Alibaba, WeChat and other Chinese tech companies show that Beijing has been pursuing a decoupling of its own, or at least a strategy of asymmetrical market access, for decades now.
In 2003,
just as I was arriving in China as a correspondent for The New York Times,
tectonic changes were coming to the worlds of internet commerce, search and
social media. But their rumblings were so deep beneath the surface that few
could have predicted their long-term consequences.
That
year, Alibaba, a four-year-old web company that had started out of an apartment
in Hangzhou, fended off an ambitious push by eBay into China’s e-commerce
market by eliminating merchant fees for Taobao, Alibaba’s own e-commerce
platform, even as it was losing money. The move helped put Alibaba on the road
to becoming the world’s biggest seller of goods online and its founder, Jack
Ma, one of the world’s richest men. It was part of a series of measures, both
public and private, that were meant to create “national champions” for the
internet in China, meaning companies that would compete vigorously for business
globally, while getting help from Beijing in keeping foreign companies out of
their home market.
Fast
forward to 2011, by which time I was living in New York, and more big news
about the internet in China suddenly arrived, this time like a thunderclap.
Numerous friends in China as well as Chinese nationals living abroad wrote to
urge me to sign on to something called WeChat, which had overnight become the
must-have cellphone app for staying in touch, and very soon thereafter, an
almost unimaginable array of other services.
There
has been much talk in recent months about a decoupling of the world’s two
largest economies, driven by the United States under President Donald Trump.
But the stories of Alibaba, WeChat and other Chinese tech companies show that
Beijing has been pursuing a decoupling of its own, or at least a strategy of
asymmetrical market access, for decades now.
Consider China’s “Great Firewall.” Earlier this year, the
Spectator Index published a partial list of companies blocked on the Chinese internet. It included Google search and Gmail, Yahoo, Facebook, YouTube, Wikipedia, Twitter, Netflix, Instagram, WhatsApp and Dropbox, as well as the websites of the BBC, The New York Times, Nikkei, LeMonde, Der Spiegel and The Economist, among others.
While
Alibaba and Tencent, the parent company of WeChat, have been extraordinary
success stories, not all of China’s would-be national champions have enjoyed
comparable triumphs. For example, Baidu, the search engine that has dominated
the Chinese internet since Google abandoned China largely over censorship
issues in 2010, has garnered little success competing in international markets.
Indeed, many in China loathe it, particularly young people, who often turn to
virtual private networks, or VPNs, and other technical hoops to evade domestic
internet controls so they can use Google and some of the other popular Western
tech giants that are blocked.
What
Baidu’s example means is that there is potentially a steep price to be paid for
accepting the bargain offered by Beijing to Chinese companies operating in what
it considers a strategic sector. Life inside of a walled garden may be cushy at
first, but it is ultimately quite limiting, even if you get to cater to the
world’s largest population.
Herein
lies a lesson about how the United States and other advanced economies should
deal with China. One approach, already seen in the sanctions-happy policies of
the Trump administration, is largely punitive and leaves little scope for what
I’ll call “virtuous reciprocity.” A better approach would actively push for
opportunities of positive-sum engagement about the shape of the internet, and
beyond even that, the future of the world economy more generally.
Of
course, it would have been better had Washington and other governments tried
this approach back at the start of this century, when they had much more
leverage in their discussions with Beijing. But appeals to principles that
offer prospects for true win-win outcomes never lose all of their potency. Nor
does the stifling prospect of ever-more confinement to the walled garden that
is China’s internet.
How
would this kind of engagement work? Today, Washington sanctions Huawei, China’s
telecom giant, because it considers the hardware it builds—which is vital to
the fifth-generation cellular networks, known as 5G, that will soon to be
arriving in markets everywhere—to be a national security risk. The U.S. is
contemplating similar measures against TikTok, a Chinese social media app whose
business has recently exploded in the West. Rather than punitively closing off
markets, an approach based on virtuous reciprocity would instead reserve that
as a final step if common standards for all couldn’t be reached. For example,
Washington and Beijing could agree to security reviews for 5G hardware like
Huawei’s in exchange for open markets where companies from whatever quarter
would be allowed to market their equipment without restriction. If that meant
that China’s national champion wins this round, so be it, despite all the talk
about how high the stakes are for dominance of 5G around the world. Sound
common principles for market access that are enforceable would be worth it.
For
social media and the internet more broadly, the ship left port a long time ago,
so retroactive corrections are required in order to arrive at a reciprocity
that is meaningfully virtuous. Since the major players of the internet outside
China, like Google and Facebook, are not allowed to operate in the country,
Chinese companies like WeChat and TikTok should not be allowed to operate in
the U.S. or other Western markets, until this asymmetry is seriously addressed.
One of
the obstacles to this virtuous reciprocity is that Beijing, of course, shies
from openly articulating one of the key aspects of its internet protectionism,
which is not commercial at all but rather based on a desire to sustain a regime
of strict censorship. As recent news stories have troublingly demonstrated,
this censorship extends to Chinese social media apps like WeChat and TikTok,
which have been found censoring discussions outside of China, for example about
developments in Hong Kong, or the forced internment of more than a million
Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.
For the
Chinese state, censorship is a matter of national security. It is high time,
though, that the West treat it this way as well. China corralling and
indoctrinating its population online, insulating it almost entirely from varied
sources of outside information, amounts to a strategy of weaponizing
nationalism that threatens other countries.
In light
of all this, it seems clear that China may never be compelled to fully open its
internet to information and tech companies from other countries. But that
doesn’t mean that the U.S., Japan, South Korea and Europe shouldn’t insist upon
it, while holding out the prospect of positive outcomes with incentives for
Beijing. With its extraordinary functionality, WeChat, in particular, seems
like it could rival any mobile app in a world where the internet wasn’t so
Balkanized.
In the
meantime, though, there’s only the walled garden, where more Chinese citizens
will become aware that their use of the internet—at the center of so much of
life today—is crippled not by others, but by their own government.
***Howard
W. French is a career foreign correspondent and global affairs writer, and the
author of four books, including most recently “Everything Under the Heavens:
How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power.” You can follow him on
Twitter @hofrench. His WPR column appears every other Wednesday.