The evaluation of President Obama's grand strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is now developing in the national and international defense and security sectors, both public and private. Expectedly, the discussion will have to go in two directions: the design of the grand strategy based on a reading of past experience on the one hand and a periodic review of the execution.
The Obama Administration was quick to indicate that it intends to create a measurement of success as outlined by the press conference announcing the plans. Hence in this post we will not analyze the plan thoroughly but indicate to readers where would the most challenging issues be in the forthcoming discussions. In future post a structural and functional analysis will be offered in light of the Presidential announcement but also in the framework of a re-reading of the past eight years, a task I do contend wasn't fulfilled comprehensively yet by the national security and counter terrorism community yet.
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In very short, the general direction of the strategy seems to be sound and in line with what the defense and CT sectors would have expected, meaning a determination to defeat a central Terror force stretching on both sides of the Afghan Pakistani borders. But from there on, the evaluation of the sub strategies can differ. In short the administration’s plan to send 4,000 additional U.S. troops as trainers to prepare the native forces is a step in the right direction. The fight against the jihadi war machine in that region must meet the strategic threat posed by the Taliban network and the Al Qaeda organization. As accurately described by President Obama, they threaten not only NATO troops and the government in Kabul, but also Afghan civilians and, just as importantly, the democratically elected government in Pakistan.
These Army trainers, along with the 17,000 Marines and Army personnel the president wants to deploy into combat operations in Afghanistan, should be part of a global campaign to defeat the terror forces strategically. In that sense, the decision extend and tries to solidify the campaign that began in 2001 not abruptly end it.
But the administration must not fall into the trap of striking militarily and failing politically inside the two battlefields. In all versions of the strategy, NATO and Afghan-Pakistani forces must defeat the Taliban on the ground to be able to engage with the country’s civil society. One sub strategy we warn against is the so-called striking a deal with “moderate Taliban” while pushing back against the “bad Taliban.” Such a move, within the grand design could generate a disaster for the whole strategy which sound in its inception. The Administration must remained focused on winning the war against the jihadist hydra while engaging the forces of civil society.
Another area of concern would be the sub strategy of "development" in tribal area based on the $ 1.5 Billion pledged by the Administration. The sectors to be targeted for such aid can either make the success or the failure of the economic aid component.
I'll expand further in these areas in future posts.
Following is a radio interview on Dateline Washington on the Strategy.
09 Dateline Obama Strat AfPak.mp3
