SUMMARY: On 20 July, Cyprus marked the 44th anniversary of the Turkish military occupation of the Northern part of the island, which followed the Cypriot Greek-supported coup of 15 July, 1974. On the occasion, the Greek Minister of Defense, Panos Kammenos, quoted by Kathimerini, assured “[…]the Greek people, the Greek nation, whether here in Cyprus or in the motherland, that the armed forces are ready to tackle any threat.” The 1974 events led to the establishment, in 1983, of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a de facto state recognized only by Turkey.
One of
the protracted conflicts of Europe, the Cyprus conflict has defied resolution
over the past four decades. Yet, until recently, it remained rather latent and
attracted little attention outside the United Nations and the main state actors
involved: Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, and Britain, the last three being Cyprus’
guarantor powers under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
However,
Cyprus has once again taken center stage in the geopolitical debates
surrounding the Eastern Mediterranean, fueled by vivid discussions of possible
new resource wars in the region, and the evolving role of Turkey. But what
happened to trigger this change? First of all, Cyprus struck gas, twice: in
2011 and in 2018. Second, the Cyprus peace talks, led by the UN, collapsed
dramatically in 2017 and left the international community in a state of
pessimism regarding a possible reunification of the island. And third, Turkey
decided to play a more assertive role in the regional energy game.
So what
drives the Cyprus natural gas issue? Does it fall under the complex network of gas-conflict-cooperation
in the Eastern Mediterranean? Or is it a consequence of Cyprus’ ongoing
division, amplified by the involvement of the two regional competing actors,
Turkey and Greece?
BACKGROUND
Gas
reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean were only recently discovered and remain
largely underexplored, with their total actual size yet to be evaluated. Out of
these, five major discoveries stand out: the Tamar and Leviathan fields,
discovered in 2009 and 2010; offshore Israel (with an estimated capacity of 282
bcm and 621 bcm of gas respectively); the Aphrodite field, discovered in 2011
off of Cyprus (with 128 bcm); and the 2015 major discovery off the cost of
Egypt, the Zohr field, which holds the largest capacity in the Eastern
Mediterranean with an estimated of 845 bcm of natural gas. The discoveries have
aroused the interest of European countries looking for supply alternatives
outside Russia, as well as of the energy companies. As a result, negotiations,
predominantly bilateral, have been launched between various countries of the
region. Examples include the €12 billion deal for Egypt to buy gas from
Israel’s Tamar and Leviathan fields and the tripartite memorandum of
understanding between Cyprus, Greece, and Israel to build a gas pipeline to
Europe.
Turkey
Steps into the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Game
But the
waters of the Eastern Mediterranean really started to simmer when, on 8
February 2018, the Italian company Eni and the French company Total announced a
breakthrough gas discovery at the Calypso block off the Cypriot coast,
estimated to be comparable as size to the giant Zohr field. Just three days
later, the Italian Eni drill ship Saipem 12000 was stopped by Turkish military
vessels on its way to a gas drill position in the Block 3 of Cyprus’s Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). The incident gave rise to an intense exchange of mutual
accusations and diplomatic declarations; old and new tensions surfaced around
the Calypso discovery and triggered a plethora of geopolitical and economic
warnings about a new resource war on Europe’s doorstep. Outside analysis
focused on the complex web of geopolitical competition and conflicts around the
Eastern Mediterranean, and the focal point of concern became, this time,
Turkey.
Turkey’s
February military intervention in Cypriot waters raised fears that recent gas
discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean would worsen pre-existing tensions in
the area, potentially creating new conflicts driven by competition over the
newfound resources. Concerns were fueled by a series of reciprocal warnings,
days after the discovery was announced, mostly between Turkey and Greece, and
by clashing declarations at the highest political level. Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned Greece, Cyprus, and foreign companies that, by
continuing the gas drilling off the coast of Cyprus, they are violating
Turkey’s sovereignty. He went on to announce that “[Turkish] warships, air
force and other security units are following developments in the region closely
with the authority to make any kind of intervention if necessary.”
Turkey’s
election campaign in June took it one step further. In May, Turkey launched its
first drilling ship, named Fatih after the Ottoman Sultan Fatih Mehmet, which
was expected to be dispatched to drill for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean and
the Black Sea. Turkey’s ambitious energy plans marked by this event were highly
symbolic. Turkey’s energy minister, cited by Cyprus Mail, compared, much to the
concern of Cyprus and Greece, the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul with the launch
of Fatih: “The conquest of Istanbul opened a new era in world history and the
deployment of the first drilling vessel marks the beginning of a new era in
Turkey’s oil and gas drilling objectives.”
If the
timing of the launch was controversial, the event itself was hardly a surprise.
It was meant to support Turkey’s plans to become a global player in the oil
& gas field, and to reduce its high hydrocarbons dependence. The launch was
in following with the country’s National Energy and Mining Policy, announced in
April 2017, which focused on the mobilization of domestic resources and greater
diversification. But it was news of a giant discovery in the Calypso gas field
in 2018 that fueled new attention and ambition, much more so than the impact of
the discovery of modest reserves in the Aphrodite field in 2011. What raised
concerns from Greece, Cyprus, and their European Union partners was the
connection between Turkey’s official stance against drilling offshore Cyprus,
backed by its military presence, and the political discourses regarding Cyprus
during Turkey’s June elections. The ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP)’s electoral ally, the ultranationalist National Movement Party (MHP), favors
a hardline national security approach and, according to Sinan Ülgen from
Carnegie Europe, it regards any Cyprus deal as treason. Greece and Cyprus’
fears were further aroused by an MHP electoral clip depicting Cyprus as a
Turkish territory.
These new
tensions came to complement existing concerns between the countries of the
Levantine basin, notwithstanding the Syrian war, with Lebanon and Israel
disagreeing over the delimitation of their EEZ, Israel and Turkey fighting over
the Gaza issue, and Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, and Israel managing to forge a
cooperative block, without Turkey, in the Eastern Mediterranean.
But is
this just a matter of energy geopolitics, or is it a political issue stemming
from Cyprus’ ongoing division?
Cyprus:
A History of Division
In 1974,
radical Greek Cypriots and troops from the Greek junta in power in Athens
organized a coup and declared the unification of Cyprus with Greece. As a
consequence, Turkey, one of the three guarantors of Cyprus (along with Britain
and Greece) sent troops with the declared intention to protect the Turkish
Cypriots. Inter-communal violence broke out across the island, with thousands
ending up dead or disappeared on both sides. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots
declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and established their parallel
administrative and political system. In 2017, international efforts to reunify
the island, mediated by the UN, collapsed dramatically at the Crans-Montana
talks. The Greek community, supported by Greece, refused to accept a federal
Cyprus with Turkish troops on its soil and Turkey’s unilateral right to
intervene, while the Turkish Cypriots, backed by Turkey, could not settle for
the withdrawal of the approximately 30,000 Turkish troops still stationed in
the North.
Turkey
is the only country to have ever recognized the Northern entity while, at the
same time, Ankara refuses to recognize the existence of the Republic of Cyprus
(the Southern part). This is important for Turkey’s plans to start its own
drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean, and it has major implications for
Cyprus. In addition to not recognizing Cyprus, Turkey applies its own
interpretation of international maritime law (contrary to the generally
accepted UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). According
to this individual interpretation, national territories have continental
shelves up to 200 miles while islands are limited to territorial waters up to
14 miles and thus, for Ankara, Cyprus is an island with no rights to a
continental shelf. In Turkey’s view, Cyprus has no legal right to declare an
EEZ, and all agreements concluded by the Greek Cypriot authorities with
international companies are legally invalid.
As a
consequence, Turkish authorities accused Cyprus and the international companies
drilling in the Block 6 and Block 3 off the coast of Cyprus of violating the
sovereign rights of Turkey (which considers its own EEZ to extend to the blocks
south of Cyprus) and of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, in 2011, the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus awarded in its own drilling rights for Block 3 to
the Turkish company TPAO. Before the June elections, Turkey’s Foreign Minister
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, quoted by Ahval, declared that the Cyprus-Egypt agreement to
delimitate the EEZ between the two countries was “null and void,” violating the
“inalienable rights” of Turkish Cypriots to “benefit from the island’s
resources.”
The
Republic of Cyprus offered a rather swift diplomatic response, being assertive
regarding its rights as protected by the international law, but also stressing,
through the voice of President Nikos Anastasiades: “the necessity of avoiding
anything which could escalate.” The government’s spokesman Prodromos Prodromou
linked the situation to the Turkish electoral climate and declared that Cyprus
will avoid letting itself be pulled into the spiral of resulting tensions. The
Greek Cypriots refuse to consider any agreement with their Turkish Cypriot
counterparts regarding the possibility of joint exploitation of hydrocarbons
unless a deal regarding Cyprus is reached first. The immediate prospects for
such a deal however collapsed at Crans-Montana last year.
But what
about the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus? The media focused
overwhelmingly on the reactions of the main recognized actors and international
players, but ignored the response of the element of discord itself. Kudret
Ozersay, the foreign minister of the unrecognized entity, adopted a rather
tempered line that echoed the South, declaring: “We aim at cooling down the
waters, not warming them up.” However, the entity’s representative took a firm
stance regarding Northern Cyprus’ determination to drill for gas with or
without the Greek Cypriots: “I believe we will soon enter a period when
everyone will see that nothing can be done in the region without first having
the consent of the Turkish Cypriot people.” The president of the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus, Mustafa Akıncı also called for a joint Turkish Cypriot and
Greek Cypriot committee to deal with the natural gas issue, linking the efforts
in the gas cooperation to the future of a peaceful Cyprus, and accusing the
Greek Cypriot leadership of refusing to share power and resources.
Looking
Ahead: Gas for Cooperation or Conflict in Cyprus?
Despite
the more virulent reactions and declarations of Greece and Turkey surrounding
the Cyprus issue, it is to be noted that the Cypriot authorities, both the ones
in the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the unrecognized ones in the Northern
part, have chosen a more diplomatic voice in order to express their intentions
and avoid further escalations as they exploit resources that both consider to
be rightfully theirs notwithstanding the potential for future joint
exploitation. Nevertheless, both parties continue to link the possibility of
economic cooperation with finding a political solution to the protracted
conflict that has divided Cyprus since 1974. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots
have expressed fatigue with failed negotiations over time, and it is in their
interest to avoid a backslide toward conflict or a clash between other regional
actors, as this would ultimately impede their successful exploitation of
natural gas reserves.
Previous
instances of cooperation in the energy field do exist between the South and the
North. In 2016, their respective electricity networks were joined into one
island-wide network and discussions for a further subsea link between Cyprus
and Turkey’s electricity grid were launched.
Nevertheless,
in the case of Cyprus, it might be that economics follow politics rather the
other way around. Although instructive examples of past cooperation, both
inside and outside the energy field, already exist, solving the chronic
political issues between the South and the North and reaching a settlement of
the conflict might be the better incentive for a peaceful and fruitful
exploration of gas reserves. Should this ever come to pass, Cyprus would be
able to play a central role in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as on the
wider European energy stage.
***This
article was originally published on August 20, 2018.