The Dutch were in a unique position to deliver key intelligence about Iran’s activities to procure equipment from Europe for its illicit nuclear program and about the centrifuges themselves.
An
Iranian mole recruited by Dutch intelligence was the US and Israel's key to
installing the Stuxnet virus on Iran's nuclear centrifuges in Natantz,
according to a report Monday by Yahoo News, citing foreign sources.
Neither
the Mossad, nor former Mossad agents or US intelligence agents reportedly
involved in operations regarding Iran at the time, had commented to The
Jerusalem Post on the report by press time.
The
Stuxnet virus ruined around 2,000 Iranian centrifuges, delaying its uranium
enrichment plans by as many as a couple of years according to analysts.
Many say
that this additional time bought by multiple rounds of sabotage in the
2008-2010 time frame provided pressure and space to get the Iranians to
negotiate over their nuclear program, eventually resulting in the 2015 nuclear
deal.
The
report said that according to multiple sources, the courier behind the
intrusion into Natanz, whose existence and role had not been previously
reported, was a mole recruited by Dutch intelligence agents at the behest of
the CIA and the Mossad.
An
Iranian engineer recruited by Dutch intelligence agency AIVD, noted four
intelligence sources in the report, provided critical data that helped the US
developers target their cyberattack code to the systems at Natantz.
That
mole then either inserted a USB flash drive with the virus onto Iranian systems
(since the systems were not connected to the internet) or manipulated another
person working at Natanz into doing so.
The
report said that two of the three participating countries along with the
central players – the US and Israel – were the Netherlands and Germany. It said
that the third is believed to be France, although UK intelligence also
allegedly played a role.
It has
been previously reported that Germany contributed technical specifications and
knowledge about the industrial control systems made by the German firm Siemens,
which were used in the Iranian plant to control the spinning centrifuges. The
report said that France is believed to have provided similar intelligence.
But, the
Dutch, according to the report, were in a unique position to deliver key
intelligence about Iran’s activities to procure equipment from Europe for its
illicit nuclear program and about the centrifuges themselves.
This was
because the centrifuges at Natantz were based on designs stolen from a Dutch company
in the 1970s by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who used them for
Pakistan’s nuclear program, and in order to help Iran and Libya.
Over the
course of years of negotiations, the CIA and the Mossad convinced the Dutch and
their operative to cooperate and be their man in Natantz as they developed the
cyber weapon that would make history.
Later
rounds of cyberattacks on Iran's nuclear program did not require the
operative's physical presence in Natantz, but his initial intelligence and
physical presence provided the basis for Stuxnet's success.
Another
important aspect of the Dutch operative eventually losing access to Natanz was
that it may have been a factor that led the Mossad, against US advice, to
reportedly act more aggressively with the Stuxnet virus in later stages.
When
confronted with the difference of opinion between the Mossad and the CIA on the
later uses of Stuxnet, one former Mossad operative has told the Post that those
criticizing Israel for over-aggressiveness were usually not as directly
threatened by Iran’s nuclear program.
But the
new details about the Dutch mole’s loss of physical access provides a new
window into why later rounds of cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear program might
have been exposed – and not only because of aggressiveness.
Physical
access to Natanz may also have helped cover the cyberattack’s tracks in ways
that a pure external cyberattack might be more easily exposed.
Another
fascinating aspect of the report, was that the Dutch mole failed to infiltrate
Natanz with one straw company before succeeding with another straw company,
reportedly with guidance from the Mossad.
It was
unclear why the sources who made the new revelations were coming forward now.
Often
such new revelations come to influence current events, when a key actor retires
and wants credit or when an operative dies, such that revealing his activities
will no longer put him in danger.
It was
unclear how this revelation might influence the ongoing current nuclear
standoff between the US, Israel and Iran.
There
are recent tensions between the Netherlands and Iran with the Dutch accusing
Iran of involvement in attacks in 2015 and 2017. There are also ongoing
internal battles within the EU about how to view Iran.
https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Secret-Dutch-mole-aided-Stuxnet-attack-on-Irans-nuke-program-report-600430