The Chief Minister has, of course, denied the charges, and these are still to be independently validated. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that serious differences have cropped up between the Army and the political establishment in the State, and that this will undermine the effectiveness and direction of counter-insurgency operations.

According to the Army report, Chief Minister Singh, in March 2005, contributed INR five million to the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and a further INR 10 million to the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF), the political wing of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in June 2005. The Army, as evidence, has produced two receipts, allegedly issued by these groups, acknowledging the contribution by the Chief Minister.

Unfortunately, Ibobi Singh is not alone, and there is a long list of politicians, including Chief Ministers, who have been similarly accused of buying – or attempting to buy – peace with the militants. In the late 1980s, the then Manipur Governor, General K.V. Krishna Rao, accused Chief Minister Rishang Keishing of contributing INR three million to the coffers of the then undivided National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). Keishing’s linkages with the militants found mention in the report of another State Governor, General V.K. Nayyar who accused him as well as another senior politician of the State, R.K. Dorendro of financing the NSCN. In December 2000, the Union Government had asked the Manipur Government to investigate the alleged links of at least five State Minister’s with militant groups. It had provided evidence that some of these Ministers had not only contributed funds to the groups, but had also participated in the funerals of militants killed in encounters and had provided militants with official vehicles.

In militancy-ridden Manipur, buying peace with the militants is a common practice and is seen simply as a strategy of survival. The nexus between politicians and militants, seen partly as fallout and partly as cause of the protracted conflict, is even more common. As former Manipur Governor Ved Marwah expressed it, "There are hardly any politicians in Manipur of any stature who do not have links with the insurgent groups."

Seen from the other side, the 15 active militant groups operating in the State have minimal access to external funding, even though the small arms, explosives and narcotics trade provides a limited trickle of resource. As a result, most of the outfits remain dependent on extortion for their operations. Unlike neighbouring Tripura, only handful of cases of abductions for ransom take place in Manipur, but the extortion mechanism in the State remains all-pervasive and a substantial portion of the money is collected through ‘voluntary contributions’ induced by an omni-present threat, and such ‘contributions’ cover several Government Departments as well, at least some of which have been known to make ‘standard deductions’ from their budgets to meet their ‘obligations’ towards the insurgents.

However, while there is nothing astonishing about Ibobi Singh’s payoff to the militants, the Army’s report to the Centre and its leakage to the Press have brought the schism between the political class in the State and the Security Forces out into the open. The Army and the political leadership in Manipur have long been known to hold and voice diametrically opposite views on the issue of counter-insurgency. The Army – whose presence in the State has not been particularly successful, and has been marred by several allegations of human rights violation – insists that its operations are hampered by the linkages between politicians and the militants. Politicians, on the other hand, have harped on a ‘political solution’ to the problem of insurgency, and insist that the Army’s ‘high-handed’ approach has undermined the possibilities of such a solution.

These differences had come to a head on August 12, 2004, with the Chief Minister’s 2004, unilateral decision, in the face of strong resistance from the Army, to lift the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) from seven assembly segments in the greater Imphal area, subsequent to the custodial killing of Manorama Devi. The Army continues to voice its opinion in favour of the re-imposition of the Act. Speaking on November 11, 2005, at Imphal, the GOC Eastern Command, Lieutenant General Arvind Sharma, advised the State Government to re-impose the act citing an escalation of militant activities "where the Disturbed Areas Act has been withdrawn." [The Disturbed Areas Act is an enabling legislation under which the AFSPA become operational in areas designated ‘disturbed’. Absent such a designation, the AFSPA is automatically suspended.]

The relations between the State political leadership and the Army came under further strain after the Army suspended operations against eight Kuki militant groups in September 2005. An announcement to this effect was made by the Union Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee in Imphal on September 22. The State Government, however, saw little logic in this move, which, it claimed, ascribed undue importance to the highly fragmented Kuki groups. Reiterating this position, the Chief Minister had declared that, while the Army was free to declare a ceasefire against the Kuki groups, the State Police would continue their operations against these outfits.

While the rest of the Northeastern States have shown significant signs of recovery from the multiple and decades-long militant movements that afflict the region, Manipur continues to be affected by a high degree of insurgent and terrorist violence. During the current year (as of December 5) out of the 663 insurgency-related fatalities reported in the Northeastern States, 310 (46.8 per cent) have occurred in Manipur alone. The enormity of these numbers becomes evident in view of the fact that the State accounts for just 6.3 per cent of the population, and 8.52 per cent of the land mass of the Northeastern region. State Government control in a majority of Manipur’s nine districts remains nominal, most civil administrative institutions have collapsed, and developmental work is at a standstill. Within such a scenario, a lack of harmony between the political leadership and the Security Forces is bound to have serious ramifications for the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations, and this can only further strengthen the militant groups.

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) continues to maintain a practiced silence on these developments, clearly reflecting a continuous and resolute lethargy, and a lack of will. The Centre evidently believes that inaction could be the best policy under the circumstances, and finds itself constrained not to disturb the ‘political stability’ in the State, known for its fly-by-night opportunistic politicians. Before Ibobi Singh took over as the Chief Minister in June 2001, Manipur had created an unenviable record of sorts for political instability. Between 1990 and 2001, the State was ruled by seven chief ministers with varying tenures ranging from three months (Radhabinod Koijam) to about two years (Rishang Keishing).

The absence of a coherent policy response at the Centre, and of a consistent counter-insurgency strategy in the State, combined with the political propensity for inaction, errors on the part of the Security Forces, and an ill-founded conviction that militancy can be controlled through unprincipled deals, have created an extremely favourable context of operation for the militants. Despite the unfortunate and worsening trajectory of developments over the past years, there seems no sign of an emerging pattern of response from any of the authorities that would suggest any foreseeable improvement in the situation or relief for the careworn people of Manipur.

Bibhu Prasad Routray- Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management