The Al-Durra gas field, or Arash field as Tehran prefers to call it, is located in the Arabian Gulf and has been a source of ongoing geopolitical tensions between Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Kuwait. Despite that the dispute over the field dates back to the 1960s, these tensions have been intensifying over the past few months due to various political and economic factors. The field is believed to hold proven reserves of up to 20 trillion cubic feet of gas and up to 300 million barrels of oil, placing it among the world’s top energy fields.
In
October 2023, Kuwait’s Minister of Petroleum Saad Al Barrak stated that the
Al-Durra field is considered one of the most important targets of the Kuwaiti
government work program, and earlier in July 2023, Minister Al Barrak stated
that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have the “exclusive rights” to the field. In this
respect, In 2022, a Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian agreement was already signed in order
to develop Al-Durra field, allowing for the production of 1 billion cubic feet
of gas equally between both nations.
Iran on
the other hand has criticized the agreement, decrying it as illegal. Iran
advances the claim that 40% of the field falls within its maritime border,
despite its failure to demarcate its maritime borders in this region.
Regardless of Iran’s claims and criticism against KSA and Kuwait, the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) ministerial meeting stated last Sunday that Al-Durra
gas field in its entirety is jointly and “only” owned by KSA and Kuwait, as
reported by the Saudi state news agency. This has prompted Iran’s Foreign
Ministry Spokesman to reject the statement issued by the GCC ministerial
meeting, depicting it as “unconstructive.”
Iran has
long sought to expand its influence in the Middle East, with destabilizing
consequences over the past three decades. The Al-Durra field presents an
obvious opportunity for Iran in the prospect of gaining control over a valuable
energy resource. In securing access to just 40% of such a major gas field, Iran
could enhance its energy security and boost its economic capabilities, thereby
increasing its political and strategic influence in the region. Since Iran also
views GCC states as the enemy-of-its-enemy in Washington, rising tensions over
the Al-Durra field presents Iran with another opportunity to directly challenge
the GCC as well, and by extension US interests in the region. In the same vein,
the situation invites external powers such as Russia, to support Iran in its
endeavours towards its claims ithe Al-Durra field.
The
developing tensions in the Arabian gulf will produce three critical tests.
Firstly, it will test the extent of the success of the relations normalization
agreement between KSA and Iran, which took place in March 2023 under Chinese
mediation. Secondly, it will test the extent of Chinese influence in the Middle
East and how China may seek to establish an equilibrium in Iran’s tensions with
other regional players. This is of particular interest given that China is
already the main trade partner for Iran and seeking to increase its economic
footprint in the GCC and the broader Middle East. However, China’s influence in
the Middle East is already being limited in the context of the war in Gaza,
civil war in Sudan, and the threat posed to international maritime safety by
Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. Thirdly, it will test the extent of the
contemporary US strategic commitment to the Middle East.
For
decades, the US has proved to be the strategic defense, security, and economic
partner to most of the countries in the Middle East, especially the GCC
nations. Furthermore, as the Houthis threat to shipping routes in the Red Sea
emerged, the US was the first nation to take a proactive response by launching
the US-led operation “Prosperity Guardian,” aimed at countering Houthi attacks
on commercial vessels and degrading their attack capabilities. On the other
hand, China has not offered to take any role or extend support to the
operation, which is primarily aimed at protecting commercial vessels regardless
of their origin.
Thus,
rising tensions between Iran and KSA-Kuwait around Al-Durra provides the United
States with an opportunity to further cement its strategic engagement in the
Middle East. This can take place on multiple fronts including but not limited
to further enhancing its defense and security cooperation and domestic
capability building with regional Arab partners, which will collectively
increase deterrence against any possible aggression from Iran as a result of
the rising tensions over the Al-Durra field.
The
Al-Durra field is a significant point of contention in the Gulf region, with
Iran, KSA, and Kuwait competing for control. The competition for access and
exploitation of the gas reserve is influenced by a complex interplay of
economic, political, and strategic interests, which could potentially escalate
existing rivalries and contribute to further instability in the region. It is
crucial for all parties involved to participate in diplomatic dialogue and
cooperate to address developing tensions and prevent any escalation that risks
negative consequences for the entire region.
****The
views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not
necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
***More:
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/unresolved-dispute-between-kuwait-iran-durra-arash-gas-field/2966133
https://gulfif.org/the-al-durra-field-dispute-and-the-path-forward-for-iran-gcc-relations/
