But there's another term that has frequently been attached to Ankara's newfound diplomatic activism, one that Turkish policymakers are much less fond of: "neo-Ottomanism." At its best, the term describes a foreign policy that derives part of its legitimacy from Turkey's experience as a longtime imperial power in its wider neighborhood. At its worst, it suggests hegemonic ulterior motives behind Turkey's newfound activism. Despite Ankara's displeasure, it has stuck around, sustained to a certain extent by Turkey's own ambitions.

"The official rhetoric is that Turkey is doing [its foreign policy outreach] for the good of the region, but there is also this sense of grandeur," says Sami Kohen, a veteran foreign affairs columnist with the daily Milliyet newspaper. "Davutoglu himself wants Turkey to be a major player, with this sense of mission. It's no wonder that there is all this talk of neo-Ottomanism."

Understandably, that talk is not appreciated in Ankara's foreign policy circles. As Turkey tries to reconnect with areas such as the Balkans and the Middle East, where the Ottoman past remains a thorny issue, any talk of "neo-Ottomanism" and its implications of far-reaching ambitions could easily sink Ankara's project to become a more forceful regional player.

"It doesn't speak to our reality. It's not a name that we have chosen for ourselves," says Ibrahim Kalin, chief foreign policy adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. "Certainly, we see the Ottoman past as an asset, especially since the soft elements of culture and history, the soft elements of international relations, are back. In that regard, yes, the Ottoman past is part of our present, but we don't want to go out and conquer the world. Empires are costly and ineffective."

Still, in some ways, Ankara is trying to have it both ways in this debate. A large part of Davutoglu's regional foreign policy and many of the Turkish government's initiatives in recent years -- from its brokering of talks between Israel and Syria to its attempts to reconcile the arguing factions in Lebanon -- have been justified by Turkey's Ottoman experience.

"There's no doubt that our Ottoman past and history somewhat legitimates this [new foreign policy]. It's not like we are going into brand new areas. We know these areas and people know us in those areas," said Suat Kiniklioglu, the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) deputy chairman of External Affairs, in an interview last year.

"[W]e have centuries of history in the region," he added. "I'm not saying Turkey is a central piece in everything, but it's definitely a useful part in the delicate setting of the Middle East."

Namik Tan, formerly Turkey's ambassador to Israel and now its recently appointed ambassador in Washington, said similar things during a 2007 interview. "How can you disassociate yourself from an empire . . . which existed for almost 700 years? We are the descendants of the Ottoman Empire and we have to recognize that past and we have to embrace our legacy," he said.

"We have been in [the Middle East] around 500 years," Tan explained. "We have established very strong cultural and historical affiliations to all the people living in this region. In other words, we are local. . . . This means that we think we understand the issues better than other parties, such as the Europeans and others. I don't say they are less interested, but we can understand the feelings of the people living in this region better."

The "neo-Ottoman" tag's lasting power has also been fed by pundits both inside and outside Turkey. In a recent column in the English-language Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish political analyst Cengiz Candar talked about Ankara's improved relations with Syria and Lebanon, hinting at a kind of re-creation of the Ottoman-era "Damascus province" that included both countries. And in recent years, particularly after Erdogan publicly berated Israeli President Shimon Peres at Davos in early 2009, several Arab columnists and writers have talked about the "return of the Ottomans" and have even referred to the Turkish prime minister as a new "sultan."

This is exactly the kind of nostalgic talk that worries Ankara. But Omer Taspinar, director of the Turkey Program at the Brookings Institution in Washington, says that rather than trying to sweep the term under the rug, Ankara might want to redefine it.

"I think of neo-Ottomanism as a balancing act between East and West, and they do this much better than the Kemalists, who were not only against the East but are now also against the West. Neo-Ottomanism is actually more at peace with [both]," he says.

"It has an imperial vision," Taspinar allowed, "not in the sense of territorial ambitions. But it is imperial in the sense of a mindset: Let's think of Turkey as regional superpower and let's try to balance things. Let's try to resurrect the region from its decline."

Turkish foreign policy may have a clear forward vision these days, but it is also inescapably linked with its Ottoman past. Ankara's challenge now involves redefining the state's previously uneasy relationship to that past, in order to draw strength and legitimacy from it. Because like it or not, the term "neo-Ottomanism" will be around for a while.

**Yigal Schleifer is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul, Turkey, where he works as a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor and the Eurasianet Web site, covering Turkey and the surrounding region. His work has appeared in the New York Times, Washington Post, Haaretz, the Jerusalem Report, the Times of London, the Walrus and other publications. He blogs on Turkish politics at Istanbul Calling.