22/02/2018 | Central America - El Salvador’s ¨Iron Fist¨ Crackdown on Gangs: A Lethal Policy With U.S. Origins
Danielle Mackey
For the families of Salvadorans killed by the police, what comes next can be just as terrifying.Aided by the media, Salvadoran authorities have convinced much of the country that gangs are the biggest threat it faces.Those who denounce the dark side of mano dura are frequently accused of supporting gangs.
SAN
SALVADOR—Late one morning in the fall of 2016, police officers handcuffed a
group of middle school-aged boys on a street in a neighborhood on the outskirts
of El Salvador’s capital. The boys were serving as lookouts for members of
MS-13, or Mara Salvatrucha, the violent street gang that originated in Los
Angeles and expanded over two decades ago to this small Central American
country, which had just ended a brutal civil war. MS-13 and other gangs have
since multiplied across El Salvador, becoming a main source of violence in the
postwar era. There are now an estimated 60,000 gang members in a country of 6.5
million people. Serving as lookouts, as the boys were doing, is an early step
toward full gang membership.
After handcuffing them, the police officers commandeered a nearby home, forcing
the family out, then took the boys inside and onto the back patio. The officers
proceeded to torture and kill them; it took several hours. The coroner’s report
notes that one boy’s body featured a trail of bullet wounds leading from his
left wrist to his forehead. Neighbors later said they could hear the boys
pleading for their lives as the officers laughed.
Yet the internal police report, which I’ve reviewed, lays out a different
scenario. It says a confidential informant called the police to report that
MS-13 members were gathered on a corner, and that when the police arrived, a
shoot-out ensued. It describes the operation as an “achievement obtained” and
states—falsely, according to witnesses—that the boys were killed in the
exchange of gunfire.
Such incidents are all too common in El Salvador, where there is an alarming
pattern of escalating police violence. The Salvadoran National Civil Police,
known by its Spanish initials, PNC, often uses the term enfrentamiento,
meaning “shoot-out,” to explain police killings of young people suspected of
gang membership. The number of socalled enfrentamientosjumped
from 39 in 2013 to
591 in 2016, after
Mauricio Landaverde, the director of the PNC at the time, announced that
officers would face no consequences for shooting suspected gang members. But as
was true in the case of the boys’ killings, these often aren’t shoot-outs at
all.
When confronted with these cases, the PNC disputes their details, but it makes
no apologies for its zero-tolerance policy toward gangs. Like MS-13 itself,
this policy, known as mano dura, or iron fist, has roots in the
United States, having been modeled on crime-fighting tactics championed by
American politicians and law-enforcement officials. The policy was first introduced
in El Salvador in 2003 and has since evolved, taking a particularly gruesome
turn after 2015, in the wake of Landaverde’s announcement. This trend was
reinforced by the current government’s adoption in April 2016 of a security
policy known as Extraordinary Measures, which keeps prisons holding suspected
gang members on lockdown.
In 2016 and again in 2017, the Washington-based Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights said the available evidence suggested that enfrentamientos amounted
to systematic extrajudicial killings. In 2017, the United Nations asked the
Salvadoran government, which has been controlled by the leftist Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front, or FMLN, since 2009, to discontinue
Extraordinary Measures—a recommendation that Landaverde, now the minister of justice and
security, says was “based on
falsehoods.” Also
last year, in its first report on El Salvador, the International Crisis Group
declared that mano dura had been a failure. Yet the government
is doubling down, and now seeks to renew Extraordinary Measures for another
year.
For the families of those killed, what comes after a police killing can be just
as terrifying. Last fall, I sat with the parents of the boys who had been tortured
and killed a year earlier. They spoke to me on condition of anonymity, in near
whispers, hunched together in plastic chairs in a one-room cinderblock house
owned by one of the mothers.
Following alleged enfrentamientos,
they told me, police officers regularly invade the homes of the dead. The PNC
had already stormed the house we were sitting in on multiple occasions,
overturning furniture, cursing the boys’ memory and, when the parents
protested, declaring that they were “the law” and threatening to murder the
parents, too. Families don’t typically report either the police killings or
their harrowing aftermath to judicial officials, fearing reprisals if word were
to get out that they were talking. Instead, they lay low, besieged by grief,
bitterness and terror. “We don’t go out anymore,” one mother told me. “We’ve
completely cut ourselves off from society.”
‘Where Did You All Lose Your Way?’
Mano dura was adopted in 2003 under El Salvador’s then-president,
Francisco Flores, who came to power in 1999. More than a decade had passed
since the end of the Salvadoran Civil War, a 12-year conflict in which more
than 75,000 people died. The policy was adopted even though the murder rate had
steadily fallen throughout the postwar years, from 6,792 murders in 1996 to
2,388 murders in 2003.
At first, mano
dura wasn’t even a formal policy; it was a memo to the police. The
memo instructed them to use any means at their disposal to incarcerate and
disband the nascent gangs, and to work with the army and attorney general in
doing so, according to an October 2017
report by
analyst Veronica Reyna for the German political foundation Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung.
Public policies usually feature concrete goals, defined timelines and ways to
measure success. Mano dura had none of these, Reyna’s report
notes. After sending off the memo, the Flores administration began successfully
lobbying for anti-gang laws to grant mano dura judicial legitimacy.
These laws defined gang members by their clothing or tattoos, allowed for mass
arrests, reduced police oversight and made combating gang activity a top
judicial and police priority.
Another crucial element of mano dura’s implementation was generating
media coverage that would prime Salvadorans for the crackdown to come. The goal
seemed to be to convince the population that gangs posed a singular threat to
security. This coverage had the added benefit of distracting from economic and
social problems and other types of crime.
In the first 13 months that mano dura was in effect, the
police arrested 19,275 people for alleged gang membership, according to Reyna’s
report. Of those, 17,540 were almost immediately freed for lack of evidence.
Many of them weren’t gang members; they simply came from poor communities where
the authorities suspected that gangs existed. But once arrested, they were
cycled through holding cells with actual gang members, and some chose to join
gangs as a result. These mass arrests were carried out in lieu of tactics
that would actually address the systemic causes of persistent violence in El
Salvador—a problem that was much bigger than the gangs. The police force even
called attention to this fact early on. A November 2004 report from the PNC’s
Division of Youth and Family Services defined violence as a matter of public
health, and took issue with the idea that the police should be the sole
institution in charge of public security. It also identified additional drivers
of violence in El Salvador, none of which mano dura did
anything to combat: the widespread availability of guns, drug and alcohol
abuse, the legacy of the war years and social problems like family
disintegration.
“I look at this and I think, Where did you all lose your way?” a Salvadoran
police officer told me last August during an interview at a café in San
Salvador. The officer, who insisted on anonymity so he could speak freely about
the policy, said he was especially disturbed by the similarities between
tactics employed by police implementing mano dura and those of
state security forces during the civil war, which sponsored death squads and
were notorious for their widespread use of torture.
Confronted with evidence of abuses, El Salvador’s government has denied them.
Last September, when civil society groups presented statistics on extrajudicial
killings before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Landaverde, the
justice and security minister, responded that there was no
evidence that
the state was “permitting, tolerating or making policies of extrajudicial
assassinations or human rights violations.”
Constructing a Common Enemy
Given both mano dura’s ineffectiveness and the social harm it
caused, the government’s commitment to it was puzzling, perhaps. But shortly
after the policy was put in place, the leak of an internal memo from the
leadership of Flores’ political party, the right-wing Nationalist Republican
Alliance, or ARENA, shed some light on officials’ motivations.
The purpose of mano dura, the memo stated, was simple: to win the
upcoming 2004 presidential elections. Since assuming office in 1999, Flores
hadn’t made significant strides on his proposed economic improvements, so the
party didn’t have much to rally around. It had also suffered a poor showing in
mid-term legislative elections in 2003, underscoring the need for a visible
win.
As a political tool, mano dura was wildly successful. It
worked by constructing the image of a common enemy—gangs—that both the
government and the public could rally against. And it convinced voters that
ARENA was the one force capable of vanquishing that enemy.
Media coverage was instrumental in selling this argument. In her 2017 book “Mano
Dura: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador,” Sonja Wolf, a political
scientist and researcher at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics
in Mexico, describes how media coverage presented gang members “as deviant
outsiders and a danger to society” and “defined the gang problem as stemming
from individual character deficiencies rather than from social conditions.” The
coverage also presented mano dura as successful and paid
little attention to its shortcomings. Ultimately, Wolf writes, “the Salvadoran
press acted as willing amplifiers of a moral panic driven by the government and
law enforcement.”
ARENA won the 2004 presidential elections, allowing Antonio Saca to succeed
Flores, who was not able to run for re-election because Salvadoran presidents
cannot serve consecutive terms. Shortly after taking office, Saca introduced a
new security policy known as “Super Mano Dura.” It was the first sign
that a pattern was emerging: Every administration since Flores’ has embraced
some form of mano dura, in substance if not in name.
MS-13: An American Export
The rhetoric that took root in El Salvador around suspected gang members
harkens back to moral panics around crime in the United States. The obsessive
focus on the gangs as the focal point of societal ills recalls alarm over
“squeegee men” in New York City under former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani or the
“super-predators” that Hillary Clinton infamously warned about as first lady in
the 1990s. Identifying particular groups as representing a paramount
threat, and then arguing that special policing and judicial policies are
necessary to protect the public from them, is the same approach that led the
U.S. to adopt zero-tolerance policies and “broken windows” policing more than a
decade before they appeared in El Salvador. Whereas zero-tolerance policies
involved frequent arrests and long prison sentences, “broken windows” referred
to the aggressive prosecution of minor infractions that were believed to be
gateways to violent crimes. Both ruined relationships between communities and
the state and resulted in overcrowded prisons.
Over the years, various journalists and researchers have established more
explicit links between American and Salvadoran approaches to fighting crime.
For example, Jose Miguel Cruz, a Salvadoran political scientist who has been
tracking approaches to gang violence in both countries for more than two
decades, has written that El Salvador’s anti-gang laws were “inspired by the
zero tolerance policy—oriented more toward penalizing wrong than preventing
it—that had been implemented in several North American Cities” like New York
and Los Angeles.
Those who lived in Los Angeles during the heyday of America’s embrace of zero
tolerance and broken windows policing know its harmful effects all too well.
Carmelo Alvarez, an L.A. native, saw how the policies contributed both directly
and indirectly to the problems El Salvador faces today. In the early 1980s,
Alvarez founded
Radiotron, one of
the first hip-hop clubs on the West Coast. He grew Radiotron into an ad-hoc
community center that taught breakdancing, graffiti, rapping and a host of
other undeniably cool, competitive group pastimes that kept kids from joining
gangs, and even got some who had already joined to leave. About half of his
kids were Salvadoran war refugees, he estimates. Alvarez also taught a course
on human rights and cultural sensitivity to officers from the Los Angeles
Police Department.
In the 1990s, Alvarez watched as LAPD officers conducted mass sweeps in areas
of the city where gangs held territory, often interrupting his programming to
line up, interrogate and beat his kids. “The story was: Salvadoran kids fled
war to get beat up by cops,” he told me when we met at an IHOP in L.A.
Sometimes Alvarez himself was forced to his knees and searched after officers
stormed Radiotron.
Public panic at the time around anything even tangentially related to gangs
drove much of this aggressive policing, he says. The abuses were compounded by
the fact that police officers saw things like graffiti as inherently criminal
rather than as vehicles for self-expression. “It’s a self-portrait in letter
form,” Alvarez says. “They’re not in the business of getting that. They’re in
the business of arresting people. There’s that history of the criminalization
of youth.”
By the mid-1990s, his kids started to get deported. Alvarez said he watched
patrols drive by and point out suspected Salvadoran gang members to immigration
officials, who would detain them. Some of these youths did have ties to MS-13,
and would continue gang activity after they arrived in El Salvador. “The LAPD
exported MS to El Salvador,” he says, referring to MS-13. “When I say that, I
mean I witnessed it. It happened.”
The LAPD today recognizes that zero tolerance was a failure. “The war on gangs
gave us exactly the opposite of what we wanted,” says Michael Downing, who was
a young cop in L.A. when zero-tolerance policies were at their most popular and
rose to become deputy chief of the department. “It was awful. It isolated
communities. It broke down any trust we had with communities. We were seen as
an occupying army. If you’re always in the role of warrior, everything is a
state of fear, and that’s not what democratic societies should
represent.”
Yet some American policymakers continue to tout zero-tolerance policing. One of
its most visible advocates, Giuliani, who built his political career on it,
also helped legitimize the approach in El Salvador. The year after completing
his final term as New York’s mayor in 2001, he founded a global security
consulting firm, Giuliani Partners LLC. In 2015, after being hired as a
consultant by a conservative alliance of private firms in El Salvador, he came to the
country and
announced that he had a recipe to keep its citizens safe. “These two gangs need
to be annihilated,” he said, referring to MS-13 and the two factions that make
up its main rival, Barrio 18 Surenos and Barrio 18 Revolucionarios.
Salvadoran journalist Gabriel Labrador noted at the
time that
Giuliani made statements and offered ideas that echoed the security plans and
strategies that were already being implemented. One of the architects of mano
dura in El Salvador, Francisco Bertrand Galindo, who was the minister
of security when it was first implemented, told Labrador that Giuliani had come
to bolster support for what was in place. With Donald Trump in the White House,
Salvadoran authorities are receiving even more encouragement from the U.S. to
continue with mano dura. “Let me state this clearly,” Attorney
General Jeff Sessions said last April. “Under President Trump, the Justice
Department has zero tolerance for gang violence.” Three months later, Sessions
traveled to El Salvador to applaud the anti-gang work of his Salvadoran
counterparts, calling a recent mass raid of suspected gang members an
“inspiration.” In meetings with President Salvador Sanchez Ceren and Attorney
General Douglas Melendez, Sessions reportedly asked the leaders to “place an
emphasis” on combating gangs. While Sessions was in El Salvador, Trump went to Long Island, New York, where
he proclaimed in a speech that members of MS-13 are “animals” and that the gang
is fed by undocumented migrants who come to the U.S. fleeing violence in
Central America, an argument he later repeated in his 2018 State of the Union
speech. Salvadoran journalist Oscar Martinez, who went to Long Island shortly
after Trump did, said history is
repeating itself:
Zero-tolerance policies in America are criminalizing young Salvadoran
immigrants, resulting in deportations and a repressive atmosphere that fuels
gang recruitment. The Trump administration is implementing the same tactics
that gave rise to the gang problem in El Salvador in the first place.
Mano Dura’s Political Power
Since the
implementation of mano dura, violence in El Salvador has
skyrocketed, and the country has become the homicide capital of the world. In
2015, according to Reyna’s report, the total number of murders reached a high
of 6,657; in 2016, it fell slightly, to 5,278. Gangs are also targeting police
officers and their families with increasing frequency. In 2014, more than 30
police officers were killed. That number doubled in 2015, and 20 soldiers, who
patrol the streets alongside police officers, were also killed.
Yet few politicians in El Salvador have taken a public stance against mano
dura. Parties on both the right and the left continue to profess faith in
zero tolerance. These statements, however, are insincere, as these same
politicians have also used the gangs as machines to get votes. Court testimony
and leaked audio and video have implicated
both ARENA and the FMLN in arrangements in which they promise gang leaders favors in
exchange for their support. Gangs, after all, hold sway over thousands of
citizens, and winning gang support can be an effective political strategy.
As political parties fine-tune their messaging ahead of the 2018 legislative
and 2019 presidential elections, the demonization of gangs will play a
prominent role. While the FMLN touts its security policies and doubles down on
Extraordinary Measures, ARENA and other parties on the right are promising
basically the same thing. Billboards for the conservative party Grand Alliance
for National Unity, for example, promise to declare a “state of emergency and
the death penalty to finish off the gangs.”Those who denounce the dark side
of mano dura and keep records of extrajudicial murders are
frequently accused of supporting gangs. The few lawyers, journalists and human
rights advocates in the country willing to document government abuse strongly
suspect they are the targets of unauthorized electronic surveillance by the
intelligence services, which sometimes they are able to
prove. In a society that has been sold the benefits of mano dura for
more than a decade, many Salvadorans equate police brutality with public
safety. A 2017 study on citizen confidence in the
police, published by the University of Central America in San Salvador and
Florida International University, found that 40 percent of respondents
supported torture against people involved in organized crime, and 40 percent
also approved of police breaking the law if necessary when capturing criminals.
But El Salvador’s gangs are arguably stronger than ever. According to a 2017
study published by Florida International University, young people say they join
gangs for the same
reasons they
did more than 20 years ago: domestic violence, lack of education, limited
employment opportunities and rundown neighborhoods, among other economic and
social problems. Mano dura ignores all of that.
The situation will persist until the political beneficiaries of mano
dura are willing to recognize its defects. Until then, civilians,
especially those who suffer, shoulder the task of resistance. Adonis Ramos is a
23-year-old university student whose father, a police officer, was killed by
MS-13 in the rural region of Bajo Lempa, where the family lived, in 2015. “My
dad was my superhero,” he said in an interview over Skype from a country in
Europe, where the family has fled as refugees. “I wanted the gang members who
killed my dad to die. But killing them isn’t a solution,” he says. “These
structures exist because of an unjust economic order. The kids in my community
who joined—they weren’t born violent. The whole environment they live in is
violent. It’s sick.”
He understands, though, why it’s hard for many people to look past vengeance
when they’re grieving a death at the hands of a gang. Policy is the last thing
on their minds. “It’s not easy to maintain your reason,” he says, “when you’re
emotional because they’ve killed your dad.”
**Danielle Mackey is a journalist based in El Salvador and New York. She is a
senior fellow at the Schuster Institute for Investigative Journalism at
Brandeis University, and is a part-time staff member of the research teams at
The Intercept and Field of Vision. More of her work is available here. Reporting for this story was made possible by
a grant from Fund for Investigative Journalism and a fellowship from the
Schuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, with support from the Ford
Foundation.
World Politics Review (Estados Unidos)
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