Prominent Western politicians have launched a global discussion about the risks associated with Russia developing hypersonic weapons. Arms control experts are attempting to estimate the potential of these new weapons, but attempts at this stage are hindered by the absence of important technical data and the lack of specialized terminology in this field.
The
discussion of the threats posed by hypersonic weapons was triggered by
President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, who in his address to the
Federal Assembly on March 1, 2018, described the impressive capabilities of
Russia’s new Avangard and Kinzhal strategic missile systems as follows: “The
glide vehicle strikes its target like a meteorite, like a fireball, with its
surface temperature reaching between 1600 and 2000 degrees Celsius, while
remaining completely controllable at the same time.”
Federal
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany Heiko Maas attempted to take the lead
in discussing the destabilizing new technology. In March 2019, he hastily
organized the “2019. Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control”
international conference in Berlin. In his opening speech, Maas said:
“Manoeuvrable missiles travelling at many times the speed of sound barely leave
time for considered human responses. The fact that we are not just talking
about science fiction here is demonstrated by Russia’s announcement that the
first Avangard systems will be entering service this year. I would therefore
also like to seize this conference as an opportunity to establish an
international missiles dialogue that takes into account both the challenges
posed by new technologies and the dangers of their proliferation. The experts
gathered here today could form the backbone of this kind of global Missile
Dialogue Initiative.”
However,
the subsequent discussion at the conference demonstrated that many of the
participants were unfamiliar with the topic of hypersonic weapons. Recognized
experts on missile control proved unprepared to hold a substantive conversation
about hypersonic technology. As a result, the dialogue was reduced to
discussing the INF Treaty.
At the
end of the conference, the ministers of foreign affairs of Germany, the Netherlands
and Sweden signed a political declaration stressing the “need to build a shared
understanding of how technologically enhanced military capabilities may change
the character of warfare and how this will influence global security.”
In the
United States, where hypersonic technology has already been developing at a
rapid pace, including as part of the Prompt Global Strike programme, Putin’s
announcement was used as a pretext for investing more in the Pentagon’s
projects. “We have lost our technical advantage in hypersonics [but] we have
not lost the hypersonics fight,” said Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Paul Selva. Meanwhile, Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering Mike Griffin, for his part, has identified hypersonics as his
top priority and called for an industrial base to be established that could
support the development and production of thousands of deterrence hypersonic
vehicles.
Mike
White, the Pentagon’s assistant director for hypersonics, announced that the
department had a three-step plan for the development of hypersonic weapons that
involves investing generously in offensive capabilities, then in defensive
systems, and finally, at least ten years from now, in reusable airborne
hypersonic vehicles. The Pentagon’s spending on hypersonic projects has
increased from $201 million in 2018 to $278 million in 2019, and the overall
cost of the program is estimated at $2 billion.
China
has been no stranger to this “war of words,” with several fantastic reports
emanating from the country about “successful tests of hypersonic flight
vehicles,” the creation of a material capable of withstanding temperatures of
up to 3000 degrees Celsius, and even the development of a universal engine that
can accelerate a vehicle from zero to hypersonic flight. Japan has stated its
intent to create a High-Speed Gliding Missile, an equivalent of Russia’s
Avangard.
Minister
of the Armed Forces of France Florence Parly has announced the country’s plans
to use the ASN4G supersonic air-to-surface cruise missile as the baseline for
the V-MaX supersonic glider that could travel at a speed of over 6000 km/h. The
project is being led by ArianeGroup, a joint venture between Airbus and Safran,
and the first test flight could take place in late 2021.
In the
meantime, the global expert community has yet to come up with a clear
scientific definition for the term “hypersonic vehicle.” Hypersonic flight is
conventionally understood to mean atmospheric flight at speeds higher than Mach
5, that is, five times the speed of sound. The second important feature of a
hypersonic aircraft is its ability to maneuver with the use of aerodynamic
forces, rather than merely adjusting the target accuracy. This entails longer
atmospheric flight times and greater susceptibility to the destructive factors
associated with atmospheric flight.
At
present, only a handful of countries are close to creating effective hypersonic
weapons. Hypersonic weapons engineers are faced with some very unique technical
challenges. To begin with, there is the problem of ensuring controlled and
sustained flight in a rarefied atmosphere whose density varies with altitude.
Among other things, this creates difficulties for propulsion systems that
consume oxygen.
Also,
the friction created by the hypersonic airflow around the vehicle’s surface
generates a sheath of ionized plasma, with the nose fairing temperature
reaching up to 3000 degrees Celsius. Even vehicles made of ultra-heat-resistant
alloys or composites lose their shape and original aerodynamic characteristics
due to the heating and ablation. For example, the U.S. Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird
high-altitude supersonic reconnaissance aircraft would become 10cm longer in
flight owing to thermal expansion, and fuel would seep from its seams on
landing.
Controlling
a hypersonic vehicle from launch to target impact is a separate problem, as the
plasma sheath blocks radio signals. Solving this problem requires complex and
expensive research. Even US engineers have not yet found a solution to this
problem.
Another
challenge is linked to the fact that the plasma sheath significantly
complicates navigation, which for a strike vehicle must be autonomous, prompt
and very accurate. Plasma makes electro-optical and radio-frequency homing impossible.
Inertial navigation systems cannot provide the required accuracy at long
distances. A solution to this problem has yet to be found.
The
traditional types of aviation fuel (jet fuel and methane) are unsuitable at
hypersonic speeds. A hypersonic vehicle needs a special kind of fuel. Also, a
universal propulsion engine capable of accelerating a vehicle from zero to
hypersonic speeds has not yet been created. At present, militaries have to make
do with rocket boosters or supersonic aircraft to accelerate vehicles to speeds
at which their supersonic combustion ramjet engines can be engaged.
When it
comes to the flight mode, there are three different types of hypersonic
vehicles. The first type is an unpowered glide vehicle, which rides a ballistic
missile to an altitude of approximately 100km, separates, and performs a
maneuverable flight in the upper atmospheric layer at speeds between Mach 8 and
Mach 28. By skip-gliding along the atmosphere like a skipping stone along the
water surface, such a vehicle can increase its flight range by several times.
The second type is a scramjet-powered vehicle, which can only fly in the
atmosphere because its engine needs oxygen. The third type is a quasi-ballistic
or semi-ballistic missile that mainly follows a shallow ballistic trajectory
but can also maneuver to evade enemy missile defenses. One example here is the
Russian Iskander-M missile, which flies at hypersonic speeds of between 2100
and 2600 m/sec (Mach 6 to Mach 7) at an altitude of 50km.
Experts
sometimes use the term “aeroballistic.” However, this definition is not applied
to the speed of flight, but rather to the mode of travel: namely, it implies a
combined mode of partially traveling along a ballistic trajectory and partially
employing aerodynamic control surfaces and jet vanes for steering. An
aeroballistic vehicle does not necessarily have to be hypersonic, as the term
can also be applied to slower vehicles, although it is now widely used in the
context of the hypersonic Kinzhal and Iskander-M missiles.
Hypersonic
vehicles have one distinct feature which traditional exo-atmospheric ballistic
missiles do not. While most ballistic missiles develop speeds of dozens of
Machs (i.e., they also travel at hypersonic speeds), they are not described as
hypersonic unless they or their warheads are capable of aerodynamic maneuvering
in the atmosphere.
Some
ballistic missile warheads are capable of terminal trajectory corrections. They
are not classed as hypersonic vehicles, since the purpose of their maneuvering
is not to increase the flight range or evade an anti-missile attack, but merely
to reduce the circular error probable (CEP).
All
hypersonic vehicles can be subdivided into five categories depending on their
mission:
Manned aircraft (the first and so far only
example here is the U.S. North American X-15, which set the world airspeed
record of Mach 6.72 in 1967)
Unmanned vehicles (mainly experimental
projects such as the Boeing X-43, which reached Mach 9.6 in 2004)
Scramjet-powered hypersonic missiles (such
as the Russian 3M22 Zircon)
Hypersonic glide vehicles (the Russian
Avangard or the U.S. Advanced Hypersonic Weapon)
Air- or ground-launched spaceplanes (the
Soviet Buran and U.S. Space Shuttle vehicles, which reach speeds of Mach 25
upon re-entry).
Military
hypersonic vehicles fall into the following three categories:
1.
Reconnaissance vehicles
At
present, only one purely reconnaissance hypersonic vehicle is known to be under
development: the Lockheed Martin SR-72, which can theoretically travel at
speeds of up to 7400 km/h. This vehicle is expected to be better at monitoring
mobile missile systems than reconnaissance satellites. It could also eventually
be equipped to carry a charge for a pinpoint strike.
Another
experimental orbital hypersonic vehicle is the Boeing X-37B. Although little is
known about its intended mission, it could also serve as a reconnaissance
platform.
2.
Hypersonic kill vehicles
Scramjet-powered
hypersonic cruise missiles that can be launched by an aircraft, a sea-surface
ship or a submarine (the Russian 3M22 Zircon or the U.S. X-51A Waverider, which
is currently under development) can be used to destroy enemy missile early
warning systems, anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses, airfields, hardened
command posts and critical facilities.
Glide
vehicles (the Russian Avangard; the U.S. Lockheed Martin Falcon, HIFiRE and
HSSW/TBG [High-Speed Strike Weapon/Tactical Boost Glide]; and the Chinese
WU-14/DF-ZF) are primarily intended as nuclear strike weapons.
Quasi-ballistic
missiles (the Russian Kinzhal and Iskander-M; the Indian Shaurya tactical
missile; and the Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile) are relatively
difficult to detect by radar thanks to their shallow trajectory. Their warheads
can change trajectory, so enemy missile defenses cannot calculate the exact
target, and the warhead’s maneuverability considerably complicates
interception.
3.
Hypersonic interceptors
These
are surface-to-air missiles designed to intercept ballistic missile warheads,
normally in their terminal, atmospheric phase of trajectory. The most advanced
interceptors can engage ballistic missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes and
even shoot down low-orbit satellites.
To stand
a chance of intercepting a ballistic target, an interceptor must not only
develop a high speed, but also launch promptly and maneuver actively. U.S.
RIM-161 SM-3 Block IIA missiles of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System
can travel at speeds of up to Mach 15.25; the Russian S-400 48N6DM missiles
have a speed of Mach 7.5, and the future S500 77N6-N1 missiles will be able to
reach speeds of up to Mach 21.
Advantages
of Hypersonic Missiles
Hypersonic
missiles have several obvious advantages over ballistic missiles. First, they
follow significantly shallower trajectories, so ground-based radars detect them
later into the flight. Second, thanks to their maneuvering, high speed and
unpredictable trajectory, the enemy cannot be certain of the hypersonic
vehicle’s target, whereas the trajectory of a ballistic missile is currently
fairly easy to calculate. Third, ballistic missile interception experiments
have been conducted since the 1960s, and there are plenty of reports on
successful trial intercepts. However, intercepting a high-speed maneuvering
atmospheric target is extremely difficult and is believed to be impossible at
present. Also, the mass production of hypersonic vehicles is expected to be
cheaper than that of ballistic missiles. Despite the challenges associated with
developing scram engines, such jets have virtually no moving parts and their
cross-sections represent special configuration tubing. According to analysts at
the U.S. company Capital Alpha Partners, “If hypersonic weapons can be produced
with unit costs of $2 million, or less, they will impact some of the outyear
weapons plans. A weapon that travels at Mach 5, or faster, and that can
maneuver will see strong U.S. demand in the later part of this decade.”
Finally, the kinetic energy of a hypersonic missile is so high that its release
will be enough to destroy certain types of targets even without using a charge.
This gives experts reason to state that hypersonic missiles might become an
alternative to nuclear weapons in certain situations.
Shortcomings
of Hypersonic Missiles
As for
the shortcomings of hypersonic missiles, experts point out that they cannot
offer high target accuracy because it is almost impossible to fit such a missile
with a homing head, and its high speed will result in an increase in targeting
error. A hypersonic vehicle is believed to have a CER of between 30 and 50
meters. Furthermore, high-speed missiles will have a large infrared signature
due to frictional skin heating, making them easily detectable by IR sensors.
Designers will need to find a compromise between the high impact speed and the
high probability of standoff detection. Also, a scramjet-powered missile must
be initially accelerated to a speed of about Mach 3. This complicates the use
of such weapons, which require a rocket booster or a high-speed air-launch
platform. Experts believe that, due to a plethora of technological problems,
hypersonic weapons currently have a relatively limited effective range (some
1000km for scramjet-powered missiles). However, the veil of secrecy surrounding
this type of weaponry provokes rumors and excessive fears, and this
destabilizing factor could prompt the enemy to resort to a pre-emptive strike.
Challenges
for International Security and Stability
The U.S.
expert community has carefully studied the potential of Russian hypersonic
weapons in terms of how they could affect the balance of forces and concluded
that, in general, they do not pose an existential threat to major nuclear
powers. Thus, fitting Avangard missiles with glide vehicles will not increase
the size of the Russian nuclear arsenal, nor will it extend the effective range
of the missiles, their range of action or their strike speed. The United States
and other nuclear powers will still be able to respond to a Russian nuclear
attack.
U.S.
experts admit that maneuvering hypersonic vehicles are almost impossible to
intercept. However, given that the U.S. missile defense system has very limited
intercept capabilities when it comes even to Russian ballistic missiles, the
introduction of Avangard hypersonic missiles changes little in the nuclear war
scenario. For the United States, this is more of a technological challenge,
with which both the Pentagon and the White House are fairly unhappy. Dominance
in military technology has remained a priority for the United States for
decades, ever since the launch of the first Soviet satellite. Therefore, the
news of Russia’s hypersonic achievements does not sit well with Washington. At
the same time, it has provided the United States with an opportunity to study
the possibility of extending missile defense to near space. Megawatt laser
weapons are believed to be capable of destroying both ballistic and hypersonic
missiles. The current level of U.S. technology already allows for equipping
different types of ground transport with lasers generating in excess of 50kW of
power, while sea-based lasers can generate over 150kW. Under the current trend,
laser power increases tenfold every three years. In this sense, within five
years, we can expect U.S. laser technology to reach a level that where the
Pentagon may be confident in the possibility of building lasers that are
capable of shooting down hypersonic devices. The next step will then be to
deploy laser weapons in the Earth’s orbit.
In light
of the above, the emergence of hypersonic weapons will introduce a number of
destabilizing factors for international security. First, countries possessing
such weapons will have an asymmetric advantage over other developing countries.
Second, it will trigger the deployment of the space-based laser component of
the missile defense system. Third, it will provoke a new global arms race,
including with regard to laser weapons, hypersonic anti-missile systems,
cyber-weapons, railguns and unmanned delivery platforms for strike weapons.
Moreover, for non-nuclear powers, hypersonic missiles may become a serious
instrument of deterrence or power projection. It should also be noted that
hypersonic missiles could be used in a pre-emptive strike against an enemy
whose main weapons are situated within their effective reach (at present,
within a radius of up to 1000km). That is, the deployment of hypersonic weapons
can be considered as a critical threat to the country’s immediate neighbors.
Finally, there are global risks to the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). The secret hunt for missile components such as fuel, alloys,
electronics and airframe blueprints has never stopped. In the new environment,
even those countries that are signatories to the MTCR are interested in
obtaining prompt global strike technologies.
The
current leaders of hypersonic weapons research are, in addition to Russia, the
United States and China.
China
Despite
its ambitious statements, China has not yet rolled out a reliable prototype of
a hypersonic vehicle. Chinese engineers have developed the YJ-12 supersonic
anti-ship cruise missile, but the country’s military currently only has
subsonic ground-based cruise missiles in service. It may be the case that
Beijing hopes to leap from subsonic straight to hypersonic, skipping
supersonics altogether.
China is
believed to be working on at least two hypersonic programs. Since 2014, it has
been testing the DF-ZF (dubbed Wu-14 in the United States) hypersonic glide
vehicle complete with the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile for the launch
vehicle (eventually to be replaced by the DF-31 missile). The second project,
the air-launched CH-AS-X-13 missile, is primarily intended against aircraft
carriers. According to a representative of the Chinese Academy of Engineering,
the Institute of Mechanics has created a turbine-based combined-cycle engine
capable of accelerating a vehicle to Mach 6.
United
States
As part
of the High Speed Strike Weapon (HSSW) program, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) and the United States Air Force are working on three
hypersonic concepts. The Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) combat vehicle riding a
solid-fuel rocket booster, under development by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon,
is planned as an equivalent to Russia’s Avangard. The Boeing Hypersonic
Air-Breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) will have a combined-cycle engine (the
turbine will accelerate the vehicle to Mach 2, after which the scramjet will further
propel it to hypersonic speeds). According to some reports, the vehicle may be
reusable. Northrop Grumman Corporation is working to design the combined-cycle
Advanced Full Range Engine (AFRE) for HAWC under a contract with DARPA.
Finally, the reusable unmanned craft under development as part of the HyRAX
project and the XS-1 Experimental Spaceplane program will be used as an
inexpensive launch vehicle to insert dual-use satellites into low-Earth orbits.
The HSSW
program is aimed at designing and testing a hypersonic strike vehicle by 2020.
The key specifications include speeds of Mach 6 to 10, an effective range of
over 1000km, a CEP of under 5m and a variety of warhead types (penetrator,
HE-fragmentation or cluster).
The U.S.
Air Force Research Laboratory is looking into the possibility of creating a
combined-cycle propulsion system for reusable vehicles, including by way of
integrating scramjets with reheated bypass turbojets.
In
addition to DARPA, hypersonic weapons are being developed by the United States
Army Space and Missile Defense Command in conjunction with the Sandia National
Laboratory under the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon project, which calls for the
creation of a hypersonic glide vehicle with a precision terminal guidance
system.
Russia’s
breakthrough in the hypersonic weapons race may have shaken the global balance
of forces, but it has not reshaped it. The United States is not far behind
Russia technologically, and may even be ahead in certain aspects of hypersonic
weapons, including when it comes to making combined-cycle or hybrid propulsion
systems for hypersonic vehicles that would allow a reusable
reconnaissance/strike vehicle to be created. Nevertheless, the Russian
achievements came as an unpleasant surprise for all the leading world powers.
The
situation appears different for those nations that do not command massive
nuclear arsenals. The Russian example opens a window of opportunities for them.
Hypersonic weapons may appear to be an excellent solution for ensuring a decisive
military advantage over a technically lacking adversary. Those countries
lagging behind in the arms race may perceive hypersonic weapons as a critical
and potentially disarming threat to an unfriendly neighbor.
In the
art of war, uncertainty often drives progress. As the leading analytical
centers are working to collect relevant information and understand the scale of
possible threats, politicians and militaries are approving investment in new
defense programs. A new item on defense budgets around the world has appeared.
***Moderne Diplomacy From our
partner RIAC
*Vadim
Kozyulin, Ph.D. in Political Science, Professor, Academy of Military Sciences,
Director of the Emerging Technologies and Global Security Project at
PIR-Center, RIAC expert