"We are going to fewer countries, staying for shorter periods of time, and with smaller numbers of people than historically we have done." This is of particular concern because, in both counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, special operations forces are the sharp end of the spear, the troops with the precise mix of skills and training needed to fight "asymmetrical" adversaries on their own terms.

Throughout the history of the U.S. military, special operations troops have been viewed with a mixture of suspicion and resentment by "regular" military leaders, who frequently fail to understand the special operations mentality, the proper employment of special operations forces, and their limitations in conventional combat roles. Typically, the United States has raised special operations units in an ad hoc manner for a particular conflict, then rapidly decommissioned them as soon as the war was over. Thus, in World War II, we raised Army Ranger battalions, a Special Services Brigade, Marine Raider battalions, combat swimmers and Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs), only to abolish most of them after VJ-Day.

We found that we needed their capabilities again in the Korean War, and went through the trouble of re-learning much that we had forgotten after World War II, only to demobilize most these units yet again once the Korean armistice was signed. A handful of small Ranger companies and Special Forces Groups (the Green Berets) carried the flame through the 1950s, until John Kennedy (a military romantic at heart), made the Special Forces his pet project, a way of fighting the elusive Viet Cong at their own game of guerrilla warfare.

Beginning with Kennedy, and continuing under Lyndon Johnson, the Special Forces were enlarged several-fold. Not to be outdone, the Navy then formed its Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Teams from the old UDTs, but adding infiltration, reconnaissance, and ambush tactics to beach clearing. The Air Force and Marines likewise created their own small commando-style units in response to the needs of the Vietnam War. Some of these units were very good indeed, others not so much. Many pioneered the kinds of counter-insurgency tactics being employed today in Iraq and Afghanistan. But again, once Vietnam was over, the United States cut back on special operations forces in order to concentrate on "real war"--the head-to-head conflict with the USSR on the plains of central Germany.

Lacking any sort of proponent in the military, special operators became orphan children: they had to scrounge for the equipment and training they needed, and its members, officers in particular, faced career dead ends if they stayed in their chosen professions (it used to be said that in the U.S. Army, commando types retired at lieutenant colonel, while in Israel they were made chiefs of staff). Fragmented across the services, they lacked a common doctrine and interoperability. They were, to be blunt, looked on as prima donnas, even circus freaks, by conventional force commanders, who did not want them in their commands, and would not have known how to use them if they did.

A turnaround began in the late 1970s, when the wave of multinational terrorism that began with the Munich Olympic massacre pointed out the need for highly trained hostage rescue forces. This led to the formation of Special Operations Detachment-Delta, better known as "Delta Force" (AKA "The Unit," the "D-Boys," and "The D"). Selected from among the best of all other Army special operations units, they were mostly sergeants or higher, older than most soldiers, trained to operate independently and undercover, and highly skilled in the use of all sorts of weapons and tactics. They were ideally suited for taking down terrorists--except that the U.S. military was highly reluctant to use them, and so threw up all sorts of obstacles to their deployment when hostage situations emerged. They were finally set loose as part of Operation Eagle Claw, the botched Iranian hostage rescue mission of April 24, 1980, in which a U.S. C-130 transport and MH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter collided on the ground, killing eight U.S. soldiers and airmen, and causing the failure of the mission.

It is axiomatic that one learns more from defeat than victory, and this was no exception. Out of the tragedy of Operation Eagle Claw came a whole series of lessons learned, the most important of which was that special operations cannot be organized and planned in an ad hoc manner like a pickup game of basketball. Failure of the mission was traced to the lack of unified command, coherent common doctrine and training, and inappropriate equipment. To rectify

the situation, all special operations forces in all the services were placed under a single "unified command." SOCOM would serve as the single point of contact for all special operations requirements, planning and mission execution. It would formulate doctrine, establish training standards, and, with its own budget authority, develop and purchase precisely the kind of weapons and equipment that the special operators needed for their demanding missions. In effect, SOCOM became an unofficial "fifth service," and as such the most important role it played was providing special operations troops with a stable career path that allowed them to advance in rank without leaving for more conventional assignments. Thus SOCOM fostered stability and an institutional memory, putting special operations on a permanent and professional footing for perhaps the first time in U.S. history.

Even then, the regular military remained leery of them. Norman Schwarzkopf famously did not even want a SOCOM liaison at his headquarters, and refused at first to use the SOCOM assets put at his disposal--they would only "get in the way" of the "real war." In the event, the need to track down and destroy Saddam Hussein's Scud launchers gave the special operators a chance to shine--and they came out of Operation Desert Storm with a vastly enhanced reputation, at least among the political leadership of the Pentagon. In the years that followed, special operations forces were at the forefront of a host of U.S. military expeditions, including the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia, the U.S. intervention in Haiti, operations against drug lords in Columbia, and a host of classified missions of which we have no need to know.

After September 11, U.S. special operations forces, including Green Berets, Rangers, SEALs, the Delta Force, and others, were at the forefront of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and remain both the cutting edge and a key force multiplier in our fight against the remnants of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and various other extremist forces around the world. In fact, it is not too much to say that special operations forces have become invaluable, the core of the New Model Army that will be fighting the wars of the 21st century. In a military where money talks and BS walks, SOCOM has seen its budget increase from $2.3 billion in 2001 to $7.3 billion in 2007--a three-fold increase.

And therein lies the rub--there just are not enough of them to go around.

Today, SOCOM has about 50,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in a number of different units, each of which has a specific specialty. The Army, as might be expected, provides the bulk of the manpower. Its contribution includes the three battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment, who specialize in infiltration, raiding, and direct action against high value targets; seven (five active and two National Guard) Special Forces Groups that focus on guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense and indigenous force training; the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (the Night Stalkers), who fly a variety of highly modified helicopters capable of penetrating deep into enemy territory at night or in bad weather; a Psychological Operations Group; and a Civil Affairs Brigade. The USMC brings to the table several Marine Special Operations Battalions, with capabilities similar to those of the Rangers (but with a focus on amphibious insertion). The Navy provides several SEAL Teams and Special Boat Teams that perform special reconnaissance, infiltration, demolition and sabotage, and direct action missions. The USAF provides four Special Operations Wings equipped with a range of helicopters, tankers, transports and gunships to support other special operations units, particularly for insertion and fire support at night and in bad weather; it also has special air controller units who, when inserted on the ground, have the ability to direct all sorts of precision air support against enemy forces--which may have been the decisive factor in the defeat of the Taliban.

Finally, there are the creme de la crème, the Special Missions Units (SMUs) of the Joint Special Operations Command, who answer directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out the most difficult and sensitive missions. This is where one finds the Delta Force, together with its Navy counterpart, the Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, successor to SEAL Team Six), the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), which collects, collates, and analyzes the unique tactical intelligence needed for planning special operations; and the USAF 24th Special Tactics Squadron, which provides support to the other SMUs.

Because the capabilities and skills of the special operations forces are in such high demand, the operational tempo in these units is ferocious. Most of these troops spend an average of 270 days per year on deployment, with concomitant strains on personnel and their families. I know of many special operators who are on their fifth and sixth tours of duty in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. It's a high-stress job, and there is a limit to how many times we can go to the well with the same troops, before they simply say enough. In addition, these men are in high demand from private security companies (PSCs), particularly as personal security details (VIP bodyguards). With pay in the six figure range and far more relaxed hours, these jobs are highly attractive to special operators, and it is surprising that the military retains as many as it does. In fact, though, the military does not really mind the loss of special operators to PSCs, because they often perform manpower intensive personal and facility security duties that the military would otherwise have to perform itself, to the detriment of its key mission of fighting insurgents and terrorists. Nonetheless, as demand for special operators by theater commanders (finally won over to the cause!) increases, it is clear that something has to give.

To that end, the Bush administration has proposed a 13,000 man (26 percent) increase in SOCOM manpower over the next three years, consisting mainly of three additional Ranger companies and five more Special Forces battalions. This may not seem like much, in relation to the demands being placed on SOCOM, but in fact it is a very ambitious and difficult to achieve target. The type of men who make good special operations troops do not grow on trees. They are a special breed, and this is reflected in a selection process that tests mind, body, and will to the breaking point. In the most elite units, upwards of 90 percent of recruits flunk out; even in less demanding units such as the Rangers, the washout rate exceeds 80 percent. It is not unreasonable to say that the typical special operations soldier is the equivalent of an Olympic-caliber athlete with two Masters Degrees combined with the spirit of a Spartan warrior. The selection process deliberately seeks out this type of man, and as a result, only a few qualify. To enlarge the force quickly, there are really only two options: reduce standards, or increase the size of the selection pool. The former was tried in the Vietnam buildup of the Green Berets, and explains in part why the Army soured on the notion of special warfare in its aftermath.

But enlarging the pool is also hard--you have to convince people to put themselves forward, because this is a purely volunteer force (people get in, and stay in, by choice). The military could look to direct recruiting from the civilian sector, but one wonders just how many suitable applicants can be found, with the military already just getting by on its quotas for regular forces. For these reasons, the best that can be expected is slow organic growth without dilution of quality. Intake can be increased modestly each year, and pre-screening and "remedial" preparation can increase somewhat the chances of troops getting through the selection process, but it is unreasonable to expect the force to grow by 26 percent in just three years.

So what is the answer? The Marines may have hit on the solution: rather than lowering the quality of special operations troops in order to increase the size of the force, they are raising the quality of their line troops to take on some of the missions currently performed by special operations forces. This has been done by training certain Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) to be "Special Operations Capable"; such units are now designated as "MEU(SOC)s." A typical MEU(SOC) is built around a Marine rifle battalion reinforced with an artillery battery, an amphibious assault vehicle company, a reconnaissance platoon, and other support elements, with a total of 1,200 men. The MEU(SOC) also has an aviation element with transport and attack helicopters, and its own logistic support element. Members of the ground combat element--specifically the rifle battalion and the reconnaissance platoon--receive training in infiltration and assault tactics, urban warfare, and basic special operations tasks (hostage rescue, raiding, indigenous force training, etc.). They obviously do not have the same level of training in each of these disciplines as dedicated special operations forces, but they may be "good enough" for lower-end tasks, which are thus off-loaded from the over-committed special operations troops. If MEU(SOCs) can take up perhaps 15 percent of the burden, that would be the equivalent of some 7,500 men to SOCOM. The Army could and should follow the lead of the USMC by training some of its light infantry battalions in the 82nd Airborne and 10th Mountain Division to be "special operations capable" as well, further reducing the stress on high-end special operators.

This may even herald the beginning of a real transformation of the military, as the Special Operations mindset begins to percolate throughout the entire institution. There are precedents for this kind of transformation. The elite storm troop tactics employed by the German Army in World War I were adopted throughout the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic and eventually the Wehrmacht of World War II. On the Allied side, the brilliant but eccentric British General Orde Wingate formed the famous "Chindits" to operate deep behind Japanese lines in Burma, living off the land and by air resupply, disrupting Japanese communications, and preparing the way for an Allied counteroffensive. After Wingate's death in 1944, the unit was gradually disbanded. But the lessons and ethos of the Chindits had been assimilated. As General William Slim, commander of the British Fourteenth Army (and perhaps the most brilliant British general of the War) remarked, the Chindits were no longer needed "because we are all Chindits now."

While there will always be a need for truly elite troops to perform the most hazardous and difficult missions, we may be approaching an era when the military will say, "We are all Special Operators, now".