The Bench has issued notices to the Federation of Pakistan, the Northern Areas Chief Executive, Chief Secretary and Northern Areas Legislative Council on a petition filed by Ehsan Ali, Labour Party Chairman and an advocate in the NACC. Ali filed the petition in June 2001 questioning the legality of the existing institutions in the region after the Supreme Court’s May 1999 verdict on the status of the Northern Areas.

On May 28, 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan had observed that, "It was not understandable on what basis the people of Northern Areas can be denied the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. We are of the view that the people of Northern Areas are citizens of Pakistan for all intents and purposes. They have the rights to invoke any fundamental rights but are also liable to pay taxes and other levies competently imposed." The Court ruled, further, "We allow the petitions and direct the respondent federation to initiate appropriate administrative/legislative measures within a period of six months from today to make necessary amendments in the Constitution... to ensure that the people in Northern Areas enjoy their fundamental rights, namely, to be governed by their chosen representatives, and to have access to justice inter alia for the enforcement of their fundamental rights under the Constitution (of Pakistan)."

It was against this background that the All Parties National Alliance (APNA), a conglomerate of regional political parties, on June 16, 2005, challenged in the High Court, the ban imposed on nationalist parties to participate in the elections in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). Under the Interim Act 1974 of the Constitution of Azad Kashmir [PoK], a person may contest elections and seek Government employment only if he or she ‘believes in the ideology of Pakistan’ and the concept of the ‘State’s accession to Pakistan’. APNA contends that "those who are real patriots and believe in the reunification and independence of their motherland have been deprived of these basic human rights." APNA chairman Arif Shahid stated, at a Press Conference in Muzaffarabad, the capital of PoK, that according to UN resolutions, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) was a disputed territory whose future was yet to be decided and that the clause of accession to Pakistan was against the UN resolutions and a violation of human rights. In order to participate in elections, APNA has moved the Court for the removal of the unconstitutional clause of accession to Pakistan. In a writ petition filed under Section 44, APNA argues that "that the declaration… in Azad J&K Assembly Rules, 1970 and Sec, 3 and 9 of the Political Parties Act, 1987, to the extent of the words, "State’s accession to Pakistan" and in the Local Bodies Election Rules, 1970 the Declaration: "I believe in the ideology of the State’s accession to Pakistan" are coram-non-judice, illegal and have been inserted without lawful authority..."

The strategically important Northern Areas (NA) of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), spread over an area of 28,000 square miles, comprise the five districts of Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer, Skardu and Ghanche. The population of approximately 1.5 million has ethnic groups as varied as the Baltees, Shinas, Vashkuns, Mughals, Kashmiris, Pathans, Ladhakhis and Turks, speaking a variety of languages including Balti, Shina, Brushaski, Khawer, Wakhi, Turki, Tibeti, Pushto and Urdu. Unlike the rest of Pakistan, Shias dominate the demography of the NAs.

Islamabad’s orientation towards the NAs has been riddled with suspicion, and there has been a systematic effort to alter the region’s demography by settling large numbers of Pathans from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Punjabis, in the area. This has already altered local majorities in several areas of the region. The late Amir Hamza, a resident of Gilgit and a former Senior Superintendent of Police, once stated, "They [the Pakistan Government] have never trusted us. From day one, that is, November 1, 1947, till now we cannot govern our own land. If we are given that right, they think all hell will break lose." There is no mention of Gilgit-Baltistan either in the Constitution of Pakistan or in the Interim Constitution of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The area is thus an extraordinary example of constitutional ambivalence and, in contravention of judicial decrees, Islamabad continues to maintain this status quo.

The recent petitions and earlier Court rulings mirror the prevailing climate of public opinion in the NAs. The people of Gilgit and Baltistan, who are not allowed to travel in Pakistan without special permission, are currently insisting that Islamabad clarify the region’s status, particularly in light of President Pervez Musharraf’s varied proposals on a ‘final settlement of the Kashmir issue’. Absent an unambiguous declaration from Islamabad, the existing political deprivation and resentment may lead to a gradual escalation of what is currently a situation of low-level violence with larger hidden costs.

The people of the NAs have also questioned why letters of accession from the Rajas (Kings) of Nagar and Hunza, signed by Pakistan’s first President Mohammad Ali Jinnah, were not accepted as legal basis for integration. According to Farooq Haidar of the NA chapter of the Jammu and Kashmir Front (JKLF), there is, in fact, "no documentary evidence" to suggest that the people of the area have acceded to Pakistan. Islamabad is believed to have suppressed the letters of accession from the Rajas of Nagar and Hunza partially because they had no power of accession (since the entire State of Jammu & Kashmir reverted to Maharaja Gulab Singh after the departure of the British), and because the whole State was sought to be brought under dispute before the United Nations.

Nominal political institutions such as the 24-member Northern Areas Legislative Council have been created, but these have had no impact on the political rights of the people of the region, which is directly administrated by fiat from Islamabad. The bureaucracy, primarily drawn from the North West Frontier Province and Punjab, has intensified the sense of alienation and negated any semblance of self-rule in the NAs. Forces opposing Islamabad’s rule over the region have long argued that the revenue accruing from resources like hydro-electricity, tourism and minerals are being ‘managed’ by Islamabad for the benefit of other provinces.

Dissent against Islamabad is now crystallizing as the perception grows that the legal status of the NAs is being held hostage to the ‘Kashmir issue’ by Islamabad. There is also the larger conviction in the region that successive Pakistani regimes, while calling for ‘basic human rights’ in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, have at the same time promoted extreme repression in the NAs. Indeed, Pakistan’s reticence in discussing the Kargil-Skardu road-link is connected to the fact that any alteration in the status quo in NA would weaken its claim on what it calls the ‘core issue’ of Kashmir. And General Musharraf, who has personally seen a fair amount of ‘action’ in Gilgit-Baltistan, is also aware that the further he moves on the Kashmir issue, the more untenable would Pakistan's position on the Northern Areas be.

And in the prevailing climate of ‘peace-building’ and ‘people-to-people exchanges’, many find it hard to fathom why people from the NA have been excluded from the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan. In tune with General Musharraf’s stated policies, separatists from the Hurriyat Conference and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Islamabad’s proxies in J&K, opted not to visit Gilgit-Baltistan during their sojourn in Pakistan in June 2005, though they did find the time and inclination to visit Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. The separatists believe that Pakistan’s control over NA is irrevocable and, as such, it would be prudent not to bring this disputed region into the current discourse on Kashmir.

The people of the NAs have also been extremely restive as a result of the attempts being made to re-engineer the demographic profile of the region. The Balawaristan National Front leader Nawaz Khan Naji stated in an interview on March 16, 2004 that "the Pathans are buying property and our cities are becoming Pathan-majority cities, where our locals are becoming minorities. We have no right to cast votes in Pakistan, nor in Azad Kashmir. Like a no-man's land. We are the last colony in the world." Sources in Gilgit indicate that large tracts of land are being allotted to Afghan refugees and Pashtuns from the NWFP.

Meanwhile, violence, primarily sectarian in nature, continues to affect the NA. In Gilgit alone, 127 cases of violence occurred between January and May 3, 2005, including the killing of Agha Ziauddin, a Shia community leader and priest of the main Gilgit mosque, on January 8. According to Raji Rehmat, the Gilgit Superintendent of Police, while 148 persons were arrested for their alleged involvement in these incidents, a total of 26 vehicles, private as well as official, were set ablaze in the sectarian violence and protests.

At least 42 civilians and five security force personnel have died in sectarian violence in 2005 (till August 18). The most significant incidents include:

July 18: Unidentified assailants attacked a Rawalpindi-bound passenger bus coming from Gilgit near Chilas Farm on the Karakoram Highway (KKH), killing five persons and injuring 15 others.

March 23: Former Inspector General of Police (IGP), Sakhiullah Tareen, and four police officials were killed when unidentified men fired at his vehicle near village Jotal in the Northern Areas. Tareen was on his way back to Gilgit from Hunza when gunmen ambushed the vehicle. The Government had reportedly removed Tareen from the post of Northern Areas IGP and transferred him as Officer on Special Duty on March 18.

January 8: At least 11 people were killed, including six members of a family who were burnt alive, and 14 were injured during sectarian clashes that occurred after unidentified people shot at the vehicle of Agha Ziauddin. Reacting to news of his death, officials in Skardu said protesters burnt down a seminary and destroyed a Pakistan International Airlines office and some other shops.

There is some evidence to indicate that the sectarian violence in the NAs, in particular at Gilgit, is being planned and orchestrated from other Pakistani provinces, especially the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Ziauddin’s killer, for instance, belonged to the village of Zareef Korona on the outskirts of Peshawar in the NWFP. Later, Qari Anwar Khan, an NWFP-based leader of the outlawed Sunni group, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), was arrested on February 2 in connection with the Ziauddin assassination. Further, Police at Battagram in the NWFP disclosed on June 16 that they had foiled a bid to smuggle arms and ammunition and arrested two persons, Ubaidullah and Abdul Karim. Police officer Nisar Khan Tanoli said they recovered 12 AK-47 rifles, fifteen 303 rifles, twelve 8 mm rifles, 13 China rifles, 12 pistols, 20 other rifles, three 7mm guns and about 5,000 rounds of different bore. He added that the cache was being transported to Gilgit.

Further, the tactics used by sectarian terrorists in places like Quetta, Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore, and elsewhere are now being employed in the NAs. The bomb explosion at a mosque in Naltar village, about 35 kilometers west of Gilgit, occurred during evening prayers when the attendance is relatively higher. A pattern of such attacks has characterized operations by sectarian groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in other provinces of Pakistan. Ahsan Wali Khan, a prominent journalist from the NAs, reports that there is a dangerous trend of well-organized teenagers armed with lethal weapons carrying out executions behind the smokescreen of mob violence. Road travel is becoming increasingly hazardous, especially on the KKH, since it passes through a Sunni majority area from Gilgit to Rawalpindi (the July 18 bus incident occurred on this route). The KKH also passes through the Shia dominated Nagar valley en route to Hunza and China, where IGP Tareen was killed. Uncertain travel on the KKH has led to a relative decrease in the volume of trade and inflow of foreign tourists, the mainstay of the local economy.

Notwithstanding escalating dissent, through legal, political and extra-legal channels, the possibilities of a more concerted and violent campaign against Islamabad are remote. Essentially a peaceful grouping, the sparsely populated nature of the NAs (a population of 1.5 million inhabits a vast area of 72,495 square kilometers) militates against the prospects of a widespread insurgency in the proximate future. Previous movements in the region have been brutally and easily suppressed by Islamabad, and the present crackdown has also been relatively severe. For example, a large contingent of the army, 800 Punjab Rangers, 1,000 Scouts and about 1,000 police personnel took part in a combing operation on April 1, 2005. This was in addition to the existing police strength of 3,700 in the NAs.

But it isn’t a cakewalk for the administration. Ahsan Wali Khan noted in The News on August 7, 2005, that certain officers of Superintendent of Police rank have refused to join duty at Gilgit, even at the risk of facing disciplinary action, because of the fear of being killed in the ongoing sectarian violence. These officers were selected and posted to Gilgit by the Federal Government to improve the law and order situation.

Persistent sectarian violence in the NA could, according to Pakistani analysts, impact adversely on the security forces in the country. Aziz-ud-din Ahmad wrote, in The Nation on July 28, 2005, that the region supplies the Pakistan Army with men and officers with greater capability to fight in some of the most difficult terrain along the Line of Control than men recruited from the plains of Punjab and that rise of communalism can affect their morale.

Pakistan has persistently propagated the thesis of ‘self-determination’ in Kashmir and in other theatres of supposed ‘Muslim oppression’ across the world. Curiously, in the NAs, Pakistan has utterly suppressed, and continues to seek the total circumvention of this very principle.