The uprising in Libya and the subsequent foreign military intervention there are providing a significant test for Turkey's stated desire to create a foreign policy that combines realism with idealism, while also highlighting the difficulty Ankara is facing in balancing its aspirations to become a more independent regional leader in the Middle East with its efforts to maintain its traditional alliances. Furthermore, the developments in Libya threaten to deepen ongoing tensions between Turkey and NATO as well as some of the alliance's member countries, in particular France.

In recent years, Turkey has set lofty goals for its foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, where Ankara has sought to establish itself as a mediator, promoter of democratic values and even a restorer of regional "dignity." Speaking recently to an annual gathering of his diplomatic corps, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu laid out a vision that portrayed Turkey as "the frontrunner on the list of wise countries in the international community."

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, meanwhile, was among the most forceful regional voices calling for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down during the recent mass protests in Cairo.

In a speech that he gave to the parliamentary group of his Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) in early February, Erdogan supplemented his appeal for Mubarak to step down with a bold vision of where Turkey's government stands regarding the wave of change sweeping through the Middle East.

"The AK Party, not only in Turkey but all over the world, has always opposed the status quo and oppression, and supported aggrieved peoples without any fear or hesitation," Erdogan said.

But the subsequent crisis in Libya found Ankara taking a significantly more cautious approach, initially opposing both the imposition of sanctions against the regime of Moammar Gadhafi and any NATO-led military intervention in the country. Far from the grand vision for regional change and justice that Erdogan put forward in his speech about Egypt, Turkish Foreign Ministry officials now said that they were taking a distinctly more realistic approach and looking at regional developments on a "case by case" basis.

In the case of Libya, Turkey's considerations appeared to be heavily influenced by its deep economic interests there, particularly in the construction field, where it had won some $15.5 billion in tenders over the past five years, as well as by the presence of more than 25,000 Turkish workers who needed to be hastily evacuated.

But Turkey's criticism of the Gadhafi regime remained muted, even after the evacuation of Turkish citizens from Libya freed Ankara to take a tougher stance. Meanwhile, Erdogan's suggestion that the people of Libya "embrace each other and determine their own direction" at a time when Gadhafi was preparing to attack the rebel stronghold of Benghazi may have signaled a return to idealist rhetoric, but also seemed to be a woefully inadequate response to what many felt was an impending humanitarian disaster. Likewise, Turkish suggestions that diplomacy be "given a chance," at the same time that Gadhafi was promising brutal retribution against the rebels, also seemed out of touch with realities on the ground.

Ankara has backed off from its initial opposition to NATO being involved in the Libya crisis and is now even expressing its willingness to take a leading role in the military operation there. But Turkey's initial position and its hard bargaining within NATO before finally agreeing to let the alliance take over military operations in Libya could reinforce a gathering impression that Ankara is acting as a spoiler and outlier within the organization. That impression first surfaced following Turkey's initial opposition to the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO's new secretary-general in 2009, and it was further established by the tough conditions Ankara initially set for joining the alliance's missile defense program. If not addressed, it could risk hardening into a dangerous split between Turkey and NATO.

Meanwhile, relations between Turkey and France, which were already strained before the Libyan crisis because of differences over Ankara's European Union membership bid, appear to be heading towards an even rougher patch. Turkey was noticeably among the countries not invited to the Paris meeting that led to the start of military action against Libya, with French officials suggesting that Ankara's stated opposition to an intervention there disqualified it from attending. Turkish leaders, in response, have obliquely accused Paris of being motivated by oil concerns and seem to have made a priority of reducing the French leadership role in the Libyan operation.

The fact that an ambitious middle power like France spearheaded the action in Libya highlights the ways in which the crisis represents a missed opportunity for Turkey to have assumed the kind of regional leadership role it aspires to play. While Erdogan, Davutoglu and other Turkish leaders have long talked about their desire to create a proactive Middle East foreign policy that respects regional sensitivities, Ankara's undefined and overly accommodating approach to the Libyan crisis, at least in the early stages, left the door open for other actors to step in and assert their vision for how the problem should be resolved.

Turkey, though, could look at Libya as a dress rehearsal. With unrest continuing in Yemen and especially in neighboring Syria -- two countries where Ankara has recently been investing heavily in both political and economic terms -- Turkey is likely to be faced with some of the same, if not more-complicated, policy problems it faced in Libya. How Ankara chooses to confront those challenges could very well be an indicator of the lessons it has drawn from the Libyan crisis. 

**Yigal Schleifer is a Washington-based journalist and analyst covering Turkey and the surrounding region. He is also the author of "Istanbul Calling," a blog covering Turkish foreign and domestic affairs.