2.3 – 2.9	
108	Albania	2.5	4	0.6	2.0 – 3.3	2.0 – 3.0	
	Argentina	2.5	11	0.6	1.7 – 3.7	2.2 – 2.8	
	Libya	2.5	4	0.7	1.8 – 3.5	1.9 – 3.0	
	Palestine	2.5	3	0.5	2.0 – 2.9	2.0 – 2.7	
112	Ecuador	2.4	7	0.2	2.1 – 2.6	2.3 – 2.5	
	Yemen	2.4	5	0.7	1.6 – 3.5	1.9 – 2.9	
114	Congo, Republic	2.3	4	0.4	2.0 – 2.9	2.0 – 2.7	
	Ethiopia	2.3	6	0.8	1.6 – 3.7	1.9 – 2.9	
	Honduras	2.3	7	0.4	1.5 – 2.9	2.0 – 2.6	
	Moldova	2.3	5	0.6	1.8 – 3.4	2.0 – 2.8	
	Sierra Leone	2.3	3	0.5	2.0 – 2.9	2.0 – 2.7	
	Uzbekistan	2.3	6	0.2	2.0 – 2.5	2.1 – 2.4	
	Venezuela	2.3	11	0.3	2.0 – 3.0	2.2 – 2.5	
	Zimbabwe	2.3	7	0.7	1.2 – 3.3	1.9 – 2.7	
	122	Bolivia	2.2	6	0.2	2.0 – 2.5	2.1 – 2.3
Guatemala		2.2	7	0.3	1.6 – 2.5	2.0 – 2.4	

Table 9.1: *continued*

Country rank	Country	CPI 2004 score <sup>a</sup>	Surveys used <sup>b</sup>	Standard deviation <sup>c</sup>	High–low range <sup>d</sup>	Confidence range <sup>e</sup>
	Kazakhstan	2.2	7	0.7	1.6 – 3.7	1.8 – 2.7
	Kyrgyzstan	2.2	5	0.3	1.8 – 2.6	2.0 – 2.5
	Niger	2.2	3	0.4	2.0 – 2.6	2.0 – 2.5
	Sudan	2.2	5	0.2	2.0 – 2.5	2.0 – 2.3
	Ukraine	2.2	10	0.4	1.6 – 2.9	2.0 – 2.4
129	Cameroon	2.1	5	0.3	1.7 – 2.6	1.9 – 2.3
	Iraq	2.1	4	1.0	1.2 – 3.5	1.3 – 2.8
	Kenya	2.1	7	0.5	1.6 – 3.1	1.9 – 2.4
	Pakistan	2.1	7	0.8	1.2 – 3.3	1.6 – 2.6
133	Angola	2.0	5	0.3	1.5 – 2.1	1.7 – 2.1
	Congo, Democratic Republic	2.0	3	0.5	1.5 – 2.5	1.5 – 2.2
	Côte d’Ivoire	2.0	5	0.4	1.6 – 2.5	1.7 – 2.2
	Georgia	2.0	7	0.6	1.0 – 2.6	1.6 – 2.3
	Indonesia	2.0	14	0.6	0.8 – 3.2	1.7 – 2.2
	Tajikistan	2.0	4	0.4	1.6 – 2.6	1.7 – 2.4
	Turkmenistan	2.0	3	0.5	1.6 – 2.5	1.6 – 2.3
140	Azerbaijan	1.9	7	0.2	1.6 – 2.1	1.8 – 2.0
	Paraguay	1.9	7	0.5	1.2 – 2.6	1.7 – 2.2
142	Chad	1.7	4	0.7	1.0 – 2.6	1.1 – 2.3
	Myanmar	1.7	4	0.3	1.5 – 2.1	1.5 – 2.0
144	Nigeria	1.6	9	0.4	0.9 – 2.1	1.4 – 1.8
145	Bangladesh	1.5	8	0.8	0.3 – 2.4	1.1 – 1.9
	Haiti	1.5	5	0.6	0.8 – 2.4	1.2 – 1.9

- a. ‘CPI 2004 score’ relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
- b. ‘Surveys used’ refers to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. A total of 18 surveys were used from 12 independent institutions, and at least three surveys were required for a country to be included in the CPI.
- c. ‘Standard deviation’ indicates differences in the values given by the sources: the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences in perceptions of a country among the sources.
- d. ‘High–low range’ provides the highest and lowest values given by the different sources.
- e. ‘Confidence range’ provides a range of possible values of the CPI score. This reflects how a country’s score may vary, depending on measurement precision. Nominally, with 5 per cent probability the score is above this range and with another 5 per cent it is below. However, particularly when only few sources are available an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90 per cent. It is 65.3 per cent for 3 sources; 73.6 per cent for 4 sources; 78.4 per cent for 5 sources; 80.2 per cent for 6 sources and 81.8 per cent for 7 sources.

## Note

1. Johann Graf Lambsdorff is professor of economics at the University of Passau, Germany, and director of statistical work on the CPI for TI. Contact: [jlambsd@uni-passau.de](mailto:jlambsd@uni-passau.de)

## 10 Global Corruption Barometer 2004

*Marie Wolkers*<sup>1</sup>

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The Global Corruption Barometer, first launched by Transparency International (TI) in 2003, is a public opinion survey of perceptions, experiences and attitudes towards corruption. The barometer is carried out for TI by Gallup International, as part of their Voice of the People survey. Complementing TI's Corruption Perceptions Index (see page 233), which captures perceptions among business people and country analysts, the Global Corruption Barometer surveys the general public. This year's edition is based on interviews conducted between June and September 2004 with 50,000 people in 60 countries.<sup>2</sup>

One of the most striking findings in 2004 was that globally, just as in 2003, the public perceived political parties as the sector most affected by corruption, followed by parliament/legislature, the police and the legal system/judiciary (see Figure 10.1). On a scale from 1 ('not at all corrupt') to 5 ('extremely corrupt'), political parties received a global score of 4 and obtained the worst assessment in 30 out of 54 countries, most notably in Ecuador (4.9), Argentina and Peru (both 4.6). Similarly, when asked to compare the impact of corruption on different spheres of life, 7 out of 10 respondents worldwide judged political life to be affected by corruption, which was more than the number who said that corruption affected the business environment (6 out of 10) or personal and family life (4 out of 10).

Across the world, people view corruption as one of the biggest problems their country faces. Grand/political corruption was one of four issues identified as a very or fairly big problem by 85–90 per cent of respondents (the other three issues being unemployment, poverty and insecurity/crimes/violence/terrorism). Petty/administrative corruption was mentioned by 78 per cent of respondents.

Petty/administrative corruption was not considered to be an issue in most industrialised countries, but there were important differences regarding grand/political corruption. Although grand corruption was considered to be a very or fairly big problem by only 25 per cent of Danes and 27 per cent of Norwegians, it was seen as a matter of concern by between 86 and 95 per cent of respondents in Italy, France, Greece and Portugal, whose level of concern surpassed that of the public in some less developed countries such as Afghanistan and Malaysia, where the figure stood at 74 and 77 per cent.

In the developing world, both grand/political corruption and petty/administrative corruption were of high concern, especially in Latin America and Africa. Brazil saw the most striking results, with 99 per cent of respondents regarding both petty and grand corruption as very or fairly big problems.




Figure 10.1: Sectors affected by corruption<sup>a</sup>

a. Respondents were asked: 'To what extent do you perceive the following sectors in this country to be affected by corruption?' Answers on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all corrupt, 5 = extremely corrupt).

Differences between developed and developing countries were similarly seen when respondents were asked about the impact of corruption on personal and family life. Corruption's impact was seen to be very low in most developed countries, with the exceptions of Canada, Greece and the United States, where 43 per cent said that corruption affected their personal life to a moderate or large extent. A negative personal impact was reported by three out of four respondents in Brazil, Ecuador, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines and Turkey.

Worldwide, one in 10 respondents said that they or other members of their household had paid a bribe in the previous 12 months. The most frequent direct experience of corruption was in Cameroon, where more than half the respondents reported experiences of bribery during the year, followed by Kenya, Lithuania, Moldova and Nigeria (see Table 10.1). At the other extreme, in 18 countries only 2 per cent of respondents or fewer stated that they had paid a bribe in the previous 12 months.

Turning to expectations of the future, 43 per cent of respondents expected the level of corruption to increase in the next three years. The most pessimistic country was Ecuador, with 75 per cent anticipating a rise. Indonesia was the most optimistic country, with 66 per cent forecasting a reduction in corruption in the coming years, followed by Georgia (with 59 per cent) and Kosovo (52 per cent).



For more information on the Global Corruption Barometer, see [www.transparency.org/surveys/index#gcb](http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index#gcb)

Table 10.1: Experience of bribery – the 10 countries reporting the highest levels<sup>a</sup>

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't know/NA (%)
Cameroon	52	34	14
Kenya	36	60	4
Lithuania	32	64	5
Moldova	32	62	6
Nigeria	32	60	9
Albania	30	67	3
Bolivia	29	68	3
Ecuador	27	71	2
Romania	25	61	14
Ukraine	25	64	10

a. Respondents were asked: 'In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form?'

## Notes

1. Marie Wolkers is responsible for corruption measurement issues in Transparency International's research department (contact: [mwolkers@transparency.org](mailto:mwolkers@transparency.org)).
2. The results of the Global Corruption Barometer 2004 included 54 countries at the time of writing: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kosovo, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, the United States and Vietnam. More countries (including Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Finland, Ghana, India, Ireland, Latvia and Singapore) may be added before the expected publication date in December 2004.

## 11 National Integrity Systems in the Pacific island states

*Peter Larmour*<sup>1</sup>

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TI Australia carried out a survey of National Integrity Systems (NIS) in 12 small states in the South Pacific. The NIS is imagined as a series of pillars, upholding integrity in government. The surveys used a standard questionnaire, derived from ideas in TI's Source Book,<sup>2</sup> and already used in surveys of more than 60 other countries (including the larger Pacific countries: Australia, Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea (PNG)). Additional questions were added about traditional institutions which remain influential in the South Pacific region, and about corruption in the private sector and NGOs. The median population of the states surveyed is about 50,000 people, ranging from about 2,000 (Niue) to about 500,000 (Solomon Islands).

The research was coordinated by Peter Larmour and Manu Barcham at the Australian National University (ANU). Each country study was prepared by an expert or small team of experts on the country in question. The experts tended to be academic political scientists or anthropologists or former senior officials who were no longer closely associated with the government. Seven of the 12 studies were conducted by citizens of the country. In almost every case the researcher held a public forum in which the results were discussed – and the seeds were sown for follow-up once the report was completed. The researchers were also brought together for a workshop in Fiji in March 2004, hosted by the University of the South Pacific. There they discussed their findings and an overview prepared by ANU, and agreed a set of recommendations.

The reports found that almost every country had legal provisions against bribery, and most had public service regulations that prohibited conflicts of interest. Several had or were devising 'leadership codes' that specified appropriate behaviour for senior officials and ministers. However, the reports found confusion in the general public as well as disagreement about what counted as corruption and – particularly in Vanuatu – whether it really mattered. The small size of these countries made popular supervision of government easier as everyone knew what was going on, but it also made it difficult to keep family matters separate from official roles.

Every country studied (except Tonga) is a democracy, but there was strong concern about political manoeuvring to win elections and stay in government. Political parties are weak or absent in every country. Politicians are elected on personal promises to constituents, while governments have to assemble majorities from among independent members of legislatures. Leaders offer government jobs in exchange for support.

Government ministers are most often suspected of corruption through abuse of their powers to regulate and license, through funding projects in their own constituencies, and through interfering with public service promotions and training opportunities.

The NIS pillars include the executive, the legislature and independent bodies such as an auditor, ombudsman or public service commission. The reports found that ombudsmen were generally ineffective, and audit reports rarely read or acted upon. Ironically, the country with the most elaborate legal provision for independent oversight – the Solomon Islands – has a chronic corruption problem, which grew particularly out of the logging industry in the 1990s.<sup>3</sup>

Traditional institutions and practices remain strong in most parts of the Pacific, and the surveys asked about their role in preventing or encouraging corruption. They found that courts, particularly in Kiribati, successfully distinguished traditional gifts from bribes. Nobles in Tonga did not feel particularly accountable to the people, and it was hard to draw a line between the public and private faces of the monarchy there. People generally had different expectations of the behaviour of chiefs and government officials, with elected politicians in an ambiguous position between them: the report on the Federated States of Micronesia criticised politicians for ‘behaving like chiefs’. Cultural factors such as deference to leadership and reluctance to ‘rock the boat’ inhibited people from reporting corruption.

The surveys found civil society and the private sector to be unevenly developed throughout the region. There are TI groups in two of the countries (Solomon Islands and Vanuatu), and interest was shown at public meetings about the survey reports in Samoa and Tonga. In some states (for example, Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands) there is a lively civil society, while in others, such as Kiribati, it is less developed. The private sector is also often very small and dependent on government. The surveys found concern about corruption in NGOs, particularly in churches that dealt with large sums of money and property. Most found the media important in raising corruption issues, particularly in Palau, but they also found that pressure from government, and from advertisers, put limits on reporting.

The reports came up with a common set of recommendations about what should be done. Governments should display more political will, and a stronger civil society could press them to do so. Stronger political parties might inhibit political manoeuvring, though the Samoa report raised the danger of political parties being so strong that they inhibit criticism. Independent commissions against corruption could provide a focus for anti-corruption activity, though the research also cast doubt on the value of independent commissions, which create new positions to be filled by patronage and are typically starved of resources. Codes of practice would help define appropriate behaviour, where the reports had found there was disagreement and uncertainty.

In June 2004 representatives of TI Australia and TI PNG presented an overview of the studies to the annual meeting of the economic ministers of the Pacific Islands Forum (the regional economic and political organisation of which the island states, Australia and New Zealand are members). In the final ‘Action Plan’ ministers noted the study’s findings, and committed themselves to increasing efforts to strengthen institutions

and laws to prevent corruption, including its causes, and to improve public sector governance at national levels.

## Notes

1. Peter Larmour is a senior lecturer in policy and governance at the Australian National University.
2. Transparency International, *The TI Source Book 2000, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System* (Berlin: Transparency International, 2000), [www.transparency.org/sourcebook/index.html](http://www.transparency.org/sourcebook/index.html)
3. The Solomon Islands government requested foreign intervention after a police-led *coup d'état* and a subsequent breakdown in law and order. The Australian-led intervention has strengthened the capacity of the government to investigate and prosecute corruption, and many members of the police force have been prosecuted (though the outcomes of the cases are not yet known).

## 12 Kenya Bribery Index 2004

*Mwalimu Mati and Osendo Con Omoro*<sup>1</sup>

The Kenya Bribery Index 2004 reports the findings of TI Kenya's third national survey on bribery. The index ranks 38 public and private sector organisations according to ordinary citizens' experience of bribery in their daily interactions with them. It measures (so-called) petty bribery – it does not capture grand corruption, such as the bribery involved in major public procurement projects.

A structured questionnaire was administered nationwide by personal interview in households. In December 2003 a total of 2,407 individuals were interviewed in all eight provinces of Kenya; 1,160 in urban and 1,247 in rural residences. Respondents provided information on their experience with bribery over the last 12 months: in which organisations they encountered bribery, where they paid bribes, how much, for what, and whether they reported the episode.

Table 12.1 presents the findings on the 10 organisations most prone to bribery in Kenya. For each organisation, six indicators capture different dimensions of the magnitude and impact of the problem:

1. **Incidence** measures the likelihood that a person visiting an organisation will be asked to, or feels it is necessary to, offer a bribe.
2. **Prevalence** indicates the percentage of the population affected by bribery in the organisation.
3. **Severity** captures the level of impunity – whether service is denied for declining to bribe.
4. **Frequency** measures the average number of bribes paid per year per person having contact with the organisation.
5. **Cost** indicates the estimated proceeds from bribes, and can be interpreted as the 'bribery tax' per adult citizen (for those having contact with the organisation).
6. **Size** refers to the average size of bribes paid by those having contact with the organisation.

In addition, an aggregate index was then constructed as an unweighted average of the six indicators. The index has a value range from 0 to 100, where the higher the value the worse the performance. The frequency indicators (incidence, prevalence, severity) were computed as a percentage of observations. The value data (frequency, cost, size) were scaled by the highest value to obtain a normalised score with a value between 0 and 100 (whereas the actual values are reported in Table 12.1).

Table 12.1: Index scores for the 10 most bribe-prone organisations, 2003

Rank	Organisation	Aggreg. index	Incidence <sup>a</sup>	INDICATORS				Size <sup>c</sup>
				Prevalence	Severity <sup>b</sup>	Frequency	Cost <sup>c</sup>	
1	Kenya Police	57.3	82.1	28.4	31.7	12.5	251.59	635
2	Department of Defence	37.7	75.0	0.3	40.0	2.1	39.63	27,917
3	State corporations	30.1	37.6	2.1	9.7	3.3	191.89	10,188
4	Immigration Department	30.1	89.6	2.2	25.4	4.2	43.46	4,467
5	Kenya Revenue Authority	28.8	63.8	1.5	18.8	9.0	31.90	1,486
6	Provincial administration	26.7	53.4	20.3	16.2	4.1	90.61	636
7	Nairobi City Council	26.2	74.1	4.1	19.1	5.8	28.06	863
8	Central government	25.5	60.8	2.3	23.5	5.8	37.42	1,816
9	Ministry of Public Works	24.7	71.4	0.5	38.1	3.8	5.57	2,035
10	Ministry of Lands	24.5	73.2	3.2	21.4	2.9	40.23	3,620

a. Percentage of encounters.

b. Percentage of refusals that resulted denial of service.

c. Cost and size are in Kenya shillings.

Sadly, bribery remains a significant burden on already poverty-stricken Kenyans, though it appears to be decreasing. In 2002, two out of three encounters with ranked organisations involved bribery. By 2003, the proportion had fallen to two out of five. In addition, the number of bribes per person fell from 2.4 per month in 2002 to less than 1 per month in 2003. Police officers retain the top position for extracting the most money from the public through bribery. However, this sum fell sharply from 1,270 shillings (US \$16.90) per person per month in 2002 to 250 shillings (US \$3.30) in 2003. When asked about their perception of the level of corruption, more Kenyans were of the view in 2003 that the problem of bribery was decreasing than was the case in 2002 (32 per cent, up from 14 per cent the year before), but the majority (55 per cent) still felt there was no change in the level of corruption.

However, though the average expenditure on bribery per month (the 'bribery tax') fell from 3,905 shillings (US \$52) in 2002 to 1,261 shillings (US \$16) in 2003, the average bribe size increased from 2,318 shillings (US \$30.90) in 2002 to 3,958 shillings (US \$52.70) in 2003. This may reflect a risk premium consequent to the zero-tolerance policy adopted by the Kibaki government after it took power in December 2002.

Unfortunately, many Kenyans do not report bribery to the authorities. We asked respondents what action they took, if any, on encountering bribery. In the majority of instances (58 per cent), the respondents paid bribes and kept quiet about it. Only 5 per cent of respondents said that they had declined to pay a bribe and reported the incident to the authorities. The low level of reporting indicates a lack of trust in official law enforcement channels, principally the police.

The consequences of declining a bribe demand are still severe – there is a substantial likelihood of service denial in many organisations. In the Department of Defence, 40 per cent of refusals to pay a bribe result in denial (generally in recruitment exercises),

while in the Immigration Department there is a 25 per cent chance of denial of service if one fails to bribe.

### Note

1. Mwalimu Mati is deputy executive director, TI Kenya (email: [mmati@tikenya.org](mailto:mmati@tikenya.org)). Osendo Con Omore is deputy programme officer, TI Kenya (email: [comore@tikenya.org](mailto:comore@tikenya.org)).

## 13 Measuring corruption in public service delivery: the experience of Mexico

*Transparencia Mexicana*<sup>1</sup>

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The National Survey on Corruption and Good Governance (NSCGG) is a tool for monitoring corruption in public service delivery. As it compares both states and specific public services, it may foster competition in efforts to curb corruption and enhance quality. The survey was conducted twice, in 2001 and 2003. It measured the experience of Mexican households as regards corruption in the 32 federal regions of Mexico (including the Federal District), and for 38 public services. In total the survey covered 14,019 homes, with between 383 and 514 households surveyed in each federal region.<sup>2</sup>

The data gathered by the survey generated a national Index of Corruption and Good Governance (ICGG). The index consists of two components, one ranking public servants and the other ranking federal regions. For specific public services, the index is the number of times respondents claimed to have obtained the service by paying a bribe, as a proportion of the total number of times that all respondents used the service during the same year. For the federal regions, the index is the number of times respondents obtained any of the 38 specified services in that region by paying a bribe, as a proportion of the total number of times all respondents in the region used any of the 38 services. The ICGG uses a scale of 0 to 100: the lower the index, the lower the corruption level.

Changes in an index between 2001 and 2003 provide a reference value for assessing public policies aimed at fighting corruption. In 2003, 11 federal regions saw an increase in corruption (as measured by the ICGG) relative to 2001, while 21 saw a reduction. Having had the highest corruption score of all regions in 2001, the Federal District (Mexico's capital city) saw the biggest fall in the ICGG by 2003. However, this achievement was not reflected in comparative terms, as the Federal District only moved up one position in the rank ordering (see Table 13.1). San Luis Potosí was the region that saw the largest increase in corruption, deteriorating from 7th position in 2001 to 27th in 2003.

Significantly, Chiapas, which has the lowest Human Development Index in Mexico, is among the 21 regions that succeeded in improving their ICGG score. After learning of the results of the 2001 NSCGG, the Chiapas local administration implemented an e-government programme for public service delivery. By 2003, Chiapas had risen 10 places in the ranking, from 16th to 6th, suggesting that concrete, well-focused actions can reduce corruption even in the short term.



Table 13.1: Results by federal region in 2001 and 2003

Federal regions with the lowest corruption level, according to the ICGG 2003

Place		Region	ICCG	
2001	2003		2001	2003
2	1	Baja California Sur	3.9	2.3
10	2	Quintana Roo	6.1	3.7
1	3	Colima	3.0	3.8
15	4	Hidalgo	6.7	3.9
3	4	Aguascalientes	4.5	3.9
16	6	Chiapas	6.8	4.0
4	7	Coahuila	5.0	4.4
5	8	Sonora	5.5	4.5

Federal regions with the highest corruption level, according to the ICGG 2003

Place		Region	Score	
2001	2003		2001	2003
9	25	Guanajuato	6.0	8.9
18	26	Nuevo León	7.1	9.9
7	27	San Luis Potosí	5.7	10.2
30	28	Guerrero	13.4	12.0
26	29	Durango	8.9	12.6
31	30	Mexico	17.0	12.7
32	31	Federal District	22.6	13.2
29	32	Puebla	12.1	18.0

Procedures for phone connections, provided by a private firm in Mexico, was the sole service to post a worse index score in 2003 than in 2001. All the other services saw an improved score. The service that most frequently involved a bribe was recovering a car from a detention centre to which it had been taken, or preventing it from being sent there by a traffic warden (see Table 13.2). The lowest frequency of bribery was found for procedures relating to real estate (for example, paying property taxes).

The services for which the largest total value of bribes was given included garbage collection by local government, payments to recover stolen cars, and payments to traffic wardens to avoid detention. On average, the highest bribe of all was required to obtain loans from private institutions, for which individual payments reached US \$700, followed by bribes to speed up gas reconnections and to obtain loans from state-run entities.

Extrapolated to the whole population, the results imply almost 101 million acts of corruption in the 38 services during the year. The survey found that each *mordida* (act of bribery) involved on average 107 pesos (US \$9). Taken together these figures suggest that nearly US \$1 billion were paid in bribes in 2003 to obtain public services in Mexico. Households that claimed to have paid bribes devoted on average 7 per cent of their income to bribes. For the poorest households that claimed to have paid bribes

– those with income at the level of the minimum wage – this regressive tax accounted for 29.5 per cent of their income.

Table 13.2: Results by service in 2001 and 2003

Services with the lowest corruption level, according to the ICGG 2003

Place		Kind of act	Score	
2001	2003		2001	2003
1	1	Procedure concerning real estate	1.6	1.4
2	2	Procedure filed to get authorisation for incapacity or health problems	2.8	1.5
6	3	Fiscal procedure in the treasury: RFC, return, quarterly or annual affidavit	3.2	1.7
4	4	Phone-related procedures	2.9	2.3
11	5	Getting urgent care for a patient, or skipping queues in hospitals to get assistance	4.3	2.5
3	6	Procedure filed to obtain residential gas connections or re-connections	2.9	2.8
14	7	Procedure to get support, or to access government programmes such as PROGRESA, PROCAMPO, milk, etc.	5.9	2.8
8	8	Procedure to get draft registration documents/deferment for military service	3.9	3.0
10	9	Correspondence received	3.8	3.2
13	10	Procedure to get loans in cash for a house, business or car, in private institutions	5.0	3.2

Services with the highest corruption level, according to the ICGG 2003

Place		Kind of act	Score	
2001	2003		2001	2003
29	29	Procedure to get a demolition, building, alignment, or official number licence or permit	16.8	13.2
30	30	Procedure to work or sell in street stalls	18.7	16.0
31	31	Procedure for sewage cleaning	25.8	16.5
33	32	Procedure to avoid detention in the public ministry/file a report, accusation or claim/get follow-up for cases	28.3	21.3
32	33	Request a garbage truck from the local government to remove waste	27.0	24.4
34	34	Procedure to get through customs points, booths or border posts	28.5	25.8
35	35	Procedure to recover stolen vehicles	30.3	26.0
37	36	Parking in places controlled by people who take hold of them	56.0	45.9
36	37	Avoiding fines or detention by traffic wardens	54.5	50.3
38	38	Preventing traffic wardens from taking vehicles to the detention centre/taking the car out of the said centre	57.2	53.3

## Notes

1. Transparencia Mexicana is the Mexican national chapter of TI. Transparencia Mexicana formed a Technical Advisory Council (TAC) responsible for designing the study. The TAC members included more than 20 specialists in surveys and public opinion polls, among them political analysts and academics. The composition of the TAC was modified for the design, execution and dissemination phases, according to the technical requirements of each stage.
2. In 73 per cent of households, questionnaires were answered by the head of the household. Only after several failed attempts to interview the household head were interviewers allowed to interview other household members. Error margins for national results are less than 1 per cent. At the regional level, error margins increase because of smaller sample sizes, and can be as large as  $\pm 4$  to 7 per cent.

## 14 The Public Integrity Index: assessing anti-corruption architecture

*Marianne Camerer and Jonathan Werve*<sup>1</sup>

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The Public Integrity Index is the centrepiece of the Global Integrity Report, a 25-country study on anti-corruption mechanisms released in April 2004 by the Center for Public Integrity. Providing a quantitative scorecard of governance practices in each country, the Public Integrity Index does not measure corruption itself, but rather the opposite of corruption: the institutions and practices that citizens can use to hold their governments accountable to the public interest. A government with weak public integrity systems may not necessarily be corrupt – but it is far more difficult and rare to maintain a clean government where public integrity mechanisms are weak.

The 25 countries were chosen to generate a global sample with geographic, economic and political diversity. The selection of countries includes six from Africa and seven from Latin America, as well as the most populous democracy on each continent. The index assesses the national governance framework. In many cases, particularly in federal states, the experience at the local level diverges from national experiences, and these local situations are not reflected in the index.

The Public Integrity Index measures three things:

1. the **existence** of public integrity mechanisms, including laws and institutions that promote public accountability and limit corruption
2. the **effectiveness** of these mechanisms
3. the **access** that citizens have to public information to hold public officials accountable.

The index is composed of 80 main indicators and 212 sub-indicators (292 in total). These are grouped into 6 main categories and 21 sub-categories (see Table 14.1). The categories and the indicators were chosen on the basis of a comprehensive survey of the academic literature on anti-corruption safeguards. For example, Category 3 – ‘branches of government’ – has three sub-categories that focus on (1) the *executive* branch of government, including accountability mechanisms, immunity from prosecution, conflict-of-interest regulations and citizen access to financial disclosure records of the head of government; (2) the *legislature*, including accountability mechanisms, immunity from prosecution, conflict-of-interest regulations, as well as legislative control over the national budgetary process; (3) the *judiciary*, including issues of

independence and accountability, as well as the safety of judges and witnesses in corruption-related cases.

Table 14.1: Index categories and sub-categories

1. Civil society, public information and media	Civil society organisations; access to information law; freedom of the media
2. Electoral and political processes	National elections; election monitoring agency; political party finances
3. Branches of government	Executive; legislature; judiciary
4. Administration and civil service	Civil service regulations; whistleblowing measures; procurement; privatisation
5. Oversight and regulatory mechanisms	National ombudsman; supreme audit institution; taxes and customs; financial sector regulation
6. Anti-corruption mechanisms and rule of law	Anti-corruption law; anti-corruption agency; rule of law and access to justice; law enforcement

The index is based on peer-reviewed expert assessments. The lead social scientist in each country assigned an initial score to each indicator. To derive the final score the indicators, comments and references generated by the lead social scientist were critically reviewed by a panel of experts familiar with the country, and then consolidated by the central scoring team in Washington. Each indicator score was averaged within its parent subcategory, to produce a subcategory score. The subcategory score was in turn averaged with the other subcategory scores in a parent category. Category scores were finally averaged to produce a country score.

Country scores are presented in Figure 14.1. Countries are grouped into 5 broad scoring tiers that reflect an assessment of the strength or weakness of a country's public integrity system: very strong (90–100), strong (80–90), moderate (70–80), weak (60–70) and very weak (less than 60). No country was rated 'very strong'.

There are two major advantages to this research model. First, the index is transparent in its scoring and methodology. Readers can learn not only how a country scored, but also see exactly why it scored that way, down to the existence of an individual law, or the performance evaluation of a specific institution.

Second, the indicators themselves serve as a checklist of incremental steps that governments can use to enhance anti-corruption reforms. As a tool for dialogue and reform, the index is also useful for civil society groups that do advocacy work to confer with governments and define achievable and measurable goals for improving public integrity. The index is not a tool to shame poor performers. Instead the scores are diagnostic, highlighting weak areas in a country's anti-corruption architecture.

## Public Integrity Index

The Index measures the existence, effectiveness and accessibility of the institutions that hold a government accountable to its citizens.




Figure 14.1: Public Integrity Index

For the full 25 country reports including country facts, corruption timelines, corruption notebooks, integrity assessments, integrity scorecards and integrity indicators, please see [www.publicintegrity.org/ga](http://www.publicintegrity.org/ga). In 2005 we plan to update the 25 country reports and expand the study.

### Note

1. Marianne Camerer is director of Global Access, and Jonathan Werve is associate director, Global Access, at the Center for Public Integrity, United States, [www.publicintegrity.org/ga](http://www.publicintegrity.org/ga)

## 15 A survey of governance in 30 underperforming states

Sarah Repucci<sup>1</sup>

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The international community has focused increasing attention on governance in recent years. The US government's Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) exemplifies this trend – it is a pool of foreign aid that will be given only to countries whose leaders 'rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom'. In May 2004 the Millennium Challenge Corporation announced the first 16 countries eligible to apply for funds.

Currently, Freedom House's *Freedom in the World* survey provides some of the criteria utilised by the US government to determine whether a country is 'ruling justly'. In order to examine in more detail some of the issues pertinent to the MCA, Freedom House designed a survey to focus on government performance in 30 countries. These countries represent a range of geographic areas and polities – monarchies, dictatorships, struggling nascent electoral democracies, and those suffering insurgencies – but all are low performers in *Freedom in the World*. Carried out with support from the US State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the new *Countries at the Crossroads* survey is not yet an official indicator for the MCA. However, its methodology was designed to track the MCA criteria and to help inform the MCA process. Of the 63 MCA candidate countries in 2004, 18 were covered in the first edition of *Countries at the Crossroads*. The other countries were chosen for their geopolitical or strategic importance.

The survey combined four core components in narrative and numerical form: civil liberties, rule of law, anti-corruption and transparency, and accountability and public voice. It included 83 questions that were divided into the four topical areas and grouped into 16 subsections. Freedom House hired one expert per country to write narratives answering the questions. The experts came from a variety of backgrounds, both academic and professional (including journalists and policy analysts), both domestic and international. In addition to the narratives, the experts rated their countries on a scale of 0 (weakest performance) to 7 (strongest) for each of the questions. By averaging the scores in each subsection and then averaging the averages within the topical areas, Freedom House came up with four scores for each of the countries covered (see Table 15.1). The reports covered events in the year from October 2002 to September 2003.

The corruption section was an especially important feature of the report, since this is the only MCA criterion that can eliminate an otherwise eligible country. *Countries at the Crossroads* used a distinctive corruption indicator: rather than measuring corruption in each country, it focused on the governmental environment and how it

might encourage or suppress corruption. In keeping with the focus of the survey, non-governmental corruption was not addressed. The four subsections of anti-corruption and transparency were:

- the environment to protect against corruption (addressing levels of bureaucracy and the degree of official control over and involvement in the economy)
- the existence of laws, ethical standards and boundaries between private and public sectors (addressing regulations to prevent corruption and ensure state financial accountability)
- the enforcement of anti-corruption laws (addressing the effectiveness of investigation and prosecution of corruption)
- governmental transparency (addressing disclosure of government practices).

Table 15.1: Country scores for *Countries at the Crossroads* (scale 0 weak to 7 strong)

	Civil liberties	Rule of law	Anti-corruption and transparency	Accountability and public voice
Afghanistan	2.48	1.67	1.56	2.21
Armenia	3.96	3.26	2.75	2.98
Azerbaijan	3.74	2.92	1.57	2.63
Bahrain	3.67	3.33	2.83	3.32
Cambodia	3.21	2.04	2.11	3.04
East Timor	4.77	4.76	2.42	4.77
Georgia	3.90	3.89	2.30	3.68
Guatemala	3.70	2.66	2.47	3.84
Haiti	3.19	2.34	2.81	3.09
Indonesia	3.38	2.95	2.46	4.03
Jordan	3.46	2.75	2.92	2.94
Kazakhstan	3.53	1.90	1.58	1.94
Kenya	4.74	3.97	3.80	4.22
Kyrgyzstan	3.17	2.62	2.34	1.84
Malaysia	3.64	3.52	2.31	3.11
Morocco	2.84	2.42	1.54	2.42
Nepal	3.91	3.96	3.81	3.84
Nicaragua	4.56	3.95	2.69	4.56
Nigeria	4.49	3.60	3.00	4.02
Pakistan	2.61	2.03	2.12	1.89
Qatar	3.69	3.74	2.58	3.27
Sierra Leone	3.81	3.76	3.01	4.13
Sri Lanka	4.59	4.49	3.97	4.45
Uganda	4.33	4.08	3.77	3.82
Ukraine	3.85	3.32	2.82	3.48
Uzbekistan	2.31	1.93	1.31	1.35
Venezuela	4.32	3.21	2.89	3.64
Vietnam	2.80	2.36	2.45	1.30
Yemen	3.63	3.45	1.85	3.23
Zimbabwe	2.97	2.48	1.86	2.19



One of the most striking findings was that the anti-corruption and transparency scores were significantly lower than those of each of the other topical areas.<sup>2</sup> Thus, among these already poor performers, the state of corruption appears to be worse than other aspects of their governance.

Freedom House also found anti-corruption and transparency to be less highly correlated with the other three topical areas than the latter were with one another. The civil liberties, rule of law, and accountability and public voice sections had correlations with each other of around 0.85, whereas the correlation of anti-corruption and transparency with each of these three was closer to 0.67. This finding further suggests that corruption was the exception among the areas we looked at, with conditions for corruption being somewhat independent of the wider political environment.

In general, the survey found that most of the countries under consideration had passed legislation to address international standards but were failing to implement it. However, in the case of anti-corruption and transparency measures, laws were not consistently in place. This further suggests that corruption is a greater problem than other areas of governance, and that special attention needs to be given to the drafting of appropriate laws.

Beyond the scores, each country narrative provided recommendations that highlighted the most urgent priorities for government action. The most common recommendations on corruption were for improved protection for whistleblowers, increased transparency in the awarding of government contracts, publication of financial statements of government officials, and freedom of information legislation.

The full report is available at [www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/cac.htm](http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/cac.htm). The survey will be carried out again in 2004–05 with 30 new countries.

## Notes

1. Sarah Repucci is a Researcher at Freedom House, United States.  
Contact: [repucci@freedomhouse.org](mailto:repucci@freedomhouse.org)
2. Some caution should be exercised when comparing areas in the survey, although Freedom House did make every attempt to use the same scale across areas.