The situation is eerily similar to one in late 2005: In that case, the dispute led Russia to cut off supplies transiting Ukraine in the first few days of the new year, leaving more than a dozen European countries in the cold. The cast in this drama is nearly the same as it was in 2005; however, there have been quite a few changes in circumstances for each player, giving this re-enactment more significance.

Europe relies on Russia for roughly one-quarter of its natural gas supplies. Of those shipments, 80 percent run through Ukraine — making it the keystone of energy policy between Europe and Russia. Ukraine itself receives 70 percent of its natural gas from Russia and is constantly racking up billions of dollars in debt multiple times a year. Currently, Russia claims that Ukraine is $2.4 billion in arrears, while Ukraine puts the amount at $1.2 billion. On top of that, Russia and Ukraine currently do not have a firm agreement over new deliveries of natural gas: They have decided on an amount, but not a price. Russia is threatening to raise the price of Ukraine’s supplies from $179 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to more than $400 per tcm — which is what the rest of Europe now pays, though Europe’s price also could increase.

Paralyzed by its own financial crisis, Ukraine simply cannot pay any more than it does already. Even when its economy was booming from high food and steel prices, Kiev still owed Moscow money for energy supplies — not a bad situation for Moscow, since energy is one of its favorite means of leverage with both Ukraine and Europe. At this point, Russia once again is trying to use energy issues — which impact Ukraine financially, economically, politically and socially — to shape the country’s internal political scene.

In 2005-2006, the energy cutoff marked a turn of the tide in Ukraine, which had begun a shift toward the West with the Orange Revolution in 2004. The political players today are the same as they were in 2005 and 2006. Back then, Russia’s Dmitri Medvedev — then a newly minted deputy prime minister — led the charge against Ukraine, just as he is doing now as president. In Ukraine, the energy struggle is being led by pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko and dealmaker Timoshenko, both of whom were involved in the struggle in 2005 — though Timoshenko was bumped from her political position just before the gas cutoff (she is now on the cusp of being bumped again, since Ukraine’s parliament was dissolved in October).

In another parallel, Moscow is threatening to use legal means (the international courts) to force payment of Ukraine’s natural gas debts. The Kremlin is trying to portray Ukraine as the one at fault, hoping that European leaders will once again pressure Kiev in efforts to avoid the consequences of another energy shutoff. The problem this time around is that since 2006, Russia has established a pattern of using energy supplies as a political tool against other (and EU) states. Moscow has cut oil supplies to the Czech Republic and refused to mend a broken pipeline to Lithuania — both countries that either have struck deals or are vying for a deal with the United States over military or missile installations.

The Europeans now know Russia’s game well.

Most of Europe is already attempting to reduce dependence on Russia by finding alternative suppliers (like Libya, Algeria, Azerbaijan or Norway) or energy sources (liquefied natural gas or wind, solar or nuclear energy), or by slashing their own consumption. Russia has already seen impacts to its exports, which tumbled 8 percent in October — the first real drop in a decade.

But Moscow also knows that it still has Europe on a leash, if only for the moment. Russia has a very brief period left in which it can play the energy card.

There are two reasons for this, outside of shifting Ukrainian politics. First, Russia is on a high following its war with neighboring Georgia, and the Kremlin recognizes that it must use that momentum. Russia is trying to solidify its place as a world shaper, and it is crucial for Moscow to shift things in a key state like Ukraine while issuing reminders to Europe that it is still dependent on Russia.

Second, Russia is on edge over the upcoming NATO meeting, set for Dec. 2-3. Members of the alliance — which Russia considers its chief security threat — will be discussing whether to admit Ukraine and Georgia to the group. Moscow considers these states key to Russia’s national security, and their admittance would mean NATO encirclement of Russia. A tiny crisis that could affect energy supplies for many NATO states, especially heavyweights like Germany, would serve as a nice reminder on the eve of the summit, and should (at least in Moscow’s mind) give those states a reason to vote against Georgian and Ukrainian membership in the security alliance. If that strategy fails — and the United States’ plan to absorb Ukraine and Georgia into NATO succeeds — Moscow will have a nice payback waiting for those who facilitated the move: turning off their lights and heat this winter.