

CIDSE STUDY ON SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

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CIDSE
Coopération Internationale pour le
Développement
et la Solidarité



CIDSE (International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity) is a coalition of 15 Catholic development organisations in Europe and North America. CIDSE members share a common vision on poverty eradication and social justice and a common strategy on development programmes, development education and advocacy. CIDSE's advocacy work covers trade and food security, resources for development, global governance, EU development policy, and security and development. <http://www.cidse.org> - 16 rue Stévin, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium - Tel: +32 2 230 77 22

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The document is available in English and French. The Executive Summary is also available in Spanish.

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Executive Summary

In recent years and months interest in the inter-relationship between security and development has shot up the development agenda of multilateral institutions like the UN and the EU, of national governments, and of the NGO development community. However, at both the policy level and in practice NGOs and development agencies are still grappling with precisely where and how security and development meet - including how military and development workers interact - and where the boundaries should be between them. This study reflects our considerations on this debate from the perspective of a network of faith-based development agencies. Overall objectives of the study were:

- To deepen our understanding of the relationship between security and development
- To explore the potential for related CIDSE advocacy.

The study is organised into two main parts. The first part describes an evolution of the relationship between security and development, with a special emphasis on how the international community has responded to perceived changes. Part two of the study elicits opinions and ideas from southern partner organisations on the topic through replies to a questionnaire sent to partners in Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia. Throughout the paper recommendations and suggestions for possible follow-up action are made where appropriate, and the last section contains overall conclusions and a summary of the study's main recommendations. The paper is not a position paper; it is rather a reflection paper with recommendations for CIDSE and its member agencies.

A shifting paradigm from development to a security perspective?

There are a number of ways in which military and development policies, goals and practices interact at the current time, which are of interest and concern to the development community. The overarching concern is that a paradigm shift is taking place through which:

1. development policy is increasingly being integrated and subordinated to security concerns, a military logic and short-term political and military strategies.
2. military forces assume a much greater role in peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and development activities

As church-based development agencies, the way in which the world has moved to a more militaristic conceptualisation of security is concerning because it places responsibility 'out there' and presents the illusion that problems can be sorted out without addressing fundamental global injustices, power imbalances and practices such as the continuing arms trade which fuel conflict and contribute to insecurity. CIDSE agencies see tackling structural causes of poverty and global injustice as essential elements of our development work. It follows on from this that we do not believe that global security will be achieved without changes taking place in the north.

This study has been part of a process taking place over several months, which has challenged some of our starting assumptions and led us in new directions. Initially, a good deal of emphasis of the study was on the concern about shifting budgets and the concern that more money was being designated to security-related activities to the detriment of development expenditure. We discovered evidence to suggest that aid for security-related activities has so far largely been *in addition* to existing sources, although we also discovered shifting priorities in the EU's aid policy and budget and a concern that additional sources for security-related expenditure are unlikely to be available in the long

term. Input to our study from partner organisations in Africa and Latin America shows that there is certainly the perception that more money is being designated to security concerns, although whether a definite shift *away* from social expenditure has taken place in all cases is less clear.

In the process of carrying out this study, it has become clear that whilst the shifting budget question is important, it is not the only one. The overarching concern is that a *paradigm shift* is taking place whereby development policy is increasingly being integrated and subordinated to security concerns, a military logic and short-term political and military strategies. At the same time, a positive recent development to be supported is the comprehensive strategy outlined by the UN Secretary General underlining the need to act simultaneously in different areas: "*Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.*"

During the process of our study questions were raised on the legitimacy of military forces assuming increasing roles in the delivery of humanitarian aid, in peacekeeping and development activities, given an approach which is essentially about moving in, getting a job done and moving out, as opposed to the long-term engagement and empowerment approach assumed by development agencies. The study allowed for an initial exploration of *appropriate* roles for civil and military actors in post-conflict situations, with some differing views among partners as well as among CIDSE member agencies.

Views of Southern partners on security and development

The study's consultation of partners in Africa and Latin America included questions grouped in three sections: the relative importance given to state security versus human security and development needs in each country; the roles that different actors (the military, NGOs, the private sector) play in relation to physical or state security, human security and development, and how best to meet security and development needs.

On the whole southern partners agree that more emphasis is being placed on state security as opposed to human security concerns, although responses were nuanced differently from Africa and Colombia. African partners were keen to point to the need for state security to be guaranteed for human security and development concerns to be addressed. Colombian partners, on the other hand, believed that their government's strong emphasis on state security has had real negative consequences for local populations. Partners' responses indicated how different people are impacted in different ways by perceived changes in security perspectives, for example in certain regions or in *urban* areas (Uganda), or between social classes (Colombia). Women and men are also being impacted differently, and gender-specific responses are necessary whereby these kinds of different needs are addressed.

Regarding the role of different actors in post-conflict situations, partners did not refer so much to the role of foreign military forces as peacekeepers, although they did give a clear message that *civilian* as opposed to military peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities should be a funding priority. Regarding the role of the private sector partners gave examples where companies, private security forces and illegal paramilitary forces have fuelled conflict and war. In Colombia a forward-looking strategy was to attempt to engage the private sector in peacebuilding initiatives, appealing to a sense of social responsibility and the opportunity to demonstrate faith-in-action.

Overall, partners argue strongly for more emphasis on human security, for ensuring respect for human rights, for addressing the root causes of conflict and always keeping in mind the link between development and peace. Partners made the point that CIDSE

agencies have a responsibility to raise awareness of southern partners' ongoing concerns at the international level, and to be their ambassadors in the north. In response, various means were identified by which member agencies could better integrate these concerns into their work.

Main Recommendations for CIDSE and its member agencies:

- To help prevent a paradigm shift towards looking at development from a security lens, CIDSE member agencies should not accept the current security/development discourse, but rather work to support and promote the UN Secretary General's conceptual framework of interlinkages between development, human rights and security.
- CIDSE should consider monitoring whether Northern aid budgets are shifting from development objectives to security objectives. Member agencies should encourage and support partners in budget monitoring work, in cooperation with organisations specialised in this work. CIDSE's advocacy work on EU development policy should continue to monitor the EU's approach to the interface between security and development.
- CIDSE should organise during the first half of 2006 a meeting of member agencies to discuss the role of the military in achieving security and in development, in order to foster exchange and greater common understanding. Member agencies should discuss with partners the roles of civilian and military actors in achieving security and the rule of law, both short-term and long-term mandates and their implications.
- Member agencies should inform other agencies, governments, the church and the international community about important issues identified by partners such as the unequal investment in resources towards state and human security concerns, the causes and dynamics of conflict, and the gender perspective in conflict situations. Existing fora such as country dialogues with governments and their embassies, CIDSE country working groups and other platforms can be used, also strengthening partners' involvement in this work.
- Member agencies should reflect on how their own programme work integrates the concerns raised by partners, for example examining how their organisation's work addresses the different perspectives of women and men in conflict and empowers them, and how their work is *actively contributing* to conflict prevention.
- Opportunities for future joint advocacy on issues relating to security and development may be identified within the CIDSE Peace & Conflict Officers Group.

Overall paradigm shift from development to a security perspective

- To help prevent a paradigm shift towards looking at development from a security lens, CIDSE member agencies should not accept the current security/development discourse, but rather work to support and promote the UN Secretary General's conceptual framework of interlinkages between development, human rights and security.
- The CIDSE working group on Global Governance should consider whether it would be possible to integrate into its work the topic of reform of the UN's role in peace & security—recognizing that this would require the contribution of expertise from member agencies.

Shift in budgets from development expenditure to security activities

- CIDSE should consider monitoring whether Northern aid budgets are shifting from development objectives to security objectives, e.g. by establishing a baseline for later comparison. This might include the issue of whether aid is shifting towards "strategic" countries and away from "non-strategic" countries. This approach is considered more appropriate than developing advocacy around the shifting budgets question at this stage.
- Detailed analysis of government spending would be useful to corroborate partners' perceptions that more resources are being designated for state security as opposed to human security concerns, and also to be clearer on if there has been a definite shift *away* from social expenditure. Member agencies should encourage and support partners in budget monitoring work and related advocacy capacity, in cooperation with organisations specialised in this work. (For example, a pilot project with a strong partner in a given country could be co-funded by several CIDSE agencies. A link could be made with work on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers related to breakdowns in national budgets.)
- CIDSE agencies should be informing other agencies, governments, the church and the international community in general about the unequal investment in resources towards state and human security concerns (e.g. within existing country dialogues, within CIDSE country working groups).
- CIDSE's advocacy work on EU development policy should continue to monitor the EU's approach to the interface between security and development. Some member agencies have agreed to contribute to advocacy work on the content of the EU Stability Instrument through early 2006.
- Member agencies should continue to monitor the political debate on the OECD DAC criteria, in view of the potential need for advocacy in relation to the assessment to be made in 2007 on the inclusion of security-related activities. Some member agencies within the CIDSE working group on Resources for Development are monitoring this.

Shift in addressing conflicts from a development to a security approach

- CIDSE agencies should continue to inform their governments about how partners interpret and understand the causes and dynamics of conflict in their countries. This should provide a counter-balance to partners' governments' explanation of conflict, which may be driven by a particular agenda.

- The above can be done within CIDSE country working groups, government dialogues, existing platforms or networks, and visits to embassies. Member agencies should strengthen the involvement of partners in this work and e.g. through field visits by decision makers (recent examples: bishops' visit to Guatemala organised by CIDSE, Parliamentarians' visit to Colombia organised by Caritas).
- Member agencies may wish to reflect upon how the concept of peace is understood and used in current discourse, e.g. peace is not just about the absence of conflict, which could be called a "negative peace"; a "positive peace" must include rights and good governance.

Roles of the military, civil society, and private sector in security and development

- CIDSE should organise during the first half of 2006 a meeting of member agencies to discuss the role of the military in achieving security and in development, in order to foster exchange and greater common understanding.
- Member agencies should discuss with partners the roles of civilian and military actors in achieving security and the rule of law, both short-term and long-term mandates and their implications.
- Civilian peacebuilding and activities for prevention of violent conflict should be a funding priority for northern donors. CIDSE agencies should continue to lobby for this.
- Member agencies should examine whether their work is *actively contributing* to conflict prevention, as well as being conflict sensitive (e.g. by testing programmes).
- Member agencies should consider the question of the accountability of legal private security forces hired by private companies, e.g. for expulsion from land, the accountability of those who hire them. This could be raised with member agency staff working on corporate accountability and also in the CIDSE Africa Forum of November 2005 on extractives.
- Member agencies should monitor the evolution of the trend in the privatisation of war.

Gender implications in security and development

- Member agencies should promote the role of women in peacebuilding and peace processes.
 - In relation to gender-based violence and crimes, member agencies should focus on prevention, root causes and political implications, in addition to the needs of victims, to help prevent a shift to a security-driven paradigm of development.
 - Member agencies should support the wider dissemination and better implementation of UN Resolution 1325 (calling for increased protection of women during armed conflict, for an end to impunity for gender-based abuses during and after conflict and the participation of women at all levels of decision-making related to prevention, management and resolution of conflict).
 - Member agencies should deepen their analysis of the gender perspective in conflict situations and the impact of conflict on gender relations and development (e.g. demobilised men). Agencies should continue to include a gender perspective in government dialogues, in programme work (example: Mindanao peacebuilding work), and also examine how their organisation's work addresses the different perspectives of women and men in conflict and empowers them.
 - Member agencies should address unjust gender structures in development organisations.
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Introduction

It is now widely accepted that there can be no development without security and there can be no security without development. However, at both the policy level and in practice NGOs and development agencies are still grappling with precisely where and how security and development meet - including how military and development workers interact - and where the boundaries should be between them. This study reflects our considerations on this debate from the perspective of a network of faith-based development agencies. Overall objectives of the study were:

- To deepen our understanding of the relationship between security and development
- To explore the potential for related CIDSE advocacy.

The study is organised into two main parts. The first part describes an evolution of the relationship between security and development, with a special emphasis on how the international community has responded to perceived changes. We set out what we understand by the different ways of describing security used in debates on the topic, and point out that a primarily militaristic conceptualisation of security is problematic both from a moral standpoint and from a practical point of view. It gives the impression that military intervention is a magic wand, which will solve the world's security problems without any need to address global injustices and power imbalances. On a daily basis we are provided with evidence that this is not the case. The study goes on to examine the evidence of development aid shifting to security perspectives. Whilst integrated approaches to security and development concerns are necessary, this does not suggest that we should accept a blurring of distinctions between the goals. Further, nor should we accept a slow bleeding of financing for development into security-related military activities. The last part of section one brings us back to the overarching context in which we are operating and outlines some of the areas in which we believe that changes will need to be made in order for there to be a fairer balance of global interests conducive to human dignity and security in the broadest sense for all.

Part two of the study elicits opinions and ideas from southern partner organisations on the topic through replies to a questionnaire sent to partners in Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia. On the whole southern partners agree that more emphasis is being placed on state security as opposed to human security concerns, although responses were nuanced differently from Africa and Colombia. African partners were keen to point to the need for state security to be guaranteed for human security and development concerns to be addressed. Colombian partners, on the other hand, believed that their government's strong emphasis on state security has had real negative consequences for local populations. They argue strongly for more emphasis on human security, for ensuring respect for human rights, for addressing the root causes of conflict and always keeping in mind the link between development and peace.

Throughout the paper recommendations and suggestions for possible follow-up action are made where appropriate, and the last section contains overall conclusions and a summary of the study's main recommendations. The paper is not a position paper; it is rather a reflection paper with recommendations for CIDSE and its member agencies.

PART ONE: SETTING THE SCENE

Section One: An Evolution of Security and Development Discourses

Up until the mid-late 1990s, the dominant understanding of security was that it was about protecting the state and its sovereign territory from external attacks. In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant view of development was that there was a need for rapid economic growth in order to overcome the colonial legacies of low incomes, low growth and investments, low literacy, poor health and dependency. Towards the end of the 1970s the basic needs approach emerged which argued for a range of basic goods and services in order for the poor to live decently. The 1980s saw the debt crisis and the introduction of a broad range of neoliberal stabilisation and structural readjustment programmes which called for the shrinking role of the state and an increased role for markets. But this did little to reduce - and in many cases exacerbated - poverty and inequalities.

1.1 The Human Development Approach

The evident failures in the structural adjustment approach led a group of development practitioners and academics to develop a set of ideas around development with a human face in 1990. The *human development* approach argued that economic growth does not automatically trickle down to improve people's well-being and that there was a need to put people back at centre stage, as both subjects and agents, and as the means and ends of development.ⁱ This approach offered an alternative to pure economic development and the 'one-size-fits-all' approach of the neoliberal policy prescriptions, which proposed a standard set of reforms regardless of national realities.ⁱⁱ Human development moved beyond this, to address a range of other choices that people value such as better access to knowledge, improved health and security, political and cultural freedoms, self-respect and dignity.

1.2 The Human Security Approach

The Human Security approach was first mentioned in the UNDP's Human Development Report in 1994. If *human development* was about widening people's choices, then *human security* was the ability to pursue those choices in a safe environment. Human security broadly encompassed seven dimensions of security - economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. It is about freedom from fear and freedom from want. Beyond this, it includes the idea that what is gained today will not be taken away tomorrow.

The concept of human security was not really new. For years such concerns had been at the centre of development pursuits. Nevertheless, the onset of human security gave legitimacy and breadth to the inter-relationship between poverty and insecurity, development and peace from mainstream organisations and governments.ⁱⁱⁱ

Box 1 Catholic Social Teaching & Human Security

Catholic Social Teaching is a body of teaching on social, cultural and economic matters that can be found in the scriptures and the official teaching documents of the church, then taken forward, expressed and developed in the writing of theologians and the lived witness of individuals and communities. As development agencies of the Catholic Church, the work of CIDSE members is both *informed* by the teaching and *expressed* through our work with partners in all five continents. The human security perspective fits well with our approach as church-based agencies. The Preferential Option for the Poor combined with hope for a more just and peaceful world form the cornerstone of our work.

We see development as a process of freeing people from hunger, poverty, disease and oppression, which aims to restore dignity and rights to the poor and marginalised. It follows from this that security has to be about creating the conditions whereby the dignity of the human person is possible. Pope John Paul II reiterated this in his Message for the World Day of Peace in 1987:

"All States have responsibility for world peace and this peace cannot be ensured until a security based on arms is gradually replaced with a security based on the solidarity of the human family. Once again, I appeal for further efforts to reduce arms to the minimum necessary for legitimate defence, and for increased measures to aid the developing countries to become self-reliant".^{iv}

1.3 Trends in Development Policy & Donor Practice Regarding Areas in Conflict

The move towards a greater awareness of the need for security to encompass human development and human security needs came about at a time when large institutional donors such as the EU were becoming more concerned about the limitations and failures of development aid in regions of violent conflict. At the beginning of the 1990s, and particularly in Africa, a plethora of local, civil and regional conflicts emerged which too frequently cancelled out years of development aid achievements. The case of Rwanda is illustrative. Prior to 1990, Rwanda was considered to be a particularly skilful country in aid management by donors like the EU. But this analysis neglected crucial social and political factors which subsequently contributed to the war and genocide in which some 800,000 people died within the space of three months.

In response, large donors such as the EU began to pay much more attention to the *root causes of conflict* and to mainstream *conflict prevention* into development aid programmes. This made financial sense: conflict is estimated to cost poor countries and their surrounding regions an average of \$54 billion for each conflict, or some 250 per cent of an average country's GDP.^v It would be logical to assume that if conflict could be *prevented* then this money would (at least theoretically) be available for development purposes.

A parallel tendency was the strong emphasis from northern countries to direct aid to countries with better policies and institutions. Experiences during the Cold War had shown that geostrategic goals such as maintaining 'friendly' authoritarian regimes in place were often to the detriment of development objectives. Understanding that foreign aid works best when it is given to governments who govern well, have a capacity to implement their decisions, and decide themselves how to use their aid, led to consensus around the concepts of *ownership* and *partnership*. This implied better ownership of development initiatives and more accountability of both recipient governments and donors. The OECD DAC, the World Bank, IMF and all major donors adopted this language of ownership and partnership in their development strategies.^{vi}

1.4 Post September 11th & Fragile States

This paper contends that the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th 2001 had a considerable influence on development policy. The attacks showed that everyone, everywhere could be vulnerable to terrorist attack. In reality there are fewer incidents of terrorism now than in the 1980s, and these are impacting on a smaller scale.^{vii} Nevertheless, the direct hit on a Western superpower meant a sweeping change in *perception* that has not only firmly put development centre stage, but has also made it a tool for security purposes. This is happening in a number of ways.

Firstly, in the planning of military interventions in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, development cooperation has been included from the outset to deal with the consequences of intervention.

Secondly, development is now being seen as a means to *protect the West* from terrorist threats and from other impacts of conflict in far-off lands such as immigration and organised crime. This tendency can be seen in the increasing attention paid to the drivers and consequences

"When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around the world."^{viii}
USAID

of failed and failing states.^{ix} Whilst development attention was very much focused on the 'good performers' during the 1990s and early 2000s, the World Bank, OECD and a number of national development agencies, including USAID and DFID are now turning attention to

the countries where there have been more difficult partner relationships. The argument is that a strategy is needed to target aid to fragile states even if they are poor performers, since fragile states disproportionately impact on regional and global insecurity.^x

Security concerns will not be the only reasons for targeting aid to fragile states. As with aid to other countries, poverty reduction and other domestic political, geo-political and commercial interests will all play a role. But the concern of CIDSE agencies is that security objectives are assuming an *increasingly important* role in defining aid priorities, and that the emphasis is on *state* security to the detriment of meeting the human development and security needs of the poorest. The UN shares this concern:

"An increased focus on combating international violence has diverted attention and human and financial resources away from development. Thus, there is a risk that concerns for national security will further marginalise the social agenda both nationally and internationally, especially in times of heightened public alert over security threats. That reality has compounded the difficulties for social development...and has prevented the emergence of comprehensive strategies, including building an enabling environment and strengthening institutions, as public attention has been diverted elsewhere."^{xi}

1.5 The UN: Highlighting the Problems; Forging the Solutions?

The UN has been at the centre of efforts to respond to and address emerging issues in the security/development discourse. In 2004 the UN Secretary General commissioned a high-level panel to examine threats to global peace and security and the policies needed to address them. The panel report argues that the threats we face today are inter-linked: poverty, disease and environmental degradation as well as terrorism, the proliferation of small arms, weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, conflict and state failure. The UN must be transformed into the effective instrument for preventing conflict that it was always meant to be, by acting on several key policy and institutional priorities. Kofi's Annan's March 2005 report 'In Larger Freedom' outlines a comprehensive strategy.

Box 2: 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All'

The world must advance the causes of security, development and human rights together, otherwise none will succeed. *Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.*

In the realm of *freedom from want* action is called for on national development strategies, financing for development, trade and debt relief.

In the realm of *freedom from fear* action is needed on preventing terrorism, reducing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, reducing the prevalence and risk of war and setting out clear principles to be applied in decisions regarding the use of force.

In the realm of *freedom to live in dignity* action is needed on strengthening the rule of law, international human rights protection and democracy.

2005 is highlighted as a year of historic opportunity. In September 2005, world leaders will come together at a summit in New York to review progress in the Millennium Development Goals since their inception in 2000.^{xii} But the UN will need to be reformed *with a boldness and speed not previously shown.*

Kofi Annan, March 2005

Kofi Annan and the UN have been comprehensive in their analysis of security and development concerns and admirable in their efforts to draw attention on the need to act in different areas simultaneously. This is a positive development to be supported. But the UN can do nothing alone. It needs the cooperation of member states and it needs to work in partnership with other stakeholders including NGOs and the private sector to achieve its goals. But these actors will not always share interpretations of the best course of action. As the Iraqi case demonstrates so well, even on the very fundamental decision of when it is legitimate to invade sovereign territory and go to war, states are still far apart in their

analysis. The UN has been instrumental in drawing attention to the problems, but whether it has the clout to forge consensus on solutions remains to be seen.

Recommendation:

- The CIDSE working group on Global Governance should consider whether it would be possible to integrate into its work the topic of reform of the UN's role in peace & security—recognizing that this would require the contribution of expertise from member agencies.

1.6 Peacekeeping, Security & Development Boundaries

2004 saw an unprecedented surge in UN peacekeeping operations with three new missions established in Cote D'Ivoire, Haiti and Burundi.^{xiii} This expansion put huge demands on resources, which draws attention to the question of how peacekeeping operations should be funded. Whilst the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions has been limited in the past, particularly in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN peacekeeping troops have helped bring peace and democracy to Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and East Timor. They also continue to serve as a stabilising factor in potential or post-conflict regions around the world, although as shown in the Kosovo case mentioned under 2.2 below, they are still not without their problems.

Peacekeeping activities are a valuable contribution to world security and the question of how they should be funded brings us to the centre of some overarching questions which are raised in this paper. Where do security and development policies meet, where should the boundaries be drawn between them and how can development NGOs ensure that concerns regarding human development and human security needs continue to receive the attention they deserve?

1.7 Potential Paradigm Shift Towards Security-Driven Development

There are a number of ways, then, in which military and development policies, goals and practices interact at the current time, which are of interest and concern to the development community. The overarching concern is that a paradigm shift is taking place through which:

3. development policy is increasingly being integrated and subordinated to security concerns, a military logic and short-term political and military strategies.
4. military forces assume a much greater role in peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and development activities

This is of concern because military (and peacekeeping) forces have a very different approach to tackling violent conflict and its aftermath than development organisations. The approach of military (and peacekeeping) forces is essentially a temporary one. They fly in, deliver their brand of security and withdraw. Development organisations, local and international, are left to deal with the long-term impacts of conflict in the decades which follow. Military forces also have a different approach to partnership. Whilst development agencies tend towards an approach which empowers local partners and prioritises the building of effective partnerships over the long-term, military forces do not have this as such a high priority because of the essentially short-term nature of their engagement. In addition there are serious concerns about the need for humanitarian actors to maintain their neutrality and impartiality, both as a means to guarantee their own safety and to ensure access to the civilian population in need, wherever they may be. This becomes increasingly difficult if the waters get muddied by the military assuming a humanitarian

role. At another level there are questions around the whole concept of “military-humanitarianism” - to what extent should we accept the idea that military forces, essentially trained for war, are appropriate actors to be engaged in humanitarian, peacebuilding and development activities? Wouldn't it be more appropriate for military forces and humanitarian/development workers to adhere strictly to their areas of expertise, their mandate and responsibilities?

Part of the concern regarding the potential paradigm shift is that it will lead to a decrease in funding available for development purposes as development money is increasingly used for military and security purposes. Here there are three related issues. The first is that the military is starting to compete for funds in the fields of humanitarian aid and development assistance. The second is that changes in the international development assistance architecture will allow development funding to be used for security purposes (either as a means to fund military missions or as a means to fund civil activities carried out by the military). The third is that in post-conflict scenarios more money is being channelled into *humanitarian* and *reconstruction* aid to the detriment of activities aimed towards sustainable development in the long-term.

Given this context, development policy has a fundamental and strategic interest in defining and shaping its interfaces with other policy fields. As development NGOs we need to decide how best to ensure that development continues to receive its rightful position in on-going debates around security and development. We also need to consider how best to support partners in the field who are interacting with military actors and others involved in security concerns such as private security companies in their everyday work. The second part of this study will explore the kinds of problems partners have and begin to sketch out how best CIDSE members can respond.

Recommendation:

- To help prevent a paradigm shift towards looking at development from a security lens, CIDSE member agencies should not accept the current security/development discourse, but rather work to support and promote the UN Secretary General's conceptual framework of interlinkages between development, human rights and security.
- CIDSE should organise during the first half of 2006 a meeting of member agencies to discuss the role of the military in achieving security and in development, in order to foster exchange and greater common understanding.

Section Two: Security: Elaborating on the Concepts; Delineating our Concerns

Part of the difficulty in addressing questions of security is that it takes on different meanings for different people at different times. Our understanding of different forms of security is as follows:

State security: a condition whereby a state is able to protect itself from external military invasion, internal dissent and unrest and terrorism.

Military security: the absence of war or violent conflict ensured by the (active) presence of military forces. In post-war contexts, these may be *peacekeeping* forces. This is linked to *physical security*, which means freedom from fear of violent attack.

Geostrategic security: This is concerned with the geopolitical and strategic factors that together characterise a certain geographic area, and implies a condition whereby geopolitical and strategic interests (including access to strategic resources) are not hampered by insecurity. Geostrategic security can refer to a region within a state, a nation-state, or ensuring a secure environment at the regional or international level

Human security: a safe, sustainable environment through which people can meet their economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political needs. Whilst ensuring *state* and *military* security will contribute to allowing this to happen, they do not go far enough.

These different kinds of security relate and overlap in different ways at different levels. As pointed out by Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, for most people the greatest threats to security are violence in their own neighbourhoods, poverty, hunger and disease. Whilst providing state security may be one necessary condition for people to meet these needs, it clearly doesn't go far enough. Security for countries cannot be separated from the issues that endanger the lives of ordinary people. At the same time, people need to feel that they have a satisfactory degree of *physical* security in their everyday lives in order to meet their human development needs and have confidence in state structures. In order to ensure such physical security it may well be necessary to employ peacekeeping forces to attain a satisfactory level of *military* security.

Notwithstanding the need for a sufficient degree of physical and military security, however, there are practical and moral dangers inherent in the predominantly militaristic view of security which emerged post September 11th. In this environment, military interventions were justified to public constituencies in the north as a means to bring about regional and worldwide security. But as continuing instability in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly show, not only was the conceptualisation of the kind of 'security' to be achieved through military intervention highly circumscribed, it hasn't even worked as a means to bring about basic physical security.

2.1 The Perspective of Church-Based Development Agencies on the Militaristic Concept of Security

As church-based development agencies, the way in which the world has moved to a more militaristic conceptualisation of security is concerning because it places responsibility 'out there' and presents the illusion that problems can be sorted out without addressing fundamental global injustices, power imbalances and practices such as the continuing arms trade which fuel conflict and contribute to insecurity. As outlined in Box 1, CIDSE agencies see tackling structural causes of poverty and global injustice as essential elements of our development work. It follows on from this that we do not believe that global security will be achieved without changes taking place in the north.

The Poor as a Threat

A related concern to that which poses security as being something to be addressed far from our shores is the fact that increasingly the poor are perceived as a threat against which we in the west must protect ourselves. This is ironic given the fact that it is, for the most part, the poor who suffer most from insecurity. As partners from Colombia explain in their response to our questionnaire in the second part of this paper, the elites and middle class have benefited most from an increasing emphasis on state and military security. The poor are CIDSE's main constituency and we see it as particularly problematic that they are being viewed in this way as a threat.

From the point of view of development agencies, then, a primarily militaristic concept of security is highly circumscribed. Whilst state and military security are necessary *they do not go far enough* and in addition *should only be used as a last resort*. By putting human beings at the centre, the human security approach allows us to take into account all the conditions necessary for human development needs to be met, whether during times of conflict or in nominal 'peace'-times.

2.2 Gender Relations & the Militaristic Concept of Security

In particular with reference to the US, feminists have argued that the predominant militaristic culture post September 11th reinforces the public/private divide, with the state taking on the role of protector, just as the male is the protector in the patriarchal household.^{xiv} As has been shown by the Patriot Act, the contract is that whilst the state offers protection, citizens must trade in a degree of their autonomy and liberty. Individuals within this system are perceived primarily as victims, and not as agents in their own right.

For years women have primarily been viewed in this way in situations of violent conflict and war. In issues to do with security, in both waging war and making peace, men (and boys) have historically called the shots. Men have made the rules, decided when, why and how wars are to be waged, decided when cease-fires are to be called and at what cost peace is to be negotiated. Women have largely been absent from conventional understandings of war, peace and security, except as victims or ancillaries.^{xv}

But women are agents too. The case of the DRC clearly illustrates the inter-relationship between insecurity and poor development prospects and opportunities. It also reminds us of the well-known fact that women, and children, suffer most in wartime. *However*, women have also emerged as powerful agents of social transformation in wars across the globe. In the DRC, a number of women's human rights, church and development organisations have mobilised themselves to respond to the needs of survivors.

Box 5: Gender-based violence in the DRC

Conflict in the DRC has been particularly marked by the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war. Tens of thousands of women including young girls and the elderly, as well as a number of men and boys, have been raped in order to terrorise, humiliate and subjugate populations. Survivors of rape are frequently abandoned by their families and communities, forced to leave their homes and left in poverty. Mass rape in the DRC has contributed to the spread of HIV, which is predicted to have a catastrophic future effect on the health of the country. Women have also reported being unable to access or work in their fields due to fear of being attacked and raped by militia living in forests surrounding the fields. As a result communities have been suffering from malnourishment. Before the war, women suffered economic, social and cultural discrimination that undermined their ability to protect themselves. This was a culture where women were seen as second-class citizens - and where they were subsequently raped on a massive scale as part of the conflict. All this has stark implications for the ability of the DRC to recover from recent conflict.^{xvi}

Another danger associated with a primarily militaristic conceptualisation of conflict is that it allows certain situations to be perceived as conflictual whilst others are not. Women may then legitimately experience feelings of severe insecurity in wartime, but not necessarily in times of peace. This in spite of the fact that the insecurities women experience in war-time may well continue into 'peace'-time, and in spite of the fact that it is not at all clear that peace is more conducive to gender equality than situations of war. Indeed, a recent report from Amnesty International on post-conflict Kosovo points to the fact that peacekeeping forces have created a market for trafficking women and girls into forced prostitution.^{xvii} In addition, in wars worldwide women have often assumed additional roles and responsibilities which they have been forced to renounce when war is declared 'over'.

Recommendations:

- Member agencies should promote the role of women in peacebuilding and peace processes.
- In relation to gender-based violence and crimes, member agencies should focus on prevention, root causes and political implications, in addition to the needs of victims, to help prevent a shift to a security-driven paradigm of development.
- Member agencies may wish to reflect upon how the concept of peace is understood and used in current discourse, e.g. peace is not just about the absence of conflict, which could be called a "negative peace"; a "positive peace" must include rights and good governance.

Section Three: Examining the Evidence of Aid Shifting to Security Perspectives

The main evidence for a shift in development aid from development to security concerns is:

- A shift in donor priorities towards short-term goals to maintain state and regional security to the detriment of long-term goals which could contribute to human security in the long term
- Substantial increases in development assistance for front-line states in the “war against terror”
- Changes in the international development assistance architecture, including institutional changes in the European Union and debates around what constitutes Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)

3.1 Donor Emphasis on State Security

Integrated Approaches to Peace, Security & Development

In recent years there has been a real shift in favour of more *coherence* between aid for development and aid for security in the international development assistance architecture. This is evident at a multilateral level through mechanisms such as the proposed EU Stability Instrument^{xviii}, and is evident at the national level through instruments such as the UK’s Conflict Prevention Pools, the Dutch Stability Fund and the Canada Fund which all attempt to promote a more integrated approach to peace, security and development. Such initiatives responded to a real need; in the past a lack of coherence and coordination within and among donors has created duplication and waste at the global level as well as contradictions and cross-purposes among agencies. They have also led to poor and inadequate responses to countries in post-conflict situations. Improved coherence in order to ensure a better delivery of aid is, in and of itself, a good thing. However, coherence as it is now being played out is not without risks.^{xix}

Security for some is not security for all

One of the problems with an approach that promotes security and development goals at the same time is that *not all security and development goals are compatible*. This brings us back to the fundamental question of what kind of security do we want and whose security? When the emphasis is on human security then it is likely that interventions will have a positive impact on human development goals. But the contradictions begin when the referent of security becomes the state or even a region. Take the case of Uganda.

Box 6: Uganda: State Stability Compromises Human Security

The Ugandan government, long seen as a model of effective aid delivery, was quick to cash in on the post September 11th climate. It quickly declared allegiance to the global ‘war on terror’ and requested that the US designate the LRA (Lords Resistance Army, with whom the government had been engaged in an 18-year civil war) as a terrorist organisation, which duly happened.

Emboldened by this, the government launched Operation Iron Fist against the LRA, partly funded by a large-scale diversion of money from social service provision to defence spending. This operation contributed to a dramatic escalation in the fighting and civilians have paid a high price in terms of human rights violations and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.^{xx}

Beyond Uganda, countries across the world including Russia, Indonesia, Australia, Colombia, China, Israel, Zimbabwe and the US have used the rhetoric of counter-terrorism to justify their actions in cracking down on the opposition.

The Ugandan case was possible partly because of inadequate controls over how the government was using aid. But there is a wider problem which is the temptation for donors to use development assistance as a broad incentive for geostrategic purposes. Further, aid driven by regional and global security concerns has historically been the least conducive to human development. This conclusion is borne out by recent experiences in Afghanistan.

Box 7: Afghanistan: Human Development Suffers as State Security is Prioritised

In February 2005 the UNDP issued a report which argued that putting a higher emphasis on elements relating to *state* security, on regional and international stability (eliminating the threat of the Taliban and other militias, the fight against drugs trafficking), has undermined the urgency of tackling the kind of issues which impact on the daily insecurity of Afghans - poverty, inequalities, unemployment, lack of access to education and human rights violations. The report concludes:

"To minimise chances for renewed conflict while improving livelihoods and the prospects for dignified lives for all Afghans, state-building strategies need to expand the notion of "security" to cover not only territorial security, or freedom from violence and human rights abuses, but also basic human needs (education, health, food, shelter, incomes and livelihoods, etc.) as well as strategic "needs" (such as participation, dignity, empowerment, etc.)"

Post September 11th, and particularly in states on the front-line of the "war on terror," the strong emphasis has been on short-term goals to maintain state and regional security to the detriment of long-term goals which could contribute to enhancing human security in the long term. Concerns such as respect for human rights and accountable governance - which *had* entered the development lexicon in the 1990s - have been sidelined. Pakistan, previously a blacklisted country, has seen significant increases in aid from the US, the UK, and the EU. The message seems clear: as long as a state is useful for the purposes of maintaining state, regional or global security then human rights abuses and behaviour which undermines individual freedoms and long-term development prospects will be tolerated.


Aid for Security or Aid for Development?

What impact does such a message have on development at the local level? An example would be that trade capacity assistance which could have been deployed to assist rural farmers ends up targeted towards strengthening customs capacity to interdict terrorists. This, and other examples of development aid being used primarily for global security and geostrategic goals may be relatively invisible at the local level, but taken together they could have a significant impact on development prospects. There can be no denying the inter-connected nature of security and development, and indeed the need for a coherent approach to security and development goals. But accepting the need for an integrated policy approach does not imply accepting a blurring of distinctions between the goals. Further, it does not imply accepting a slow bleeding of financing for development purposes into security-related military activities. When military interventions are needed, defence budgets should be the source to pay for them.

3.2 Increases in Development Assistance for front-line states in the "war on terror"

The increase in development assistance for front-line states in the war on terror cannot be refuted. An easy way to see this is to compare aid per capita to strategic countries prior and post September 11th.

Chart 1: Aid per Capita in US\$ to selected strategic countries in the 'war on terror'^{xxi}



Increases in per capita aid to Afghanistan and Iraq are most striking which is not surprising given the huge increases in development aid for security imperatives and post-war reconstruction. More recently, in fiscal year 2004, the US allocated \$18.9 billion for Iraq alone, whilst in 2003-2004 the UK's top aid recipient was Iraq, which hadn't even numbered in the top 10 of recipient countries the previous fiscal year. The UK also increased aid to Pakistan five-fold between 2000-1 to 2003-4, with a further projected increase in 2004-5. The EU's budget line for Iraq increased from Euro 29 million in 2003 to Euro 190 million in 2005, a more than six-fold increase.^{xxii}

A study on aid statistics undertaken by an economics team at Oxford University argues that in spite of these statistics there has been no real *diversion* of existing aid to new security imperatives. Rather, the aid provided has largely been *in addition to* existing sources.^{xxiii} In spite of the conclusions of this study, however, there is some evidence to suggest the contrary: of the EU's €190 million budget for Iraq mentioned above, €100 million was fresh money, but the other €90 million was taken from the aid budget to the Western Balkans. Furthermore, acute budgetary pressures besetting Japan, France, Germany, and the United States (among others), it is very unlikely that *additional* resources will be sustainable in the long term.

Recommendation:

- CIDSE should consider monitoring whether Northern aid budgets are shifting from development objectives to security objectives, e.g. by establishing a baseline for later comparison. This might include the issue of whether aid is shifting towards "strategic" countries and away from "non-strategic" countries. This approach is considered more appropriate than developing advocacy around the shifting budget question at this stage.

3.3 Changes in the International Development Assistance Architecture

3.31 Security & Development: A Difficult Balancing Act for the EU

Over the past few years, tensions have been simmering between the narrow security agenda for the EU and its long-term aspirations to improve the lot of developing countries. In June 2002, the Development Council, the formal meeting which brought together EU international development ministers, was abolished. This seriously weakened the voice of development ministers, made the Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) the main reference point for all of the EU's external relations, and was an early indication of the shape of things to come.

Co-ordinated Approaches

Javier Solana's European Security Strategy document, adopted in December 2003 by the European Council, reinforces this trend. The document proposes creating synergy between security and development goals through a more coherent and comprehensive approach. This is no bad thing in and of itself, but CIDSE's concern is that development will be firmly placed *at the service of* security imperatives: European cooperation policy is presented as an essential tool in a global EU security approach which includes diplomatic, economic and military means. Following the publication of the Security Strategy there has been a raft of other changes in European policies and institutions which all point in the same direction. They include changes proposed in the EU budgetary framework for 2007-2013; the creation of a new Peace Facility fund; changes in the Cotonou agreement and debates around the Development Policy Statement. These will all be explored further below.

The need for coherence in EU policies was in part a response to the perceived need to address the root causes of conflict. This has been problematic for the EU for a number of reasons. Firstly, addressing root causes would demand an ability to develop a *common political analysis* within European institutions and among Member states within the Council - no easy task given different approaches to foreign policy and the lack of institutional coherence at EU level. But developing this common political analysis is crucial if effective coordination is to take place. To this end the EU has created a set of analytical and coordination tools, but this leads us to the second problem: the plethora of such tools can lead to a lack of coordination when they are used. In addition, the large numbers of EU programmes and their different management structures do not encourage coordination.

The African Peace Facility

The € 250 million African Peace Facility was established in 2003 in response to a request by the African Union for EU support of regional (south-south) peacekeeping. The European Commission, which until now has not had a specific budget for peace and security, proposed to fund the Facility using money from the European Development Fund (EDF), the main vehicle for EU development cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries under the Cotonou Agreement. 1.5% was shaved off of long-term development budget allocations to each African country party to the Cotonou Agreement in order to establish the fund. Peacekeeping operations have since been funded in Burundi and Sudan using money from the fund.

There was both support for and opposition to the establishment of the African Peace Facility with development funding. Some saw it as an important and positive step in direct response to the African Union's request. But several EU Member States were opposed to the diversion of EDF funds that had been targeted toward poverty alleviation to spending related to military activities. A compromise was found whereby the use of funds from the EDF would be a one-off measure, and that for future spending the Commission would have to look elsewhere. Spending from the Facility covers costs like operational costs and daily allowances to peacekeeping troops. This does not qualify as ODA, and € 250 million was lost for ODA.

An EU evaluation of the African Peace Facility is planned, but in the meantime the successor to the Facility has already been proposed, the new "stability instrument" in the Financial Perspectives.

Financial Perspectives

The *Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument* and the *Stability instrument* are two of the six budgetary instruments for EU external relations (the others being for pre-accession countries; the neighbouring countries of the EU; humanitarian aid; and macro-financial assistance).

The *Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument* is intended to be the main vehicle for EU aid to developing countries. However, while the description of the instrument lists poverty eradication as its primary objective, the measures covered by this instrument also include security issues such as the fight against trafficking, crime and terrorism; nuclear issues; the possibility of a rapid and integrated response to post-crisis transitional needs; and management of asylum and migration flows. Development funds will be distributed mostly through large geographic programs (e.g. Asia, Latin America), and the policy guidelines for these programs repeat the security-related objectives. If these are mainstreamed into geographic programs it will be difficult to identify or track what share of development spending is going towards these objectives.

The *Stability instrument* is the proposed new peace & security instrument to allow the EU to respond in an integrated way to global crises or threats. Its main aims are to re-establish the conditions for regular cooperation, and to confront global and regional trans-border challenges, technological threats and weapons proliferation. However, there is significant overlap with the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument, in particular in areas relating to rehabilitation and reconstruction, and to ensuring human rights and the rule of law, which until now have been financed by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. Most assistance delivered under the Stability instrument will qualify as ODA eligible, which means that a portion of EU development aid will be diverted into this new instrument which makes little mention of poverty eradication but is rather targeted towards security objectives.

The Commission proposal forecasts an increase in the Stability instrument budget between 2007 and 2013 of 160%. Meanwhile the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation instrument sees only an increase of 30%. The Commission has also proposed that € 100 million from the European Development Fund be dedicated each year to funding part of the Stability Instrument, which in effect would make permanent the “transitional mechanism” which some Member States opposed in the funding of the African Peace Facility.

The different proposals being made under Financial Perspectives are problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, contrary to the Commission’s stated desire to have instruments follow policies, the stability instrument has not followed from a strategic paper as would usually be the norm. The proposed instrument raises the need for transparency on expenditure in order to clearly identify the development aid component, and a need for transparency in the *process* and democratic, Parliamentary control on decision-making.

Aid Conditionality & Changes to the Cotonou Agreement

Aid conditionality has been used by the EU to regulate its aid relations with third countries. Aid conditionality works through political clauses being inserted into aid agreements usually concerning the need for the respect for human rights, democratisation and the rule of law. If clauses are not adhered to then aid can be partially or totally suspended. Since September 11th new aid conditionalities concerning the fight against terrorism have been introduced through the revision of the Cotonou Agreement, which

regulates aid and trade relations between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries. Cooperation on counter-terrorism has now become an 'essential element' of agreements regulated by Cotonou.

EU Development Policy Statement

In 2005, the European Commission and EU Member States agreed a new joint Development Policy Statement, which sets the framework and focus for European Union development cooperation. In the Commission "issues paper" which kicked off the review of the 2000 Statement, security and development was one of the new issues to be considered. The paper explored potential ways to better integrate security and development concerns, such as bringing security into the EU's political dialogue with developing countries.

The potential for new "innovative" coordination networks including development/security/defence communities in headquarters and at the field level was also evoked. This was given weight by a March 2005 proposal by the Dutch defence minister to the EU for a coordinated approach to crisis management combining military security with development cooperation. This was to be facilitated by a new civil-military planning cell within the EU military staff which began operation in April 2005.

The agreed 2005 Statement sets development in the context of "addressing global challenges," with EU action for development being in the interests of wider peace and stability. The European Commission will increase its focus on the prevention of conflict and state fragility, and the EU as a whole will work to strengthen the capacity of regional organisations (e.g. the African Union) to enhance peace and security.

Aid allocation policy will include political and/or 'security' criteria in allocation methodologies for Community aid, namely for countries in crisis, conflict or post-conflict situations. While the Statement mentions that external action policies should not be subordinate to one another, meaning that security should not be more important than development, a measure such as the inclusion of security criteria in EU allocation methodologies could well lead to aid going increasingly to countries where security is a concern rather than to countries where the need is greatest.

Recommendation:

- CIDSE's advocacy work on EU development policy should continue to monitor the EU's approach to the interface between security and development. Some member agencies have agreed to contribute to advocacy work on the content of the EU Stability Instrument through early 2006.

3.32 What Should Count as ODA?

Changes in the development architecture at EU level are taking place in a context of debates around broadening the definition of ODA (Overseas Development Assistance). In March 2003 the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) wrote a paper called 'A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key entry points for Action' which contained several sections which could be interpreted as opening the door for re-directing aid away from poverty eradication and towards a counter-terrorism and security agenda. This led to a series of discussions around what could be included as ODA.

Discussions culminated in a High-Level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies in March 2005, when it was decided to include in the ODA definition a number of technical

cooperation and civilian support activities connected to security concerns.^{xxiv} Nevertheless, two other items discussed—training the military in non-military matters such as human rights, and extending the coverage of peacekeeping activities—were not considered to be an appropriate use of ODA budgets. It was noted that unlike the six items agreed on which expenditures are relatively modest, these items currently involve large sums, mostly from defence budgets. It was agreed to assess DAC members' positions on these two issues again in 2007.

Whilst discussions in the DAC are now stalled, there are on-going debates in the G-8 and in the EU regarding how to finance security-related activities. The G8 has committed to train 75,000 African soldiers for peace support operations, the source of funding for which is currently unclear. Within the EU, the legal services of the European Parliament in May 2005 has challenged a decision by the European Commission and EU Member States to use regional development programme funds for a € 5 million anti-terrorism project in the Philippines, advising that the move was illegal.

Recommendation:

- Member agencies should continue to monitor the political debate on the OECD DAC criteria, in view of the potential need for advocacy in relation to the assessment to be made in 2007 on the inclusion of security-related activities. Some member agencies within the CIDSE working group on Resources for Development are monitoring this.

➤ Section Four: Persistent Drivers of Conflict; Continuing Causes of Concern

Debates regarding security and development need to be viewed within the context of a militarised culture, ideology and global economy that reinforces wars. Available data indicates that world military expenditure in 2003 was nearly US\$900 billion, a figure which represents almost 20 times the current level of development aid. Contrast this with estimates that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) could be met by 2015 if official development assistance were increased by US\$50 billion per year and sustained at that level. This represents a fraction - only 5% - of what the world is now spending on arms and other means of destruction.^{xxv}

4.1 The Arms Trade

"...the excessive accumulation and illicit trade of small arms is threatening international peace and security, dashing hopes for social and economic development, and jeopardising prospects for democracy and human rights." Kofi Annan, 2002^{xxvi}

According to the Control Arms Campaign, there are around 639 million small arms and light weapons in the world today and eight million more are produced every year.^{xxvii} The global trade in arms continues to fuel violent conflict, state repression, crime, poverty and domestic abuse worldwide, and the nefarious effects of arms continue long after their first use. Landmines can maim and kill years after conflict has ended and weapons are easily sold on second and third hand, fuelling future violent conflict. Military aid to unaccountable governments has left a lasting legacy. The US sold over \$1.5 billion worth of weapons to Africa during Cold War, including to Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Congo. The ensuing civil wars there and elsewhere deprived citizens of their basic rights and destroyed hopes of economic growth and development.

In spite of the well-known consequences of the arms trade, time and time again Western countries have proved very willing to arm delinquent regimes. Iraq and Afghanistan are two cases in point. It is well known that the US armed Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran in the 1980s, and that Western countries were major financiers of the Afghan Mujahadeen against the Russian invasion in the 1970s. Both countries were later deemed the highest security risks to the Western world in recent years. The trend continues. Not only is development assistance to frontline 'war on terror' states with poor human rights records on the increase, so too the west continues to provide arms to such regimes. The UK government, for example, has drastically increased arms exports to Indonesia since 2000, despite ongoing grave concerns about human rights violations there.^{xxviii}

Efforts to promote coherence in security and development aims across governmental departments, such as the UK's Conflict Prevention Tools, will always remain circumscribed in an environment in which the arms trade continues unabated. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council - the US, UK, France, Russia and China - benefit most from the arms trade, controlling some eighty eight per cent of reported conventional arms exports.^{xxix} If prospects for worldwide security and development are to improve significantly, these countries would all need to agree to a international measures to control the arms trade. The UK government has recommended that negotiations on an International Arms Trade Treaty should begin no later than 2006. This move is to be welcomed. Nevertheless, given what they have to lose, the extent to which the UK will be able to persuade the other large arms manufacturers to come on board remains to be seen.

4.2 The Privatisation of Security

Recent years have seen a huge boom in the private security industry, with states outsourcing security to companies from the US, the UK and many other countries. Given the lack of a regulatory regime for such companies, this trend raises concerns around the legality and legitimacy of their actions, and how accountable they are to local populations. Beyond the hired security company scenario, gangs, militias, paramilitaries, proxy forces and so-called 'self-defence' units play a huge role in fuelling conflict in fragile states. Such groups have varying degrees of loyalty to the civilian population and little to gain from peace: bribery, extortion, security rackets, arms, people and drugs trafficking often make up a large part of their activities.

The common denominator of such groups is that they are not held to account for their actions. In some cases they are given tacit support to carry out the dirty work of military forces, so that the military will not be held to account for human rights abuses. In cases such as Sudan and Colombia, decades of war have rewarded these proxy forces with resources, arms and prestige. Meanwhile millions of people have been murdered and forcibly displaced from their homes.

There are many dangers in relying on private companies and proxy forces for security, not least amongst them the risk that the state becomes completely disenfranchised and dysfunctional in its ability to maintain security for the population. It is therefore crucial that every effort be made to encourage the establishment of functioning and democratic state security institutions *before* resorting to private security companies.^{xxx}

4.3 Natural Resource Extraction Fuelling Conflict

A number of studies in recent years have shown how the extraction of natural resources including oil, diamonds, timber and other minerals has fuelled poverty and conflict.^{xxxi} This happens for a number of reasons. Natural resources are often concentrated physically and economically: they lead to enclave economies, which have little integration to the rest of the country's economic structure. Economies then become skewed towards the natural resource alone leaving them highly vulnerable to price fluctuations and external shocks. This leads to periods of boom and bust and does not allow for stable economic growth. Certain kinds of natural resources, such as diamonds, lend themselves particularly well to uncontrolled exploitation, including by illegal and armed actors who can use the profits to buy arms and fund wars. In Angola a 3-decades civil war was fuelled by diamonds providing money for the UNITA rebels and oil providing money for the MPLA government. In Angola and elsewhere in Africa too, oil revenues have been inserted into governments lacking in transparency and accountability which makes it extremely difficult to track how much money enters a country, and how it is subsequently used. This has enabled corruption and revenue mismanagement to thrive.

In environments such as these checks and balances are absolutely crucial. A number of international campaigns in recent years, including the Blood Diamonds and Publish What you Pay (PWYP) Coalitions have tried to address the issue. These argue for proper regulation of the diamond industry and full transparency of revenue payments made from oil, gas and mining exploitation respectively. Natural resources belong to the people of the country where they are exploited. Companies therefore have a duty to disclose information about revenue paid to exploit these resources so that local civil societies can hold their government to account on revenue expenditure. CIDSE members have played a key role in bringing in the voice of southern partners and that of the southern Catholic Church to the PWYP Coalition.^{xxxii}

4.5 Protecting the Interests of Southern Elites

If Western powers are partly motivated by economic interests in keeping the military juggernaut running, what motivates southern governments? The UK Cabinet office (2005) has recently written a document that sets out an international strategy to manage risks of instability. The document argues that a better understanding of the elites in a country, and the incentives they face, is critical to the stability agenda. Of particular concern are 'predatory' elites, which use positions of power for personal gain, or the benefit of families and close associates and in extreme cases are able to 'hollow out' the state. The document goes on to set out a strategy for influencing elites using a mixture of incentives (membership of 'clubs' such as the OECD, OAS (Organisation of American States), AU (African Union) etc.) and disincentives (tough measures against corruption and financial crime).^{xxxiii}

A number of war-torn countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including those rich in oil and other natural resources such as Angola, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Liberia and the DRC, have been subject to the kind of predatory elite described above. In such states any shift of development aid to security perspectives is only likely to be interesting if it serves the interests of the elites in office. Since enhancing state stability brings with it the opportunity for investment and economic gain, then assistance in this direction may well be welcome. There are two concomitant dangers: that a militarised, state security allows for greater corruption and 'hollowing out' of states benefiting from new economic investment, and that, as happened in Afghanistan, state stability is prioritised to the expense of the human security of the relevant populations.

Clearly, not all states at risk of instability will be subject to predatory elites. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the UK Cabinet Office report, the extent to which the incentives of governments and other key influencers are aligned with the legitimate interests of the local populace will depend substantially on the extent of checks and balances holding them to account. In a country with strong checks and balances on executive authority and a participatory political system, elite desires are likely to be more in line with the interests of the wider population. Where these systemic checks are not in place, as in most countries at risk of instability, governing elites' incentives may be misaligned with the interests of the local population and the requirements for long-term stability.

In addition to this, power will always play a role in defining security and development priorities; north over south, states or armed groups over local populations and women in particular, national or regional institutions over community groups etc. In order to better understand motives and the impact of national government priorities an in-depth, country-by-country analysis would be required. The second stage of this study will collate the thoughts and experiences of the security-development nexus of partners on the ground in developing countries. This should help illuminate the motivations of southern governments.

This section of the study has demonstrated that there are clear economic interests of sections of the population - both in the north and in the south - which hinder attempts to address the security and development concerns highlighted earlier in the paper. Multinational companies, emerging private security companies and arms manufacturers in particular, have vested interests in maintaining a relatively high level of conflict worldwide. If human security and development prospects are to have a real chance improving then this issue will need to be tackled head-on.

Recommendation:

- Opportunities for future joint advocacy on issues relating to security and development may be identified within the CIDSE Peace & Conflict Officers Group.

Conclusion Part One

In recent years and months interest in the inter-relationship between security and development has shot up the development agenda of multilateral institutions like the UN and the EU, of national governments, and of the NGO development community. This is evidenced in a raft of recent reports exploring the topic. However, whilst there is now a broad acceptance of the inter-related nature of security and development, exactly where and how they come together is still contested. Moves are being made to apply a more integrated approach to peace, security and development, but such moves are not always cognisant of the fact that *not all security and development goals are compatible*.

This could prove to be a defining moment for the development community. Given the changes outlined in this paper, and in particular the growing influence of the military and security imperatives in development policy, those in the development community have a fundamental and strategic interest in defining and shaping how development policy relates to other policy areas. As development NGOs with counterparts in the south, we are in direct contact with practice and are well placed to have an influence on policy, where the role of civil actors in peace and post-conflict processes is still underestimated.

As faith-based development agencies, we also have a particular moral position and duty to act, based on our position that the poor should continue to be at the centre of development concerns. But it won't be an easy task: whilst we may wish development policy to be the driving concern, with security concerns feeding into that, changes in the international aid architecture at the present time indicate moves in the opposite direction.

CIDSE agencies see tackling structural causes of poverty and global injustice as essential elements of our development work. It follows on from this that we do not believe that global security will be achieved through military intervention alone and nor do we believe it can come about without changes taking place in the north. Failures to bring in effective measures to curb the arms trade in particular bring into question the authenticity of policies and declarations of Western governments to reduce conflict and improve development prospects. War is big business and there continues to be an urgent need to tackle head-on the vested interests of those who benefit from continuing conflict. It is the global, overarching militarised ideology that should frame our understandings in debates about security and development. If this is not kept as the central referent then responses are always likely to be in some way circumscribed.

The second phase of this study will bring in southern partners view and experiences. These will be crucial in providing an overall analysis of the situation and in the design of effective responses.

PART TWO: SOUTHERN PARTNERS' VIEWS

As explained in section one of this report CIDSE and its member organisations are concerned that development aid is increasingly being used for foreign policy, counter-terror and state security, rather than for meeting the needs of the poorest. In order to elicit opinions and ideas from southern partners on this topic CIDSE member organisations sent a questionnaire to selected partner organisations in Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia.^{xxxiv} The countries and partners selected were chosen because member organisations felt that they would have interesting input to give on the topic; they do not form a representative sample. The questions were grouped into three sections: the relative importance given to state security versus human security and development needs in each country; the roles that different actors (the military, NGOs, the private sector) play in relation to physical or state security, human security and development, and how best to meet security and development needs. Partners from the DRC and Colombia sent particularly detailed and considered responses, which explains why more information in this summary is given on those cases. Three partners responded from the DRC, four from Colombia, one response was received respectively from partners in Uganda and Rwanda. This section of the study summarises the input from southern partners, draws out recommendations by them and suggests some possible responses.

Has there been a shift in emphasis from development aid to security perspectives since September 11th?

In response to this first question Colombian partners responded that more attention has been paid to state security for some time. It isn't so much a radical change, but rather the intensification of an existing logic, which has nevertheless seen a significant increase in the military's budget. A similar response was received from one of the partners in the DRC, whilst the others there, in Rwanda and Uganda all thought that there *had* been a shift in emphasis, demonstrated by increases in defence budgets and reductions in social expenditure. Some figures were included to demonstrate this shift and the relative weight given to social and defence expenditure. Uganda has seen a drop of 23% in its social budget, in the DRC five times as much was spent on local conflict in Bukavu and Kanyabayonga than on development activities and in Colombia President Uribe's Plan Colombia designates 26% for social development and institutional strengthening and 74% for the strengthening of the military and the police. One Colombian respondent, however, cited a report which argued that increased military expenditure hasn't meant a reduction in social expenditure.

Recommendations:

- Detailed analysis of government spending would be useful to corroborate partners' perceptions that more resources are being designated for state security as opposed to human security concerns, and also to be clearer on if there has been a definite shift *away* from social expenditure. Member agencies should encourage and support partners in budget monitoring work and related advocacy capacity, in cooperation with organisations specialised in this work. (For example, a pilot project with a strong partner in a given country could be co-funded by several CIDSE agencies. A link could be made with work on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers related to breakdowns in national budgets.)
- CIDSE agencies should be informing other agencies, governments, the church and the international community in general about the unequal investment in resources towards state and human security concerns (e.g. within existing country dialogues, within CIDSE country working groups).

If so, why has this been the case?

In Colombia the post-September 11th period coincided with the election of President Uribe. President Uribe has been determined to reframe the Colombian conflict as a war against terror as opposed to a situation of internal conflict or 'civil war' which has lasted for more than 40 years. The biggest ever military operation against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) guerrillas has been on-going over the last year, with FARC and other remaining guerrillas in the country designated as 'narco-terrorists'.^{xxxv} Uribe's framing of the Colombian conflict in this way ignores structural problems such as political and social inequalities, the concentration of wealth and corruption and the interests of particular interest groups to remain in power as a way of protecting and favouring particular national and international economic interests. Nevertheless, such a framing neatly ties in with the US-vision of the worldwide "war on terror" and US Congress strongly supports Uribe's vision. There is concern from Colombian partners that the EU has also been moving towards prioritising state security over human security needs, in both its discourse and the orientation of EU programmes and policies.

In Uganda it was felt that the influence of northern governments, along with the continuing situation of war were responsible for the increasing emphasis on state security and in the DRC the government made a declaration against terror which presumably was in part response to global dynamics and calls for support for the global "war on terror."

Recommendations:

- CIDSE agencies should continue to inform their governments about how partners interpret and understand the causes and dynamics of conflict in their countries. This should provide a counter-balance to partners' governments' explanation of conflict, which may be driven by a particular agenda.
- The above can be done within CIDSE country working groups, government dialogues, existing platforms or networks, and visits to embassies. Member agencies should strengthen the involvement of partners in this work and e.g. through field visits by decision makers (recent examples: bishops' visit to Guatemala organised by CIDSE, Parliamentarians' visit to Colombia organised by Caritas).

What are the consequences of any perceived changes, both positive and negative?

On the positive side partners in Uganda and the DRC pointed to a reduction in rebel activities, or at least their containment to certain parts of the country. In Uganda it was felt that there is increased security in urban areas. Meanwhile in Colombia partners differentiated between how people from different social sectors have been impacted. They point to an increasing sense of security for elites, but less security, greater vulnerability and risk for social leaders, unions, indigenous groups, grassroots and peasants' organisations. The increasing emphasis on ensuring state security through defeat of the guerrilla has led to local populations, particularly in conflict zones, feeling the negative impacts of the conflict much more acutely: increasing poverty, higher levels of displacement and psychological trauma, lower life expectancy, worse health statistics, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, increasing paramilitarism etc. At a local level the Colombian state has encouraged people to become involved in the conflict through financial incentives to create informant networks. This has contributed to a breakdown in trust, has impacted negatively on social organisation and has made it more difficult to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants. The conflict has also led to a reduction in the opportunities to make a living legally, and a consequential increase in participation in the conflict as a means of making an income.

How have men and women been impacted differently and how should this be addressed?

Many countries, such as Colombia, have seen an increasing number of female-headed households and women assuming an even greater role in ensuring family survival. In coca producing regions of the south, this has meant a more active participation in the production and trafficking of coca paste to ensure family survival, something which brings into question the Colombian state's continuing strong emphasis on fumigation to eradicate coca crops given that few economic alternatives exist. In the DRC women take charge of 80% of household needs and conflict has thrown up particular needs such as the fact that they haven't been able to get back to their work in the fields. In both countries women's vulnerability to sexual violence and rape in on-going situations of conflict was highlighted. In Colombia it was mentioned that women increasingly want to enter into active service of the military and the police, something that would need to be further explored to be properly understood. This desire may come from a feeling that women would be less vulnerable and more in control in such active service. A number of concrete strategies for enhancing women's voices were suggested by partner organisations:

1. the promotion of more equal relations between men and women
2. the need to strengthen and support women's organisations, participation, networking and leadership as a means of promoting their active role in decision-making and ensuring that their needs are taken into account
3. a better and wider dissemination of UN resolution 1325: adopted in 2000, this calls for increased protection of women during armed conflict, for an end to impunity for gender-based abuses during and after conflict and the participation of women at all levels of decision-making related to prevention, management and resolution of conflict
4. the use of appropriate media and communication strategies to educate (often illiterate) women about their rights
5. the provision of empowering psycho-social support to women and children who have been traumatised

Regarding particular impacts on men it was noted that they are the ones who have to go to war, who are faced on a daily basis with death, who are challenged in their masculinity and are prevented from expressing fear, forgiveness, tenderness etc. Men suffer from higher indices of violent death, are forcibly recruited by armed actors and are stigmatised as armed actors or collaborators. This raises the question of how, in such highly militarised contexts, men can be supported to reject the overwhelming emphasis on violence and machismo and embrace more positive masculine traits, which could contribute to more peaceful societies.

Recommendations:

- Member agencies should support the wider dissemination and better implementation of UN Resolution 1325.
- Member agencies should deepen their analysis of the gender perspective in conflict situations and the impact of conflict on gender relations and development (e.g. demobilised men). Agencies should continue to include a gender perspective in government dialogues, in programme work (example: Mindanao peacebuilding work), and also examine how their organisation's work addresses the different perspectives of women and men in conflict and empowers them.
- Member agencies should address unjust gender structures in development organisations.

How are the roles of different actors changing/adapting to prevailing contexts?

The military

In the questionnaire CIDSE was interested in exploring whether partners believe that the role of military forces is changing, and in particular whether they are becoming more involved in the delivery of humanitarian/development aid and what the consequences of this may be.

Partners generally understood this question to refer to local military forces and answered that legacies of military abuse and human rights' violations have made it very difficult for substantial cooperation to take place between civilian and military actors. Nevertheless, a degree of cooperation *has* taken place when the protection of civilians has been necessary e.g. in camps for internally displaced people or when civilians have been implementing development projects in conflict zones. Partners did not indicate that local military forces are becoming more involved in humanitarian/development aid, and indeed a strong message was that partners' priorities and those of the military forces are "diametrically opposed". This could be considered a slightly surprising response given the partners' obvious understanding of the link between physical, state and human security concerns, but needs to be understood in the context of military forces which have long threatened and abused local populations. When asked what the military's role *ought* to be a common response from partners in the DRC and Colombia was that the military ought to concern itself with fulfilling its legal mandate, ensuring a state of law and protecting and respecting the civilian population. It was clearly felt that military forces do not fulfil these roles adequately and in certain cases directly violate them. Partners suggest that:

1. The military's role should be to ensure a state of law and respect and protect the civilian population. This should be the primary message in any engagement with military forces.
2. In African countries the military should receive the necessary funds to fulfil their role so that they don't need to resort to pillage in order to survive.

Recommendations:

- Member agencies should discuss with partners the roles of civilian and military actors in achieving security and the rule of law, both short-term and long-term mandates and their implications.

Civil Society

Civil society organisations are increasingly involved in activities related to ensuring physical security in all of the countries concerned. Partners are involved in a range of activities including:

- arms collection campaigns and programmes;
- disarmament work and reinsertion programmes (including training ex-combatants in ethical perspectives and reconciliation techniques and trying to generate economic alternatives for them);
- monitoring the security situation and monitoring the implementation of state agreements on security;
- carrying out lobbying activities related to security, democracy and good governance, economic and human development

In the DRC it was pointed out that women's organisations have played a particularly strong role in monitoring and lobbying activities at the local level, including dialoguing with military commanders and denouncing cases of rape and pillage by soldiers.

Recommendations:

- Civilian peacebuilding and activities for prevention of violent conflict should be a funding priority for northern donors. CIDSE agencies should continue to lobby for this.
- Member agencies should examine whether their work is *actively contributing* to conflict prevention, as well as being conflict sensitive (e.g. by testing programmes).

The Private Sector

Partner responses addressed the private sector, private security forces, and illegal paramilitary forces. A distinction must be made between these actors, which have different levels of implication in fuelling conflict and in rebuilding after a conflict. On the role of the private sector a common response from partners in Rwanda, the DRC and Colombia was that some companies are fuelling conflict and war. A common problem is that private companies support rebel and paramilitary groups as a means of ensuring their own security, but this exacerbates the security situation for surrounding local populations. Examples were also given of companies that are guarded by foreign forces, which are completely outside state control. In the DRC it was mentioned that the private sector also contributes to illegal arms and natural resource trafficking, and that porous borders facilitate this. In Colombia, local economies have been permeated by illegal activities, especially those related to drugs trafficking, which in turn has become a means of financing illegal armed groups (both guerrillas on the left and paramilitaries on the right). A clear recommendation from partners was for the full demobilisation of paramilitary groups and their de-linking with the military. In the process the rights of those who have been victims of paramilitaries must be respected.

The role of the media was highlighted as problematic by one Colombian partner. As mentioned previously, part of the strategy of the Colombian government has been to create images and present what is happening with a very particular slant which favours its position of all out war on the 'narco-terrorists'. The media has followed this line faithfully and has played a role in polarising positions and fuelling the conflict.

In spite of these problems one Colombian respondent referred to the fact that some private sector groups are becoming aware of the need to seek ways to contribute to peacebuilding, and have taken part in debates on the positioning of the government regarding the conflict. One fledging project seeks to link the private sector into peacebuilding in the city of Medellin, appealing to their sense of social responsibility and linking this to choices and options they have to demonstrate their faith-in-action. Partners suggest that:

1. Illegal paramilitary forces should be demobilised and in the process their victims' rights must be respected.
2. There should be a full de-linking of paramilitary and military forces.

Recommendations:

- Member agencies should consider the question of the accountability of legal private security forces hired by private companies, e.g. for expulsion from land, the accountability of those who hire them. This could be raised with member agency staff working on corporate accountability and also in the CIDSE Africa Forum of November 2005 on extractives.
- Member agencies should monitor the evolution of the trend in the privatisation of war.

How best to meet security and development needs?

Colombian partners argued strongly for more emphasis on human security, for ensuring respect for human rights, for addressing the root causes of conflict and for always keeping in mind the link between development and peace. They believe that President Uribe's emphasis on state security has had real negative consequences for local populations. They believe that CIDSE and its member organisations have a role to play in informing the international community about the negative impacts of the strong emphasis on state security in Colombia. Moreover, the police and the army should have clearly delineated functions, the practice of war should be humanised (i.e. the rights of civilians should always be respected) and the overall emphasis should be on *political* over *military* solutions.

The responses from partners in Africa were nuanced differently. They point to the fact that state security is necessary for other kinds of security to be fulfilled, and that the lack of physical security is a threat to human security. At the same time, however, they point to the need for a more balanced approach to state and human security concerns because the emphasis on state security has led to an exacerbation of poverty. They believe that civilian peacebuilding and development work should be prioritised in terms of financial support, but also that the army should receive the necessary support to properly fulfil its role, which is defence of the national territory. Partners suggest that:

1. Human security needs have been marginalised by the emphasis on state security. There is a need to raise awareness with northern donors that human security needs should be centre stage.
2. In the African context physical and state security are pressing concerns, but there is also the need for a better balance between state and human security needs.

Conclusion Part Two

The responses received from partners to the CIDSE questionnaire were rich though uneven. Far more insight was gained into the situation on the ground in Colombia given the detailed input from partners there. Overall, partners made the point that CIDSE agencies have a responsibility to raise awareness of southern partners' ongoing concerns at the international level, and to be their ambassadors in the north.

On the whole, partners were very conscious of the link between state security and human security concerns. Regarding shifting budgets, partners certainly perceived that more resources are being designated for state security as opposed to human security concerns, but whether or not there has been a definite shift *away* from social expenditure in all cases is less clear. Regarding the role of different actors in post-conflict situations, partners did not refer so much to the role of foreign military forces as peacekeepers, although they did give a clear message that *civilian* as opposed to military peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities should be a funding priority.

Partners' responses indicated how different people are impacted in different ways by perceived changes in security perspectives, for example in certain regions or in *urban* areas (Uganda), or between social classes (Colombia). This is of particular concern to CIDSE agencies since our primary focus is on impact on the poor. Women and men are also being impacted differently, and gender-specific responses are necessary whereby these kinds of different needs are addressed.

Regarding the role of the private sector partners gave examples where companies, private security forces and illegal paramilitary forces have fuelled conflict and war. In Colombia a forward-looking strategy was to attempt to engage the private sector in peacebuilding initiatives, appealing to a sense of social responsibility and the opportunity to demonstrate faith-in-action.

This has only been a very initial consultation with southern partners on how they view and are impacted by changing dynamics between security and development. Nevertheless, it is important. In all the analysis on security and development there appears to have been only one attempt to consult in a systematic way with people living in zones of conflict and post-conflict, published in June 2005, and providing input from people in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Kosovo.^{xxxvi} Our own analysis highlights the fact that local context matters, and that differences between and indeed within, countries should be taken into account in tailoring responses.

Overall Conclusions and Main Recommendations

This study has been part of a process taking place over several months, which has challenged some of our starting assumptions and led us in new directions. Initially, a good deal of emphasis of the study was on the concern about shifting budgets and the concern that more money was being designated to security-related activities to the detriment of development expenditure. We discovered evidence to suggest that aid for security-related activities has so far largely been *in addition* to existing sources, although we also discovered shifting priorities in the EU's aid policy and budget and a concern that additional sources for security-related expenditure are unlikely to be available in the long term. Input to our study from partner organisations in Africa and Latin America shows that there is certainly the perception that more money is being designated to security concerns, although whether a definite shift *away* from social expenditure has taken place in all cases is less clear. These findings suggest that it would be worthwhile for CIDSE to consider monitoring whether aid budgets are shifting from development to security objectives in a more systematic way. Links could be made with work already happening on budget monitoring for Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Given the findings of this study it would not seem appropriate to launch into advocacy on the shifting budgets question at this stage.

In the process of carrying out this study, it has become clear that whilst the shifting budget question is important, it is not the only one. The overarching concern is that a *paradigm shift* is taking place whereby development policy is increasingly being integrated and subordinated to security concerns, a military logic and short-term political and military strategies. At the same time, a positive recent development is the comprehensive strategy outlined by the UN Secretary General underlining the need to act simultaneously in different areas: "*Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.*" Supporting and promoting this conceptual framework rather than accepting the current security/development discourse should help prevent a paradigm shift towards looking at development from a security lens.

During the process of our study questions were raised on the legitimacy of military forces assuming increasing roles in the delivery of humanitarian aid, in peacekeeping and development activities, given an approach which is essentially about moving in, getting a job done and moving out, as opposed to the long-term engagement and empowerment approach assumed by development agencies. The study allowed for an initial exploration of *appropriate* roles for civil and military actors in post-conflict situations, with some differing views among partners as well as among CIDSE member agencies. This raised the need to discuss with partners the implications of the short-term and long-term mandates of civilian and military actors in achieving security and the rule of law. An opportunity for CIDSE member agencies to meet and discuss the role of the military in achieving security and in development was also suggested as a means to foster exchange and greater common understanding.

In response to partners' understanding and concerns related to security and development emerging from the limited consultation, various means were identified by which member agencies could better integrate these concerns into their work. CIDSE agencies can inform other agencies, governments, the church and the international community about important issues such as the unequal investment in resources towards state and human security concerns, the causes and dynamics of conflict, and the gender perspective in conflict situations. Existing fora such as country dialogues with governments and their embassies, CIDSE country working groups and other platforms can be used, also strengthening partners' involvement in this work. Agencies can reflect on how their own

project work integrates these concerns, for example examining how their organisation's work addresses the different perspectives of women and men in conflict and empowers them, and how their work is *actively contributing* to conflict prevention. Finally, some issues were identified for monitoring, such as the accountability of legal private security forces hired by private companies and the privatisation of war.

Main Recommendations:

- To help prevent a paradigm shift towards looking at development from a security lens, CIDSE member agencies should not accept the current security/development discourse, but rather work to support and promote the UN Secretary General's conceptual framework of interlinkages between development, human rights and security.
- CIDSE should consider monitoring whether Northern aid budgets are shifting from development objectives to security objectives. Member agencies should encourage and support partners in budget monitoring work, in cooperation with organisations specialised in this work. CIDSE's advocacy work on EU development policy should continue to monitor the EU's approach to the interface between security and development.
- CIDSE should organise during the first half of 2006 a meeting of member agencies to discuss the role of the military in achieving security and in development, in order to foster exchange and greater common understanding. Member agencies should discuss with partners the roles of civilian and military actors in achieving security and the rule of law, both short-term and long-term mandates and their implications.
- Member agencies should inform other agencies, governments, the church and the international community about important issues identified by partners such as the unequal investment in resources towards state and human security concerns, the causes and dynamics of conflict, and the gender perspective in conflict situations. Existing fora such as country dialogues with governments and their embassies, CIDSE country working groups and other platforms can be used, also strengthening partners' involvement in this work.
- Member agencies should reflect on how their own programme work integrates the concerns raised by partners, for example examining how their organisation's work addresses the different perspectives of women and men in conflict and empowers them, and how their work is *actively contributing* to conflict prevention.
- Opportunities for future joint advocacy on issues relating to security and development may be identified within the CIDSE Peace & Conflict Officers Group.

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Annex 1 Questionnaire for Southern Partners

Questions for Southern Partners

[CIDSE and MO] are concerned that after the attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001, Northern governments now consider the “war on terror” and security issues more important than fighting global poverty. For example, in Afghanistan, Northern donor governments and the Afghan government are putting a higher emphasis on steps to improve regional and international (state) security such as eliminating the threat of the Taliban and other militias and the fight against drugs trafficking, than on the urgency of tackling issues which impact on the daily insecurity of Afghans—poverty, inequalities, unemployment, lack of access to education. We believe that development aid is increasingly being used for foreign policy, counter-terror and state security (related to the stability and authority of governments), rather than for meeting the needs of the poorest. We also see that violent conflicts and insecurity affect dramatically the lives of the poor, especially women.

Given our concerns, we are writing a study exploring the changing relationship between security and development and how it is impacting on our work. Security has different meanings in different contexts, and we want to understand better what it means for you as partners of CIDSE member organisations and how it affects your development work. Ultimately, our aim is work with a range of partners to develop adequate responses to the problems resulting from security and development concerns. This set of questions is to help us to do that, and we would be very grateful if you could take the time to answer them.

Physical or state security: we understand this to be protecting a country from threats such as external military invasion, internal dissent and unrest, crime and terrorism. Military and police forces will be the main actors in trying to ensure physical or state security. We are also exploring what role civil society organisations can play here.

Human security: we understand this to be about ensuring a safe environment through which people can meet their different needs. Whilst ensuring *physical or state security* will contribute to allowing this to happen it does not go far enough. Insecurity is felt in many different areas. The concept of human security has seven different dimensions – economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. It is in contributing to meeting these *human security* needs that development workers have a role to play. But, more and more, actors like the military and the private sector do play a role.

Question	Answer
Relative importance given to physical or state security, versus human security and development needs	
1. Do you think that your government, and/or Northern aid donors, have started to pay more attention to physical or state security, and consequently less attention to addressing poverty and human needs through development activities, since 11 September 2001?	
2. a) If so, why do you think your government has made this change or allowed it to happen? 2. b) Can you give concrete examples of how this is happening? For example, have you heard of any cases where aid money that should be used for human development purposes is instead used to strengthen physical or state security? 2. c) What are the consequences of this change, both positive and negative?	

<p>3. If you believe that more attention is being paid to physical or state security in your country than to the daily development needs of the population: 3. a) How are men and women are being impacted differently by this? What could be done to meet the needs and enhance the voice of women, who are often more affected by violent conflicts and the lack of human security?</p>	
<p>4. How is the role of civil society organisations changing? Are civil society actors becoming more involved in physical or state security, for example in demobilisation of militias and their reintegration into communities? 4. a) What is, or could be, the role of your organization in this? 4. b) What is, or could be [CIDSE and MO's] role in this?</p>	
<p>5. How is the role of the military changing? For example, have military forces become more involved in the delivery of humanitarian/development aid and are their priorities different to what yours would be? What should their role be? 5. a) How does your organisation interact, or cooperate with, the military?</p>	
<p>6. Does the private sector (multinational, state or local companies) / economic activities play a role in the causes of conflict in your country? If so, could you give an example? How does your organisation interact, or cooperate, with the private sector?</p>	
<p>7. Considering the security (both <i>physical or state</i> and <i>human</i> security) and development needs in your country, is there anything else you would like to add about gaps in meeting these needs? Where should efforts best be targeted to meet both security and development needs? Should non-military means of building peace and development should continue to be a policy and funding priority for Northern donors?</p>	
<p>8. Are you involved in advocacy and influencing policies towards a more secure environment (both physical and state or human security)? Could [CIDSE and MO] bring an additional value by being involved in related advocacy on an international level?</p>	

Endnotes

ⁱ Whilst economic growth was seen as a *means* to better human welfare, the broader concept of human development was seen as both a *means* and an *end* in itself.

ⁱⁱ UNDP (2005)

ⁱⁱⁱ Boyd (2005)

^{iv} Pope John Paul II, Message for the World Day of Peace, 1987

^v Cited in CAFOD (2004)

^{vi} Woods et al (2004)

^{vii} Cited in CAFOD (2004)

^{viii} Quoted in USAID, Fragile States Strategy, January 2005: 1

^{ix} DFID defines fragile states as those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people. There is no agreed global list of fragile states, even though there is consensus on some clear-cut examples (e.g. Somalia). States move in and out of fragility and labels may mask sub-state and regional variations (e.g. insurgencies), which could mean that certain parts of a country are fragile whilst others are not.

^x The World Bank has been working on Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS); the OECD DAC has set up a Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships and has a Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States; whilst DFID and USAID's strategies on fragile states are outlined in respective papers in January 2005

^{xi} From UN Commission for Social Development, 43rd Session, Report of the Secretary-General, February 2005: 114

^{xii} The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), agreed to by world leaders, are a series of targets for addressing global poverty by 2015. They address basic needs such as ending hunger, reducing extreme poverty, providing health and education, tackling critical and infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, removing discrimination against girls in education, providing basic energy services, clean water and sanitation. For a critical analysis of progress in reaching the MDGs see *More than a Numbers' Game - Ensuring the Millennium Development Goals Address Structural Injustice*, A CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis Position Paper, 2005

^{xiii} In Africa the UN has ongoing missions in Sudan, Liberia, DRC, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Western Sahara. In Asia there are ongoing missions in East Timor and India/Pakistan. In Europe in Cyprus, Georgia and Kosovo and in the Middle East in the Golan Heights, Lebanon and a Middle Eastern mission.

^{xiv} See for example, Young (2003) Young, Iris Marion, *Hypatia* vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 2003): 223-231

^{xv} Singh 2004

^{xvi} Adapted from Amnesty International Press Release 1.12.04 and Johnston et al (February 2005)

^{xvii} Amnesty International *Kosovo: Trafficked women and girls have human rights*, June 2004 on

www.amnesty.org

^{xviii} The EU Stability instrument is explained on page 13

^{xix} The following arguments regarding the limitations of coherence are elaborated in Woods et al (2004)

^{xx} Adapted from Christian Aid (2004)

^{xxi} Chart compiled with information from the OECD league tables on development expenditure and population statistics

^{xxii} Statistics from Woods et al (2004)

^{xxiii} Woods et al *Ibid.*

^{xxiv} These are: management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight and democratic control; enhancing civil society's role in the security system; supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers; security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control; civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons

^{xxv} These figures come from the Report of the Secretary-General, UN Commission for Social Development, 43rd Session, February 2005, points 91 & 92

^{xxvi} Quoted on www.controlarms.org

^{xxvii} Figures from *Ibid.*

^{xxviii} CAFOD (2004)

^{xxix} See www.controlarms.org

^{xxx} For a further exploration of the growing phenomenon of private security see Holmquist, Caroline (January 2005), *Private Security Companies The Case for Regulation*, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 9

^{xxxi} See, for example, Ian Gary et al, *Bottom of the Barrel Africa's Oil Boom and the Poor*, CRS, June 2003

^{xxxii} See *Transparency: A Christian Concern Catholic Social Teaching and the Case for Transparency in the Extractive Industries*, CIDSE, Caritas Europa & Pax Christi, September 2003

^{xxxiii} Cabinet Office UK 2005: 71

^{xxxiv} Names of partner organisations are withheld for safety reasons but are available upon request. Consultation of partners in Asia was initially planned but could not be realised.

^{xxxv} In Colombia left-wing guerrilla forces have been engaged in armed conflict against the state since the 1960s. Whilst these movements began with political ideals much of that has been lost and the guerrillas do engage in drugs production and trafficking as a means of financing their activities. Nevertheless, it is a big leap to conclude from that that the only reason there is conflict in Colombia is because of drug-trafficking guerrillas. Right-wing paramilitary groups, some of whom have collaborated very closely with the Colombian military and have been responsible for some of the worst human rights violations, also use drugs production and trafficking as a means of funding their activities.

^{xxxvi} See Donini Antonio, Larry Minear, Ian Smillie, Ted van Baarda and Anthony C. Welch *Mapping the Security Environment Understanding the perceptions of local communities, peace support operations, and assistance agencies*, Feinstein International Famine Center, June 2005

CIDSE MEMBER AGENCIES

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