Talabani, also leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, announced March 15 that he would retire from politics after his term as Iraqi president ends. Potential successors lack the Kurdish leader’s political gravitas, and his regional rival is a divisive firebrand likely to make matters worse with Iraq’s neighbors and the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad.

Iraqi President and Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani will not seek re-election, but will remain active in the “political and partisan arena,” according to a March 15 statement posted on Talabani’s Web site. The statement follows an interview aired March 13 on Iran’s Press TV in which the Kurdish leader says he has no plans to seek re-election when his presidential term expires at the end of 2009, and that he intends to retire from politics. Though this transition is a long time coming, doubts remain over Iraq’s ability to manage the intra-Kurdish, Kurdish-Arab and regional rivalries that will likely reignite once Talabani, a central figure in Kurdish and Iraqi politics, is out of the picture.

Talabani, better known as Mam Jalal (Uncle Jalal), will turn 76 this year. The veteran Kurdish leader has long suffered a number of ailments, and after undergoing heart surgery in August 2008, he knew it was only a matter of time before he would need to step down as president and make arrangements for his successor.

Talabani fills two major political roles in Iraq as the country’s president and as the chief of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls the southeastern part of Iraq’s northern Kurdish region. His chief political rival, Massoud Barzani, leads the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which rules the northwestern part of Iraqi Kurdistan. In the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the two parties formed a political alliance and created the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to represent Kurdish interests in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

This unity between the PUK and KDP, which has lasted almost six years, is by no means the norm. The Kurds are a naturally fractious tribal people who inhabit the mountainous territory where Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran come together. These mountains are both a blessing and a curse for the Kurds — a blessing in that the mountains are the Kurds’ only real refuge in a hostile neighborhood, and a curse in that the jagged landscape allows only for isolated population enclaves and a fiercely competitive and stubborn culture. On more than one occasion, deep-seated tribal rivalries have led to full-scale intra-Kurdish civil war.

With the Sunni and Shiite Arabs to the south, the Turks to the north, the Syrians to the west and the Iranians to the east, the Kurds are blocked on all sides by powers that share a common interest in containing Kurdish aspirations for independent statehood. The Kurdish rivalries run so deep that both sides have at times sided with one of their common enemies — be it Saddam Hussein, Iran or Turkey — in an attempt to undercut the other side. As a result, the surrounding regional powers have ample opportunity to exploit these rifts to keep the Kurds locked down. Occasionally, these regional powers also will play the Kurdish card in proxy battles against each other.

In 2003, when faced with the prospect of a Hussein-free Iraq, the PUK and KDP decided to put aside their differences, form a political union and stake out a prominent claim for the Kurds in the new government. In the early years of the war, when the Sunnis opted for the gun over the ballot and boycotted 2005 general elections, the Kurds saw an opportunity to fill the Sunni gap and expand Kurdish clout in the Iraqi political system. Their aim was to gain a major say in such projects as writing a constitution, which would help them lay the groundwork for a federalist style of government that would enhance Kurdish autonomy.

While Talabani took on a more Iraqi nationalist role as president, Barzani stayed more focused on promoting Kurdish rights at the regional level as the KRG president. So far, the anomalous political union between the KRG and PUK has held, and Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed the most political freedom and economic prosperity they have had in their history. Once Talabani leaves the scene, however, the Iraqi Kurds will face a major test in trying to hold things together and prevent a re-ignition of intra-Kurdish rivalry that could throw northern Iraq back into a more familiar state of conflict.

Not a Good Time for Succession

It was long assumed that Talabani’s second son, Qubad, would succeed his father, but STRATFOR sources say that is now unlikely. Most Iraqi Kurds believe that Qubad, after spending years in Washington as the KRG representative to the United States, lacks the credibility to rule the PUK in Iraq. Instead, the more likely successor to Talabani is Barham Salih, currently one of Iraq’s two deputy prime ministers. Salih joined the PUK in 1976 when it was still an underground movement, and he has long worked alongside Talabani. Salih also has worked closely with U.S. officials since the lead-up to the 2003 invasion and is highly regarded by many of them.

What Salih lacks, however, is Talabani’s legacy and charisma. Talabani is an iconic personality in Kurdish and Iraqi politics. The immense respect he enjoys among Iraqi Kurds allows him to maintain the PUK-KDP balance in the north, while his qualities as a statesman allow him to skillfully manage relations with the Americans, the Iraqi Arabs, the Iranians and the Turks. There is serious concern that Salih, while thought to be a competent leader, will be unable to fill Talabani’s shoes in all these important roles.

To make matters worse, the talk of succession is coming at a time when Talabani’s own party, the PUK, is showing signs of fracturing. News about Talabani’s poor health and rumors of his retirement prompted a faction within the PUK to push for a greater share of power for party members through reforms that would curb Talabani’s authority. Talabani loyalists have responded by trying to purge the party of these dissenters, resulting in several high-profile resignations over the past several months. This internal crisis is likely to intensify as Talabani goes public with his intended retirement date, and as political rivals start to size up Salih as a potential successor.

While the PUK leadership tries to manage these internal fissures, it also will have to keep an eye on Barzani and the KDP. Barzani, who is 62 and reportedly in good health, will be more than happy to see his chief rival finally step down and the PUK consumed with political infighting so that he can carve out a more prominent political position. After all, the KDP was the dominant party in Kurdish politics under the rule of Barzani’s father, Mustafa, until Talabani broke off from the party in the late 1970s to form the PUK. Barzani, however, is a firebrand leader who takes a much tougher stance than Talabani on Kurdish issues, much to the annoyance of the Iraqi Arabs and Iraq’s neighbors, who prefer to deal with Talabani.

Re-ignition of the PUK-KDP rivalry could also provide an opening for a third political front to rise in the north. Such a third front likely would be dominated by Islamists from the Kurdistan Islamic Union and Kurdistan Islamic Group who have been slowly gaining stature in recent years. Of particular concern would be the rise of Ansar al-Islam, an al Qaeda-linked jihadist Kurdish group that has been at war with the PUK since 2001.

The intra-Kurdish rivalry then spins out into a broader Kurdish-Arab rivalry in Iraq. The KRG is already on thin ice with the Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad. Now that the Iraqi government is coalescing into a more coherent political entity, the Sunnis and the Shia have returned to their common agenda of keeping the Kurds contained. At the core of this issue are the KRG’s attempts to expand the territory of their autonomous region to include the ethnically diverse and highly contested city of Kirkuk, where 13 percent of Iraq’s oil is concentrated. With Kirkuk under Kurdish control, the Kurds would theoretically have the economic muscle to push for an independent Kurdish state.

The Kurds’ array of rivals believe this outcome must be prevented at all costs, and they have an assortment of tools available to keep Kirkuk from falling into Kurdish hands. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, for example, has fought tooth and nail against Article 140 of the constitution, which stipulates a settlement over Kirkuk through a census and referendum. For the Kurds, the implementation of Article 140 would correct Hussein’s “Arabization” campaign that displaced Kurds and provided financial incentives for more Arabs to settle in Kirkuk. Although the inclusion of Article 140 was a major win for the Kurds, the constitution was written during the heyday of the Iraq war, when Sunnis were not participating in the political process. Now, most of Iraq’s Sunnis and Shia are trying to amend the provision and allocate more power for the central government rather than the federal regions, thereby further undermining Kurdish autonomy.

This has provoked a strong reaction from the Kurds, and particularly from Barzani, who has threatened to suspend the constitution and continues to push for more energy deals that circumvent the central government. On Jan. 22, in a show of force that garnered immense respect among Iraqi Arabs, al-Maliki deployed the army’s 12th Division north toward Kirkuk in a signal to the Kurdish peshmerga forces that any attempt to take Kirkuk by force would be met with stiff resistance. This bold anti-Kurdish move is part of a formula that has worked extremely well for al-Maliki in gaining both Sunni and Shiite Arab support in Iraq, and it is likely a tactic he will rely on more in the lead-up to national parliamentary elections at the end of 2009. Turkey, meanwhile, continues to put pressure on the KRG through airstrikes against alleged Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) targets and will take bolder action should it feel threatened by Kurdish moves. The Turks do not trust Barzani, who has pushed the line on a number of issues and, unlike Talabani, refuses to share intelligence with Turkey on PKK movements.

A Shaky Future for the Kurds

After the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraqi Kurdistan prided itself in being an oasis of security for U.S. troops and foreign investors while the Sunni and Shiite provinces farther south were embroiled in civil war. Though the Kurds have made strides in enhancing their autonomy over the past six years, the geopolitical landscape of Iraq has shifted dramatically in the past two years. The U.S. surge strategy helped reduce the violence enough for the United States to begin implementing its exit strategy and turn its focus to Afghanistan. With a more stable security situation on the ground, the Iraqi government became more coherent, and the Sunni and Shiite factions quickly rediscovered their common hatred for the Kurds. The Kurds, on the other hand, fear that the gains they have made since 2003 will be undermined by a strong central figure in Baghdad who scores political points among both Sunnis and Shia for keeping the Kurds locked down. The Kirkuk issue remains Iraq’s most sensitive political tinderbox, and Iraqi Arabs are growing ever more confident that they can amend Article 140 to kill the issue.

While external pressure on the Kurds intensifies, there is also the specter of intra-Kurdish rivalry. Talabani’s exit from the political scene will exacerbate existing fissures with the PUK, and it will give Barzani an opening to raise his political stature among the Kurds and threaten the delicate balance Talabani has maintained among Kurdish adversaries. This all comes at a time when the United States has a pressing need to draw down its military presence in Iraq and shift gears to Afghanistan. U.S. President Barack Obama already has modified his Iraq withdrawal plans after facing stiff resistance from U.S. commanders who feel a hasty withdrawal could undermine the security gains made so far. Though the United States is now taking a more prudent approach in drawing down forces, the Kurdish dilemma is yet another factor that could complicate the U.S. exit strategy from Iraq.