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22/01/2006 | Uganda: Re-election at Any Price

WMRC Staff

In March 2006, Uganda is expected to hold its next general election. However, ahead of the key ballot, the country's political environment has been undermined by a number of worrying developments, all seemingly aimed at one thing: ensuring that President Yoweri Museveni remains in power beyond the election.

 

The issues that have underlined the executive's continued influence on the workings of the country's legislature and judiciary include:

  • the National Assembly's decision to amend the country's constitution in order to allow Museveni to stand for his third elected term in office; and
  • the decision to arrest opposition leader and leading presidential candidate Dr Kizza Besigye on trumped-up treason and rape charges, and the subsequent decision by a military court to keep the retired former army man in custody on additional terrorism and weapons charges, despite a civilian court granting him bail.

Bypassing Constitutional Hurdles

Museveni, who first rose to prominence in 1986, after leading the then rebel National Resistance Movement (NRM) to power, was due to step down from office in 2006 at the end of his second and final five-year term. Section 105 (subsections 1 and 2) of Uganda's 1995 constitution restricts the president to serving one five-year term, renewable once.

However, having led an unofficial campaign to have the offending clauses removed from the constitution, Museveni finally got his way when the National Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favour of the third Constitution (amendment) Bill. The president duly completed the formalities of removing the constitutional hurdle that would have thwarted his power-extension bid a few weeks later by signing the amended sections into law.

The decision to tamper with the constitution, although controversial, was always going to be a formality, given Museveni's ruling domination of parliament once he formally declared his wishes, having previously downplayed his intentions to seek another term in office. Uganda's current parliament (2001-2006), the seventh since independence, is composed of:

  • 214 constituency representatives elected from the country's 39 districts;
  • 56 district woman representatives;
  • 10 Uganda People's Defence Forces representatives;
  • five representatives of the country's youth;
  • five representatives of people with disabilities; and
  • five workers' representatives.

Although the Assembly contains a number of independent MPs who are elected without any party affiliations, except those belonging to the NRM, the overwhelming majority of members are aligned with the ruling power, making the house nothing more than a rubber-stamping chamber. 

Elimination of Opposition Challenge 

In yet another move aimed at ensuring Museveni's re-election as head of state, the government is currently holding opposition leader and leading presidential candidate Dr Kizza Besigye in custody following his surprise arrest in mid-November 2005. The Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) leader only returned home to Uganda three weeks earlier from his four-year, self-imposed exile in South Africa - where he fled shortly after he challenged Museveni in the March 2001 presidential election, claiming that he felt his life was in danger - with the view to challenging the incumbent for a second time.

Despite his physical absence from Uganda from such a length of time, Besigye, who lost the 2001 election by a margin of 69.3% to 27.8%, despite claims that the vote was rigged in Museveni's favour, was widely expected to be Museveni's strongest challenger in the March 2006 ballot and was already in full campaign mode when he was arrested.

The opposition leader was initially charged with treason, concealment of treason, and rape charges before a civilian court, with the government claiming that he belonged to the DRCongo-based Peoples' Redemption Army (PRA) rebel group. However, more worryingly, Besigye's initial court appearance was marked by the clearest interference in the independence of the country's judiciary in recent times, when armed special forces troops - locally known as the 'Black Mamba Urban Hit Squad' - invaded the court house, forcing a postponement of his bail hearing. This clear intimidation of the judiciary's working saw the original judge who was due to preside over the case pulling out in protest, while the country's lawyers and legal professionals embarked on a day-long strike to express their dissatisfaction. 

However, even with this much political pressure, the High Court in Kampala was prepared to grant Besigye temporary bail, but was unable to do so because of a remand warrant issued by the 'more reliable' military court - the General Court Martial (GCM) - which subsequently hit him with separate terrorism and weapons charges to ensure his continued incarceration at the Luzira maximum security prison in Kampala. Besigye's lawyers have argued, with some justification, that as a retired army colonel, the GCM no longer has any jurisdiction over him. Although the High Court has since effectively suspended Besigye's court martial by granting him an interim order stopping the proceedings against him, until questions surrounding the GCM's fairness, powers and competence are resolved, it has rejected his bail application, ordering him to remain in custody until the higher Constitutional Court decides on the legality of his case.

Conclusion

The decisions to alter the constitution and arrest opposition flag-bearer Kizza Besigye just a few months before the presidential election with charges that, if proven, could result in the death penalty, are clearly designed to ensure that Museveni can extend his rule into a third decade with as little trouble as possible. Although the government has since allowed Besigye to register for the presidential ballot while still remaining behind bars, the decision, which comes without the guarantee that he will actually be allowed to partake in the ballot, appears a minor concession by the government aimed at deflecting some of the criticism it has faced over the issue. The current constitution allows candidates to stand for public office from prison as long as they have not been convicted, but the government only gave its consent for Besigye to file his papers grudgingly.

The government may still torpedo his presidential chances even before they get off the ground by pushing for an early trial, but so far appears to be encouraging the FDC leader to admit his guilt and apply for a presidential pardon under the country's Amnesty Act. Despite the chance of immediate freedom such a plea bargain offers, Besigye has so far rejected the proposal, maintaining his innocence.

Either way, Museveni and the government appear to be in full control of Besigye's destiny. Even in the unlikely event that his trial is delayed beyond the March 2006 election and the opposition leader is allowed to contest the presidency, his chances already appear to have been seriously damaged with this unexpected legal trouble, giving rise to those who had argued that the entire case against him was politically motivated and intended to derail his chances of ousting Museveni from power.

Looking beyond Besigye and the immediate future, the National Assembly's decision to rewrite the constitution and remove the constitutional clause that limits the head of state to a maximum of two five-year terms is perhaps even more worrying. Although having a presidency without any time limits has its merits, such restrictions are usually imposed in order to ensure that the office of the head of state remains accountable to the electorate and uncorrupted by longevity. The outgoing parliament's decision to remove such restrictions just months before the next election is only going to serve Museveni's own power ambitions at the expense of the country's interests.

Contact: Raul Dary

24 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421, USA
Tel: 781.301.9314
Cel: 857.222.0556
Fax: 781.301.9416
raul.dary@globalinsight.com

www.globalinsight.com and www.wmrc.com

WMRC (Reino Unido)

 


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