Inteligencia y Seguridad Frente Externo En Profundidad Economia y Finanzas Transparencia
  En Parrilla Medio Ambiente Sociedad High Tech Contacto
Inteligencia y Seguridad  
 
26/02/2006 | Iraq: Shrine Attack Sparks Unprecedented Sectarian Strife in Iraq

WMRC Staff

An attack yesterday on a revered religious mausoleum threatens to lead to large-scale sectarian conflict, with Shi'a protesters torching Sunni sanctuaries and dozens of killings across the country in revenge.

 

Global Insight Perspective

Significance

After a period of relative calm following the successful staging of Iraq's parliamentary elections, ethnic conflict has once more reared its head in what is now being officially described as a potential descent into civil war.

Implications

The perpetrators of the shrine attack had one ultimate aim: to drive an inexorable wedge between Iraq's disparate sectarian communities. By targeting the Imam al-Hadi mausoleum, which houses the tombs of the tenth and eleventh revered Shi'a imams, the objective of provoking wanton violence appears to have been fulfilled.

Outlook

The crisis afflicting Iraq's political and security environment has been long in the making; unable to overcome their differences in the political realm, Iraq's politicians are facing unprecedented challenges to the future unity of the country. With the thirst for vengeance battling calls for restraint, the issue of potential civil strife has unfortunately returned the national agenda.

On the Brink

The attack on the Imam al-Hadi mosque was calculated to destroy sectarian harmony. What harmony has remained after three years of post-Saddam Hussein rule is fast receding towards crisis, with an atmosphere of distrust permeating wider society. Although low-scale tit-for-tat sectarian attacks have been ongoing throughout the country's occupation period, at no point has the situation resembled anything close to ethnic war. However, with the latest assault, the talk of civil war is now gaining official currency.

President Jalal Talabani immediately grasped the gravity of the mausoleum attack when he told Iraqis: 'We are facing a major conspiracy that is targeting Iraq's unity. We should all stand hand in hand to prevent the danger of a civil war'. Alarmingly for the Iraqi leadership, the hitherto effective and moderating voice of the Shi'a spiritual establishment has failed to temper religious emotions on the streets. Key Shi'a religious figure Ayatollah Ali Sistani urged followers to remain calm and not to seek vengeance. Unfortunately, the invocations are falling on deaf ears. Reports this morning suggest that at least 80 bullet-ridden - presumably Sunni - corpses have been brought to the capital Baghdad's morgue, in what is most likely a burst of revenge killings. According to the British Independent newspaper, at least 60 Sunni mosques have been attacked across the country. In other developments:

  • 47 dead bodies have been discovered alongside 10 burnt-out cars east of Baghdad;
  • three bodies, believed to be of Iraqi journalists working for the Dubai-based Al-Arabiya satellite channel, have been found in Samarra, where the three were apparently kidnapped whilst reporting on the shrine bombing;
  • three religious leaders and three worshippers have been killed in the capital Baghdad, with 27 Sunni mosques assaulted, including one that was torched;
  • two people were killed in an attack on a Sunni political party in the southern city of Basra;
  • eleven suspected Sunni rebels have been taken from a prison in Basra and killed;
  • thousands of demonstrators in the south-eastern city of Kut have called for vengeance;
  • gunmen opened fire on a Sunni mosque in central city of Barquba this morning, killing one person; and
  • clashes have been reported between Sunnis and followers of young Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

 

Although the initial shrine attack has been condemned around the world, attention is rapidly focusing on fears that the retaliation may get out of control. Shi'a and Sunni relations have been tense since the toppling of Hussein, but the current crisis reflects a widening gap between the two communities. Despite repeated efforts to invite the largely marginalised Sunni community into the political process, a policy that reaped significant dividends during the recent election, ongoing bickering over the make-up of the new Iraqi government is certainly not helping to ease tensions. The mausoleum attack may be received by some sectors as a timely opportunity and outlet for pent-up frustrations. The U.S. and British administrations implored Iraqis not to 'fall into the trap' of sectarian war, with President George W. Bush urging Iraqis to take a measured response to the atrocity. 'Violence will only contribute to what the terrorists sought to achieve by this act', he said.

Sunni religious leaders have similarly described the shrine attack as a 'criminal act' (see Iraq: 22 February 2006: Attack on Shi’a Mausoleum Sparks Demonstrations in Iraq). Given the gravity of what is at stake in Iraq, Sunni officials have appealed to the Shi'a religious establishment to find a way out of this crisis. 'We ask the Marjaiya [Shi'a ayatollahs] to intervene before it is too late', the Sunni-based Islamic Party leader Tariq al-Hashimi told reporters. If evidence were needed of the raw emotion on display in Baghdad, a young supporter of Sadr said: 'I am going to go and burn the Abu Hanifa mosque [one of the most prestigious Sunni sanctuaries in Baghdad]. It is time to take revenge for the martyrs'.

Damage Limitation

Although it is extremely difficult to pinpoint who was responsible for the mausoleum attack, blame will inevitably fall on the al-Qaida movement led by Jordanian dissident Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; he has repeatedly publicised his group's desire to stoke civil war, and the attack would appear to fit a pattern of insurgent threats. What is also difficult to judge is the extent to which this latest bout of violence will tip the balance in favour of eventual sectarian war. According to James Jeffrey, the U.S. State Department's special coordinator on Iraq, the latest developments are 'extremely troubling. We find all of them to be certainly efforts to spark a civil war. And we think the Iraqi people will do their very best to avoid just that'.

The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, earlier this week came out sharply against Iraq's descent towards sectarianism. His accusations that the country's security and intelligence ministries were rife with ethnic and militia infiltration were not taken too kindly by the new Shi'a political elite (see Iraq: 21 February 2006: U.S. Warns against Iraq Sectarianism). Although rising levels of ethnic conflict are obvious, the Shi'a leadership appears to be in little mood to accept responsibility for adding to the burgeoning crisis. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the powerful Shi'a-based Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), pointedly blamed the U.S. ambassador for the shrine attack. 'These statements [by Khalilzad] were a reason for more pressure and gave a green light to terrorist groups', he told reporters. Relations between the U.S. and Shi'a camps appear to be hitting a new low.

Outlook and Implications

The flare-up of violence comes at an extremely tense moment for Iraq as negotiations for the formation of a cross-ethnic national unity government continue. As Iraqi political leaders attempt to iron out their lingering differences, so the political vacuum is fast being filled by a brazen and relentless insurgency. On top of all the other national woes, the Iraqi security and military forces are increasingly beginning to resemble private militias with personal scores to settle. Given that the new post-Hussein Iraq was supposed to end all previous injustices, the sectarian conflict now carries the potential of destroying even the most impressive recent political successes. The Iraqi administration is currently caught up in its own apparently unbridgeable melee over which ethnic community should get which cabinet seat. Whether the current crisis can be contained or will deteriorate depends on the actions of the political elite.

Contact: Raul Dary

24 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421, USA
Tel: 781.301.9314
Cel: 857.222.0556
Fax: 781.301.9416
raul.dary@globalinsight.com

www.globalinsight.com and www.wmrc.com

WMRC (Reino Unido)

 


Otras Notas Relacionadas... ( Records 1 to 10 of 418 )
fecha titulo
13/05/2013 Massoud Barzani: A Regional Powerbroker Rises in Iraqi Kurdistan
27/04/2013 Iraq: The Sectarian Divide
02/04/2013 America's Other Dark Legacy In Iraq
24/03/2013 Irak - La ciudad de las mil y una bombas
21/03/2013 Irak hace justamente diez años y Siria ahora
19/03/2013 Irak: los espías que engañaron al mundo
19/03/2013 Saddam Would Have Survived the Arab Spring
16/12/2012 Silence on Syrian Scuds
11/11/2012 Iraq cancels new arms deal with Russia
01/08/2012 Iraq - Iraq’s Secular Opposition: The Rise and Decline of Al-Iraqiya


Otras Notas del Autor
fecha
Título
05/06/2006|
23/05/2006|
21/05/2006|
11/05/2006|
09/05/2006|
05/05/2006|
14/04/2006|
10/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
06/04/2006|
06/04/2006|
30/03/2006|
30/03/2006|
28/03/2006|
28/03/2006|
25/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
26/02/2006|
20/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
10/02/2006|
10/02/2006|
09/02/2006|
08/02/2006|
07/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
27/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
23/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
20/01/2006|
20/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
18/01/2006|
16/01/2006|
15/01/2006|
14/01/2006|
12/01/2006|
11/01/2006|
08/01/2006|
07/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
05/01/2006|
05/01/2006|
01/01/2006|
31/12/2005|
25/12/2005|
28/10/2005|
21/10/2005|
20/09/2005|
01/09/2005|
13/08/2005|
13/08/2005|
13/08/2005|
13/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
08/08/2005|
30/06/2005|
30/06/2005|
30/06/2005|
30/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
08/06/2005|
03/06/2005|
03/06/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
27/05/2005|
10/05/2005|
10/05/2005|
10/05/2005|
05/05/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
22/04/2005|
04/04/2005|
04/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
01/04/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
29/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
27/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
23/03/2005|
11/03/2005|
11/03/2005|
09/03/2005|
09/03/2005|
08/03/2005|
08/03/2005|
05/03/2005|
05/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
03/03/2005|
02/03/2005|
02/03/2005|
19/02/2005|
19/02/2005|
18/02/2005|
18/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
06/02/2005|
31/01/2005|
31/01/2005|
26/01/2005|
26/01/2005|
22/01/2005|
22/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
21/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
06/01/2005|
02/12/2004|
02/12/2004|

ver + notas
 
Center for the Study of the Presidency
Freedom House