EU leaders are reconsidering their approach to Russia. Warmer-than-average temperatures may have spared Europe from the worst effects of the energy crisis, but that is about to change: with temperatures predicted to plummet in the coming weeks, heightened demand for dwindling (and very expensive) supplies of natural gas will seriously test Europe’s fragile energy networks — potentially to breaking point.
In
Germany, the Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance recently issued
a near-apocalyptic advisory telling people what to expect in the event of a
blackout: “The telephone is dead, the heating doesn’t come on, there is no warm
water, the computer goes on strike, the coffee machine stays off, there is no
light.” The agency urged households to stock up on battery-powered flashlights
and candles, and even suggested camp stoves to prepare small meals. Elsewhere
in Europe, governments are preparing food distribution networks that can
function through a blackout.
A
colder-than-normal winter is expected in the UK as well. Ofgem has said there
is “a significant risk” of gas shortages, which could affect electricity
supplies. And with more than 3 million low-income UK households unable to
afford to heat their homes, the cold weather, combined with potential energy
shortages and higher prices, could have lethal consequences, and not just in
Britain. According to one disturbing study published in The Economist, based on
the historical relationship between mortality, weather and energy costs, the
death toll from the energy crisis across Europe could exceed the number of
soldiers who have died in the Ukraine war so far. Depending on temperatures,
prices and government support measures, between 30,000 and 300,000 deaths above
the historical average may be recorded across the continent this winter.
Sanctions kill — we’ve known that for a long time (just ask the Iraqis); these,
however, are probably the first sanctions in history that could kill the
sanctioners.
Meanwhile,
EU countries have reduced their gas demand by a quarter, according to
the Financial Times as industry cuts back or stops production altogether
following the rising costs. In the coming months, this will mean higher
prices and possible shortages in energy-intensive industries such as metals,
chemicals (including fertiliser), plastic and food. Moreover, analysts warn
that without increased supplies, gas shortages could persist for years in Europe,
regardless of the lower demand. This would effectively mean the long-term
deindustrialisation of the continent — with the chaos, political instability
and unrest that would go along with that.
It’s no
surprise, then, that European leaders are looking for a way out of the hole
they dug themselves by joining the US in its proxy war against their main gas
provider — even as the EU itself continues to sabotage any possible diplomatic
solution to the conflict. Only last week, French president Emmanuel Macron
marked his profound difference with the US (and EU) stance on Ukraine
during an interview for the French channel TF1, in which he said that Nato
member states may have to offer “security guarantees” to Russia when Moscow and
Kyiv resume negotiations. “This means that one of the essential points we must
address — as Putin has always said — is the fear that Nato comes right up to
its doors and the deployment of weapons that could threaten Russia,” Macron
said. “That topic will be part of the topics for peace, so we need to prepare
what we are ready to do, how we protect our allies and member states, and how
to give guarantees to Russia the day it returns to the negotiating table.”
Macron
has always had a more “realist” approach to the issue than his colleagues, yet
this was the first time a European leader suggested that Russia’s decision to
invade Ukraine may have been motivated by legitimate security concerns. Before
the invasion, Putin said at a joint press conference with Macron in Moscow that
Russia would aim to obtain replies from the West to its main three security
demands. These included stopping any future Nato enlargement, presenting missile
deployments near its borders, and a scaling back of Nato’s military
infrastructure in Europe to 1997 levels.
Back
then, the US and its Western allies called the Russian demands “non-starters”;
however, after ten months of war that have ravaged Ukraine, an increasing
number of people in the West are considering the possibility that, as Charles
Kupchan recently wrote in the New York Times, “sooner rather than later, the
West needs to move Ukraine and Russia from the battlefield to the negotiating table”,
and that a hypothetical deal between Russia and Ukraine would necessarily have
to include a commitment by Ukraine to “back away from its intention to join
Nato”. Kupchan even goes on to admit that “Russia has legitimate security
concerns about Nato setting up shop on the other side of its 1,000-mile-plus
border with Ukraine”.
Chancellor
Olaf Scholz also marked his distance from the US’s hardline stance by talking
to Putin for the second time in successive months, and suggesting that Europe
should return to the pre-war “peace order” with Russia and resolve “all common
security issues” if Putin would be willing to renounce aggression against his
neighbours. Yet for all the talk of the war in Ukraine making “the EU and the
transatlantic alliance stronger than ever before”, as Scholz recently claimed,
the reality is that transatlantic relations have been growing increasingly
strained for months. Several European officials have accused the Americans of
profiting from the war — and from Europe’s hardship. In their attempt to reduce
their reliance on Russian energy, EU countries have turned to gas from the US
instead — but the price Europeans pay is almost four times higher than the same
fuel costs in America. Macron said high US gas prices were not “friendly”,
while Germany’s economy minister has called on Washington to show more “solidarity”
and help reduce energy costs. So far, the US has ignored Europe’s concerns.
On top
of that, sales of American military equipment in Europe are booming: since
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, countries in the EU have pledged to beef up their
arsenals, and the US — which provides most of the weaponry — has been the
biggest beneficiary. “The fact is, if you look at it soberly, the country that
is most profiting from this war is the US because they are selling more gas and
at higher prices, and because they are selling more weapons,” one senior
official told Politico.
The war,
however, isn’t the only crack in EU-US relations. Anger has also been mounting
in Europe over America’s Inflation Reduction Act, a $369-billion package of
subsidies and tax breaks enacted by the Biden Administration to boost American
manufacturing (under the guise of the “green shift”). From a European
perspective, the bill constitutes a protectionist measure that encourages
companies to shift investments from Europe and incentivises customers to “Buy
American”, dealing a serious blow to
Europe’s already struggling industry.
The EU’s
chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, has called on Washington to respond to European
concerns. “Americans — our friends — take decisions which have an economic
impact on us,” he said. “Is Washington still our ally or not?”, asked one
clearly traumatised EU diplomat, while Macron referred to the Inflation
Reduction Act as “super aggressive” towards European companies. These choices
“will fragment the West because they create such differences between the US and
Europe, that those who work in these companies/industries will simply decide
not to keep investing on the other side of the Atlantic”, he said.
While
such complaints may seem reasonable, one might ask why the continent’s
politicians are only now waking up to the reality that the war in Ukraine is,
as Nicholas Vinocur, Editor-at-large of Politico Europe, has observed, “just
one facet of the US’s larger strategic duel with China, which will always take
precedence over EU interests”. From a US perspective, this doesn’t mean simply
decoupling from China, but rethinking the entire paradigm of globalisation by
rebuilding the country’s manufacturing capacity and making the US
self-sufficient in a whole series of strategic industries. This is really what
the Inflation Reduction Act is all about.
In this
context, Europe isn’t seen as a strategic ally but as a competitor and a rival,
which the US has every interest in keeping in a subordinate position. It does
not seem unreasonable to posit that one of the aims of America’s strategy may
be to strengthen its own hegemony over the continent and end Europe’s
aspirations to “strategic autonomy”.
“America
has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests,” Henry Kissinger said.
Today, these words seem strikingly prescient. America’s interests no longer
seem aligned with Europe’s (if they ever were). The sooner Europeans realise
that, the sooner they can get to work on something they’ve been neglecting for
a very long time: thinking about where their own interests lie.
https://unherd.com/2022/12/is-america-still-europes-ally/
****Thomas
Fazi is a writer, journalist and translator. His latest book Reclaiming the
State is published by Pluto Press.