The governing structure of international financial institutions, the statement said, "should reflect the changes in the world economy, increasing the voice and representation of emerging economies and developing countries." This was in line with the rising economic powers' longstanding demand that the global financial architecture be restructured to make it more representative. Though China's resistance kept the group from explicitly supporting India and Brazil's bids for permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council, the statement also calls for "comprehensive reform" of the U.N. to make the body "more effective, efficient and representative."

Among the more specific actions and recommendations announced were an agreement for development banks in BRICS countries to open mutual credit lines denominated in local currencies; a warning over the potential for "massive" capital inflows from developed nations to destabilize emerging economies; and support for "a broad-based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty." There was also an implicit challenge posed to the status of the U.S. dollar as the leading global reserve currency.

Clearly, these moves constitute an attempt by the emerging powers to coordinate their efforts on the global stage. With the U.S. under the Obama administration appearing preoccupied with its internal troubles, a vacuum is increasingly being felt in the international system. Even the U.K. and France are finding it hard to sustain the military campaign in Libya in the absence of American leadership. This presents an ideal opportunity for the BRICS to finally emerge as major global players.

But great-power politics is a murky business. For all the bonhomie at the Hainan summit, there remain serious differences among the BRICS. First, there is the structural disparity between China and the other members, who are scrambling to catch up with China's spectacular and rapid rise. Indeed, China's dominance threatens to render the very idea of a coordinated BRICS response to the changing global balance of power a non-starter. Beijing's overweening presence makes its BRICS partners nervous, leading them to hedge their bets by investing in alternative alliances and partnerships. Given the leverage that China enjoys in the group, it should not come as a surprise that Beijing has suggested that IBSA -- a grouping of democracies comprising India, Brazil and South Africa -- be shut down in favor of BRICS.

Moreover, there are significant bilateral differences among the BRICS. Brazil is worried about the influx of investment and cheap imports from China and has been very vocal in criticizing Beijing for undervaluing the yuan. Brazilian manufacturers are losing market share to their Chinese counterparts, and Brazil is also wary of China's growing economic profile in South America, which Brazil considers its own sphere of influence.

Russia is also worried about its growing economic disparity with China. Russia's failure to develop its Far East has allowed China to gain a toehold in this strategically important region and has put Beijing in the driver's seat in defining the Asian security landscape. Russian Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin has openly warned that if Russia fails to become a "worthy economic partner" for Asia and the Pacific Rim, "China . . . will steamroll Siberia and the Far East." And even though China is the largest buyer of Russian conventional weaponry, many in Russia see this as counterproductive: China could emerge as the greatest potential security threat to Russia, worse than what the U.S. could ever become.

The recent decline in Sino-Indian relations is well-known. Despite the two sides' decision to resume defense contacts during a sideline meeting at the summit, New Delhi remains sceptical of China's intentions. Beijing's refusal to acknowledge India's rise and its lack of sensitivity on core security interests is leading to pushback. Last year, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh acknowledged that "China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality. . . It's important to be prepared." With overall bilateral trade worth $55 billion, India's trade deficit with China rose to $20 billion in December 2010 from $16 billion in 2009.

As such it is difficult to see a productive future for BRICS.  

Notably, the Hainan summit came only weeks after Brazil, Russia, China and India all abstained on the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya as well as "all necessary measures" for protecting Libyan civilians from Col. Moammar Gadhafi's forces. But there were significant differences in their individual approaches to the Western intervention. For China and Russia, abstention actually meant a "yes," as their veto would have killed any U.N. action. The fact that they abstained meant that they were willing to let the West proceed against Libya, albeit with limits. Moreover, as they are not democracies, they can't be expected to champion the democratic aspirations of the Arab street. The abstentions by India and Brazil, however, combined with South Africa's vote in favor of the resolution, underline the real challenges facing both the BRICS as a coherent grouping and the emerging global order.

The narrative surrounding the rise of BRICS is as exaggerated as that of the decline of the U.S. The tectonic plates of global politics are certainly shifting, but their movements are yet not predictable.

Harsh V. Pant teaches at King's College London in the Department of Defense Studies. He is also an associate with the King's Centre for Science and Security Studies and an affiliate with the King's India Institute. His current research is focused on Asia-Pacific security and defense issues.