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05/01/2006 | Democratic Trends in Iraq, Israel and the Palestinian Territories

WMRC Staff

In 2006, the quest for peace and stability in the Middle East will once more be shaped by events in Iraq, Israel and the Palestinian territories. However, unlike previous years, all three will face tests at the ballot box, the results of which will carry strong regional implications. Given Iraq's recent unstable history, its transformation from pariah to model 'democratic' state will be keenly scrutinised

 

Staking the Democracy Project in Iraq

Iraq has certainly suffered its fair share of human and material indignities. Efforts towards transforming the country's political system into a beacon of stability continue apace, although even these are beset by lingering domestic complexities. With the authorities having staged two largely successful nationwide ballots, the ultimate fruits of hard political labour are expected to be sown by the beginning of 2006. Not only will Iraq's post-transitional political phase determine the course of the country's unitary future, but the foreign military presence - already under mounting domestic and international pressure - will also be scaled back, once political stability is restored following the success of Iraq's third and final interim polls (which took place on 15 December 2005). The larger-than-expected participation of the Sunni community provides opportunities and pitfalls for the new administration to push forward a national political agenda. Reversing the marginalisation of the Sunni community and working towards the establishment of a truly cohesive government would both be key for improving Iraq's political plight in 2006. 

Political alliances will be crucial following the elections. As the January 2005 poll revealed, the overwhelming leverage exercised by the leading Shi'a United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) should enable the present governing coalition to win a majority of seats in the new permanent parliament. December's one major variation from earlier polls was the greater involvement of the hitherto disenfranchised Sunni community, whose participation the U.S. authorities had publicly, privately and actively pursued. The expected increase in Sunni parliamentary representation will impact on both the Shi'a and Kurdish domination of the legislature, and could offer an improved semblance of political balance amongst Iraq's fragmented sectarian communities. However, what remains beyond contention is that without adequate Sunni representation, Iraq's ongoing security crisis cannot and will not dissipate. The Sunni-dominated insurgency feeds off Sunni political and economic marginalisation, an aberration that demands urgent rectification.

Some 15 million Iraqis were eligible to vote in the December 2005 polls. Their political allegiances were certainly tested, given that over 307 coalitions, parties or individuals had been approved by the Iraqi Electoral Commission (IEC) to contest the ballot. Fringe elements aside, the UIA, with the express backing of the Shi'a religious hierarchy, including Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, is projected to storm to victory. It is likely to be trailed - somewhat at a distance (although this time round, perhaps by not too great a margin) - by the Kurdish Alliance, led by current president Jalal Talabani, and the recently formed Sunni alliance, which incorporates three separate Sunni movements under the Iraqi Accord (IA) umbrella. Secular-oriented parties under former interim premier Iyad Allawi and current deputy premier Ahmed Chalabi may be forced into striking compromises with sectarian interests. The latter figure in particular is engaged in a charm offensive with Moqtada al-Sadr, the young but influential Shi'a cleric. Although cross-sectarian support for the political process is deemed vital for Iraq's future political and economic stability, the election programme per se will be heavily shaped by sectarian and tribal motivations. Whether or not Iraq can transcend these divides and build a more cohesive political structure following the polls will prove the ultimate test. Demands for greater federalism amongst Shi'a and Kurdish factions may in fact upset the balance that Sunni participation is designed to protect.

The steadfast progress towards meeting Iraq's interim political timetable has inevitably raised questions over the long-term viability of maintaining the predominantly U.S.- and U.K.-led foreign military forces in the country. The debate over the foreign military presence is a hotly contested one, particularly since a groundswell of opinion in the United States is gradually turning against the latter's continuing and costly involvement in Iraq. U.S. president George W. Bush is under increasing domestic pressure to announce a timetable for military withdrawal. This prospect may in fact prove far-fetched, given the U.S. military's commitment towards building a strong Iraqi army that is adequately trained and able to assume security responsibility, irrespective of how long the process may take. With the U.S. forces boosting their numbers to some 160,000 troops ahead of the December polls, a limited withdrawal following the elections can be foreseen, taking the figure down to what the military describes as its 'baseline' number of 137,000 troops. As U.S. officials continue to remind detractors, the Bush administration has always been committed to pulling U.S. troops out in a timely fashion. In the words of U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, 'the question is how you get there.' Therefore, a cut of some 40,000-50,000 U.S. troops during 2006 cannot be summarily discounted.

Revisiting the Age-Old Arab-Israeli Conflict and Gasping for Solutions

September 2005 proved a momentous month for Israeli-Palestinian relations, following the first ever Israeli pullout from occupied Palestinian territory. The withdrawal of some 8,000 Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip and evacuation of Israeli military forces was acclaimed as the first major step towards brokering the much sought-after, yet unattainable, peace. With Gaza - barring control over borders, airspace and coastline - partially secure in Palestinian hands, the future of the West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem may just be nearing a resolution. However, despite the Gaza goodwill, an amalgamation of political upheaval in Israel, the profusion of tit-for-tat violence across the territories and the participation of Hamas in Palestinian elections suggest that the path towards peace will not necessarily be paved with gold. 

For the early part of 2006, the peace process will remain in abeyance pending Palestinian and Israeli parliamentary elections. The formation of administrations following the polls will provide the best measure of where bilateral negotiations are headed. 

Election Scenarios

  • Forward with Kadima?: The Israeli political system is undergoing unprecedented transformation, with the advent of a new 'third way' political alliance under the stewardship of current prime minister Ariel Sharon. The premier's resignation from the right-wing Likud party - in protest at the latter's refusal to accept the Gaza pullout - suggests that the political battleground will shift towards further but gradual compromise with the Palestinians. The new centrist Kadima party under Sharon has vowed not to let the Gaza momentum slip, and is projected to win sufficient parliamentary seats to establish the next government. However, Kadima is not expected to win an outright majority, a prospect that raises the likelihood of another coalition government. 

    The all-important security dimension, with its concomitant 'tough on terror and tough on the causes of terror' clause, will similarly feature as a crucial component in the election. It remains inconceivable that Sharon will cede ground on such a vote-winning issue. This is particularly because of his strong personal association with the defence of Israel as someone who has 'fought mercilessly against terror', as supporters are wont to repeat. However, the premier's greatest electoral liability remains his health. With Sharon having been hospitalised for a minor stroke ahead of the parliamentary recess in December 2005, Kadima officials were forced onto the back foot to defend his health conditions. Opponents will undoubtedly revel in portraying Sharon as an overweight, ageing and ailing politician, who would be well advised to hang up his political coat by nominating a successor.
  • Harangued by Hamas: The peace baton will first fall into Palestinian hands as the West Bank and Gaza ready for legislative polls in January. Although only the second such election since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the early 1990s, the ballot will prove a compelling affair, given the powerful Hamas movement's intention to participate in the national political programme. The Hamas ascension has riled the Israeli leadership, whose opposition to the movement on grounds of its armed activities and 'illegitimacy' may complicate the already delicate Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas's ruling Fatah party will face stiff competition from Hamas, although the former's dominance in the 132-seat Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) will not be greatly threatened. However, the prospect of Hamas attaining some 20 to 30 seats within the new chamber should come as little surprise. How Israel - and no less the U.S. administration - reacts to a potential Hamas elevation to the Palestinian government, as Abbas has pledged to consider should the movement score sufficient gains, will inevitably determine the future direction of peace negotiations. Hamas's relentless rise may demand greater Israeli political compromise.
  • Labour and Likud Loyalties: Although an unlikely prospect, an outright victory for Israel's resurgent Labour Party would significantly boost the chances of peace, owing to the 'peacenik' credentials of new leader Amir Peretz. The former union boss's opposition to Jewish settlement expansion in the Occupied Territories, together with calls for a resumption of negotiations with the PA, would certainly provide meaningful progress. However, Labour's less-than-overwhelming popularity amongst the Israeli electorate could leave the party trailing Kadima, albeit with a respectable upswing in parliamentary seats. Having pulled Labour out of the current national unity government, owing to the party's reservations over Sharon's political and economic policies, Peretz may find it difficult to engineer another alliance with Sharon should the election result produce another hung parliament. The crisis-strewn right-wing Likud party presents the least opportunity for wider Israeli-Palestinian peace, given its entrenched position on seeking an end to Palestinian 'terror' ahead of any move towards talks. Likud members elected former premier Binyamin Netanyahu to lead the party; his political record negates the likelihood of further concessions with the Palestinians.

War and Peace

Political oppression and ruthless security control have traditionally been associated with the Middle Eastern model of governance. However, the past year has witnessed a remarkable transformation that, given the region's historical political malaise, presents opportunities for regional peace and prosperity - but equally, for further unrest and instability. War and peace have traditionally occupied central ground with respect to any meaningful analysis into the Middle East. The coming year will prove no less significant in determining the strength of political progress in the region. The most entrenched crisis - the Arab-Israeli conflict - and the other regional heartache, Iraq, will dominate the political and security environment in the coming year, with an air of anticipation and excitement hanging over parliamentary elections in Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Israel. The formation of new governments following these polls, and the resultant stability these bring within their respective spheres of influence, will determine the future course of war and peace in the wider region.

Elections in themselves offer little prospect for progress, especially when considering that dictators have also become amenable to the concept of ballots as useful tools for legitimising despotic power. Former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's near-100% presidential referendum victories were perhaps the best testimony to such provisions. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak is also another contender for exaggerated electoral successes. However, it would not be much of an exaggeration to suggest that far more is at stake regionally, and the ramifications far more profound, with the success or otherwise of Iraq's December 2005 legislative elections. Iraq will once more prove a benchmark for positive political transition, swiftly followed by Palestinian and Israeli polls early in 2006.

Contact: Raul Dary

24 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421, USA
Tel: 781.301.9314
Cel: 857.222.0556
Fax: 781.301.9416
raul.dary@globalinsight.com

www.globalinsight.com and www.wmrc.com

 

WMRC (Reino Unido)

 


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