In the aftermath of its disastrous raid on the Mavi Marmara, part of a flotilla that tried to break the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Gaza, Israel has come under intense pressure to lift the embargo of the Hamas-run territory. The decision of how to handle Gaza under Hamas rule is an extraordinarily complicated one for many political, strategic and humanitarian reasons. In fact, there is one aspect of the embargo that many of its presumably peace-loving opponents fail to note: Ending the blockade of Gaza could kill the chances for peace.

There is a reason why Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is quietly telling powerful players -- including U.S. President Barack Obama -- that while he wants the siege eased, he opposes ending the naval blockade. An end of the blockade could strengthen Hamas, whose charter mocks negotiations, rejects compromise, and commits the organization solemnly and theologically to Israel's destruction.

Egypt, too, opposes lifting the naval blockade. Egyptian officials say they worry about the difficulty of inspecting cargo well enough to keep more weaponry from entering Gaza. While Cairo occasionally opens its border with Gaza at the Rafah crossing, it is committed to containing Hamas' physical presence and its ideological influence in Egypt.

The consequences of ending the blockade and thus handing a major political victory to Hamas could prove devastating to moderate Palestinians. That's why Palestinian Authority officials are outraged at Turkey's support of Hamas and at the recent visit of Arab League chief Amr Mousa to Gaza. 

PA operatives argue that Turkey's coziness with Hamas, Ankara's leading role in the so-called Freedom Flotilla, and Mousa's high-profile meeting with Hamas leaders have combined to erode support for Palestinian moderates and strengthen extremists. One PA official said that Turkey, in particular, "is emboldening Hamas and weakening the Palestinian Authority."

While Egypt's role in the embargo receives little attention, critics of the blockade demand that Israel bring an end to the closure, largely on humanitarian grounds. For Israel, the situation poses a wrenching dilemma. Maintaining the tough sanctions on Gaza has turned the territory into a breeding ground for a new generation of Israel-hating Palestinians.School children in Gaza are indoctrinated with the extremist ideology that drives Hamas, intensified by the experience of a harsh life under the Israeli-Egyptian embargo, which they blame almost exclusively on Israel. 

Israel and Egypt imposed the partial blockade in 2007, after Hamas wrested control of Gaza in a brief but vicious civil war between Hamas and its rival, Fatah. Since then, Hamas has rejected international entreaties to accept Israel's existence and enter into peace negotiations. In the meantime, Israel and the international community have engaged with Abbas and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, which governs the West Bank.

The blockade has three basic objectives. The most important is keeping weapons and weapons-making material out of the hands of Hamas, which has already fired some 10,000 rockets into Israel in recent years and continues to do so now. The second goal is to pressure Hamas' leaders to free Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier captured four years ago and held incommunicado in Gaza ever since.

The third purpose of the sanctions, the one that is seldom discussed publicly, is to weaken Hamas relative to the Palestinian Authority. This is a multi-front effort that seeks to make extremism less appealing to the average Palestinian, while degrading Hamas' ability to strike at Israel or at the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. 

In order to make Hamas' militancy less attractive than political moderation, Israel, along with the Middle East Quartet -- the U.N., EU, Russia and the U.S. -- have endeavored to raise living standards in the West Bank, even as economic activity stagnates in Gaza. 

Israel, however, pays a high diplomatic cost for the blockade. And that cost is likely to rise as attempts to break it continue. An imminent move by Iranian ships to pierce the Israeli navy's Gaza shield could lead to a face-to-face military confrontation between the two countries. 

By all accounts, the humanitarian situation in Gaza, though undoubtedly harsh, is much less acute than activists claim. Still, Israelis think of their country as one of high moral values, in contrast to the image critics like to paint. They don't want to cause suffering among innocent civilians if they can avoid it, and they bristle under charges that their actions are cruel and unjustifiable.

And yet, nothing is more important to Israel than security and survival, and Israelis genuinely believe that the embargo is necessary for the country's security. Hamas' military strength may pale next to Israel, but the group is closely allied with Iran, which is actively seeking to raise the level of Hamas' arsenal. According to Yuval Diskin, Israel's security chief, lifting the blockade would constitute a grave security threat to Israel. 

Diskin told the Knesset, Israel's parliament, that Hamas has at least 4,000 rockets in Gaza and is actively building up its stockpiles.

The dilemma for Israel is how to help the people of Gaza without helping Hamas. It's a dilemma shared by the Palestinian Authority and Egypt, both of whom worry about the Islamist group's ideology and military strength. For now, Israel will try to follow a middle ground, making adjustments to the embargo but keeping the blockade. The stage is set for more confrontations, more mixed messages from Palestinian leaders, and a situation that remains dangerously unstable.