Inteligencia y Seguridad Frente Externo En Profundidad Economia y Finanzas Transparencia
  En Parrilla Medio Ambiente Sociedad High Tech Contacto
En Parrilla  
 
19/01/2006 | Nigeria: Militant Impact Continues in Nigeria as Shell Declares Force Majeure on EA Output

WMRC Staff

Shell has declared a force majeure on further Nigerian production, as unrest in the country's Niger Delta region continues, with militants now widening their target range to include all oil company facilities.

 

Global Insight Perspective

Significance

The announcement confirms an extended timeframe for outages at the offshore EA field, which, together with Brass Creek crude losses, keeps some 226,000 b/d of Shell-operated crude from the market.

Implications

Delta instability shows no sign of an early resolution, with militants also claiming attacks on other oil facilities as part of a campaign to cause maximum disruption to oil exports in order to press their case.

Outlook

A military crackdown has already been launched, causing local communities to flee from the area as armed clashes increase. The escalation in tensions suggests that further oil operations may be affected in the coming weeks, with significant political concessions being the only real way to bring a more decisive end to this issue.

Extended Outage

Following an attack last week, Shell has finally announced a force majeure on production from its offshore Niger Delta EA field, after an attempt to bring production back online failed because of 'technical reasons.'

The force majeure is effective from 17 January and effectively confirms that the EA field's 115,000-120,000 b/d of production will be offline for a more extended period than anticipated, in addition to the 106,000 b/d of crude production subject to a force majeure in Brass Creek, after an attack on a pipeline last week. In total, some 226,000 b/d is now subject to force majeure, representing nearly 25% of the company's operated production and some 9% of Nigerian capacity.

The prospect of further losses from other Delta facilities remains high, given militant threats to cause maximum disruption to the region's oil exports in order to win political concessions from the government. The previously unknown Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has already claimed responsibility for the Shell incidents and also for attacks on Total and Eni facilities, although both companies have denied this to date. The group has also pledged to attack Chevron facilities in the area, rather than restrict its operations to Shell alone. Meanwhile, ExxonMobil reportedly told non-essential personnel to stay away from work at its two Delta export terminals, where some 550,000 b/d of oil is shipped. However, the company denied reports that export operations had been affected by the increasing civil unrest.

The government response so far has been twofold: first, forming a committee to negotiate the release of the four Shell hostages taken in the EA attack last week; and second, increasing military operations in the region in order to try to regain control in a situation of spiralling insurgency. The militants involved are thought to be allied or affiliated with Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, which launched a previous wide-scale attack on oil company facilities in 2004.

Outlook and Implications

The stated intention of militants to 'prevent Nigeria from exporting oil' means that further attacks on oil facilities in the Delta are almost inevitable, jeopardising the country's current export levels and making further disruptions likely. However, as yet, none of the oil companies concerned has taken the decision to withdraw further personnel or shut in operations as a precaution, with Shell denying reports from earlier in the week that it is considering a pullout from the western Delta, which accounts for some 380,000 b/d of oil production.

However, if government forces do not begin making some inroads on the militants soon, the 'wait and see' attitude from operators is likely to be put to the test by further attempts at sabotage, with a temporary withdrawal of personnel and closure of operations in affected areas possible, as occurred in 2004. With the Delta area notoriously inaccessible for troops, a decisive victory by the government based on force alone looks virtually impossible unless it is matched by some level of political concession, although this will be a tough sell to make at the federal level, where sympathy for Delta troubles is more limited.

Contact: Raul Dary

24 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421, USA
Tel: 781.301.9314
Cel: 857.222.0556
Fax: 781.301.9416
raul.dary@globalinsight.com

http://www.globalinsight.com/ and http://www.wmrc.com/

WMRC (Reino Unido)

 



Otras Notas del Autor
fecha
Título
05/06/2006|
23/05/2006|
21/05/2006|
11/05/2006|
09/05/2006|
05/05/2006|
14/04/2006|
10/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
06/04/2006|
06/04/2006|
30/03/2006|
30/03/2006|
28/03/2006|
28/03/2006|
25/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
26/02/2006|
26/02/2006|
20/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
10/02/2006|
10/02/2006|
09/02/2006|
08/02/2006|
07/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
27/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
20/01/2006|
20/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
18/01/2006|
16/01/2006|
15/01/2006|
14/01/2006|
12/01/2006|
11/01/2006|
08/01/2006|
07/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
05/01/2006|
05/01/2006|
01/01/2006|
31/12/2005|
25/12/2005|
28/10/2005|
21/10/2005|
20/09/2005|
01/09/2005|
13/08/2005|
13/08/2005|
13/08/2005|
13/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
30/06/2005|
30/06/2005|
30/06/2005|
30/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
03/06/2005|
03/06/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
10/05/2005|
10/05/2005|
10/05/2005|
05/05/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
04/04/2005|
04/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
11/03/2005|
11/03/2005|
09/03/2005|
09/03/2005|
08/03/2005|
08/03/2005|
05/03/2005|
05/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
02/03/2005|
02/03/2005|
19/02/2005|
19/02/2005|
18/02/2005|
18/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
31/01/2005|
31/01/2005|
26/01/2005|
26/01/2005|
22/01/2005|
22/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
02/12/2004|
02/12/2004|

ver + notas
 
Center for the Study of the Presidency
Freedom House