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31/10/2005 | India- Peace Deals as a Tool of War

Wasbir Hussain

An ominous quiet prevails in southern Assam’s Karbi Anglong District after a series of macabre killings spanning almost a month. An analysis of official statistics relating to the violence reveals unexpected dimensions of the violence, suggesting that a particular community – surprisingly the majority in the District – bore the brunt of the merciless raids, suggesting that this was not, as has been widely projected, an ‘ethnic war’ that has been witnessed.

 

Rather, the attacks had the character of an organized expansionist campaign by a particular ethnic militia, capitalising on absence of pressure from counter-insurgency Forces as a result of the prevailing ceasefire with the authorities.

As on October 29, 2005, a total of 88 people were officially reported killed, of whom 76 belonged to the majority Karbi ethnic group. The others killed include nine Dimasas, one Bodo, one Nepali and one Assamese. A comparable pattern is visible in the break-up of people who took shelter at the 55 relief camps set up in the District in the wake of the violence: of the 44,747 people listed at the relief camps till October 24, 2005, as many as 37,604 were Karbis. There were 5,687 Dimasas, and 1,456 persons belonging to an assortment of communities. Interestingly, the same skew is not visible in the destruction of property: as on October 19, 2005, out of a total of 1,014 houses burnt, 534 belonged to Karbis and 469 to Dimasas. Significantly, the Karbis constitute about 40 per cent of the District’s population of 812,000, and the Dimasas just three per cent.

On its part, the Government has admitted the role of local insurgent groups in the violence. Two rebel groups operate in the District: the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), pushing for ‘self-rule’ for the Karbis; and the the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), primarily based in the neighbouring North Cachar Hills District, fighting for a separate Dimaraji State for the Dimasas. Incidentally, both UPDS and DHD had entered into a ceasefire with the Government – the DHD truce came about on January 1, 2003, and the UPDS ceasefire on May 23, 2002. Obviously, the UPDS cannot be behind the slaughter of the Karbis. The present slaughter of the Karbis is believed to be the work of the DHD and its supporters or some other shadowy Dimasa forces.

The UPDS ‘publicity chief’ Tung-e Nongloda squarely blames the DHD of being involved in the massacres of Karbis. In an cell-phone interview, Nongloda said: "The DHD is behind the killings of Karbis. That it was a systematic campaign by the group is clear because, between October 4 and 7, Dimasas living in scattered and isolated villages were evacuated to safety, after which the attacks on Karbis were launched." The UPDS leader’s claim, if true, can be an explanation as to why there were so few fatalities among the Dimasas, despite the widespread arson and destruction of property in Dimasa villages. If these claims are correct, the Dimasas had shifted to safety in areas where the community was in a majority, well before the violence was initiated.

The DHD, however, has refuted these charges. DHD ‘president’ Dilip Nunisa, in a telephonic interview from an undisclosed location, declared, "My group is not involved in the killing of Karbis. May be, ordinary Dimasa villagers or the Black Widow group could have decided to launch revenge attacks after three Dimasa auto-rickshaw drivers were found dead near the town of Manza (in Karbi Anglong district) on September 26, 2005." The Black Widow is a loose gang of armed men headed by Jewel Garlossa, one of the founders of the DHD, who has since broken away from the group. While official confirmation of the identity of the group or forces behnd the massacres is yet to come, there can be little doubt, nevertheless, that Dimasa forces were behind the raids.

Another aspect that requires attention is the fact that most of the Karbi victims had been brutally hacked to death with machetes, rather than being shot. This suggests possible conscious design, intended to create the impression that it was not AK-47 wielding rebels, but incensed villagers who were behind the attacks. Nevertheless, the manner in which 22 Karbi bus passengers were killed on October 17 – most of the passengers had their heads chopped off – would indicate the role of experienced and hardened killers rather than ordinary, albeit incensed, civilians.

Karbi leaders claim that the DHD is pushing for a Dimaraji State for the Dimasas comprising the North Cachar Hills District, parts of Karbi Anglong and the central Assam district of Nagaon. The present violence, Karbi leaders allege, is intended to ethnically cleanse the Karbis living in the Dimasa strongholds in Karbi Anglong District, before a final settlement is hammered out with the Government. On the other hand, if it is the Black Widow or any other Dimasa force that was behind the violence, the intention could be to corner the rival DHD ahead of a possible deal with the authorities.

Possibilities aside, the events in Karbi Anglong demonstrate that, while ceasefire deals with local insurgent groups might result in an cessation of hostilities between the rebels and Government Forces, these do not bring to an end the murky militant agenda or the bloody local politics of these violent groups. Worse, authorities appear consistently to fail to keep these rebel groups under check after a ceasefire agreement has been reached. Ceasefire violations by both the DHD and UPDS have been routine: despite a ban on such practices, rebel cadres have frequently moved out of their designated camps with weapons, and extortion is endemic. In the latest instance, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi has accused both the DHD and the UPDS of having violated the ceasefire rules, and, Assam Governor Ajai Singh has called for disarming rebels from both the groups.

There is clear evidence that both the DHD and the UPDS were active players during the recent phase of violence. On October 19, nine UPDS cadres – four veteran members and five who had been newly inducted – were shot dead in an ambush by DHD men at village Tamulbari, near Diphu, the District headquarters. This was confirmed by UPDS leaders who said their cadres were killed while they were out ‘chasing’ DHD rebels, who were moving about in the area with plans to attack Karbi villages.

The Assam Government’s decision to request the Centre for a probe into the causes of the violence in Karbi Anglong by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is a positive step. If militant groups are found to be directly involved in violence during the ceasefire period, this would demonstrate the necessity of a comprehensive review of the Government’s policies in arriving at settlements with rebel groups, and the framing of a new set of ‘ground rules’ with groups that agree to a truce.

South Asia Intelligence Review (India)

 



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