An early meeting with the country’s newly-elected President, Dilma Rousseff, will provide greater clarity on the international role that Brazil seeks to play, helping reduce the possibility of mutual misunderstanding and bilateral friction going forward.

Brazil has been on a tear since former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso conquered inflation in the 1990s. His successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, effectively built on this solid foundation over the past eight years to grow the economy, reduce poverty, and expand Brazil’s global role.

As Brazil’s first female president, Rousseff’s January 1 inauguration was both a manifestation of Brazil’s social strides as well as a strong reaffirmation of the outgoing Lula’s established path.

With an economy the size of the rest of the region put together and rapid growth -- 7.5 percent in 2010 with 5.5 percent growth projected by the Central Bank through 2014 -- Brazil is leading Latin America’s conscious and confident outreach to partners beyond the United States, notably in Asia, to diversify relations. The global community has taken notice; a member of the G20, Brazil has been awarded both the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Summer Games in 2016.

There is a lot here to celebrate, and Brazil’s rise is something generations of U.S. policymakers have encouraged. Cooperation is ongoing in everything from peacekeeping in Africa, Haiti, and elsewhere, to counter terrorism and law enforcement, to economic development, to clean energy and global climate change mitigation.

Nonetheless, over the final months of Lula’s administration, Brazil and the United States often seemed to be working at cross-purposes. Brazilian actions on Iran’s nuclear program and the constitutional crisis in Honduras, its sudden recognition of Palestine as an independent state, and other initiatives complicated U.S. efforts. In some cases, Brazilian actions helped to create political space for those who explicitly reject the norms of international behavior and undermine broader consensus.

The rationale for several of these actions may primarily have been to gain commercial advantage and expand markets for Brazilian exports, apart from any collateral strategic issues. This explanation could go far in explaining Brazil’s public disinterest in the state of democracy in neighboring Venezuela and Cuba, and outreach to Iran and the Arab states. On the other hand, such actions might also be predicted of a nation that views its interests primarily as a BRIC or leader of the developing world, looking to triangulate with the United States.

Greater understanding of Brazilian motivations is required.

As the past months have shown (longer, in the case of trade policy), a more confident and activist Brazil is making an impact on foreign relations. Washington has largely failed to view these issues in a strategic context or sought to understand the rationale behind them, but in some cases, such as Iran, real damage can be done.

A meeting of presidents in Brasilia is recognition of this fact, and an opportunity to develop and reassert a common policy agenda. At the same time, to keep its own position in the hemisphere, the United States also needs to reprioritize efforts with other regional partners and institutions such as the Organization of American States. Otherwise, with the United States focused elsewhere -- Egypt and Tunisia this week, Afghanistan and North Korea the next -- Brazilian leadership could gradually become the default position for the region, with broad implications for U.S. policy interests.

Focusing on the hemisphere is often easier said for Washington than done, although rebuilding a long-term regional trade agenda, including prompt passage of pending agreements with Colombia and Panama, would be a useful and long-overdue place to start.

**Eric Farnsworth is vice president of the Council of the Americas and a former White House policy advisor on hemispheric affairs.