IMPACT

Damascus and Moscow have officially run out of patience with their erstwhile partner in Ankara.

Cooperation had hinged on a 2018 deal that established a buffer zone around Idlib. The agreement included a pledge from Turkey to clear out extremists from Idlib in exchange for a delay in the inevitable full-scale invasion and reunification of the country. The deal also granted Turkey permission to establish a string of military observation posts across Idlib.

It soon became apparent to the Russian authorities that Turkey was in no rush to vacate the region. In April 2019, the government launched a foray into the demilitarized ‘safe zone,’ backed by Russian air power, and in August frictions came to the fore when a Turkish military convoy was destroyed in an airstrike. (The convoy may have been resupplying the very rebels that Damascus was fighting against).

The end of last month brought a renewed push, and now two weeks into February government forces are closing in on Idlib city. Critically, government forces are also closing in on the main north-south highway between Aleppo and Homs – a key logistical conduit between north and south that has remained partially in rebel hands for over five years.

So far, the offensive has plowed through Turkish defensive positions, and with no small amount of casualties. In one incident, eight Turkish troops were killed along with a civilian contractor, prompting a Turkish counter-attack that reportedly killed dozens of Syrian troops. Elsewhere, other Turkish observation posts have been encircled by troops and militias loyal to the Assad regime.

The Erdogan administration has been quick to respond, sending some 5,000 new troops to Idlib province and amassing another 30,000 at the Syrian border along with heavy armor.

FORECAST

The situation is fluid and escalation remains a distinct possibility, particularly with regard to clashes between Turkish and pro-government forces and/or their proxies. President Erdogan has already warned that he would “hit regime forces in Idlib and anywhere else” should any more Turkish soldiers come to harm.

Though Ankara has threatened to push the advance back to the 2018 ceasefire line (essentially the provincial border of Idlib), it’s far more likely that Erdogan will be limited to trying to maximize the size of a Turkish-controlled safe zone within Idlib. It follows that the soldiers currently being deployed to Syria are more to forestall total government control of the areas northwest of Idlib city, rather than roll back the territorial losses already suffered by Ankara’s allies over the past few weeks.

Stemming the flow of refugees into Turkey is of paramount concern. Turkey currently hosts some 3,650,000 Syrian refugees – and those are just the ones who are officially registered. Some 2.4% of the refugees are housed in camps, leaving the vast majority to find shelter and sustenance in Turkey’s cities, the largest of which is Istanbul (548,000 refugees live there), followed by Gaziantep (443,000) and Sanliurfa (431,000) near the Syrian border. The immense number of arrivals has strained relations with locals, especially after the 2018 economic downturn began to bite, and some have even pinned the ruling AKP party’s poor showing in last year’s local elections on the refugee issue and Erdogan’s eager involvement in the Syrian civil war.

Framed in this context, it becomes clear why Ankara wants to maintain a sizable safe zone in Idlib: to avoid a new refugee influx into Turkey. The stakes are high, as some 700,000 people are already on the move in Idlib and there are fears that the government offensive could push another three million civilians into Turkey.

Russia, intent on cashing out its geopolitical gains and ending its active (and costly) support for the Assad regime, will be doing everything to smooth over tensions between the two antagonists and bring the civil war to a close. But Moscow’s official line has been conspicuous in its support for Assad by blaming Turkey for not fulfilling its obligations to neutralize Idlib-based extremist groups under the 2018 ceasefire agreement. It should also be noted that Syria isn’t the only theatre where Ankara and Moscow find themselves on opposing sides of a proxy war. Libya is also seeing renewed interest from the Turkish government of late; one prominent example is Ankara’s recent dispatch of 2,000 well-paid Syrian militiamen in support of the Tripoli-based government of Fayez Sarraj. Russia of course is a long-term backer of Khalifa Haftar, whose Libya National Army has been laying siege to Tripoli since last year.

Some 600 US troops remain deployed in the area, mostly around Kurdish-operated oil fields. A situation earlier this week where fire was exchanged between Syrian government forces and US troops serves as a grim reminder of how easy it would be for the US military to unintentionally get involved in the conflict. The incident involved a US patrol being fired on by Syrian troops, and then returning fire, after encountering a checkpoint that had recently changed hands.

***This article was originally published on February 14, 2020