Rio de Janeiro’s northern suburbs remain the worst affected areas, particularly in neighborhoods around the low-income Pedreira and Chapadão favela complexes. The satellite city of Duque de Caxias is also a cargo theft hotspot. Many incidents occur along the principal highway through Rio, Avenida Brasil, the metropolitan stretch of Rodovia Presidente Dutra, and bisecting roads. It is little coincidence then that these areas are dominated by Rio’s three largest organized crime groups, ADA, CV, and the TCP. The ADA in particular is one of Rio’s most prolific cargo theft groups, with former leader Celso “Playboy” Pinheiro Pimenta personally overseeing those operations until he was killed in August 2015, according to an O Dia report.
Smaller criminal groups specializing in cargo theft also operate in the city, likely with the consent of larger organized crime groups that take a cut. Typically, criminal groups will carry out cargo robberies in small bands, intercepting cargo trucks travelling through under-policed urban areas. In some cases, drivers are held hostage for a short period until the merchandise has been unloaded, stolen, and then delivered to buyers on the black market.
Authorities in Rio de Janeiro have become increasingly aware that cargo theft is animportant source of funding for the city’s drug-trafficking groups. Selling largely untraceable stolen cargo like cigarettes and alcohol is a quick and easy income stream thatcan be reinvested in weapons or drugs.
O Dia reported that one Rio gang stole an average of $111,000 worth of cargo in each of its robberies. Due to the surging number of cargo theft incidents, Rio’s cargo theft police unit (Delegacia de Roubos e Furtos de Cargas - DRFC) now only investigates incidents involving more than $29,000 worth of stolen merchandise.
Black Markets, Inside Men, and Corrupt Cops
Cargo theft and the sale of stolen goods is facilitated by a wide network of corruption and bribery. It relies on businesses in the black market that buy the goods, corrupt employees who reveal confidential information on transportation routes, and complicit police officers who are either bought off or get a cut of the proceeds. In several cases, Rio police officers have actually been directly involved in the robberies themselves, subsequently selling off the stolen merchandise to organized crime groups.
Media outlet Jovenpan cited a security official's estimate that former or current employees of the targeted companies are involved in approximately 90 percent of the incidents. Several sources in Rio’s cargo security industry suggested that truck drivers are often complicit in cargo theft schemes.
Efforts by cargo companies as well as the state to counter a surge in robberies have done little to address the issue. The companies have installed tracking devices and employed armed guards, but, as one industry source noted, the criminals often have more firepower.
State security operations by cargo theft units like Rio’s DRFC have also done very little to control the problem despite seizures of stolen goods. And plans to cut Rio’s security budget by $558 million are not a good sign for the DRFC’s ongoing operations. The increased costs associated with cargo theft has already forced some transport companies out of business.
With police attention focused on combating drug-trafficking, widespread infiltration by organized crime groups and already inadequate public investment facing budget cuts, the problem is likely to get worse. Meanwhile, stolen merchandise is likely to continue to be a quick and easy revenue stream for Brazil’s organized crime groups, funding the purchase of arms and narcotics and fueling further violence.
*Lloyd Belton is a political and country risk analyst at the consulting firm S-RM.