The suspects, who were returned to Morocco and Tunisia on March 20 following a six-month investigation, purportedly planned the Milan attack for around the time of the April 9 Italian parliamentary elections. The case highlights the alarming level of jihadist activity in Italy, and illustrates its attractiveness to militants who are seeking a safer place to operate.

The fact that the Italian Interior Ministry deported the suspects, rather than charging them with conspiracy, perhaps exemplifies an unofficial policy of avoiding trials that could be inconclusive or result in acquittals. By coordinating the expulsions with the Moroccan and Tunisian governments, which take a hard-line stance against militants and have less stringent requirements for the burden of proof, the Italians can practically ensure that the suspects will be detained in those countries as soon as they arrive.

The suspects supposedly were linked, perhaps only loosely, to two groups affiliated with al Qaeda: the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC), and al Qaeda in the Maghreb. There are indications that the groups, or their remnants, have shifted operations to Italy, and have set up a network of cells in Milan, Venice, Naples, Brescia and Salerno.

Although the focus of jihadist combat operations is Iraq and Afghanistan, Europe has served as a logistical and support base for jihadist networks. The Continent, however, is being transformed from a support base into an operational theater, as the 2004 and 2005 attacks in Madrid, Amsterdam and London demonstrated. As the heat is turned up elsewhere, then, Italy is becoming more and more attractive as a safe haven. Its attraction stems not only from its large Muslim immigrant community, which is centered in Milan, but also its lax asylum and immigration regulations and anti-terrorism laws that are less stringent than those in, say, Britain. Osman Hussain, who is accused of participating in the failed attack against the London Underground on July 21, 2005, for example, fled to Italy shortly afterward, where police in Rome arrested him a few days later. Hussain might have been trying to take advantage of a militant logistic support network in the country as he attempted to transit to the Middle East.

Efforts to end years of bloodshed at the hands of Islamist militants in Algeria -- a government crackdown and a policy since 1999 of offering the militants amnesty from time to time, for example -- have reduced militant activity in that country. These efforts, along with similar crackdowns in Morocco, forced many stalwart North African militants to transfer their operations to other countries. In 2002, cells of Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan militants began turning up in Italy. Today, Muslim militant operations in Italy are centered within Milan's sizable immigrant Muslim population, even though it generally is known to be moderate compared to other such communities in Western Europe. As a result, Italian authorities have expelled several members and associates of Milan's Viale Jenner mosque and cultural center under suspicion of militant activity. In addition, Italian authorities have arrested suspects linked to the GSPC for possession of explosives, and for planning attacks against ships, train stations and stadiums.

Italian authorities are aware of, and are attempting to mitigate, the militant threat in their midst. The extent of militant activity in the country, however, indicates that it still is considered a safe place to operate. As the recent deportation case suggests, jihadists consider Italy a target-rich environment as well.