Taken together, these questions represent one of the most important and most consequential unknowns in the realms of diplomacy, foreign policy, and geostrategic planning today. It is no exaggeration to say the course of history will be shaped by what lies behind the veil that is hiding Obama's true plans for Iran. 

Bit by bit, an image of the Obama administration's long-term views on how to deal with the Iran problem is gradually surfacing, as administration officials reveal the thinking taking place at the highest levels of Washington policymaking. What emerges is the troubling picture of an Iran policy that appears confused and not altogether coherent, amid hints that what we hear in public from the president is not wholly consistent with the policies of his administration.

Obama came to office proposing a radically different approach to Iran from that of his predecessor. Washington would seek to engage Tehran in order to respectfully -- if firmly -- persuade Iranian leaders to stop enriching uranium in violation of the country's international commitments. That velvety foreign policy touch marked a sharp contrast from the abrasive style of the Bush White House. While the tactics would change, however, the ultimate goal of the policy presumably remained unchanged. Just as it had under Bush, America under Obama would refuse to allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.

Washington's efforts at engagement with Iran fell flat, so the administration moved on to the next stage of its plan -- namely, the pursuit of international economic sanctions. Engagement was not simply an effort to dissuade Iran from its nuclear aspirations. The idea was that, even if Iran rejected diplomatic entreaties, America's efforts would show the world that the stand-off was not the result of American aggressiveness -- as they might have concluded under Bush -- but, rather, the product of Iranian intransigence.

That part of the engagement strategy also met with less-than-resounding success. When the Obama administration sought unanimous support for a new round of sanctions against Iran in the United Nations Security Council, the hoped-for show of unanimity wasthwarted by Iran's new friends, Turkey and Brazil, who voted against the resolution. In the end, Washington succeeded in pushing through a fourth round of sanctions against Iran. But the sanctions, which had been watered down to ease passage, did not look particularly muscular or threatening. Iran responded with a mix of anger and derision.

The centerpiece of the current strategy is to use the pressure of sanctions to coerce the Iranian regime into compliance. But it turns out that nobody actually believes sanctions will succeed in accomplishing that goal -- not even the Obama administration.

Speaking at the Aspen Security Forum, America's top military man, Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, said that Iran will continue to pursue nuclear weapons even if sanctions become tighter. Mullen characterized a nuclear Iran as "incredibly dangerous" and reiterated his belief that Iran is lying when it claims its nuclear program has only peaceful intentions.

After admitting that economic sanctions will not work, Mullen expressed his disinclination to use military force against Iran, characterizing the potential impact of such a move as "incredibly destabilizing."

CIA Director Leon Panetta, in a rare interview, revealed that the CIA believes Iran already possesses enough low-enriched uranium for two nuclear bombs. By Panetta's account, Iran could have a nuclear bomb in two years, if it chose to take the necessary steps: one year for the further enrichment of the fissile material, and another to develop a delivery system.

Panetta also agreed with Mullen's view that sanctions will not derail the program. In what looks like an administration consensus, the CIA director said sanctions could weaken the regime, but added, "Will [sanctions] deter them from their ambitions with regards to nuclear capability? Probably not."

While it is clear that top members of Obama's national security team have no faith that sanctions will bring an end to the Iranian nuclear program, it is reasonable to believe that there are other areas of pressure available to them. Washington may be counting on covert operations, such as sabotage of nuclear installations, or perhaps on Iran's domestic pro-democracy movement to derail Tehran's nuclear ambitions. But there is no evidence that either one of those approaches is likely to succeed. The so-called Greens have lost much of their shine. And while sabotage and espionage may have succeeded in delaying Iran's enrichment efforts, progress is nonetheless continuing at a rapid pace. 

When the U.N. Security Council passed the latest round of sanctions, Obama proclaimedthat the move signaled an "unmistakable commitment" from the international community to stop Iran. But the president's own commitment seems rather less than unmistakable.

The administration is clearly taking a softer line than Congress, which passed much more punitive unilateral sanctions against Iran. The White House had asked congressional leaders to wait until after the U.N. vote before finalizing their sanctions legislation.Congress acquiesced, but in a sign of how strong sentiment against a nuclear Iran remains, the House of Representatives approved the final sanctions bill by a vote of 408-8. The Senate approved the measure with a unanimous 100 votes. 

The legislation is an attempt to tighten trade rules against Iran's banking and energy sectors, and could hurt non-American companies doing business with Iranian firms. Obama has not yet signed the bill into law.

The European Union also imposed sanctions that go much farther than those espoused by Obama at the U.N. The EU froze the assets of Iran's biggest bank and banned a series of individuals linked to the nuclear program from entering EU territory. 

At the moment, the message of the administration is, "We will try sanctions, but we are sure sanctions will not work." Beyond that, the official line is that "all options" -- meaning military force -- remain on the table. But the quieter message is that the cost of military action is much too high.

One might charitably consider the possibility that the administration is deliberately sending mixed signals. If that is the case, the strategy can only prove counter-productive. The most logical conclusion for Iran and its neighbors to draw is that the Obama administration plans to learn to live with a nuclear Iran, even as it feebly tries to stop the nuclear program by diplomatic means.

The one hopeful sign is that Israel seems satisfied to watch America's efforts, for now. Perhaps Israel, too, is waiting for its chance to say, "See? Nothing else worked," before it gains international support for more forceful action.

Watching Washington's approach, however, it seems likely that Barack Obama will leave office having ushered in the era of a nuclear Iran, with all its dire consequences.