As states continue to implement digital ID systems, it is essential that they build tools in ways that inherently protect civil liberties rather than asking citizens to just trust government officials.
In many
states, Americans can now ditch their physical wallet and verify their identity
simply by tapping their device on a scanner. And just as digital wallets from
Apple and Google have made commerce more convenient, digital ID systems could
potentially make government interactions faster and more efficient. But they
also raise the ominous specter of government surveillance. Can we have the
efficiency of a digital ID without letting government track our every move?
Yes, but
that's not the path we're on.
Take
Colorado. Since 2019, Coloradans have been able to use a digital ID as a legal
form of personal identification throughout the state. Users download an
application to their smartphone, enroll in the service, and have their identity
authenticated by taking photos or videos of a valid ID card or other government
issued documents to prove that they are who they claim to be. Then that
information is encrypted, and the user is granted a digital ID and an
associated key or code that serves as an identifier.
Colorodans
can simply show their digital ID to verify their identity in much the same way
as you would show your driver's license to a bartender to prove you are over
21. That means of verifying identity is relatively private. However, many
services, both public and private, are increasingly turning to electronic
verification, which requires pinging a government server. This ping creates a
data record outlining who, what, when, and where. Over time, these records
create a government-controlled ledger of information about its citizens.
Built
and maintained by third-party vendors, Colorado Digital ID collects troves of
information from users. As outlined in the privacy policy for myColorado, the
app collects data "including, but not limited to your IP address, device
ID and browser type," and information on the "general geographic
area" of the user. The privacy policy further details that the government
shares information with third-party service providers and, much more
concerningly, with law enforcement and other government agencies upon request.
The
fundamental flaw in digital ID systems like Colorado's is that they are
centralized. In order to work, citizens must trust the government to protect
their data from malevolent actors and from the state itself, despite the fact
that government agencies have not been good stewards of citizen data.
When
implementing digital ID systems, many states claim they will respect the
privacy and civil liberties of their citizens, essentially promising that they
will not use their newfound power for evil. But far better than Google's
longtime motto "Don't be evil," is the idea of "Can't be evil."
It's easier to trust state actors to respect our privacy when they lack the
ability to violate our privacy.
And yet,
digital IDs do show promise. These systems could streamline and modernize
archaic procedures by introducing secure, easily verifiable credentials that
work seamlessly across our physical and digital lives. Digital IDs can help
make governments more accessible and efficient, reducing costs and increasing
civic participation by automating many processes that would otherwise require
physical interactions. For example, digital ID systems can allow citizens to
securely apply for permits online, eliminating the time and hassle of doing so
in person.
How do
we get the good and not the bad? For inspiration, we should look to the
cypherpunks of the late 1980s and early 1990s who had a clear vision centered
around robust privacy secured by encryption. "We cannot expect
governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant us
privacy out of their beneficence," wrote Eric Hughes in A Cypherpunk
Manifesto. "The technologies of the past did not allow for strong privacy,
but electronic technologies do."
Decentralized
networks now make it such that there need not be a trusted intermediary in a
digital system, so digital IDs could theoretically cut the government out
entirely. Similarly, advanced cryptographic methods such as zero-knowledge
proofs allow information to be verified without the verifier needing access to
the information. Combining these two characteristics, we can create systems
that grant us all the benefits of digital IDs and are resistant to
surveillance. In fact, several projects already have protocols and products
that operate based on these principles.
Hughes
is right that governments, by their very nature, resist privacy and are more
than willing to exploit new technologies to surveil citizens. Thus, as more
states and localities choose to implement digital ID systems, it is up to the
citizens to demand that those systems be built in ways that protect their civil
liberties. The technology exists. All that is left is for it to be implemented.
***Luke
Hogg is the director of outreach at the Foundation for American Innovation
where his work focuses on the intersection of emerging technologies and public
policy.
https://reason.com/2023/07/25/government-wants-to-control-your-digital-identity/