This Handbook contributes to clarification of the nature of oversight and the spread of good practice. It consists of drafts of legal standards for democratic accountability of the security and intelligence services and in collecting best legal practices and procedures of oversight.
The publication proposes legal standards based on a wide-ranging analysis of oversight legislation in liberal democracies in the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia. Following a foreword written by Ambassador Leif Mevik, Chairman of the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee and by DCAF Director, Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler, the publication focuses on the four main challenges of oversight: the agency design; the role of the executive; the role of parliament; and independent review.
As additional features, the study introduces an intelligence glossary and a checklist for overseers. As additional features, the study introduces an intelligence glossary and a checklist (recommendations) for overseers. The realisation of the Handbook was made possible through the financial support of the Parliament of Norway and DCAF.
The Handbook was jointly produced by the Human Rights Centre of Durham University (UK), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee decided to join forces
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Preface
Contents
List of boxes
List of Acronyms
Section I: Introduction
Chapter 1 - Defining Democratic Oversight of Security and Intelligence Services
Chapter 2 - The Need for Oversight of the Security and Intelligence Services
Chapter 3 - In Search of Legal Standards and Best Practice of Oversight: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Section II: The Agency
Chapter 4 - Defining the Mandate
Chapter 5 - Appointing the Director
Chapter 6 - Authorising the Use of Special Powers
Chapter 7 - Information and Files
Chapter 8 - Internal Direction and Control of the Agency
Section III: The Role of the Executive
Chapter 9 - The Case for Executive Control
Chapter 10 - Ministerial Knowledge and the Control of Intelligence
Chapter 11 - Control over Covert Action
Chapter 12 - International Cooperation
Chapter 13 - Safeguards against Ministerial Abuse
Section IV: The Role of Parliament
Chapter 14 - The Case for Parliamentary Oversight
Chapter 15 - The Mandate of Parliamentary Oversight Bodies
Chapter 16 - The Composition of a Parliamentary Oversight Body
Chapter 17 - Vetting and Clearance of the Oversight Body
Chapter 18 - Parliamentary Powers to Obtain Information and Documents
Chapter 19 - Reporting to Parliament
Chapter 20 - Budget Control
Section V: The Role of External Review Bodies
Chapter 21 - Resolving Citizens? Grievances
Chapter 22 - Oversight of Agencies within the Administration by Independent Authorities
Chapter 23 - Independent Audit Offices
Overview of Best Practice
Contributors
Glossary
