Democratisation versus 'Zarqawisation'

On 9 November 2005, the capital, Amman, witnessed a major terrorist attack that brought to fruition the ambitions of militant Islamists linked to Iraq's al-Qaida leader, Jordanian-born Abu Musab al Zarqawi. In 2005, Zarqawi came to rival the terror network's global chief, Osama bin Laden, as the primary symbol of the violent Islamist campaign against Western involvement in the Middle East. The Amman blasts underscored the necessity, indeed urgency, of implementing long-overdue reforms designed to tackle the social and economic inequalities that have blighted Jordan's development and swelled the ranks of militant groups such as al-Qaida. Jordan's King Abdullah responded by overhauling government and appointing a new prime minister, Marouf Bakheet, tasked with implementing the National Agenda - an ambitious 10-year reform blueprint. Jordan's political and security prospects in the coming year will in large part be determined by the new government's ability to institute its reform programme, translating the Hashemite monarchy's oft-expressed commitment to political reforms and expanded economic opportunities into reality. If progress is finally made, it should help deny Islamist extremists an important lifeline.

A Dangerous Cocktail

The short, seven-month premiership of Adnan Badran mirrored the limited shelf lives of a long line of Jordanian prime ministers, and underscored the deep-seated internal divisions over Jordan's political and economic reform agenda. Badran's popularity plummeted in the months prior to the blasts, as he proved unable to break the deadlock between reformists and tribal conservatives who opposed the reform programme. The writing was on the wall in June 2005, when ultra-reformist Finance Minister Bassem Awadallah succumbed to the objections of conservatives within parliament and submitted his resignation. The political gridlock and in-fighting deflected attentions from tackling unemployment - currently estimated to stand at 14-17%, and at an especially high level for the burgeoning youth population. The dangerous cocktail of social and economic deprivation, and the proliferation of radical Salafist teachings by unregulated mosque preachers created the ingredients for violent opposition against the Western-oriented royal family. Cities like Zarqa, Salt and Ma'an became fertile ground for the recruitment of young Jordanian jihadists, many of whom were spurred by Zarqawi's example. Indeed, Zarqawi's hometown of Zarqa is described by the Brussels (Belgium)-based International Crisis Group (ICG) as an 'impoverished working-class suburb of 472,000.' Iraq provided this new generation of disaffected young Jordanian with their first taste of combat, and has enabled them to create a cross-border network of fighters, suicide bombers, planners and sympathisers.

The devastating force of a combined Jordanian-Iraqi assault was evident in February 2005 when a Jordanian suicide bomber killed over 100 Iraqis in the Iraqi city of Hilla. Meanwhile, it was Iraqis who carried out the multiple suicide attacks - against the Grand Hyatt, Radisson and Days Inn hotels - in Amman on 9 November; these killed over 60 people, mostly Jordanians. The epicentre of the strike was a Jordanian wedding party celebration, and images of the Jordanian women and children who were casualties were broadcast across Arabic news networks. Immediately following the blasts, Jordanians, including members of Zarqawi's Khalayhleh-Bani Hassan tribe, distanced themselves from their exiled relative and voiced support for King Abdullah. Significantly, Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood head Abdel Majid Zuneibat condemned the attackers, saying that such acts violated Islamic principles and Jordanian interests.

Emboldened by this sense of national outrage and show of support, King Abdullah moved to unveil his National Agenda, which had lingered in limbo since February 2005. He also appointed Marouf Bakheet as prime minister with a strong mandate for change. Bakheet's military experience and security credentials, combined with his stint as ambassador to Israel, make him a bold choice, underscoring the king's determination to override objections to his agenda in 2006. King Abdullah described Bakheet's appointment as part of an 'all-out war against extremist groups and their ideology', with Bakheet expected to employ an integrated strategy to implement the key policies contained within the document - namely, reform of electoral law, the expansion of press freedoms and women's rights, and greater transparency and public accountability. Despite the national consensus currently in place, the political considerations and socio-cultural sensitivities of tribal elements will resurface in 2006. Tribal elements are fearful that the government's reform programme will erode their traditional influence within the Hashemite political arrangement. This means that Bakheet, like his predecessors, will have his work cut out for him.  

Jordan Watches as Iraq Rumbles

Jordan's year ahead will inevitably be affected by developments on the regional horizon, principally in Iraq. Anger against the United States' Iraq policy is not confined to a radical minority represented by the likes of Zarqawi, but rather reflects a genuine and popular grievance against what is perceived as a biased U.S. regional agenda. Although King Abdullah opposed the invasion, the United States nonetheless benefited from the use of Jordanian airstrips and seaports during its military campaign. Jordan's military relationship with the United States is difficult to conceal and was highlighted in August 2005 by a botched missile strike against the USS Ashland, which was stationed in the port city of Aqaba. Despite public discomfort at the close U.S. ties, especially with the administration of George W. Bush, U.S.-Jordanian relations will remain strong in 2006. They may indeed prove tighter with the emergence of a Shi'a Muslim-dominated political leadership in Iraq, as King Abdullah counters the rise of a 'Shi'a axis' on his doorstep with expanded security and military assurances from the United States.

Why Failure is Not an Option

The militants finally caught up with King Abdullah in 2005, aided in no small measure by the security vacuum currently affecting Iraq. The suicide bombers communicated the message that even the most stringent security safeguards would not protect Jordanians against attack. The best protective shield available in the long term will be achieved not through added security clampdowns, but rather a willingness by Jordan's political establishment to allow a genuine opening up of the political space, even if that is achieved at the expense of traditional tribal interests and loyalties. The policy of restricting public debate and silencing moderate Islamic opponents has simply encouraged the expansion of a radical underground network, largely made up of young and disenchanted Jordanians who draw inspiration and logistical support from their ideological counterparts across the border. Time is no longer on Jordan's side, and 2006 promises to be an eventful and testing year for its authorities, which have to decide whether to continue on the current path of controlled reforms or begin a process of genuine constitutional reforms and political change that will require years to complete. The king has promised much on the reform front, but has in fact delivered little. Unless the government improves on its delivery in 2006, Jordan will remain vulnerable to attacks of a similar scale as those seen in Amman. Although Global Insight does anticipate movement on the reform front in 2006, the process of change will remain beholden to the interests of the house of Hashem.

Contact: Raul Dary

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Lexington, MA 02421, USA
Tel: 781.301.9314
Cel: 857.222.0556
Fax: 781.301.9416
raul.dary@globalinsight.com

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