Indeed, recoveries of a number of unexploded devices, as well as arrests and the discovery of cottage ‘bomb factories’, including one in the single district – Munshiganj – which escaped the serial blasts (but where over a hundred bombs were recovered from a house at Baligaon village), suggest that the numbers could well have been larger.

Over the past years, Islamist extremist activities have only been noticed in a few of Bangladesh’s western districts including, Naogaon, Rajshahi, Kushtia (each sharing border with the Indian State of West Bengal), Bogra, Natore and Pabna. The Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and its twin organisation, the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) – the latter is widely held responsible for the August 17 explosions – have been known to be active in these districts. Southern Districts, including Bandarban, Cox’s Bazaar, Chittagong, Khagrachhari, Rangamati (sharing borders with Myanmar and the Indian States of Mizoram and Tripura) have also witnessed significant extremist activity attributed to the Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-BD) and its international partners, including the Al-Qaeda. In addition, Sylhet in east Bangladesh, sharing a border with India’s Assam State, has also seen some Islamist terrorist violence, prominently including the May 21, 2004, attack in which two persons were killed and the British High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Anwar Choudhury, was among some 70 injured in a powerful bomb blast at Hazrat Shahjalal Shrine in Sylhet. There was, however, little cumulative evidence of capacities in any single terrorist organisation – or known coalition of such organisations – that could engineer a nationwide strike of such a magnitude. Nor, indeed, is it credible that such capacities, involving thousands of persons, could have systematically been acquired without generating a substantial volume of intelligence ‘chatter’ – if not actual precursor incidents and arrests.

Intelligence sources estimate that at least two persons would have been involved in the planting of each explosive device – suggesting an operation mobilizing well over a thousand cadres through the length and breadth of the country. That a conspiracy of such magnitude could escape the notice of intelligence agencies defies belief.

Equally incredible, indeed ludicrous, is the Minister of State for Home, Lutfozzaman Babar’s statement that, "We had intelligence reports of some attacks between August 14 and 16, but we had no information of attacks on August 17." Terrorist plans don’t come with an inbuilt and irrevocable ‘expiry date’, after which everyone goes home. [Babar quickly shifted his position, claiming shortly thereafter that the incidents were "totally unexpected. None of us had any idea about such an incident."] Separately, an unidentified ‘security official’ disclosed in The Daily Star, "We were told that there might be attacks on Awami League rallies and meetings." He clarified, however, that, "This was not a specific warning, but we stepped up security across the country on August 14, 15 and 16." There is no explanation why security was then ‘stepped down’ on August 17.

While the sheer number of explosions is startling, the bombs were all of low intensity and of crude manufacture, clearly intended to communicate a message, rather than to inflict hard damage to life and property. That is why, despite the scale of the operation, only two persons were killed, and the total number injured were estimated at just 100. Most of the targets were Government establishments, mainly offices of the local district administration and courts. Significantly, just two hours after Prime Minister Khaleda Zia left for China from the Zia International Airport, on a five-day official tour, a time bomb went off on the stairs inside the Airport. The districts that witnessed the largest number of explosions included Dhaka (28 explosions, including the high-security Bangladesh Secretariat, Supreme Court complex, the Prime Minister's Office, Dhaka Judges Court, Dhaka University, Dhaka Sheraton Hotel, and Zia International Airport); Barisal (18); Chittagong (16); Khulna (15); Sylhet (15); and Rajshahi (12).

Some 300 persons have since been arrested, including a number of low level activists of the JMB, and the Government has circulated photographs of 15 leaders of four militant organisations, including Maulana Abdur Raman and Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen, to all airports and land ports in Bangladesh to prevent them from leaving the country. Interrogations of persons arrested in the immediate aftermath of the explosions, including some who confessed to their involvement, revealed that they claimed allegiance to the JMB, the group whose leaflets and propaganda material was recovered near the site of several explosions.

There is, nevertheless, evidence of an enveloping smokescreen going up, and that the state is, in fact, eager to deflect suspicion away from the Islamist extremist groups. Several leaders of the ruling coalition – including some from Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s ostensibly secular Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), have sought to shift the blame to the Awami League. Despite interrogation reports confirming JMB involvement, the Deputy Minister for Land, Ruhul Quddus Talukder, a BNP Member of Parliament, declared, "I don’t think they (the JMB) have such a strong network. Awami League must have done this, using fake leaflets, to destroy Bangladesh’s image internationally." Mufti Fazlul Haq Amini, Chairman of the Amini faction of the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ-Amini), a constituent member of the ruling four-party alliance, addressing a rally in front of the Baitul Mukarram Mosque, Dhaka, on August 19, declaimed: "Swearing upon Allah, I know the 14-party alliance of Awami League and left parties launched the bomb attacks in a planned way to uproot the Islamic forces, but Islamic forces can never be eliminated."

Gradually, however, the emphasis is being shifted, and India has now been brought into the picture. The Jamaat-e-Islami amir (chief) and Industries Minister, Matiur Rahman Nizami (the Jamaat is another coalition partner in the BNP-led coalition Government), blamed India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Israel’s Mossad for "playing an important role" in the August 17 attacks, claiming, "They are the patrons of the serial blasts as they don’t want good relations between Bangladesh and China. That's why the incident occurred when Prime Minister Khaleda Zia was on a visit to Beijing." While Foreign Minister M. Morshed Khan distanced the Government and the BNP from Nizami’s statements, stating that "his voice is not BNP’s voice", he went on to add that it was "too early to go into speculations whether Islamist terrorists are present in the country or not."

This is entirely consistent with Dhaka’s past record. With enormous evidence of the activities of Islamist terrorists – including the JMJB and the JMB – accumulating over the past years, Dhaka kept up a steady stream of denials till fairly recently. Indeed, on January 26, 2005, State Minister for Home, Lutfozzaman Babar, had declaimed, "We don’t know officially about the existence of the JMJB. Only some so-called newspapers are publishing reports on it." Less than a month later, on February 23, 2005, under extraordinary pressure from the international community, particularly Western donor countries, the Government announced a ban on both the JMB and JMJB, organisations of whose existence it had denied at the highest level just a month earlier. The ‘ban’, however, was a red herring, and had little impact beyond the ritual arrest and brief detention of a few leaders and cadres. Even in cases where cadres of these organisations have been arrested on charges of terrorism, their treatment has been extraordinarily benign. A few recent examples, consistent with an extended past record, adequately illustrate the pattern:

August 2, 2005: Police dropped two top cadres of the JMJB, identified as ‘Bheti camp in-charge’ Shariatullah Simar and his deputy Mustafizur Rahman Khwaza, from the charge sheet filed in the Ziaul Haque Zia murder case. The charge sheet against 20 other persons was submitted to a court in Naogaon on August 2. Zia had been abducted from his residence by JMJB activists and was beaten to death at Raninagar in the Rajshahi district on November 14, 2004.

July 28, 2005: According to Independent, most of the 68 JMJB cadres, arrested between January 24 and January 30, 2005 from various places in Bagmara, have been released due to the non-submission of reports against them by the police.

June 1, 2005: 24 followers of Bangla Bhai, ‘Commander’ of the JMJB, released from the Rajshahi Central Jail. Earlier, the Rajshahi district court granted bail to 26 of Bangla Bhai’s followers.

April 7, 2005: A total of 42 JMJB cadres were released on bail from the Rajshahi central jail.

Bangladesh, again under extreme international pressure, has periodically launched massive ‘anti-crime’ (anti-terrorist) drives – but these have overwhelmingly targeted the ruling coalition’s political opponents, particularly Awami League cadres and activists, rather than any known terrorist formations.

Unsurprisingly, the Awami League President and former Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, has claimed that the explosions were carried out under protection of the BNP-Jamaat-led alliance Government and direct supervision of the Jamaat-e-Islami. Hasina asserted, further, that the "Jamaat has been supervising activities of various terrorist groups in the country for a long time." Notwithstanding the polarized nature of the political discourse in Bangladesh, these are assertions that cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Given Bangladesh’s past record and present projections, it is improbable that the truth of the bomb blasts – as of several past terrorist actions and major arms seizures – will ever be fully known. Nevertheless, it is necessary to assess – albeit speculatively – what precisely the intent and purpose of the August 17 explosions could be. The most coherent explanation that arises within the country’s political context is that these were, simultaneously, the demonstration of expanded capabilities, a strategy of mobilization and a campaign of intimidation. The demonstration of terrorist capabilities is, at once, a powerful tool for further recruitment in areas where such operations are executed, and a severe warning to political opponents that dire consequences attend any efforts of opposition. Conceptualized as such, the serial blasts would be calculated to benefit the ruling coalition, or elements within this coalition, in the run up to the 2006 General Election. The intervening year can only see the augmentation of such terror that would help consolidate the Islamist right in Bangladesh, and extend its own and its coalition partners’ electoral prospects.