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12/12/2005 | Q&A: Admiral Timothy Keating; Commander NORAD And Northcom

San Diego Union-Tribune Staff

Keating's Northern Command is the headquarters responsible for defending the continental United States against any external or internal threat, included that from terrorism. His North American Aerospace Defense Command is a U.S.-Canadian headquarters responsible for the air defense of both countries. Keating was interviewed Nov. 16 by members of the Union-Tribune's editorial board.

 

Question: Would you explain briefly what you do?

Answer: I have the privilege of commanding two organizations, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, long standing coming up on 50 years now, coordination with Canada, and the Northern Command, or Northcom, which coordinates military involvement in homeland security operations. Most folks associate NORAD with Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado Springs. The hardened facility. Very impressive. And we are charged with aerospace warning and aerospace control. So anything that comes into the air space of Canada or the U.S., we monitor and watch it. We work closely with our Federal Aviation Administration and the Canadian counterpart. The most visible manifestation of what NORAD does are the Operation Mobile Eagle sorties. These are principally Air National Guard pilots who fly random and armed patrols over United States cities. Since the 11th of September, 2001, we have flown almost 41,000 sorties. They are over various cities. We don't announce the cities and we don't announce the times.

These are Combat Air Patrols?

Yes, they may be overhead of us right now, flying between San Diego and Los Angeles just to be prepared. Of course, folks will say there haven't been attacks since the 11th of September. That's kind of the point. We hope the terrorists don't know where we're flying and don't know when we're flying but they just know we're up there. More importantly, we are on alert. We have alert bases throughout the country. The number is classified. At these alert bases pilots are in flight suits ready to go. And the standard we hold them to is that within 5 to 8 minutes after notification they're airborne.

Are most major population areas covered by this quick-response system?

The major border population areas are. We figure the likelihood of a pop-up threat is less in the central part of the country.

And did this system not exist prior to 9-11?

We had the capability. Prior to 9-11, we were looking out. We had fighters on alert, but they were all kind of oriented toward the Russian or Cuban MIG fighter external to the United States or Canadian airspace coming in. The 11th of September did two things for us. One, it caused us to realize the threat may not come from outside our borders. We may not have long, advanced warning. So that led to the creation of many more alert bases. Two, it led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and in the Department of Defense, the creation of the United States Northern Command. Before the 11th of September, we had (global) regional combat commands. There wasn't anybody whose sole responsibility was the United States.

So let's segue from NORAD to Northern Command.

We are coming up on our third year of full operational capability for the Northern Command. There are two parts to the current mission. One is to deter, prevent and defeat attacks against the United States. The other is to provide defense support to civil authorities in a natural or manmade disaster,

Does that mean Katrina?

Katrina, Rita, earthquake or terrorist attack, wildfire that is out of control, you name it, when we are directed. There's the important part of this statement: when we're directed. The president to the secretary of defense to me, go help the people of New Orleans, go help the state of Mississippi, go help the people of Wyoming, Idaho in providing C130s that can dispense their mobile firefighting capability. So when we're directed we provide support to civil authorities.

There is a widespread perception, acknowledged by the federal government, that the Katrina response was fumbled and delayed. If we couldn't respond to a hurricane that we saw coming for days, what does that say four years after 9-11 about our ability to respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack?

Were there things that could have been done better immediately after Katrina? Sure. Have we learned those lessons? We are working hard to take lessons observed and turn them into lessons learned.

To be fair, much of this was laid not on the military but on FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security.

Right. But from our perspective, that's not so important. It will sound a little trite but this is one team, one fight. We at Northern Command, we don't care necessarily whether it's FEMA, DHS or DOD in the lead. What is important is getting the American people the assistance they deserve and need. When a storm comes in or an attack is executed or an earthquake is of sufficient magnitude, the infrastructure is just gone. The cell phone towers are gone. The roads are impassible so power companies can't repair the phone and electricity lines that are down. There is no fresh water. The navigational waterways through which a lot of supplies move in that part of the country are totally clogged. So it's not just that the first responders are slow to respond. They are gone. Some of them are dead. Their families are gone. And the equipment that they need to assist the American people is just not there. So we need to do a better job, all of us, at initial situational assessment.

It was hours after Katrina went ashore before we realized how devastated southern Mississippi was. And it wasn't just the wind. The water surge was bad. Then comes the ability to communicate that assessment throughout the federal, state and local governments. We can get all kinds of high-end communications into a disaster situation fairly quickly. But some of those communication systems can't talk to the local sheriff who's not even there anymore. Remember, he had to leave and he's now trying to get back. How devastated is the infrastructure? How do we restore critical functions in as timely a manner as possible? So in the wake of Katrina we learned that there are areas in which we can and will improve. Some of them are pretty high end. I mentioned the communications. Some of them are relatively low end. Packaging response forces that include engineers, security folks, communicators, logisticians, medical folks, in pre-identified alert response groups. We have these folks identified now. If it happens to be hurricane season, we'll increase the number of folks on alert.

Who decides which is the lead agency in a response?

The president makes the call.

Your predecessor said last year that he thought a seaborne attack was more likely than another 9-11 style attack and that he wished his jurisdiction included sea and maritime. What is your view?

It's a great question. In the past eight months, the secretary of defense has approved our maritime concept of operations. It is a layered approach to the maritime domain. Five stages of alert. It integrates the efforts of other departments like the Coast Guard and we are working with our commercial partners on aspects like container security.

Are you in fact responsible for a seaborne threat?

Most assuredly. From the Department of Defense side, that's Northern Command's business. How would we do that when we don't own many forces? It's the integration of Third Fleet which owns the forces. They have tactical command of the ships that are out here and the Pacific Region has the Coast Guard ships. If I do need forces to combat a threat that we determine to be close in, it's one phone call from me to the secretary of defense.

Posse Comitatus was an act passed in 1878 after the Civil War that the regular Army cannot be used as a domestic law enforcement agency. In today's environment, should we loosen some of the constraints?

In reverse order, we do not advocate changing Posse Comitatus. By statute it's the Army and it has been applied by policy to the Navy and Marine Corps. I don't think there is currently sufficient reason to change. We're always willing to consider any and all options. Having done a fair amount of it pre Katrina and particularly post Katrina, we at Northern Command see no reason to redress Posse Comitatus. It is a statute that is well founded, that has not restricted us, Northern Command, in our ability to do our mission. So we don't see any reason to change it.

The U.S. military is now the world's largest humanitarian relief organization. Is there any institutional concern that you folks are being given tasks that aren't a part of the original conception of what the U.S. military is supposed to be about?

I would have answered that question 10 or 15 years ago a lot differently than I'm answering it today. I would have said then that we would have been worried silly about a dilution of our capabilities and a fracture of our focus. Today, with a half a trillion dollar a year budget, you should expect us to be able to help. You should demand that we be able to help across the spectrum, DOD, National Guard, sheriff. Everybody has to be able to provide the response depending on the gravity of the situation. Quite frankly, it's our moral responsibility.

It just seems odd that our military is sent all over the world to help in natural disasters when that wasn't the original intent of the U.S. military.

It is but it's important and we're able to do it. Again, it's a moral obligation. Folks need help, we're going to help. Tsunami, Pakistan, Katrina, all the same bolt of cloth.

The border with Mexico is part of your area of operations. Is there a terrorist component to your menu of issues on the border?

The nexus of terrorism and illegal immigration is a concern. That said, we are unaware, totally, zero, as to knowledge of terrorists using that avenue to infiltrate the United States of America. We're just as concerned about the Canadian border. So it's a two-front issue for us. We work as closely as we can imagine with all manner of domestic, local, state, national law enforcement agencies to maintain full situational awareness. We couple that with overseas intelligence apparatus and agencies so as to formulate as comprehensive a picture as we can of the movement of terrorists throughout the world.

Is terrorist movement across the Mexican border a potential threat?

It's a potential threat but we see no manifestation of the threat into reality. That is to say, we're unaware of any terrorists who are using that method of getting into the United States. We have no indication, zero indication, that the terrorists have used that as a method of entry into the United States.

Do you think this is a red herring then, mixing terrorism with the immigration question? There is relatively little enforcement along the Canadian border. What should we be thinking about?

A couple of things. One, is it possible? You bet. Is it a concern to us? Most assuredly. Are we working it to the best of our ability? Yes. But there is a very fine line and it gets back to a couple of things. One, Posse Comitatus, how does our country want to use its military forces? How does our country want to use its National Guard forces? It's a Department of Homeland Security issue. We support DHS. Two, everyone a sensor. It's a little bit of a bumper sticker-ish approach but it works. In particular the maritime community. Sailors are very suspicious and we have gotten all manner of cooperation from the Coast Guard and Coast Guard auxiliary. Nice folks out fishing who notice something unusual. So, everyone a sensor. Increased surveillance techniques.

What's your sense of the military's contribution to counter-narcotics efforts?

A couple of approaches here. There is a joint task force headquartered in Key West that integrates an interagency task force to curtail the flow of drugs, land, air and maritime through the southern approaches, and then the work being done by the Third Fleet and the Coast Guard here offshore is very, very significant.

There used to be just concern from various quadrants about Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. It used to be limited to John McCain saying I have no confidence in the secretary of defense. Lately people who support the war have become critics of Rumsfeld, saying that he shouldn't be looking for an exit strategy. And there seems to be a lot of daylight between Rumsfeld's position of an exit strategy and the president sounding almost Churchillian in saying we'll never give up. What should average Americans make of this?

My wife and I lived in Bahrain for almost two years. We were there when we went into Iraq. We were there finishing Afghanistan and Iraq. I was in the Pentagon the 11th of September, 26 kids who were in the Navy ops center and I was the Navy ops officer, who died when the airplane flew in. I'm concerned as a parent of kids who are in the military and as a citizen. We trained rigorously for chemical or biological attack in Bahrain because we were in range of the Scud missiles. I believed there was a significant WMD threat. It turns out that was inaccurate. I didn't think to question the judgment. This guy was a pro. Everything I knew led me to believe that there was this threat.

I don't think Secretary Rumsfeld is at all misaligned with the president's policy. We do have an idea in mind for transitioning security of Iraq to the Iraqis. Is it going as well as could be expected? There are hills and valleys to be sure, but today the Iraqis are in a much better position to provide for their own security than they were three years ago. I'm convinced that what we're doing there is important, that it's the right thing to do.

San Diego Union-Tribune (Estados Unidos)

 



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