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21/08/2009 | Election 2009: Mixed Picture Follows Presidential Poll in Afghanistan

Global Insight Staff

Afghanistan's second ever presidential and provincial council elections went ahead despite widespread violence and low voter turnout, suggesting that legitimacy will play a major issue in the country's post-election landscape.

 

IHS Global Insight Perspective

 

Significance: Afghanistan has held its second presidential and provincial council elections since the Taliban were ousted in 2001. The picture has been mixed, with violence occurring throughout the country and very low voter turnout, especially in the south. Nevertheless, it is remarkable in itself that the elections could be concluded and this has been hailed by many as a success.

Implications: Low voter turnout, widespread violence and threats of violence, as well as allegations of fraud are issues that are likely to affect the perceived legitimacy of results, which could ultimately lead to demonstrations and violence.

Outlook: It is widely expected that the low voter turnout in the south of the country and the higher turnout in northern Afghanistan will deprive incumbent president Hamid Karzai of a simple majority of votes. Run-off elections are likely to be held in October, the outcome of which may well hold surprises. Run-off elections or a small-margin victory in the first round of elections could ultimately lead to violence, particularly as many are expected to cry fraud. It is also a possibility that candidates will try to co-opt each other so as to secure a more comfortable majority.

There has been a mixed picture with regard to yesterday's second ever presidential and provincial council elections since the Taliban were ousted in 2001. On the one hand, many managed to cast their vote, prompting incumbent President Hamid Karzai and the United States to praise the elections as a "success". Indeed, it appears that it has to be welcomed that elections could be held at all in a country that has been scarred by decades of violence. However, it has to be stressed that voter turnout was highly uneven, with grave implications for the outcome of the elections. While no official data have yet been published, estimates by most observers suggest that countrywide only half of those eligible to vote actually went to the polls. This would be significantly less than the more than 70 per cent turnout in the presidential elections in 2004. Voter turnout was highly uneven across the country, and while it differed between districts and from polling station to polling station, there has been a particularly marked divide in turnout between the north and the south of the country. Violence occurred throughout the country, with at least 73 Taliban attacks having killed an estimated 26 people, but attacks and threats of attacks weighed more heavily in the south of the country where the Taliban have a stronger presence, where more than 10 per cent of polling stations could have remained closed. Where polling stations were open in the south, threats posed by the Taliban have resulted in many people being too scared to head out to cast a ballot. Worryingly, some have estimated that voter turnout in some areas in the south may have been as low as 10 per cent.

The low voter turnout in southern Afghanistan is likely to weigh especially heavy for incumbent Hamid Karzai, as the majority of people in the south have been tipped to vote for him as a fellow Pashtun. With pre-election opinion polls suggesting that Afghanistan's population has become increasingly disenchanted with his administration's rule over the past five years, with people particularly criticising his administation's inability to bring security to a country that has been scarred by decades of armed conflict, create employment opportunities and its failure to reign in corruption, this indicates that Karzai is likely to fail to gain a simple majority vote that would allow him to continue in office straight away. As per the constitution, this would essentially mean a run-off vote in October, in which Karzai is likely to meet former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, who, according to pre-election polls, was able to make significant gains vis-à-vis Karzai in recent months. That any candidate is likely to only win by a small margin also increases the risk of either candidate and/or his supporters crying fraud, a pertinent issue in these elections that is likely to severely affect the legitimacy of results. The danger of this ending in violence is highlighted by the fact that both Karzai and Abdullah have already claimed victory, despite the absence so far even of preliminary results.

Unofficial preliminary results are likely to trickle in over the next few days, with the first official data expected on 3 September, with final results due by 17 September at the latest. Should it come to a run-off vote, this according to the Independent Election Commission (IEC) would be held on 1 September.

Perceived Legitimacy Crucial Issue after Elections

The single most important issue on most observers' minds now is that yesterday's elections produce results that are accepted by the majority of Afghans. However, widespread violence, flawed electoral processes and a generally violent political culture have bred fears over results being perceived as illegitimate. Fears that legitimacy becomes a major issue before and after results are officially declared are spurred by the expectation of Karzai missing a simple majority of votes and the prospect of run-off elections.

Firstly, rampant insecurity especially in the south and east of the country have resulted in no voter turnout in some, and very low turnout in most areas in the south and east of the country. In these areas, Taliban attacks and threats to cut off fingers or even slit throats of those who have voted, seems to have paid off. This has important implications for the representativeness of results, with Pashtuns likely to feel under-represented. Apart from increasing the dangers of post-election political violence, this could also move people to once more support the Taliban insurgency. Widespread violence has also limited the numbers of observers at polling stations, thus limiting possibilities for monitoring. Sure enough, there have been reports of ballot stuffing in some polling stations.

Secondly, flaws in the current system of Afghanistan's electoral institutions, ranging from a problematic legal framework upon which the existence and conduct of these institutions is built, to the registration process of candidates and allegations of being politically biased, are likely to have skewed the results. With estimates that up to three million voting cards out of a total of about 17 million registered cards were fraudulent, such fears have been confirmed with children (minimum age to cast a ballot is 18) and a disproportionately high number of women voting. One issue that has specifically been criticised by one candidate, Ramazan Bashardost, was that the allegedly "indelible" ink with which voters' fingers were marked came off easily by using a domestic detergent, prompting him to demand the elections to be halted immediately.

Thirdly, in the likely event that Karzai wins the elections, however small the margin, his contenders are likely to point out his incumbent advantages. Under current constitutional provisions Afghanistan's president enjoys significant advantages in contesting elections, which many have argued go well beyond the usual advantages of incumbency. This includes the power to appoint IEC officials, provincial governors, gain disproportionate media coverage and access to state resources.

Outlook and Implications

While a simple majority for Karzai and the retaining of the status quo still remains a possibility, the most likely scenario now is that Karzai misses a simple majority of votes, forcing him into run-off elections with Abdullah. There are two broad scenarios of how this could play out.

Scenario I: Small-Margin Victory or Run-Off Elections Spark Violence

In this scenario the successful candidate wins by only a small margin, either during the first round or through run-off elections. The most likely winner is Karzai, although Abdullah, Bashardost and/or Ghani could succeed if they formed an alliance, particularly in the case of run-off elections. In this scenario the elections produce results that lack, or are perceived to lack, legitimacy among wide parts of the population. Tajik voter turnout rates have been higher than those of Pashtuns. Tensions would ensue, culminating in demonstrations and violence. A significant loss of trust in the entire democratic process would become evident. Political violence will add significantly to the general climate of instability in this scenario, and would also affect the country's cities. In such a situation the Taliban would be able to further gain strength, as efforts to counter their movement become increasingly diluted. This scenario could also see Karzai impose a state of emergency. The international community would face severe additional hardships in carrying out their mandate.

Scenario II: Small-Margin Victory or Run-Off Elections Force Winning Candidate to Co-Opt Challengers

This scenario sees the winning candidate co-opting one or more of his challengers, most likely by offering attractive positions in his government. Depending on the overall context in which such a move takes place, this could provide for more stability. Furthermore, the fact that Abdullah, Bashardost and/or Ghani have a say in government opens the door for more substantial reform moves in political, economic and social terms. The government's writ increases as its legitimacy is enhanced in the eyes of the public (although regional commanders are likely to retain control over much of their traditional territory). The international community is provided the opportunity to extend unprecedented moral and material support to a government that enjoys widespread legitimacy, which not least means enhanced public trust in government institutions that in turn are strengthened and slowly rid of rampant corruption. This would help counter-insurgency measures against the Taliban, thus enhancing security throughout the country. Furthermore, a reversal of the tide in the fight against the Taliban also enhances leverage power to initiate peace talks with "moderate" elements among insurgents, as proposed by Karzai for some time.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)

 


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