Inteligencia y Seguridad Frente Externo En Profundidad Economia y Finanzas Transparencia
  En Parrilla Medio Ambiente Sociedad High Tech Contacto
Frente Externo  
 
19/01/2006 | Côte d'Ivoire: Protests Continue as Ivorian President's Party Withdraws from Peace Process

WMRC Staff

Loyalist protests resumed in the commercial capital, Abidjan, yesterday as the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) announced its withdrawal from the peace process in response to the planned dissolution of the National Assembly.

 

Global Insight Perspective

Significance

Loyalist youths have once again taken to the streets to demonstrate their hostility to the perceived 're-colonisation' of Côte d'Ivoire.

Implications

Although the demonstrations often appear chaotic, they are without doubt orchestrated by the FPI and, with sufficient pressure from the international community, the immediate risk posed to the peace process should be reduced. 

Outlook

Bringing the FPI back into the peace process may be considerably more difficult, particularly since its most recent statements and actions have been driven by a fear of marginalisation. The lack of broader consensus over the dissolution of the assembly raises the prospect of a protracted stand-off between the two largest parties on the one hand, and the international community and transitional prime minister, Charles Konan Banny, on the other.

Although calm had been restored in Abidjan by Monday evening (16 January 2006) after a day of demonstrations by groups supporting President Laurent Gbagbo and the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), the demonstrations resumed again yesterday (17 January 2006), reaching a new level of intensity (see Côte d'Ivoire: 17 January 2006: Demonstrations Follow Dissolution of Ivorian National Assembly). Barricades were once again erected in most areas of the city and the central business district, Plateau, was deserted. The roads to the French Embassy and the international airport were closed by loyalist youth groups - known loosely as the 'Young Patriots' - while a large crowd of protesters (as many as 300 people) broke through the perimeter fence of the UN headquarters in the city, throwing stones into the compound and setting impromptu barricades alight. Warning shots and teargas grenades were fired by UN peacekeepers and the stand-off continued until nightfall, after which many of the demonstrators withdrew. No casualties were reported on either side.

Demonstrations also occurred in the western town of Daloa, the administrative capital of Yamoussoukro, and the south-western port of San Pedro - each witnessing groups of youths erecting barricades and impeding traffic. In the western town of Guiglo, around 1,000 people stormed the UN base manned by Bangladeshi troops.

The fevered atmosphere yesterday had been stoked by a statement from the FPI that it was withdrawing from the peace process. Signed by party chairman and Gbagbo-loyalist par excellence, Pascal Affi Nguessan, the statement insisted that the party would no longer 'back the re-colonisation process engaged under the aegis of the United Nations', reiterating one of the FPI's favourite rhetorical arguments, that the internationally-brokered peace agreements facilitating the appointment of a transitional prime minister and the deployment of UN troops are part of a French-led international conspiracy to overthrow an elected African president. Unsurprisingly, the statement revived the party's calls for the 'withdrawal of UN forces and (French) occupation forces' and called on President Gbagbo to 'take the necessary steps to see the country rid of foreign occupation and to engage the peace and national reconciliation process on an autonomous and indigenous basis'. The FPI also criticised the decision of the international working group - which comprises representatives from four African governments, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - not to recommend the extension of the mandate of the National Assembly, in which the FPI is the largest party.

The escalation of tensions yesterday and the violence and intimidation directed against peacekeepers prompted a swift response from the UN. The spokesman for Secretary-General Kofi Annan condemned 'the orchestrated violence directed at the United Nations' and demanded 'an immediate end to these attacks, which contravene Ivorian law and seriously endanger the peace process'. Closed consultations were also held in the Security Council yesterday evening, which subsequently expressed its preoccupation with the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and announced its intention to hold further sessions today.

Outlook and Implications

The demonstrations in Abidjan pose a number of threats to the peace process. There is a risk of escalation, which could see clashes between UN peacekeepers and loyalist groups, possibly drawing in elements of the Ivorian security services on either side. In such a scenario, security conditions for expatriate businesses and civilian residents might become intolerable, recalling the generalised panic that followed the anti-French pogroms of November 2004 and the earlier suppression of opposition demonstrations in March of that year. With the FPI occupying seven seats in the 32-member power-sharing government, loyalist demonstrations against the UN and the international working group could also seriously disrupt government activities and long-delayed preparations for disarmament and elections in October 2006.

However, there are a number of convincing arguments to believe that the impact of the current demonstrations will be considerably less significant than is implied by this worst-case scenario. Firstly, there is absolutely no doubt that the current demonstrations are being orchestrated by senior members of the FPI and that such demonstrations can be ordered or terminated at the behest of individuals close to President Gbagbo. Since the outbreak of the Ivorian conflict in September 2002, loyalist youth groups - some armed, others not - have been deployed as Gbagbo's shock-troops at any time when the course of the peace process has seemed likely to diminish the powers and prerogatives of the loyalist bloc, comprising Gbagbo, senior officers in the armed forces and Gbagbo's FPI. In such a context, external pressure from the UN can be brought to bear on the FPI in an effort to bring the violence to an end. The UN has already condemned the 'orchestrated' fashion of the latest loyalist demonstrations, revealing its growing frustration with the FPI's efforts to destabilise the situation. In the past, such declarations have had a profound effect on the party and have significantly reduced the risk of an escalation of violence, particularly if backed up by the threat of UN sanctions against those held responsible. Moreover, the FPI has no interest in provoking a full-scale escalation. Much of the violence and intimidation is calculated for its dramatic and symbolic effect: it is significant that the demonstrators in Guiglo did not attack peacekeepers stationed there, but spent the rest of the day singing and chanting slogans.

Bringing the FPI back into the peace process may be considerably more difficult, particularly since its most recent statements and actions have been driven by a fear of marginalisation. The task is further complicated by the fact that there is no broader consensus on the dissolution of the National Assembly: in a statement yesterday, the secretary-general of former single party the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), Alphonse Djé Djé Mady, argued that 'like the presidency, the National Assembly must be maintained'. The self-interest of the PDCI - the second-largest party with 93 seats - is self-evident and finding a way of circumventing such hostility will be a tortuous task for the Security Council and the international working group. However, it seems unlikely that the decision to dissolve the assembly will be reversed, raising the prospect of a protracted stand-off between the two largest parties on the one hand, and the international community and transitional prime minister, Charles Konan Banny, on the other.

Contact: Raul Dary

24 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421, USA
Tel: 781.301.9314
Cel: 857.222.0556
Fax: 781.301.9416
raul.dary@globalinsight.com

http://www.globalinsight.com/ and http://www.wmrc.com/

WMRC (Reino Unido)

 



Otras Notas del Autor
fecha
Título
05/06/2006|
23/05/2006|
21/05/2006|
11/05/2006|
09/05/2006|
05/05/2006|
14/04/2006|
10/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
06/04/2006|
06/04/2006|
30/03/2006|
30/03/2006|
28/03/2006|
28/03/2006|
25/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
26/02/2006|
26/02/2006|
20/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
10/02/2006|
10/02/2006|
09/02/2006|
08/02/2006|
07/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
27/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
20/01/2006|
20/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
18/01/2006|
16/01/2006|
15/01/2006|
14/01/2006|
12/01/2006|
11/01/2006|
08/01/2006|
07/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
05/01/2006|
05/01/2006|
01/01/2006|
31/12/2005|
25/12/2005|
28/10/2005|
21/10/2005|
20/09/2005|
01/09/2005|
13/08/2005|
13/08/2005|
13/08/2005|
13/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
30/06/2005|
30/06/2005|
30/06/2005|
30/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
03/06/2005|
03/06/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
10/05/2005|
10/05/2005|
10/05/2005|
05/05/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
04/04/2005|
04/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
11/03/2005|
11/03/2005|
09/03/2005|
09/03/2005|
08/03/2005|
08/03/2005|
05/03/2005|
05/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
02/03/2005|
02/03/2005|
19/02/2005|
19/02/2005|
18/02/2005|
18/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
31/01/2005|
31/01/2005|
26/01/2005|
26/01/2005|
22/01/2005|
22/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
02/12/2004|
02/12/2004|

ver + notas
 
Center for the Study of the Presidency
Freedom House