BACKGROUND

The Arctic’s importance for China

The reason behind China’s interest in the Arctic stems from the opportunities that are emerging as a result of higher global temperatures, which are causing the Polar ice to gradually disappear.

The economic consequences of this gradual opening of previously impenetrable terrain are twofold:

First, the maritime lanes crossing the Arctic are becoming navigable. The most relevant of them is the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which stretches along Russia’s northern coast to connect the Bering Strait with the Norwegian Sea, and its opening means new prospects for trade between East Asia and Europe. While it is still underdeveloped at the current stage, Russia, China and other powers are working to build the necessary infrastructure and make it a commercially viable solution. Shipping along the NSR takes much less time than the traditional southern courses that pass through the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In addition, it is often claimed that the NSR presents another advantage for the PRC, namely that it avoids the critical chokepoints of Malacca and Suez that the US Navy could easily block to cripple China’s economy in the event of war. However, this is only true to a limited degree: the NSR simply transfers the “chokepoint dilemma” northwards to the Bering Strait (whose strategic importance will therefore increase in the years ahead), and also the Norwegian Sea and the GIUK Gap (the relatively narrow strait between Greenland, Iceland, and the UK that was a major hotspot during the Cold War). As such, while the NSR can be considered safer than the current routes as long as China maintains positive relations with Russia, the US military can still disrupt maritime traffic along its course.

The second economic factor is that the Arctic is home to vast deposits of natural resources – namely hydrocarbons and minerals, including valuable rare earths in Greenland – that are slowly becoming easier and more economically feasible to extract. Considering China’s huge appetite for energy and ore, it is not surprising that it seeks access to these resources.

But Beijing’s interest in the Arctic also stems from geostrategic considerations. In a context of strained relations with Washington and close partnership with Moscow, the Arctic assumes a military dimension as well; since the NSR is not only viable for merchant vessels, but also for warships. By sailing along the NSR, the Chinese will be able to send their Navy in the North Atlantic to perform various activities like intelligence gathering and/or nuclear deterrence patrols with ballistic missiles submarines, possibly in cooperation with Russia. Again, doing this in practice will not be that easy, due to the extreme weather conditions and because China’s naval units will have to cross narrow areas where the US Navy can monitor their activities. As noted before, this means that Bering and the North Atlantic will gain strategic importance.

The 2018 White Paper on the Arctic

China’s growing interest in the Arctic is reflected in its publication of a dedicated White Paper in 2018.

The PRC seeks to legitimize its presence and gain influence inside the Arctic Council, the region’s most important intergovernmental forum. China obtained the status of observer country in 2013, but is now presenting itself as a “Near-Arctic State” (meaning “one of the continental states that are closest to the Arctic Circle”) as opposed to “real” Arctic states who have sovereignty over lands located within the Arctic Circle and who are full members of the Council. Beijing is therefore trying to create a new category of states that have legitimate interests in the Arctic due to their geographical proximity so to have greater influence over the Council’s discussions.

To support this position and to present the PRC as a peaceful and responsible actor, the White Paper emphasizes that “China has shared interests with Arctic States and a shared future with the rest of the world in the Arctic.” It also declares that “China shoulders the important mission of jointly promoting peace and security in the Arctic.” On this basis, it states that “China’s policy goals in the Arctic are: to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development of the Arctic.” Much emphasis is also placed on the respect of the rule of law: “Internationally, China is committed to the existing framework of international law.” The UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) is explicitly mentioned, something noteworthy considering that Beijing is often criticized for its disrespect of the very same legal tenets in the South China Sea dispute. The document lists four principles that will guide China’s participation in Arctic affairs: “respect, cooperation, win-win results and sustainability”; and it affirms that “when participating in Arctic affairs, China prioritizes scientific research, underscores the importance of environmental protection, rational utilization, law-based governance and international cooperation, and commits itself to maintaining a peaceful, secure and stable Arctic order.” In this regard, it is mentioned that “peace and stability in the Arctic provide a significant guarantee for all activities in the region, and serves the fundamental interest of all countries including China. China calls for the peaceful utilization of the Arctic and commits itself to maintaining peace and stability.”

Thus, Beijing’s discourse underlines its desire to promote cooperation and multilateralism, while respecting international law, so as to constructively pursue the common interest for the benefit of all parties and of humanity as a whole. At the same time, it does not hide its own specific interests in the Arctic, nor the initiatives it is undertaking to promote them. In particular, the White Paper proclaims that “The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative), an important cooperation initiative of China, will bring opportunities for parties concerned to jointly build a “Polar Silk Road,” and facilitate connectivity and sustainable economic and social development of the Arctic.” As a matter of fact, the document notes that “The utilization of sea routes and exploration and development of the resources in the Arctic may have a huge impact on the energy strategy and economic development of China,” all while stressing that Beijing intends to develop the shipping routes in cooperation with other countries, that they should be managed in accordance with the UNCLOS, that it “respects the sovereign rights of Arctic States over oil, gas and mineral resources in the areas subject to their jurisdiction,” that it wants to jointly develop clean energy resources and that it supports a common regulation of fishing activities. In specific regard to the Arctic Council, the White Paper states that “China, as an accredited observer to the Arctic Council, highly values the Council’s positive role in Arctic affairs, and recognizes it as the main intergovernmental forum on issues regarding the environment and sustainable development of the Arctic”; but also mentions cooperation with non-Arctic states and non-state actors.

China’s Activities in the Arctic

In parallel with this discourse that emphasizes cooperation and respect for the rule of law, China is actively pursuing its objectives in the Arctic. This does not mean that its actions do not bring actual benefits to other countries as well, but that the PRC undertakes them first and foremost to advance its own interests.

First of all, it is working with Russia to develop the NSR and Siberia’s energy and mineral resources, notably the Yamal gas field. The actual economic impact of these projects is actually smaller than it may appear from China’s rhetoric, but they serve the purpose of strengthening the Sino-Russian partnership in a context of a shared rivalry with the U.S. But Beijing’s investments and projects in other countries are somehow more relevant, since they are often interpreted as a geoeconomic tool to exert influence on Arctic countries. This is notably the case of Greenland and Iceland. In the 2012-2017 period, the former received $2 billion in Chinese investments, while the latter got $1.2 billion. In spite of the tiny size in absolute terms (for comparison, Russia received $194.4 billion and Canada $47.3 billion), these investments have a considerable weight when compared to the GDP of the two countries; standing at 11.6% and 5.7% respectively (against 2.8% and 2.4% for Russia and Canada). This has created concerns that Chinese investments could become a “debt trap” and give it political leverage over the two states. In addition, there are also more direct security concerns, even though these are less likely to become pronounced in the short-term. China and its state-sponsored actors have shown a particular interest in mines and transport infrastructures, most notably airports and harbors; and there are fears (especially in the U.S.) that these facilities may host a military presence in the future. In Iceland, a Chinese businessman made a bid to buy land in 2011, prompting fears that it would be used to build an airfield, and thus resulting in the eventual rejection of the proposal. But other deals have already been concluded involving energy, telecommunications and free trade.

The situation in Greenland is more complex. The country, while having autonomy over domestic issues, is still a Danish territory with no sovereignty over foreign policy, security, and the mining of strategic commodities. Again, Chinese foreign direct investment focused on mineral resources, but there was also an attempt to buy a former American naval base and some airports. Beijing’s presence is therefore viewed as a security threat. This is especially true in the case of Greenland, also because Denmark fears that the inflow of Chinese money could fuel the island’s quest for independence, which would greatly reduce Copenhagen’s role in the Arctic.

Apart from that, the PRC also promotes other multilateral fora, such as the Arctic Circle conference, which was created by Iceland as a sort of alternative to the Arctic Council and that includes also non-Arctic states as well as non-state actors. Beijing welcomed and supported it: its creation was announced on the same day when the China-Iceland free trade agreement was signed, the conference has discussed themes linked with China and the “Polar Silk Road,” and a subsidiary forum was held in Shanghai. China also participates in various research activities in the region.

China’s Arctic Strategy and Global Geopolitics

It is clear that the PRC wants to increase its presence in the Arctic, and that it will multiply its efforts as the region’s importance grows. Adopting a rhetoric that stresses mutual cooperation and benefit, Beijing is trying to present itself as a quasi-Arctic power and is using its economic means to expand its influence in the area. However, this has raised concerns of various powers, most notably the U.S. During the last meeting of the Arctic Council – a context where states usually avoid open conflict, instead favoring a constructive approach – Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly criticized China, raising doubts about its real intentions and citing possible security implications of its activities in the Arctic. But European countries (especially Denmark). are also concerned. Even Russia, in spite of its partnership with China, fears of becoming subordinate to the PRC and losing its influence over the Arctic.

Similarly to the situation of the Indian Ocean, the actual danger of a Chinese military presence in the Arctic is limited at the moment, but the situation may well change in the long term. What is certain is that the PRC is deploying a set of economic and diplomatic measures to advance its interests in the Arctic, and in doing so is turning up the temperature and setting the stage for a host of geopolitical jockeying and conflict to come.

*This article was originally published on June 26, 2019