There is general agreement that three factors need to be present in order to possess nuclear weapons: procuring nuclear material that is suitable for weapons production, weapon (warhead) production and the ability to deliver. Obtaining nuclear material for weapons production is the most difficult step, and the two most widely used materials are uranium and plutonium.

Enrichment

Uranium is the only natural element that can be used in nuclear weapons production. Iran uses uranium. Uranium found in nature consists primarily of two isotopes, U-238 (99.3 percent) and U-235 (0.03 percent). But only U-235 is fissile, meaning its atomic nuclei will split and release nuclear energy. As a result, U-235 needs to be separated. Uranium enriched to around 4 percent U-235 is enough to produce energy at nuclear plants, and increasing it to about 20 percent makes it suitable for use in research and medical services. However, weapons production and nuclear energy-powered ships and submarines require uranium that is at least around 90 percent U-235.

The most common method for enrichment (the process of separating isotopes) is converting the ore into gas and transporting the gas through centrifuge tubes. The most complex part is operating these tubes. Essentially, this process depends on the same simple rule of physics (centrifugal force) that is applied to operate drums in washing machines that spin and so force most of the water out of the clothes. The only difference is that while washing machine drums spin at 15-25 revolutions per minute, the centrifuges used in uranium enrichment have a tremendous speed of around 10,000 revolutions per minute. Due to the slight difference in weight (U-235 weighs about 1.3 percent less than U-238), U-235 gas accumulates on the top and inner parts of the rapidly rotating tubes, and the slightly heavier U-238 accumulates mainly on the lower and outer parts. As a result, gas obtained from the top part of the tube contains more U-235. Since enrichment in each individual centrifuge is very minimal, thousands of centrifuges are chained together in cascades and are operated for long periods of time.

The centrifuges can operate at such high speeds only in a vacuum. Centrifuge tubes need to be precision manufactured from extremely durable material, and every piece needs to be smooth and flawless. Even microscopic imperfections can impair the process. Western agents who have infiltrated Iran have tried to halt operation of the tubes through technological means. At one point in 2006, Iran had serious trouble with the tubes' rotation and suspected that this was caused by technological sabotage by Western agents. But it turned out that the problem stemmed from a simple mistake (and one which also shows how delicate the process truly is): The minuscule weight of Iranian workers' fingerprints left on the tubes was the culprit.

Despite formidable odds, Iran has managed to acquire solid, independent knowledge about centrifuge technology, which carries paramount importance. The key point to bear in mind is that enriching uranium from 0.03 percent to 4.2 and then 90 percent not only requires serious technical skill, but that the method applied at every level is substantially the same.

Weapons production

The second component of nuclear weapons possession is designing and producing warheads. While high-volume facilities are required for enrichment, warheads can be designed and produced in much smaller spaces. A mechanism that enables a large number of atomic nuclei to be split and then release a tremendous amount of energy (chain reaction) before the material blows itself apart is required, where time differences are measured in nanoseconds. It is for this reason that a country producing warheads can't just store them. To ensure that the explosive mechanism has been designed properly, it must have at least one successful test, albeit on a small scale. All countries that possess nuclear arms, including the undeclared nuclear power Israel, have tested their weapons. For example, in 2006 North Korea's first nuclear test ended in failure: the weapon exploded and destroyed itself before enough atomic nuclei had split. But another North Korean test last year was successful. As a result, only after it conducts its first successful test can Iran be considered to have nuclear arms.

The last component, delivery, has to do mainly with military strategy, something which should present no serious problem for a country capable of producing nuclear warheads. The US simply dropped the first nuclear bomb over Hiroshima in 1945. Today, however, countries prefer missiles that can be launched from land, air and sea and which give the enemy very little time to take precautionary measures.

Now we can return to the question asked at the beginning: Who is right? Does Iran's nuclear program really aim to produce weapons? As is clear from the factual framework presented above, it is not currently possible to prove that Iran has a nuclear program that aims to produce weapons, nor is it possible to prove the contrary. At least for now, the issue cannot be proven through facts, but rather has to do with trying to gauge intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- the pre-eminent authority in the matter -- has also stated that it has not found any concrete evidence suggesting that Iran is attempting to produce nuclear weapons.

Between the “peaceful purposes” view and the dark intonations of nuclear ambitions, there is a third assessment of Iran's true aims. According to this view, Iran's primary intention is not to actually possess nuclear arms but rather to possess a strong hand for bargaining with Western countries once it has full command of the technology. Iran would surely reach that point when it is able to enrich uranium to around 20 percent. This is because once a country has facilities capable of producing 20 percent enriched uranium, it is a relatively small leap to advance to being able to conduct a nuclear weapons test within a relatively short time. While 650-700 times enrichment (from 0.03 to 20 percent) is necessary to produce 20 percent enriched uranium, only four to five times enrichment (from 20 to 90 percent) is needed to have weapons grade nuclear material. Moreover, the volume of gas required for the final stage is much less than the earlier ones, and therefore, the later processes would require the handling of fewer tubes.

In such bargaining with the West, Iran can be expected to make two main demands before it would agree to abandon its nuclear bid: first, political recognition, along with guarantees to end activities meant to undermine its regime, and second, the acceptance of Iran as a legitimate side and player in international issues concerning the Middle East. Recent developments hint at the possibility that the US has already taken into consideration this bargaining stance. Richard Haass, the head of the Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank closely tied to the Obama administration, is a seasoned strategist with moderate views. While he can't be expected to pursue a line in open opposition to Washington, Haass has published articles making it clear that he has recently changed his mind and now believes that the US should follow a new, harsher policy against Iran, including efforts to change the country's regime. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has also frequently declared that the administration is considering various measures, including ones implying overt intervention in the internal affairs of the Iranian regime. One could argue, however, that such moves are meant to puff up the strength of the US' hand in advance of possible bargaining rather than expecting any actual regime change in Tehran as a result of such external intervention.

If Tehran pledged to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is very likely that in return the US would give the nod to Iran's above two demands. But Iran could also bring another demand to the negotiating table that would take the talks to the level of a grand bargain: making the Middle East a nuclear-free zone, including Israel. Though this possibility has been generally overlooked, hints of it can be seen through a close examination of Iran's signals. For instance, during talks in Zurich, when Western delegates told Iran to abandon its nuclear program, the Iranians replied that the program is a legitimate sovereign right, and then pointedly suggested, “But if you want, we can discuss how to stop nuclear proliferation.”

Military action?

Will the US or Israel try to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities through military action? Such a move would put the already unstable regional environment on even more dangerous and shakier ground. It is hard to predict what new political turmoil it could breed. Given the fact that about 45 percent of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, it would certainly deal a heavy blow to the global economy. It would not be very difficult for Iran to trigger terrible instability in the region, particularly in Iraq. Moreover, according to even US experts, such military action stands little chance of completely destroying Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities, but would rather only end up delaying its plans for some years. Even if a military option is chosen despite these considerable costs and risks, the possibility that it would be conducted without seeing the very results of the above-discussed bargaining looks to be remote. And from both a military-technical and political standpoint, Israel is unlikely to conduct an operation on its own without Washington’s approval.

Turkey’s situation

Iran’s nuclear program poses a series of tough problems for Turkey, and this fact shows little sign of changing. The thorniest of all may emerge if Iran really acquires nuclear weapons despite all the diplomatic and possibly military moves from the West to prevent this. If Iran carries out its first nuclear test, how will be the US react? Since a military operation aimed at destroying the nuclear weapons capabilities of a country that has nukes would be too risky, the US would probably issue an ominous warning: if you use those weapons or allow them to be possessed by terrorists in any way, we will exact a terrible and devastating price.

Another step from the US could be directed at Iran’s neighbors, by offering them -- including Turkey -- a choice to come under the US protective umbrella against nuclear weapons. And if this happens, how should Turkey respond?

If Ankara agreed to go under US nuclear protection, this would result in it becoming, in effect, a strategic hostage of the US in the region. Whether such a situation would mean a narrower or wider limitation of its strategic options would certainly depend on the +ideological leanings of whatever political party and president are in power in the US as well as on regional developments, but in any case it would involve a cost. To get a more concrete idea of what this could mean, let us turn to the views of Adam Lowther, an expert at the US Air Force Research Institute. For Lowther, a nuclear Iran would, contrary to what many believe, contribute greatly to US interests in the Middle East. In such a case, the US would first extend its nuclear umbrella to countries in the region and in return demand concessions from those countries. For instance, it would be able to urge despotic Middle Eastern countries to carry through democratic reforms. By providing nuclear protection to members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it could demand that they lower oil prices or buy more US-produced weapons, and so on. Thus, Lowther argues that this would bring about a resurgence of US influence in the region (International Herald Tribune, Feb. 9).

It would be equally uncomfortable for Turkey to refuse to come under US nuclear protection. Doing so would make it face frictions and problems within NATO. And if in addition to Iran other countries obtained nuclear weapons, Turkey’s strategic relations in the region would be further strained. Another problematic prospect for Turkey is a harmony-producing compromise between Washington and Tehran irrespective of any regime change in the latter. Historical experience precludes us from ignoring this possibility. In the face of such developments, the best option for Turkey in terms of both its security and strategic activities in the region is European Union membership. This is also the best outcome for the EU from the same perspective. On the other hand, if Iran gets nuclear weapons, but Turkey is shut out of the EU’s ranks, then Turkey will face the hard decision of whether or not it should develop its own nuclear weapons technology.

**Haluk Özdalga is a member of Parliament and the AK Party. haluk.ozdalga@tbmm.gov.tr