This year, on the momentous date of Sept. 11, the English-language channel of the Arab broadcaster Al Jazeera aired a report on foreign fighters joining the jihad against the US and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces in Afghanistan.
The report showed exclusive footage of a Taliban group in
northern Afghanistan where foreign fighters, whom Al Jazeera’s Sue Turton
called al-Qaeda, are bolstering the local forces. Turton interviewed ISAF
spokesperson Brig. Gen. Chris Whitecross. Upon being asked about the identity
of the outsiders strengthening the Taliban in Afghanistan’s north -- a clear
tactical counter-weight to ISAF’s presence in the south -- Whitecross spoke
without hesitation: “That means al-Qaeda and foreign fighters.”
Given that the current war in the Hindu Kush was
supposedly caused by Sept. 11 and that allied action in Afghanistan still aims
to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda,” to use President Barack Obama’s
alliterative war mantra, it is interesting to note the ease with which
foreigners joining the Taliban jihad against the ISAF occupation are termed
“al-Qaeda.” As such, this recent development, arguably scooped by Al Jazeera,
shows the way in which the war effort in Afghanistan has come full circle in
the space of 30 years.
On Dec. 25, 1979, Soviet forces officially entered
Afghanistan in an effort to support the Communist regime led by the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The Communists had seized power in
April 1978 during the so-called Saur Revolution when Afghanistan’s first
president, Mohammed Daud Khan, who had himself seized power in a bloodless coup
in 1973, was killed. The Communist government in Kabul was highly unpopular in
the conservative countryside and prone to fall prey to yet another coup or even
an armed insurrection.
Supporting one’s neighbor
As a result, the Soviets deployed their troops to support
a friendly regime in its southern neighbor. The director of studies at the
Center on International Cooperation, Barnett Rubin, argues in his book “The
Fragmentation of Afghanistan” (1995) that the Soviets had primarily entered
Afghanistan with the aim of establishing a key position in Asia, one with trade
possibilities and access to Gulf oil. But once the Soviets had installed
themselves in the country, they “imposed military and social reforms that began
to make enemies within different sectors of the indigenous population,” as
related by journalist Sehrish Shaban. Afghanistan as a landlocked country in
the Hindu Kush mountains is home to a whole host of different ethnic groups
professing adherence to Islam. Islam thus really functions as the single
unifying factor in Afghanistan, and as a benchmark of Afghan identity.
The type of Islam practiced in the Afghan mountainside
tends to be rather conservative and grounded in local tribal traditions and
attitudes. As a result, the Soviets’ proposed “military and social reforms”
could not but engender hostility among “different sectors of the indigenous
population.” This resentment grew and grew into a fully fledged call for a
jihad against the unbelievers -- the Soviets being notoriously atheist.
Nowadays the term jihad is much bandied about and used
and/or abused at will by Muslims as well as non-Muslims the world over. The
historian and Islam specialist Mark Sedgwick maintains that the concept of
jihad was developed in the eighth century, when it basically functioned as a
“mixture of the Army Regulations and the Geneva Conventions, appropriate for
the circumstances of the time.” At the time of the Islamic conquests
(seventh-eighth centuries), the world was divided between the House of Islam
(Dar al-Islam) and the House of War (Dar al-Harb) and international relations
between both spheres were primarily military in nature. But as the centuries progressed
and relations between Muslims and the outside world achieved a quasi-peaceful
status quo, punctuated by commercial exchanges and trade links, the idea of
jihad changed as well. There is the well-known distinction between the greater
jihad (al-jihad al-akbar) and the lesser jihad (al-jihad al-asghar), between a
personal struggle in the way of Allah (crf. Surah 29:69) and an armed struggle
to protect believers against oppression and violence perpetrated by
unbelievers. In other words, jihad evolved from a code of war into a defensive
mechanism, tantamount to a religious duty leading to religious rewards. In
Afghanistan during the 1980s, the protection of the land from Soviet occupation
warranted the execution of a jihad by locals and other sympathetic believers
willing to participate in a meritorious act proving one’s commitment in the way
of Allah (al-jihad al-asghar).
The US joins in
But what about the Soviets’ main rival, the United
States? Were they but passive observers of these weird scenes in the mountains?
A few years ago, Hollywood reminded the world of the activities of US
Congressman Charles Wilson, whom The New Yorker foreign correspondent Mary Anne
Weaver called “one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the jihad on Capitol
Hill.” The Hollywood movie “Charlie Wilson’s War” detailed Wilson’s role in
organizing and financing the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviets throughout
the 1980s. The Reagan administration, in conjunction with the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s
premier intelligence agency, actively supported the mujahedeen fighting the
Evil Empire. In 1985, US President Ronald Reagan even entertained the notorious
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as well as other mujahedeen in the White House, calling
them “valiant and courageous Afghan freedom fighters.” At the moment, still
leading the Hezb-i-Islami, Hekmatyar continues to fight -- this time, his
enemies are the US and ISAF forces, however. Back in the 1980s, in struggling
for their country’s freedom, not just Afghans volunteered freely, but also
militants from nearly 30 counties participated in this jihad; these foreigners
were collectively known as “Afghan Arabs.” And now apparently, the unending war
in Afghanistan has come full circle. Today’s mujahedeen, known as the Taliban,
again seem to enjoy the support and fighting power of non-Afghan militants. The
Taliban and these non-Afghan militants, whom ISAF refers to as “al-Qaeda and
foreign fighters,” are once again engaged in a jihad to drive an occupying
force of unbelievers from Afghan soil -- but this time, these unbelievers are
Americans and their allies.
**Dr. Can Erimtan is an independent scholar residing in
İstanbul, with a broad interest in the politics, history and culture of the
Balkans and the wider Middle East. His publications include the book “Ottomans
Looking West?” as well as numerous scholarly articles.