Those who first questioned the deal hammered out in Vienna were conservatives, close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but not part of the Ahmadinejad axis. Most notably, Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian Majlis and a close confidant of Khamenei's, cast doubt on the plan, saying, "My guess is that the Americans have made a secret deal with certain countries to take [low-]enriched uranium away from us under the pretext of providing nuclear fuel." Targeting his comments more directly towards Ahmadinejad, Larijani added, "We hope Iranian officials will pay due attention to this issue."

Soon thereafter, Larijani's brother, Sadegh, declared that nuclear negotiations were "not beneficial" to Iranian national interests. Most recently, and perhaps most forcefully, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the head of Majlis' influential National Security and Foreign Affairs commission, on Saturday called the IAEA-backed deal "out of the question," though he has since backpedaled.

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani then joined the fray, voicing his concerns over Ahmadinejad's negotiations with the P5+1 countries in a letter addressed directly to Khamenei. Rafsanjani's criticisms should be viewed with skepticism, however, as they run contrary to his long history of hinting support for a pragmatic approach in dealing with the West. In reality, Rafsanjani likely welcomes pursuing a policy of détente with the Obama administration -- just not under Ahmadinejad's watch. His opposition to the latest agreement could be driven by his desire to be involved personally in delivering renewed ties with the West -- the "golden prize" of Iranian politics -- or else from a desire to marginalize Ahmadinejad.

In any event, all the internal lobbying seems to have had an effect on Khamenei, who in remarks delivered on the 30th anniversary of the 1979 hostage crisis finally stated that Iran would reject any deal whose result is "pre-determined" by the United States. The National Iranian American Council's Trita Parsi labeled Iran's current crisis of leadership "the worst-case scenario" for resolving the nuclear issue, arguing that "it can leave people with the impression diplomacy has been tried and failed, whereas in reality it came at a point when Iran is too politically divided and incapable of making decisions of this magnitude."

But while Ahmadinejad may be feeling pressure most vocally from the right side of Iran's political spectrum, the increasingly unified message of the Green movement vis-à-vis the nuclear issue should not be overlooked. It represents yet another complex variable for an Obama administration trying to balance engagement with Iran based on U.S. security interests on the one hand, and not interfering with the aspirations of an expansive, grass-roots opposition movement inside the country on the other.

The Green movement has only recently started to discuss the nuclear issue directly, and with caution even then, avoiding any mention of whether the regime is actually pursuing an atomic weapon. But both Mir Hossein Mousavi's and Mehdi Karoubi's criticisms of nuclear negotiations seem to have been formulated to capitalize on the political divisions that have emerged between conservatives since June's election. At their meeting in late October, Mousavi called the outcome of the Geneva talks "shocking" and framed Ahmadinejad's engagement with the West in almost anti-nationalist terms.

"If we commit to the promises [the regime] has given in Geneva, we will be undermining the efforts of thousands of scientists across the country," he said, "while if we do not agree, that would open up the door for collective action against us in the form of sanctions. This is the outcome of an adventurous foreign policy that has no regard for rules and national interests."

Only three days later, Mousavi addressed the Obama administration's apparent willingness to negotiate with Ahmadinejad's government head-on, stating, "If need be, [the West] will sit at the negotiation table, while turning [its] back on the [Green] movement."

The opposition, it seems, is attempting to turn the tables on Ahmadinejad by painting him as the one colluding with foreign powers. If so, it would introduce an interesting new dynamic, not only in nuclear negotiations with the West, but in how the domestic crisis plays out within Iran. It increasingly appears that continued conservative support for Ahmadinejad is at least somewhat tied to his ability to either win concessions from the West or stave off further international sanctions, all without budging from the regime's recalcitrant negotiating position on the country's nuclear program. Cognizant of just how unrealistic these expectations are, the opposition may begin to increasingly use the nuclear issue as a means of widening, and exploiting, political divisions on the right, in order to ultimately advance the goals of the Green movement.

But the attempt by leaders of the Green movement to weaken Ahmadinejad by linking him to the West might soon be overtaken by the actual grassroots opposition. Throughout Iran on Nov. 4, protesters chanted, "Obama! Obama! You're either with them or with us!" If the Iranian people increasingly link their struggle for democracy with Obama's global message of hope, it will make the American president's balancing act that much more difficult. With post-election unrest entering its fifth month with no resolution in sight, Obama might soon be forced to pick sides between an Iranian regime that is widely viewed as illegitimate, and its people.

**Masoud Shafaee is a freelance writer and analyst based in Washington, D.C. He holds a Juris Doctor from American University's Washington College of Law and is currently completing his Master's degree in international affairs from the School of International Service. In addition to World Politics Review, he has written for the American Jurist and the Washington Prism, an English-Farsi publication of the World Security Institute. He also maintains The Newest Deal, a blog which actively covers post-election developments coming out of Iran.