No amount of polling-day bribery will be able to hide the fact that Putin has failed to insulate Russia from the political and economic catastrophes on the near horizon.
If all
goes as planned next week, Vladimir Putin will be on a glide path to serve as
Russia’s perpetual president. On July 1, Russia will hold a national referendum
on a proposed package of changes to its constitution that many predict will
essentially pave the way for Putin to run for office again after his current
six-year presidential term expires in 2024.
In
theory, the proposed changes—which will, among other things, “reset the clock”
on the current constitutional limit of two consecutive presidential terms—mean
Putin could win two more elections and remain in power until 2036. If he does,
he would be 84 years old by the time he stepped down and would have outstripped
the tenure of the Kremlin’s last iron-fisted leader for life, Joseph Stalin, by
about seven years.
In
practice, however, there’s no guarantee Putin will be able to last that long
politically in the event the vote next week goes his way and he is eventually
reelected.
If
recent dire predictions about the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the
future of Russia’s economy and scientific forecasts about rapidly accelerating
permafrost melt in the Arctic region are even remotely accurate, Putin and the
Russian elites who currently back him might end up having second thoughts about
the wisdom of the constitutional amendments. Given how much of Russia’s economy
and territory is likely to be literally under water in the coming years due to
the COVID-19 crisis and the accelerating climate emergency in the country, it
is reasonable to ask whether Putin will still be around or even want the job by
then.
It would
be hard to overstate just how drastically the pandemic has altered Russia’s
economic and social landscapes—and, with them, Putin’s political fortunes. When
Russia’s highest court ruled in March that a national referendum on some 200
changes to the country’s constitution could go forward, it was widely assumed
that results of the polls would be rigged in Putin’s favor. But widespread
skepticism among Russian medical professionals and experts about the accuracy
of government statistics on COVID-19 death rates, combined with the April
arrest of a doctor who has been critical of the Kremlin’s response to the
pandemic, appear to have shaken public confidence. Polls now indicate a
substantial drop in Putin’s approval rating in the wake of his government’s
disastrous handling of the pandemic.
In an
indication of rising anxiety inside the Kremlin, Putin and his elite backers
have taken a no-holds-barred approach to shoring up the vote on the referendum
next week. Russian voters have reportedly been enticed with prizes and
browbeaten by their bosses to vote in favor of the changes, which include a ban
on same-sex marriage and an expansion of parliamentary powers.
Rigged
or not, however, an affirmative vote in favor of the proposed constitutional
changes will do little to forestall the hard choices Putin will be forced to
make during his remaining four years in office—and any subsequent terms. As
I’ve previously noted, and other analysts have suggested, mounting political
problems in Syria and recent battlefield reversals in Libya likely mean that
Russia’s costly military adventures abroad may be even less viable financially
and politically in the wake of the pandemic. The postponement earlier in June
of scheduled talks between Turkey and Russia suggests Putin might be looking to
buy time in order to bolster Moscow’s negotiating position. All these signals
point toward a Russian military drawdown in the near term, a move that would
substantially constrain Moscow’s ability to achieve its long-coveted goal of
supplanting American influence in the oil- and gas-rich Middle East.
As
things stand, the International Monetary Fund is projecting a 5.5 percent
contraction for the Russian economy, and a 6.6 percent decrease in real GDP
adjusted for inflation, in the wake of the pandemic. The global recession has
also put downward pressure on demand and prices for Russia’s top strategic
exports—oil, gas and steel. Meanwhile, independent experts have called out
Putin’s government for failing to provide enough financial assistance to
ordinary Russians, and are pushing for Moscow to increase cash payments and
quadruple the amount of economic support to $136 billion.
Constitutional
changes will do even less to mitigate the looming longer-term structural risks
posed by the impact of climate change on Russia’s already fragile national
infrastructure and on public health more broadly. By 2030, the year when many
expect Putin to make one last run for a final six-year term, a sizable portion
of Russia’s giant land mass could be engulfed in floods and engorged by
mudslides.
Late
last year, Russia’s deputy minister for Arctic development estimated that the
damage and destruction caused by accelerated permafrost thaw could cost upward
of $2.3 billion in economic losses annually. That figure now seems low in light
of the roughly $4 billion price tag for the cleanup of a massive 21,000-ton oil
spill that occurred in late May, after a fuel tank owned by Russian mining
company Norilsk Nickel sank into the Ambarnaya River due to permafrost melt.
Permafrost
covers a little more than half of Russia’s territory, and much of the country’s
vital oil, gas and mining infrastructure spans the semi-frozen region
stretching across Siberia up to the Arctic Circle—all of which is imperiled by
climate change. Big companies like Norilsk Nickel have raced to revamp and
rebuild existing infrastructure to improve its stability and mitigate risks.
But they and Putin’s government may be in an unwinnable race against time. Over
the past few years, climate and earth scientists have become increasingly
concerned about the number of giant sinkholes opening up across the Siberian
Tundra due to methane gas released by the permafrost thaw.
Russia
is ranked fourth among global producers of greenhouse gases, and there is
little in the politics of Putin’s permanent presidency to suggest that the
Russian government will be better-equipped to deal with these challenges after
the referendum next week. The reality is that no amount of polling-day bribery
or Victory Day parade pomp will be able to hide the fact that Putin’s naked
power grab has failed to insulate Russia from the epic political and economic
catastrophes on the near horizon.
***Candace
Rondeaux is a senior fellow and professor of practice at the Center on the
Future of War, a joint initiative of New America and Arizona State University.
Her WPR column appears every Friday.