Yemen’s UN-backed transition has unravelled and the country has entered a new, highly unstable phase. On 22 January President Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the prime minister resigned after Huthi fighters seized the presidential palace and consolidated control of the capital.
This
has upended the troubled transition and raises the very real prospect of
territorial fragmentation, economic meltdown and widespread violence if a
compromise is not reached soon. At this point, there is little external actors
can do, with the possible exceptions of Saudi Arabia and Iran, to influence the
calculus of Yemeni stakeholders, and the choice for the Yemenis is stark:
either agree to an inclusive political settlement based on compromise, or
suffer a descent into Libyan-style violent conflict and national fragmentation.
It is in no party’s interest, with the exception of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and, to a lesser extent, some components of the southern
Hiraak, to let things go that far.
The most recent crisis
was triggered by a dispute between the Huthis, a predominantly Zaydi/Shiite
movement also known as Ansar Allah, and President Hadi over a draft
constitution that has controversial language concerning the divisive, unsettled
issue of the country’s future federal arrangement. It started when the Huthis
kidnapped presidential adviser Ahmed Bin Mubarak earlier this month, which sent
a message to Hadi that they would not accept a constitution based on six-region
federalism, a division that Mubarak supported and that the Huthis suspected him
of trying to push through without their consent. But the political challenge
quickly morphed into a military confrontation between Huthi fighters, who had
largely controlled the capital since September 2014, and Hadi’s special guards.
The Huthis easily won, completing their military dominance and placing the
president under virtual house arrest.
The
two sides signed an agreement on 20 January in which the president capitulated
to Huthi demands, all of which focused on speedy implementation of the Peace
and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), an accord signed in the wake of the
September Huthi takeover of Sanaa and built on the country’s National Dialogue
Conference (NDC) completed in January 2014. In theory, their demands were reasonable,
but any pretext of a political process had dissipated. The Huthis’ leader,
Abdul-Malik al-Huthi, gave Hadi one week to implement the agreement, or “all
options are on the table”, a thinly veiled threat of violence. Rather than
implementing Huthi commands at gunpoint, Hadi and the prime minister resigned,
throwing the political system into crisis.
Until
now, the Huthis have been pushing against an open door politically and
militarily, facing only pockets of resistance as they have spread south. They have
capitalised on widespread frustration with the transition as well as the
state’s weakness to rapidly expand their political support and territorial
control far beyond their northern strongholds. Their anti-corruption and
anti-old-regime narratives resonate widely, and in some ways the Huthis have
now shifted power dynamics far more even than the 2011 uprising that
precipitated the end of the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime. Indeed, and somewhat
paradoxically, they aligned with disgruntled tribesmen and supporters of Saleh
in 2013 and 2014 to defeat common enemies in the north – enemies including
tribal elements affiliated with the Sunni Islamist party, Islah, the Ahmar
family and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a general who led the fight against the
Huthis under Saleh but turned against his boss during the uprising. In
September 2014, Huthi fighters took Sanaa easily. Large parts of the security
forces – many affiliated with Saleh and all frustrated with President Hadi and
the transition – either joined them or refused to fight.
But
now the Huthis may have pushed too far and become victims of their own
unexpected success. Already, their post-September consolidation of power in
Sanaa and rapid expansion along the Red Sea coast and southward from the
capital has sparked resistance, especially in predominantly Shafai (Sunni)
areas like Taiz and Marib. In the latter, where Islah-affiliated tribesmen are
aligning with AQAP to defend their areas against Huthi advances, the conflict
is taking on a dangerous sectarian tone previously not present in Yemen.
Southern separatists wary of their fate under a Huthi-dominated north and
sensing a political opportunity to unify their divided ranks within the
umbrella Hiraak movement and possibly gain regional support from Saudi Arabia,
have redoubled their calls for independence.
Now
the leadership vacuum has placed the Huthis and the country in a bind. The
president and government ministers are under house arrest, and there is no
consensus among the political groups on how to resolve the crisis. Parliament
scheduled a session for 25 January to either confirm or reject Hadi’s
resignation, but then was forced to postpone it, in part because of a boycott
by southern members, thereby deepening the constitutional crisis and paralysis.
Moreover, hours after Hadi announced his resignation, the security council of
Aden governorate, a governmental body that includes the mayor and local
security officials, declared it would no longer take orders from Sanaa.
Similar
reactions are coming from central parts of Yemen, where the Huthis’ main
political adversary, Islah, is seeing a new opportunity to fight back,
organising popular demonstrations. Even Saleh, who has benefited from the
Huthis’ victories against common enemies, is giving signals he may use the
current circumstance to move against them and organise a comeback for his
allies through elections.
The
current situation is dire, but it offers opportunities as well. All political
groups, as well as the majority of average citizens, are dissatisfied with
Hadi’s stewardship of the transition. Since the September takeover, especially,
he is widely perceived as weak and unable to put the political process back on
track. His departure, while destabilising, offers a chance to Yemenis to select
a more broadly acceptable and effective leadership. This, in turn, would make
it possible to forge the informal political consensus necessary to implement
and clarify existing transitional agreements.
Until
now, the Huthis have had little incentive to compromise. As the victors, they
have increasingly been enforcing their interpretation of existing agreements,
while claiming to speak for all Yemenis. In doing so, however, they are
alienating and even radicalising their opponents, particularly Islah and southern
separatists. Under the current circumstances, any attempt by the Huthis (Ansar
Allah as they prefer to be called) to form a military or presidential council
without genuine buy-in from other parties would result in a significant
domestic and international backlash against them.
They
cannot run the government without participation from the political parties.
Equally important, they need to maintain the support of donors to prevent a
financial freefall and humanitarian disaster. Saudi Arabia, which has kept
Yemen’s government afloat with over $4 billion since 2011, cut direct support
to the government already in response to the September takeover. Were the
Huthis to insist on unilateral control now, it would only toughen the Saudi
position and encourage other donors to follow suit. Domestically it would
fortify the south’s resolve for separation and could provide the incentive for
Saudi Arabia to support its independence against a Huthi-dominated north.
Central parts of the country also could fracture, especially oil-rich Marib.
None of this would serve the Huthis’ interest. Huthi representatives say they
want an inclusive solution, but their actions are what matter now.
The only peaceful
solution that could halt centrifugal forces and economic collapse is a genuinely
inclusive political settlement between all major stakeholders, including Ansar
Allah, Saleh’s General People’s Congress party, the Joint Meeting Parties bloc
(of which Islah is the main part) and as many southern movement components as
possible. Until now, the Huthis undisputedly have had the upper hand. But their
rash overextension offers other groups the opportunity to push back and make
demands in return for their participation.
The
most immediate issue is executive authority, as the vacuum at the top is
leaving a country already teetering on the economic abyss rudderless and
dangerously adrift. A number of options are available, the most prominent of
which are convincing Hadi to withdraw his resignation, forming a presidential
committee to guide the transition until elections can be held or,
alternatively, following the constitution by holding presidential elections 60
days after parliament meets and its speaker becomes acting president. Of these,
reverting to Hadi after all that has transpired is probably the least
desirable, as it is unlikely to change the transition’s downward spiral.
Between the other two, there is no easy choice: both have advantages and
disadvantages. There are also variations of these three positions under
discussion. The most important thing is for Yemenis to agree together on the
best path and to ensure that any solution reached produces an executive broadly
acceptable to all parties. To the extent possible, it is also best that the
solution chosen is accommodated within the framework of the constitution.
An
agreement on the executive would be only the first step. Any durable settlement
must address unresolved issues, particularly pre-election power sharing as well
as the contentious matter of state structure and the future of the south. To
the extent possible, the settlement also should reflect the NDC outcome, which
benefited from wide participation not limited to those with guns. These issues
have been a persistent source of conflict and will continue to plague any political
process until they are addressed. If the heightened threat of fragmentation and
serious conflict does not persuade all groups to make greater concessions, the
country is likely to slide into sectarian conflict, egged on by regional
powerhouses Saudi Arabia and Iran.
It
is up to the Yemenis to reach a compromise. External actors, with the possible
exception of Saudi Arabia and Iran, have little leverage to influence the
calculus of key players. Saudi Arabia theoretically has the financial clout and
connections with all of them to encourage an inclusive settlement over
unresolved issues, but until now it has chosen not to do so. Riyadh seems
spooked by a perceived Iranian role in the Huthis’ victory, and therefore
appears intent on reversing that victory by any means, whereas it is probably
overstating Tehran’s hand and might be much more successful in keeping Yemen
safely within its geostrategic orbit if it sought to negotiate with the Huthis,
using the power of the purse. Encouraging the Huthis to be a constructive
component within an inclusive national government would also work to resist
al-Qaeda, a group anathema to both Saudi Arabia and the Huthis.
Thus
far, the Huthis have had notable success in battling al-Qaeda. But, their
willingness to lead the fight has also resulted in a recruitment boom for their
adversary, who is aligning with tribes that view Huthis as invaders and is
using explicit sectarian language against Shiites generally to catalyse the
fight. U.S. interests would be well served by encouraging the Saudis to reach
out to the Huthis and incentivise their integration into an inclusive
government that can fight al-Qaeda. The Friends of Yemen group (which includes
the GCC, members of the G8, and representatives of the UN, the EU, the Arab League,
IMF and World Bank), should also urge the Saudis to support Yemen economically
as a way of preventing an economic collapse and tying the Huthis into the state
to avoid its disintegration.
Iran,
too, could play a constructive role, namely by advising the Huthis against
overstretch and exclusion, which is threatening the movement’s significant
political gains. Irrespective of its exact relationship with Ansar Allah, Iran
is enjoying a political and propaganda boost regionally as a result of the
Huthis’ victories. Neither Iran nor the Huthis would benefit from the economic
collapse and conflict that is sure to come if an inclusive national compromise
is not reached soon.
The UN special envoy can also help to bring actors together, but the
final decision to either fight or compromise lies squarely with the Yemenis.
The Huthis, first and foremost, need to be convinced that their own long-term
interest is to pursue a negotiated solution. If they can be, the other
political parties and some of Hiraak’s components are likely to follow suit.
But if, on the contrary, the Huthis proceed on their current perilous course,
it will be “game on”, and their opponents will continue to gear up for a
struggle no one can win.
fecha |
Título |
09/07/2020| |
|
18/09/2019| |
|
30/11/2017| |
|
02/03/2017| |
|
13/01/2017| |
|
05/11/2016| |
|
04/10/2016| |
|
02/05/2016| |
|
30/03/2016| |
|
20/03/2016| |
|
19/03/2016| |
|
17/03/2016| |
|
19/02/2016| |
|
16/10/2015| |
|
16/10/2015| |
|
13/10/2015| |
|
04/10/2015| |
|
29/09/2015| |
|
29/09/2015| |
|
25/09/2015| |
|
25/09/2015| |
|
05/09/2015| |
|
05/09/2015| |
|
05/09/2015| |
|
05/09/2015| |
|
05/09/2015| |
|
01/08/2015| |
|
01/08/2015| |
|
27/07/2015| |
|
16/07/2015| |
|
25/06/2015| |
|
04/06/2015| |
|
11/05/2015| |
|
07/05/2015| |
|
28/04/2015| |
|
18/04/2015| |
|
17/04/2015| |
|
08/04/2015| |
|
05/04/2015| |
|
05/04/2015| |
|
05/04/2015| |
|
31/03/2015| |
|
31/03/2015| |
|
22/03/2015| |
|
16/03/2015| |
|
16/03/2015| |
|
16/03/2015| |
|
28/02/2015| |
|
10/02/2015| |
|
03/02/2015| |
|
30/01/2015| |
|
20/01/2015| |
|
07/01/2015| |
|
23/12/2014| |
|
22/12/2014| |
|
20/12/2014| |
|
18/12/2014| |
|
16/12/2014| |
|
16/12/2014| |
|
10/12/2014| |
|
05/12/2014| |
|
02/12/2014| |
|
09/11/2014| |
|
03/11/2014| |
|
30/10/2014| |
|
30/10/2014| |
|
22/10/2014| |
|
22/10/2014| |
|
18/10/2014| |
|
13/10/2014| |
|
02/10/2014| |
|
01/10/2014| |
|
23/09/2014| |
|
11/09/2014| |
|
09/09/2014| |
|
08/09/2014| |
|
05/09/2014| |
|
21/08/2014| |
|
15/08/2014| |
|
05/08/2014| |
|
03/08/2014| |
|
25/07/2014| |
|
10/07/2014| |
|
21/06/2014| |
|
21/06/2014| |
|
13/06/2014| |
|
22/05/2014| |
|
15/05/2014| |
|
13/05/2014| |
|
29/04/2014| |
|
22/04/2014| |
|
08/04/2014| |
|
08/04/2014| |
|
08/04/2014| |
|
08/04/2014| |
|
03/04/2014| |
|
17/02/2014| |
|
27/01/2014| |
|
23/01/2014| |
|
13/01/2014| |
|
05/01/2014| |
|
26/12/2013| |
|
06/11/2013| |
|
18/10/2013| |
|
17/10/2013| |
|
08/10/2013| |
|
05/10/2013| |
|
01/10/2013| |
|
22/09/2013| |
|
06/09/2013| |
|
03/09/2013| |
|
02/09/2013| |
|
09/08/2013| |
|
09/08/2013| |
|
31/07/2013| |
|
31/07/2013| |
|
28/07/2013| |
|
27/06/2013| |
|
26/06/2013| |
|
22/06/2013| |
|
19/06/2013| |
|
14/06/2013| |
|
05/06/2013| |
|
29/05/2013| |
|
29/05/2013| |
|
21/05/2013| |
|
16/05/2013| |
|
14/05/2013| |
|
13/05/2013| |
|
08/05/2013| |
|
07/05/2013| |
|
06/05/2013| |
|
02/05/2013| |
|
30/04/2013| |
|
27/04/2013| |
|
17/04/2013| |
|
12/04/2013| |
|
11/04/2013| |
|
08/04/2013| |
|
04/04/2013| |
|
02/04/2013| |
|
01/04/2013| |
|
19/03/2013| |
|
13/03/2013| |
|
07/03/2013| |
|
04/03/2013| |
|
04/03/2013| |
|
01/03/2013| |
|
26/02/2013| |
|
20/02/2013| |
|
19/02/2013| |
|
19/02/2013| |
|
18/02/2013| |
|
15/02/2013| |
|
06/02/2013| |
|
04/02/2013| |
|
03/02/2013| |
|
22/01/2013| |
|
18/01/2013| |
|
15/01/2013| |
|
02/01/2013| |
|
02/01/2013| |
|
18/12/2012| |
|
12/12/2012| |
|
05/12/2012| |
|
03/12/2012| |
|
28/11/2012| |
|
28/11/2012| |
|
26/11/2012| |
|
24/11/2012| |
|
22/11/2012| |
|
21/11/2012| |
|
21/11/2012| |
|
12/11/2012| |
|
01/11/2012| |
|
25/10/2012| |
|
19/10/2012| |
|
19/10/2012| |
|
10/09/2012| |
|
06/09/2012| |
|
27/08/2012| |
|
22/08/2012| |
|
22/08/2012| |
|
17/08/2012| |
|
16/08/2012| |
|
14/08/2012| |
|
09/08/2012| |
|
07/08/2012| |
|
03/08/2012| |
|
01/08/2012| |
|
01/08/2012| |
|
01/08/2012| |
|
01/08/2012| |
|
28/07/2012| |
|
28/07/2012| |
|
28/07/2012| |
|
28/07/2012| |
|
27/07/2012| |
|
27/07/2012| |
|
27/07/2012| |
|
27/07/2012| |
|
24/07/2012| |
|
24/07/2012| |
|
24/07/2012| |
|
18/07/2012| |
|
16/07/2012| |
|
13/07/2012| |
|
05/07/2012| |
|
05/07/2012| |
|
05/07/2012| |
|
05/07/2012| |
|
28/06/2012| |
|
26/06/2012| |
|
25/06/2012| |
|
12/06/2012| |
|
12/06/2012| |
|
11/06/2012| |
|
07/06/2012| |
|
19/05/2012| |
|
19/05/2012| |
|
16/05/2012| |
|
10/05/2012| |
|
07/05/2012| |
|
04/05/2012| |
|
02/05/2012| |
|
27/04/2012| |
|
24/04/2012| |
|
23/04/2012| |
|
16/04/2012| |
|
11/04/2012| |
|
06/04/2012| |
|
05/04/2012| |
|
02/04/2012| |
|
01/04/2012| |
|
30/03/2012| |
|
27/03/2012| |
|
21/03/2012| |
|
21/03/2012| |
|
17/03/2012| |
|
17/03/2012| |
|
15/03/2012| |
|
15/03/2012| |
|
06/03/2012| |
|
06/03/2012| |
|
04/03/2012| |
|
04/03/2012| |
|
29/02/2012| |
|
29/02/2012| |
|
29/02/2012| |
|
24/02/2012| |
|
24/02/2012| |
|
24/02/2012| |
|
23/02/2012| |
|
23/02/2012| |
|
23/02/2012| |
|
23/02/2012| |
|
23/02/2012| |
|
23/02/2012| |
|
17/02/2012| |
|
16/02/2012| |
|
03/11/2011| |
|
02/11/2011| |
|
12/10/2011| |
|
11/10/2011| |
|
04/10/2011| |
|
27/09/2011| |
|
27/09/2011| |
|
24/09/2011| |
|
23/09/2011| |
|
15/09/2011| |
|
14/09/2011| |
|
12/09/2011| |
|
09/09/2011| |
|
09/09/2011| |
|
06/09/2011| |
|
06/09/2011| |
|
23/08/2011| |
|
23/08/2011| |
|
23/08/2011| |
|
23/08/2011| |
|
23/08/2011| |
|
23/08/2011| |
|
22/08/2011| |
|
22/08/2011| |
|
14/08/2011| |
|
08/08/2011| |
|
05/08/2011| |
|
05/08/2011| |
|
04/08/2011| |
|
04/08/2011| |
|
29/07/2011| |
|
27/07/2011| |
|
23/07/2011| |
|
22/07/2011| |
|
17/07/2011| |
|
17/07/2011| |
|
07/07/2011| |
|
07/07/2011| |
|
03/07/2011| |
|
03/07/2011| |
|
28/06/2011| |
|
28/06/2011| |
|
16/06/2011| |
|
16/06/2011| |
|
16/06/2011| |
|
16/06/2011| |
|
07/06/2011| |
|
07/06/2011| |
|
31/05/2011| |
|
31/05/2011| |
|
28/05/2011| |
|
28/05/2011| |
|
25/05/2011| |
|
24/05/2011| |
|
24/05/2011| |
|
07/05/2011| |
|
07/05/2011| |
|
06/05/2011| |
|
06/05/2011| |
|
05/05/2011| |
|
05/05/2011| |
|
03/05/2011| |
|
03/05/2011| |
|
02/05/2011| |
|
02/05/2011| |
|
01/05/2011| |
|
01/05/2011| |
|
01/05/2011| |
|
01/05/2011| |
|
22/04/2011| |
|
22/04/2011| |
|
18/04/2011| |
|
18/04/2011| |
|
10/04/2011| |
|
07/04/2011| |
|
07/04/2011| |
|
25/03/2011| |
|
25/03/2011| |
|
25/03/2011| |
|
17/03/2011| |
|
11/03/2011| |
|
22/02/2011| |
|
22/02/2011| |
|
15/02/2011| |
|
15/02/2011| |
|
08/02/2011| |
|
04/02/2011| |
|
04/02/2011| |
|
28/01/2011| |
|
19/01/2011| |
|
13/01/2011| |
|
01/01/2011| |
|
31/12/2010| |
|
23/12/2010| |
|
05/12/2010| |
|
02/12/2010| |
|
28/11/2010| |
|
27/11/2010| |
|
26/11/2010| |
|
22/11/2010| |
|
22/11/2010| |
|
22/11/2010| |
|
18/11/2010| |
|
01/11/2010| |
|
26/08/2010| |
|
26/08/2010| |
|
24/08/2010| |
|
24/08/2010| |
|
06/08/2010| |
|
28/06/2010| |
|
18/06/2010| |
|
16/06/2010| |
|
11/06/2010| |
|
19/05/2010| |
|
02/05/2010| |
|
02/05/2010| |
|
25/04/2010| |
|
04/04/2010| |
|
11/03/2010| |
|
02/03/2010| |
|
18/02/2010| |
|
20/11/2009| |
|
20/11/2009| |
|
06/11/2009| |
|
01/11/2009| |
|
27/10/2009| |
|
22/10/2009| |
|
05/09/2009| |
|
31/08/2009| |
|
27/08/2009| |
|
15/08/2009| |
|
02/08/2009| |
|
02/08/2009| |
|
20/07/2009| |
|
20/07/2009| |
|
18/07/2009| |
|
18/07/2009| |
|
11/03/2009| |
|
11/03/2009| |
|
10/03/2009| |
|
10/03/2009| |
|
10/03/2009| |
|
10/03/2009| |
|
17/12/2008| |
|
14/12/2008| |
|
02/10/2008| |
|
02/10/2008| |
|
24/08/2008| |
|
24/08/2008| |
|
08/08/2008| |
|
08/08/2008| |
|
14/05/2008| |
|
02/04/2008| |
|
02/04/2008| |
|
12/01/2008| |
|
19/05/2007| |
|
19/05/2007| |
|
10/05/2007| |
|
10/05/2007| |
|
03/05/2007| |
|
03/05/2007| |
|
30/04/2007| |
|
30/04/2007| |
|
02/04/2007| |
|
01/04/2007| |
|
29/03/2007| |
|
16/03/2007| |
|
16/03/2007| |
|
05/03/2007| |
|
05/03/2007| |
|
28/02/2007| |
|
26/02/2007| |
|
26/02/2007| |
|
26/01/2007| |
|
26/01/2007| |
|
08/01/2007| |
|
08/01/2007| |
|
15/12/2006| |
|
15/12/2006| |
|
11/12/2006| |
|
11/12/2006| |
|
11/12/2006| |
|
11/12/2006| |
|
28/11/2006| |
|
28/11/2006| |
|
24/11/2006| |
|
24/11/2006| |
|
11/11/2006| |
|
08/11/2006| |
|
01/11/2006| |
|
01/11/2006| |
|
30/10/2006| |
|
25/10/2006| |
|
20/10/2006| |
|
11/10/2006| |
|
04/10/2006| |
|
15/09/2006| |
|
13/09/2006| |
|
03/09/2006| |
|
17/08/2006| |
|
17/08/2006| |
|
09/08/2006| |
|
26/07/2006| |
|
13/06/2006| |
|
06/06/2006| |
|
01/06/2006| |
|
30/05/2006| |
|
15/05/2006| |
|
12/05/2006| |
|
12/05/2006| |
|
10/05/2006| |
|
02/05/2006| |
|
25/04/2006| |
|
21/04/2006| |
|
21/04/2006| |
|
10/04/2006| |
|
23/03/2006| |
|
20/03/2006| |
|
17/03/2006| |
|
15/03/2006| |
|
15/03/2006| |
|
15/03/2006| |
|
15/03/2006| |
|
27/02/2006| |
|
23/02/2006| |
|
17/02/2006| |
|
15/02/2006| |
|
15/02/2006| |
|
04/02/2006| |
|
04/02/2006| |
|
18/07/2005| |
|
03/07/2005| |
|
30/06/2005| |
|
28/06/2005| |
|
28/06/2005| |
|
28/06/2005| |
|
19/04/2005| |
|
19/04/2005| |
|