The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank found themselves in an eerie ambience when they met in Washington last week. Along with a mass shooting at a military facility, a fatal car chase after a woman attempted to ram the gates of the White House and a self-immolating man on the National Mall, the economic situation did not leave many reasons for optimism. Surprisingly, developed economies have been slowly recovering, but emerging markets like Russia and Brazil — traditional growth engines — have continued to slow down, with their growth estimates decreasing to 4.5 percent in 2013 and 5.1 percent in 2014 .
For the last four years, quantitative easing,
combined with Western deleveraging, provided investors with abundant
and cheap cash to invest in higher-yield developing economies.
But the proliferation of investments in emerging markets,
regardless of their political system, will end with the U.S. Federal
Reserve's policy changes, which will bring back competition from developed
markets, create large current account deficits and highlight structural
problems in developing economies.
This fortune reversal is not the only fallout
from the global slowdown. The international financial crisis
of 2008-09 incentivized governments to use increasingly
interventionist policies to stabilize domestic economies. The past
few years have seen political choices create different economic outcomes
in countries like Russia and Brazil. Economically similar but
politically very different — in 2013 Brazil scored "free",
Russia scored "not free" on the Freedom in the World ranking —
the two countries' policy choices are strikingly illustrative
of different outcomes.
Brazil and Russia are both among the largest
countries in the world, are similar in terms of population,
gross domestic product and the substantive growth rates in the last
decade that followed long periods of economic stagnation. Both countries
recently benefited from high commodity prices, improved trade balances
and growing foreign direct investment. Both have similarly poor
infrastructure, abundant corruption and are close to each other in the
World Bank Doing Business rankings. In its recent report, the IMF cut
Russia's 2013 growth forecast by almost half, from 2.5 percent
to 1.5 percent, while the IMF kept Brazil's 2013 growth estimates
at its July prediction of 2.5 percent, a number which is
expected to be repeated next year.
So far, Brazil's recovery from the slowdown has been
much more successful than Russia's, in part due to the much better
quality of its institutions. In addition, the slowdowns were not
synchronized: Brazil's downturn happened much earlier and its economy
slowed to less than 1 percent growth in 2012, while Russia only
started its slowdown in the middle of 2012, so its cycle has been
occurring on a delay.
While Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff is
preparing for an upcoming re-election bid in 2014 her country's
economic advantage may disappear. Although Rousseff's electoral favorability is
almost unquestionable at this point, her prospects were less obvious last
summer when the country was shaken by a series of mass protests
in response to the overall economic slowdown. In a situation
of public unrest, democratic governments are unlikely to enact
"hurtful" policies that take people's money or benefits away. But,
at the same time, tightening liquidity urges the Brazilian government
to signal the country's credibility to investors at a time
of increased competition. A mixture of both factors is unlikely
to result in a sustainable Brazilian economic policy in the
Rousseff's endeavor to kill both birds — public
opinion and investors — with however many stones it takes is
reflected in current policy switches. Her government's decision
to decrease funding to federal state-owned banks revealed
an attempt to please investors and ratings agencies ahead
of the election. But, simultaneously, the government passed
a range of infrastructure projects requiring increased federal
funding, indicating that fiscal policy improvements will be largely
Trying to buy popular support, Rousseff has passed
a 2014 budget with overly optimistic tax collection estimates and a
more than 10 percent expansion in public expenditures. This budget,
however, will be hard to sell to much-needed investors who are
interested in more orthodox economic policy amid rising inflation.
Populist electoral considerations seem to be trumping fiscal
responsibility in the run up to the 2014 elections.
The policy uncertainty stemming from Brazil's
democratic system contrasts with the political advantages of Russia's
authoritarianism. A government that is less driven by electoral
populism can avoid excessive public spending and fiscal irresponsibility,
allowing it to shrink some of its spending during economic downturns
more easily. On the surface these uncontested policy moves seem ideal.
While central banks worldwide have been using novel approaches to monetary
policy, Russia has been remarkable for its devotion to a more
orthodox stance focused on sustainable monetary politics and fixed
interest rates. Although Russia expanded expenditures during the 2012
elections by 6 percent of GDP in the first quarter, that
temporary stimulus was reversed in the second and third quarters,
contrasting with Brazil, which is unlikely to let go of its increased
spending tendencies. Moreover, during the slowdown, Russia has been
the only BRICS country to decrease federal government spending, going
from 20.78 percent to 18.6 percent of GDP between 2009
and 2012. Government devotion to fiscal conservatism has been even
more striking in the 2014 budget, with a simultaneous decrease
in education, healthcare and social policy spending in addition
to the recent pension system overhaul that took place despite
a growth slowdown and growing public unrest.
However, instead of praising the Kremlin
for economic conservatism, observers should consider other areas
of Russia's budget and how they contrast with the alternatives
taken by a fellow BRIC like Brazil. Rather than increasing public expenses
in the face of popular unrest, authoritarian Russia, already 3rd
in the world in 2013 defense spending, has been steadily enhancing
its defense expenditures since 2011, planning a 17.8 percent increase
for 2014. The Finance Ministry has said defense and security
spending's share in total government expenditure will increase
from 17 percent in 2013 to about 18 percent in 2016.
Brazil, with defense spending constituting a quarter of Russia's $116
billion in 2013, shrank its military expenditures in favor
of measures to reduce inflation.
Contrary to Rousseff's attempts to secure
support by investing in public expenditure, Putin's government, faced
with increasing popular unrest across the country, is ensuring its own
military buttress. While suppressing unrest may work in the short-term,
longer-term demands for real economic reforms will eventually butt up
against the government's desire to preserve its own entrenched
interests. The Brazilian approach is arguably preferable for any
developing society. By using social spending to preserve power
and paying attention to a democratic structure rather than focusing
on securing an autocratic one, governments like Brazil's end up being
more sustainable and will be able to adapt to society's needs
with public support. Perhaps only a political regime change will give
Russia a real chance to reform.
**Maria Snegovaya is a researcher at the
National Research University-Higher School of Economics and a PhD
student at Columbia University.