The endless blame game, training of militants and terrorists, prevalence of mistrust, diminishing economic dependency, armed clashes at the borders, interference in internal affairs, and the pursuit of stringent policies have not and will not help mend the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Instead, the two countries desperately need to identify these past blunders, modify their intercourse, and introduce drastic changes in the interstate modus operandi.
Despite
the numerous commonalities – religious, cultural, linguistic, and societal –
both states have had a conflicting and problematic bilateral journey, largely
owing to the unjust and unpragmatic policies that represent the bitter legacy
of British colonialism. The British imperial overlords withdrew from the region
in hurry, blamed Afghanistan, and left behind a plethora of unresolved issues,
the most prominent of which were the demarcation treaties on the Durand Line.
The repudiation of the British imperial treaties by the Afghan Loya Jirga, the
traditional Legitimating Grand Assembly, cemented the uneasy foundation for
future bilateral intercourse with Pakistan, with each state supporting
nationalist and destabilizing armed movements to depose unwanted governments
and secure national interests. Tribal incursions and support for armed
insurgents along the border quickly became the norm.
The
Soviet invasion and rise of the Mujahideen insurgency turned the tables in
favor of Pakistan, though it happened at the cost of Afghan refugees, Kalashnikov
culture, and the introduction of smuggling into Pakistani society with various
debilitating effects upon the Pakistani economy. Furthermore, the
socio-politico changes of 1990s, the absence of central authority and the
crumbling of the National army brought the Taliban into power, inspiring
Pakistan to pursue the dream of its late notorious military dictator: the
policy of ‘strategic depth.’ The situation did not unfold as planned by the
Pakistani government with regard to Afghanistan. The subsequent ‘war on terror’
and arrival of the U.S. into the South Asian theatre disturbed the calculations
and designs framed by the Pakistani foreign policy establishment and military
strategists. Pakistan, adjusting to the ever-changing environment, embraced the
deposed Taliban and offered them every kind of sanctuary, as well as logistics
and expertise on strategic military operational planning, in order to wear down
the world’s mightiest military in their own backyard, much to the agitation of
successive Afghan governments.
Following
the arrival of the ‘war on terror,’ mutual relations have not been cordial, and
recently, unfortunately, they seem to be at their lowest ebb. The lack of
effective regulating mechanisms, the blame game of harboring agents of terror
and chaos, the growing influence of India, and the occasional outburst of
violent clashes at the borders continue to undermine bilateral relations.
The
quagmire forces us to ask the questions: How do we resolve the stalemate and
what is the way forward?
Both
brethren countries have various opportunities which, if dealt with honesty and
with strong intent, will drastically improve their troubled relations. There
are undeniable realities which must be admitted and historical blunders that
are not to be repeated if the positive intention of improving relations is to
be achieved.
The
first priority to be worked upon to realize this goal is the existence of safe
heavens and sanctuaries for Taliban insurgents in Pakistan, which are
fundamental and decisive in the protracted guerilla warfare against the Afghan
government. Pakistan needs to dismantle the Taliban command structures on its
soil and ease the apprehensions of the Afghan leadership about the rhetorically
discarded strategic depth policy. In return, Afghanistan will have to bargain,
sooner or later, on the formal recognition of the disputed Durand Line. Such a
bargain can only be feasible if permanent unhindered transit access to sea
routes is given to landlocked Afghanistan to secure its trade interests.
Furthermore, the malevolent Afghan public opinion toward Pakistan can only be
redressed in case of an end to the civilian carnage by Taliban insurgents. The
fact can’t be ignored that with every suicide bomb explosion in urban areas,
public angst is directed toward the eastern neighbor.
The
solution to the Afghan crisis rests only in political settlement, especially
negotiating with the Taliban so that they become stakeholders in the political
process. Pakistan can be of huge help in achieving this. Pakistan can win the hearts and minds of
millions of Afghans. Pakistan’s honest commitment can boost and reshape its
identity in public eyes as well as in the global community. In addition,
Afghanistan must redress Pakistani concerns and make sure her soil is not used
by non-state actors against Pakistan.
Trade
and economic interdependency inhibit states from falling into conflict; the
stringent border policies and frequent closure of borders have compelled Afghan
traders and importers to explore new markets. Pakistan was previously the
largest exporter, most proximate and cheapest market for Afghanistan, but such
hindrances have allowed Iran to take the lead. According to published
statistics, trade volumes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have a
hypothetical potential of around $5.5 billion, have plummeted from $3.5 billion
to $1.7 billion. One can fear that, unfortunately, it might spiral downward to
a meager amount, citing the ongoing freeze in bilateral relations.
Pakistan
can positively manage the millions of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. One
solution could be: the permanent integration of new generations into Pakistani
society, as these new generations, born in Pakistan and not having been to
their homeland, think of Pakistan literally as their own motherland. Pakistan
can also contribute in Afghanistan’s infrastructure building, the way India has
been doing by constructing hydro-electric dams, building the parliament
buildings, providing defense equipment and constructing homes for repatriating
refugees. Pakistan can contest this Indian influence in its own backyard by
continuing to cooperate in the infrastructure sector. The recent inauguration
of Muhammad Ali Jinnah Hospital in Kabul is promising, notwithstanding the
asymmetry in economic prowess with rival India.
Moreover,
enhanced diplomatic initiatives are vital for shaping popular perceptions.
Pakistan should continue the scholarship endowments to Afghan students in the
fields of science, technology, medicine and business. Students, having studied
in renowned Pakistani universities, will return as ambassadors for peace,
prosperity, and fraternity. Last but not the least, we need to promote easy
movement without stringent policies and discouraging hurdles. Both states can
learn, in this regard, from EU, Schengen, and Gulf countries.
The
recent transformation in Pakistani policy shift with regard to Afghanistan is
something one can hope for a better direction in bilateral ties. The Pakistani
commitment in pressuring Taliban leadership to reach a settlement on the
political front and the realization of investment in infrastructural and
developmental projects, even if not exactly megaprojects, are vital to winning
the hearts and minds of the Afghan populace and realizing a resurgence in
fruitful bilateral ties.
***The
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