The existence of mercenary units – understood as professional fighting forces at the service of the highest bidder in the context of an armed conflict – is not a new phenomenon. In fact, it goes back thousands of years. For instance, the so-called ‘Ten Thousand’ (a sophisticated group of mercenaries from several Greek city states) participated in conflicts that were fought in several corners of the Persian Empire.
During
the Renaissance, Swiss mercenaries were exceedingly prestigious throughout
Europe and their services were often demanded by the armies of countries like
France, Spain, England, and the Netherlands. They were regarded as fierce
warriors and their assistance in the battlefield was handsomely rewarded in
economic terms. Their prowess and the
quality of their skill also gave them access to powerful royal courts and
senior decision-makers, an asset that was later masterfully harnessed by the
Swiss Confederation to advance its national interests.
However,
the essential concept of mercenary work has evolved. For instance, the most
paradigmatic case in modern times is the American private military company
Blackwater, which was involved in security activities and even covert tasks in
challenging operational theatres like Iraq and Afghanistan. The company was
also involved in the protection of critical infrastructure and natural
resources in regions which were seen as strategically important for
Washington’s geopolitical agenda.
Since
its creation, the company was linked to both the American military-industrial
complex and the US intelligence community. Later renamed ‘Xe’ and nowadays
called ‘Academi,’ the private firm offers specialized training, security
consulting services, tactical gear, and military-grade operational equipment.
Israel
has also had its fair share of private security contractors. That’s hardly
surprising, considering the country’s proficient military, intelligence, and
law-enforcement capabilities and expertise. For example, the Israeli firm Black
Cube – whose staff include former Mossad personnel – performs all sorts of
intelligence tasks for both national and international clients who are able to
afford its professional services. This illustrates that the services provided
by private security companies are remarkably diverse.
These
trends reflect several realities, including the increasing complexity of the
21st century’s global geopolitical dynamics, the competitive proliferation of
all sorts of private security services in worldwide markets due to a growing
demand, the rise of new forms of conflict which involve both state and
non-state actors, and the diminishing line that distinguishes peacetime from
wartime.
Not
unlike the U.S. and Israel, the Russian Federation has established its own
private military company. Perhaps adequately named after a German composer who
embraced militaristic ideas, the Wagner Group has reportedly been active as a
fighting force in Syria, eastern Ukraine, and the Crimean Peninsula.
Ironically, whereas in Syria it has been involved in counter-insurgency
activities against heavily armed militant jihadists, in Ukraine it has fought
along the pro-Russian separatists against Ukrainian regular forces.
Additionally,
it seems the company’s contractors no longer operate just in Eurasia.
Interestingly, the Wagner Group’s activities in Sudan are related to the
protection of gold, uranium, and diamond mines. Their presence in the Central
African Republic is presumably motivated by mining interests as well. Also,
they may have already reached the Western hemisphere. In fact, according to
unconfirmed journalistic sources, Wagner Group operatives are acting in
Venezuela as a praetorian guard of the beleaguered Maduro regime.
Although
the company is not precisely known for its compliance with transparency
standards (it does not even have an official website), it is known it was founded
by Dmitriy Utkin, a former special forces commander that used to work for the
so-called GRU –Russian military intelligence. Moreover, not unlike its foreign
counterparts, the Wagner Group seemingly coordinates its operations with
Russian military and intelligence units. Tellingly, one of the Wagner Group’s
training centers is adjacent to a military base located in the rural locality
of Molkin, near the Black Sea.
Allegedly,
the company does not exclusively hire Russian former armed forces personnel,
but also Ukrainian and even Serbian citizens. It must be borne in mind that
Moscow’s strategic thinking has always seen Serbia as one of Russia’s closest
geopolitical allies. It is pertinent to highlight that such recruits – both
Russians and foreigners – are lured by the prospects of an attractive economic
retribution for their services and their discretion. According to journalistic
sources, the Wagner Group’s fighters in Syria are paid more than 5,000 USD per
month.
In light
of the above, despite being nominally a private company, it is clear the Wagner
group ultimately serves the national interests of the Russian Federation. Even
though the use of mercenaries has been traditionally discouraged for several
reasons by classical political theorists like Machiavelli, their instrumental
use can offer several advantages in contemporary contexts.
First of
all, military casualties are politically costly. In other words, the deaths of
men and women in uniform erode national morale, fuel popular discontent, and harm
the legitimacy of the national leadership, which might be detrimental to the
war effort. In contrast, dead
mercenaries are almost exclusively mourned by their families and, since there
are often signed confidentiality agreements and significant monetary
compensations, the company does not have to disclose where or how their deaths
have occurred.
Furthermore,
the overseas deployment of regular troops is problematic for several reasons.
Commanders and soldiers can be prosecuted for war crimes, violating human
rights, or disregarding international regulations like the Geneva Conventions.
Since mercenaries technically do not belong to the regular forces of a national
state, it is notoriously difficult to hold them accountable if they commit
atrocities. Hence, the services offered by private military companies provide
substantial power projection capabilities covered by a good layer of plausible
deniability.
Another
element worth considering is that the official presence of uniformed troops in
an operational theatre full of both regular and irregular fighters – like Syria
– is that the risks of miscalculation and escalation are naturally dangerous.
Under such conditions, even a minor incident can rapidly spiral out of control
and trigger a formal declaration of war.
For
instance, in 2018 the US military apparently killed hundreds of Russian
mercenaries –some of them may have been Wagner Group contractors – in a battle
fought over the control of a gas field near Der ez-Sor, in eastern Syria. This
particular incident is still unclear and it seems neither Washington nor Moscow
were particularly interested in issuing vocal public statements. Nevertheless,
if formal American and Russian forces had fought each other in such a clash,
the outcome might have been tragically different.
Accordingly,
it can be argued that – in terms of grand strategy – entities like the Wagner
Group and its foreign counterparts are modern embodiments of the ‘indirect
approach,’ a method of war advocated by thinkers such as the legendary Chinese
general Sun Tzu and the British Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. This perspective
facilitates flexibility and minimizes one’s own frontal exposure when it comes
to disrupting an enemy’s center of gravity in order to achieve victory in a
given situation, rather than engaging enemies through direct confrontations in
the framework of protracted campaigns.
Lessons
learned
The Wagner
Group is a recent iteration of an ancient concept (mercenary units). However,
as a transnational paramilitary company that informally acts as a proxy force
fighting on behalf of the geopolitical agenda of one of the world’s greatest
powers in unconventional battlegrounds, it is also a product of the 21st
century. Considering the evolving nature and changing operational parameters of
armed conflict, it is reasonable to foresee that the presence of private
military companies like the Wagner Group will continue to thrive.