A Conflict through the Decades: Known for being the longest river on the African continent, the Nile River has served as a key source of water for all the countries residing in its basin, with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan representing the three countries most reliant on this water source.
This
natural resource has been a point of conflict for over a century, often serving
as the root cause for inter and intra-state wars, as political leaders and
citizens fight for what they believe is inherently theirs. Dating back to 1821,
this motivation to establish maximum control over the Nile pushed Egypt to
invade Sudan and in 1875 led to the Egyptian occupation of Ethiopia, with the
basin experiencing social and political tensions ever since. The histories of
these three countries are filled with the development of several treaties
between their colonial power-holders, including the building of dams and rights
to minimum amounts of water, however most of these treaties gave preference to
Egypt, as exemplified by the Nile Waters Agreements of 1929 and 1959. The
struggle for Nile waters is also considered to be one of the most important
causes of the proxy wars of the 1960s to the 2000s in and around Egypt,
Ethiopia, and Sudan.
Another
factor contributing to these countries’ inability to cooperate and negotiate
equitable terms is the belief that each of them has a right to the majority of
the water’s shares. Egypt, having the most ancient population of the three
countries and therefore the longest record of usage, believes it has historical
rights to the waters, while Ethiopia claims geographical rights, since 95% of
the Nile waters run naturally through the Ethiopian wetlands. Sudan on the
other hand claims it is entitled to the waters given its geographical location
between Ethiopia and Egypt – stating that cooperation between those two
countries, and in turn peace in the basin, is not possible without their
involvement. As a result, these countries have been unable to negotiate fair
and equitable terms as to how the water should be distributed, and therefore
have been unable to ease tensions in the basin.
Despite
the quieted nature of this conflict in recent years, the ongoing attempts to
negotiate, and the development of treaties that failed to equally distribute
the Nile’s waters have created permanent tensions between these three countries
and continue to destabilize the basin, with the latest high-impact development
being Ethiopia’s plans to build a multibillion-dollar dam, the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD). Announced during the Arab Spring in the early 2010s,
this dam was intended to secure the water that naturally flows through the
country. Both Egypt and Sudan viewed the decision as a threat to their water
supply, thereby escalating the conflict to near-violent levels, with Egyptian
representatives publicly stating that if Ethiopia takes any action to block the
Nile water, ‘there will be no alternative for us but to use force.’
Fast-forward eight years and the Grand Renaissance Dam is now 70 percent
complete, having slowly but surely continued construction, despite opposition
from Egypt and Sudan.
Aggravated
Effects of Climate Change
Similar
to other periphery or impoverished regions, the Nile Basin is not immune from
the disastrous effects of climate change. As deforestation increases in
Ethiopia and Sudan, precipitation rates are dropping, and in turn increasing
the occurrence of droughts. High levels of deforestation are also causing more
erosion, resulting in downstream sedimentation which decreases reservoir life,
reduces the efficiency of hydropower production and irrigation, erodes stream
backs, and damages habitats. As a result, Ethiopia, a country already at a high
risk of famine, and Sudan, a country continuously plagued by political and
social instability, are more at risk than ever of experiencing a humanitarian
crisis as water becomes scarcer. Furthermore, all three countries are
experiencing exponential growth in their populations and require more
industrialization and development to accommodate the influx of people, leading to
an increase in their need for water as current levels prove insufficient.
As the
most developed of the three countries, Egypt is only starting to feel the brunt
effects of these factors; however, the prevailing poverty in Ethiopia and Sudan
is exacerbated due to their inability to expand economic activity and enhance
growth and development in their rural-based agricultural economies. For
Ethiopia and southern Sudan, the struggle for water is based on issues of
accessibility, where the lack of infrastructure makes it difficult for these
countries to access the waters that run naturally through their regions. For
Egypt and northern Sudan however, the issue is one of water availability, in
which being upstream from the river and variable precipitation rates result in
low-levels of naturally available water. High vulnerability combined with a low
adaptive capacity are resulting in human insecurity becoming more of a
prevalent issue in the basin, and the sustainability of the current action-plan
(or lack thereof) is being called into question by all parties.
State-Centric
vs. Basin-Centric
Since
the beginning of this conflict, the Nile Basin has been characterized by
unilateral development of water related infrastructure and self-interest, which
has exacerbated competition for scarce water resources. Rather than perceiving
this water accessibility/availability issue as a basin-wide issue that requires
cooperation, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan approach the Nile Water conflict
through state-centered strategies, motivated exclusively by their own country’s
specific needs, with little regard toward the needs of other affected states.
Given each country’s vast history of civil war and political unrest, this
state-centric approach makes sense, however as history has demonstrated, it is
not effective in alleviating any of the tensions in the basin or providing
sufficient water resources to each country in need. While historically Egypt
has been favored, as exemplified by the 1929 and 1959 treaties, and the High
Dam at Aswan, it now fears that hostilities from Ethiopia and Sudan have grown
to the point that it will not receive a fair share of the waters, if they were
to negotiate. Ethiopia and Sudan on the other hand, having been excluded from
previous negotiating tables, fear a recurrence of this pattern, and are eager
to negotiate in order to get the water resources they require.
At
certain points it has seemed as though the issue could escalate to violent
conflict, as insinuated by both Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed; however, at this current juncture, the
escalation to violent conflict is unlikely. In order to stop the impact of the
dam, Egypt would have to bomb it before its completion. In order to accomplish
such a task, Egypt would require the use of Sudan’s air bases for refueling,
something which is unlikely due to Egypt’s move toward a more secular military
regime, and Sudan’s stronger alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover,
despite the rhetoric suggesting violent conflict, Egypt’s domestic divisions
and instability make war financially unfeasible. Lastly, earlier this month,
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won the Nobel Peace Prize, and is therefore
less likely to initiate or engage in violent conflict, in order to maintain his
international reputation as a ‘peaceful’ leader.
In 1999
the ten Nile Basin countries established the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), with
the goal of maintaining cooperation between the parties and a commitment to
work for a joint initiative over the equitable utilization of Nile River water
resources. This initiative however has ultimately failed insofar as it has not
set specific goals or dates by which to achieve their objectives, nor has it
been successful in changing the attitudes from state-centric to basin-centric.
In 2018, the three countries reached a tentative agreement regarding how the
first filling of the dam will impact each region’s water supplies; however, it
remains unclear what will happen after the initial filling of the dam is
completed, and how much of their water share each country is prepared to
permanently sacrifice in order for the dam to be operational.
The most
recent development in this conflict took place last month during the Sochi
Summit, during which time Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Ethiopian
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed agreed to restart discussions regarding the Grand
Renaissance Dam. The United States has also extended an offer for mediation to
help with these discussions, and it is reported that a meeting between the
three countries will take place in Washington on November 6, 2019. It is
unclear who will serve as the mediator – or if one is to be present at all –
however these leaders are encouraged to work toward developing programs that
address the root causes of the conflict, as well as the issues of poverty
alleviation and enhancing long-term economic development. Joint programs and
basin-centric strategies are needed between the three countries, rather than a
state-centric approach in order to establish coordinated efforts and benefits
for all populations, and avoid sowing the seeds for prolonged conflict.