espite its designation as a national park in 1979, the Ecuadorian government continued to promote oil development in Yasuní. The southern section of the park was finally placed off-limits to the oil industry in 2007 with the delimitation of a Zona Intangible, an untouchable zone designed to protect the core territory of the Tagaeri and Taromenane.

A year later, the new Ecuadorian Constitution — which made headlines around the world in September 2008 by being the first to grant rights to nature — banned oil extraction in protected areas altogether.

However, this protection came with a loophole: Drilling in protected areas, such as Yasuní National Park, may proceed if approved by the President and declared by Congress, who may call for a public referendum, to be in the national interest.

And President Correa has made it crystal clear that he will quickly move towards drilling if the initiative does not succeed — an option ominously referred to as Plan B in Ecuador.

While President Correa often states that if drilling does move forward, it would be with the best technology and inflict minimal ecological impact, the BP disaster in the Gulf of Mexico clearly illustrates that such promises are dubious and disasters still happen.

One must also understand that these oil fields have been targeted for exploitation for nearly 20 years. Detailed development plans exist. Petroecuador, the Ecuadorian national oil company, would love nothing more than to be given the green light to move forward with this drilling project.

Therefore, President Correa’s decision to launch and stick with this initiative instead of aggressively moving towards exploitation, as he easily could have, should be appreciated and applauded.

We advise that responsible journalists and bloggers should consider the complexities of the situation before inking out bad titles like, “Ecuador says pay us oil money or the rainforest gets it.” In reality, Ecuador’s proposal is daring in a good way. It is a rare chance to snatch major victory from the jaws of defeat.

Another pesky problem is the oil next door. The oil concession immediately adjacent (to the west) of the ITT zone is known as Block 31. The extraordinary rainforest boasted by Ecuador in support of the ITT Initiative is the same extraordinary rainforest in Block 31. But Ecuador is quickly moving towards development of the oil in Block 31, even as they vigorously promote the wonders of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative.

In other words, to the disbelief of many international observers, Ecuador is treating them as two totally different beasts instead of one connected masterpiece. Note to Quito: This bizarre disconnect needs to change.

The geopolitics and financing of the initiative have also come into question. Throughout 2009, many analysts were worried that Ecuador would attempt to fund the initiative by selling carbon credits for the untapped oil, thereby eliminating the global benefit of reduced emissions from not drilling. Fortunately, that option now seems off the table as Ecuador appears to be seeking pure contributions only.

The money still needs to come from somewhere though and in early March 2010, Vice President Lenin Moreno and new Yasuní-ITT Commission President Ivonne Baki travelled to Iran to seek support for the proposal, among other joint initiatives.

So as the United States and allies seek to isolate Iran for its nuclear programs, Ecuador announced its support of the country and its desire to work jointly with Iran on other projects, including hydroelectricity.

There are other global relationships that appear decidedly contradictory to the aims of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative.

Venezuela and Ecuador have formed a joint initiative to construct an oil refinery on Ecuador’s coast, prompting concerns that drilling ITT may be necessary to meet the demands of the new refinery. And there is speculation that a possible loan from China could come with backroom-deal strings attached to the development of ITT by a Chinese oil company.