Recently, relations between Beijing and Canberra have been less combative, but the Australian government of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese remains wary of China’s ambitions.
China responded harshly to Australia’s calls for investigations into Covid’s origins. A strong trade relationship exists despite Beijing’s diplomatic and economic sanctions. Beyond strong ties with Washington and London, Australia seeks regional partners.
Australia
changed governments in May, moving from the center-right leadership of Scott
Morrison to the center-left one of Anthony Albanese. Like many governments, the
Albanese administration faced multiple challenges, from the ongoing fallout
over Covid-19 to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and inflation.
But
Australia, with only 26 million people, has another problem all of its own: A
strained political and economic relationship with the giant in the Asia-Pacific
neighborhood-----: China.
Prime
Minister Albanese may have initially thought he could take a more open and
conciliatory approach, but China’s aggressive foreign policy has made it
unpopular with Australians. Beijing’s use of diplomatic and economic coercion
to punish Australia for leading the call for an investigation of the Covid-19
origins turned more Australians against China. While mutual economic sanctions
and low public opinion persist, the relationship has been relatively quiet in
the seven months since the Albanese government took office. Some of this was
due to Beijing’s own interest in keeping
its foreign affairs quiet in the lead-up to an important congress of the
Chinese Communist Party in October. With that event over, tensions could
resume.
The
prime minister and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for 30 minutes on November
15, 2022, at the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia. Both leaders described the
talks as cordial and frank while calling for improved relations. The Albanese
government is trying to strike a balance between supporting the United States
and Western countries in their stricter approach to China while also trying to
show it has agency in partnering with middle powers.
Recent
tensions
Relations
between Australia and China have deteriorated in recent years. China is a
significant trading partner for Australia. And much like the shift in sentiment
against China seen in the U.S. during the Trump administration, Australia’s
foreign policy toward China became more critical as well. In a 2017 Foreign
Policy White Paper, the Australian government began to define its view of China
as an economic powerhouse. The report highlights the increasing competition
between the U.S. and China and the need for Australia to balance this friction
with the economic interconnectedness of the Indo-Pacific region and China’s
military modernization.
When the
Morrison government came to power in 2018, it shared a lot of the same
sentiment as the Trump administration that China is an increasing threat to the
international system, making cooperation less likely. Australia-China relations
took a nasty turn in 2020 when the Morrison government called for an
international investigation into the origins of Covid-19. Beijing’s response
was to restrict Chinese travel to Australia and impose restrictions on
importing Australian barley, meat, wine and various other agriculture and
goods.
In late
2020, Beijing sent a list of 14 grievances to Canberra. Among them: siding with
the U.S. on various issues, unfriendly reporting about China in Australia’s
national media and interference in Hong Kong and Taiwan issues.
Unsurprisingly,
Australia-China relations continued to worsen from there. Polls show
Australians have some of the most critical sentiments toward China in
Asia-Pacific, and only Japan viewed the relationship with China more
unfavorably. According to the Lowy Institute, an Australia-based think tank, by
2021, more Australians held the view that China was more of a security threat
than an economic partner. In a separate poll, 75 percent of those now see China
as a military threat, compared to just 39 percent in 2016.
Recent
reports suggest that economic sanctions by Beijing on Australia have not
worked, given China’s high demand for some Australian products. Beijing has
been forced to live with an Australia that is increasingly critical but also a
valued trade partner.
Albanese
government
Before
taking office, there were concerns that an Albanese government would
dramatically change the course of Australia-China relations. Some saw his
government as potentially less critical of China. But the administration has
more or less adopted a similar tone on China as the Morrison government.
Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong has already made several comments about
how Australia is willing to work with China, but that much of the deterioration
in Australian-China relations is also the fault of Beijing.
The
Albanese government is continuing many of the same bilateral and multilateral
efforts carried over from the Morrison government. These include: working with
the U.S., Japan and India as a part of the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue, or
Quad for short; working with India and Japan on supply chain resiliency;
continuing a new security pact with the U.S. and the United Kingdom on nuclear
submarine development; launching a new security agreement with Japan; and
engaging deeply with Pacific islands such as Fiji, Samoa and Tonga. More than
ever, the Albanese government is working to build relationships and
partnerships with Pacific Island nations, Japan, India and other middle powers
in the Indo-Pacific.
Relationship
with the U.S.
Australia
and the U.S. share a long defense history, and both are members of the
intelligence-sharing alliance called The Five Eyes, a collective defense
arrangement. However, public sentiment in Australia toward the U.S. also turned
sour during the Trump administration. While the negative view of China is at an
all-time high in Australia, positive sentiment toward the U.S. is some of the
lowest in the Asia-Pacific region.
Australians
see countries like Japan, the U.K. and France as more responsible world actors.
It seems, however, that Australia-U.S. relations are improving under U.S.
President Joe Biden. The Albanese government takes a similar tone as the Biden
administration on its foreign and China policies – looking to find new global
partnerships and willing to work with China on issues like climate change but
also ready to be more critical of China’s growing economic and military
influence.
Scenarios
Negative
sentiment toward China remains high in Australia
Whether
the public view of China will improve is up to Beijing. But it is unlikely that
Beijing will take softer foreign and diplomatic policies during President Xi
Jinping’s unprecedented third term.
The
Albanese government is investing in agency
Besides
its rocky relationship with Beijing, the Albanese government is trying to show
it has more to offer the region. Many countries do not want to be caught
between the U.S. and China and are striking their own deals on such issues as
supply chains and digitalization. Australia will continue to look for
middle-power partnerships and seek new opportunities in all areas with
countries like Japan, India, the U.K., Canada, France and Germany.
The
Albanese government has more in common with the Biden administration
While
Australian sentiment toward the U.S. took a turn for the worse during the Trump
administration, it is still an important alliance. Now that there are similar
political leaders in Canberra and Washington, it may be easier for
Australia-U.S. cooperation. There is also a shared sentiment in Canberra and
Washington toward China – wariness over Beijing’s military and economic
activity while also looking out for areas of cooperation, such as climate
change.
Seeking
results from the Quad
The Quad is one of the most important security
partnerships for the U.S., Australia, Japan and India. It has expanded well beyond
its origins as a vehicle for military and humanitarian relief efforts. Now Quad
members will look at ways to produce more concrete outcomes on issues such as
climate change, supply chains, digital, maritime and more.
***Riley
Walters is the deputy director of the Japan Chair at Hudson Institute. He works
alongside Japan Chair H.R. McMaster and Japan Chair fellows Taro Hayashi and
Masashi Murano. He is also a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan
Institute.
Previously,
he was a senior policy analyst and economist at the Heritage Foundation, where
he specialized in northeast Asian macroeconomic issues as well as foreign
investment, emerging technologies and cybersecurity.
Mr.
Walters previously lived in Japan: one year in Kumamoto prefecture and one year
in Tokyo while attending Sophia University. He holds his bachelor’s and
master’s degrees in economics from George Mason University in Virginia. He also
holds a minor degree in Japanese studies. Before joining the Heritage
Foundation, he worked at the Competitive Enterprise Institute as a research
associate.
Mr.
Walters is a former Penn Kemble fellow with the National Endowment for
Democracy and George C. Marshall fellow with the Heritage Foundation.
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/australia-china-relations/