Even though pre-election polls wrongly predicted da Silva would win the Oct. 1 presidential vote outright, nothing suggests polls will be wrong again. Da Silva is likely to win re-election by a strong majority, but even strong popular support will not save him from political weakness in his second term.


Recent polls show incumbent Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva leading opponent Geraldo Alckmin with at least 61 percent of the vote ahead of Brazil's Oct. 29 presidential runoff. Da Silva's numbers have climbed steadily since the Oct. 1 first-round election, when he garnered 48.6 percent of the vote compared to Alckmin's 41.6 percent.

Even though pre-election polls incorrectly predicted he would win an absolute majority in the Oct. 1 vote, the second round will be decidedly different for three reasons. First, the runoff is not cluttered by smaller-party candidates who could split the vote. Second, the charismatic da Silva actually bothered to campaign this time around. And third, the corruption scandals surrounding his ruling Workers' Party (PT) no longer appear important to most voters. But even though da Silva is poised to win re-election with a decisive majority, even strong popular support right now will not save him from political weakness in his second term.

After displaying a nonchalant attitude toward the race before Oct. 1, which caused an unforeseen runoff, da Silva approached the runoff with renewed vigor, participating in debates and actively campaigning. He performed well in the debates, holding his own against Alckmin, and continued to distance himself from the scandals plaguing the PT.

Da Silva's runoff campaign has most strongly targeted the working class vote. Popular support for da Silva, who hails from a poor family in Sao Paulo state, largely stems from his support for the poor. In his first term, he implemented a number of social programs benefiting the country's middle and lower classes. Unlike Alckmin, da Silva comes across as someone who understands what living in poverty means, and in a country where 30 percent of the population lives on less than $2 a day, da Silva's relationship with the poor is electorally invaluable. Consequently, polls show him currently doing very well in Brazil's poor northeastern states, with Alckmin still clinging to support mainly in the nation's industrial southeast.

But even if Brazil's working class can return da Silva to office, it cannot guarantee him an easy ride in his second term. He has so far successfully distanced himself from the corruption scandals besetting the PT, but not without a price: Many of the top party officials in his government either resigned or were fired, leaving his government scrambling to fill these positions. And the scandals have not completely departed. Da Silva still faces an electoral court investigation into the latest scandal, in which he allegedly sought to obtain information on his opponents illegally in order to discredit them. He also faces general dissatisfaction among many Brazilians for his hands-off approach to economic reform. This is just one issue he will need to improve on in order to win favor with the middle and upper classes, whose support he will need if he wants to be anything more than a lame duck for the next four years.

Outside the working class, many in Brazil are displeased with da Silva over both his foreign and domestic policy. The country saw economic growth during his first term, but many attribute the policies responsible for growth to his predecessor in office, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Economists in Brazil and abroad largely agree that Brazil needs to boost its growth rate in order to compete with more-developed nations, and da Silva has so far not come up with any novel ways to accomplish this. In terms of foreign policy, many Brazilians were miffed that da Silva allowed Brazil to lose its position in Latin America's spotlight -- to Venezuela, no less, a country only a fraction of Brazil's size. Da Silva's handling of Bolivia also has upset many in the upper classes, which have perceived Brazil as too weak to convince the region's poorest country to rethink its plan to nationalize its natural gas industry.

This political weakness at home means da Silva can pursue only a limited agenda in his second term. He will therefore focus more attention on domestic affairs, and cannot afford to be a big player in the international arena. He has already initiated his new domestic focus to some extent, evidenced by his handling of the PT corruption issue -- which has involved condemning the scandals and firing anyone ostensibly connected to them.

He will probably not pursue an agenda liable to damage his popularity further. If he does attempt unpopular reforms, he will need political alliances to see them through. In all cases, da Silva will need to adopt a more aggressive approach in his second term if he wants to be effective. Many in Brazil will be skeptical of what this approach will actually accomplish, given their doubts about his political capability.

But da Silva has faced skepticism before. Before being elected president in 2002, "Lula" had been a household name for some time, having been instrumental in the labor strikes in the late 1970s that eventually ended the country's military regime. He remained at the forefront of politics by entering every presidential race since then, each time refusing to compromise his socialist values. He surprised many, then, when during his 2002 election campaign he reached out to Jose Alencar of the centrist Liberal Party to serve as his vice president. This move signaled that da Silva was ready to make some compromises and move more toward the center. Through it all, da Silva emerged as president.

Though da Silva could win the presidency, the next four years will not be easy. This campaign has shown him that he cannot merely sit back and expect things to happen for him -- the attitude that got him in this runoff to begin with. The same will be true in his second term, during which achieving anything substantial will demand greater assertiveness on all fronts.